The Somali Dir Clan's History: Codka Beesha Direed: SOMALI PEACE MAKING PROCESS PAPER

| Accord | ISSUE 21

On 18 May 1991, a few months after the collapse of

the Siyad Barre regime, the Somali National Movement

(SNM) declared the people of the northern regions were

ceding from Somalia to form the Republic of Somaliland.

Over the next three years, clan elders steered the new state

through a series of reconciliation conferences that laid the

basis for the stability that exists in Somaliland today. This

interview with Hajji Abdi Hussein, a prominent Somaliland

elder, explores his role in peacemaking and unifying a

divided society.

How and when did you become an elder? What was the

process of nomination and how it was conducted?

My elder brother passed away in 1940 and I was nominated

by our clan as his successor. This followed the Somali

tradition that when either your father or your elder brother

passes away, you will be nominated as his successor by

clan elders.

I initially refused the offer and only accepted once the clan

agreed to three conditions: to protect and keep the peace;

to abide by the government’s rulings; and not to be envious

or jealous of what other clans have. I was consequently

inaugurated as the chief (

aqal) of my sub-clan.

The role of Somaliland

elders in making and

keeping peace

a conversation with Hajji Abdi Hussein Yusuf

Haji Abdi Hussein Yususf ‘Abdi Warabe’ is one of oldest and well known genuine traditional leaders in Somaliland. He is the second deputy

chair of the Elders House (

Guurti) of the Somaliland bi-cameral parliament. He is known for his tough positions and strong voice in both

traditional conflict resolution issues and peacebuilding and political challenges. He was one of the few elders who were instrumental in

the 1993 Borame conference where the successful social contract was agreed among the Somaliland clans and from there the Somaliland

Administration was given a solid basis to take incremental growth to date. His traditional title is ‘chief Aqil’.

Haji Abdi attending the 10

anniversary celebrations of the

establishment of the Academy

for Peace and Development

in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 12

October 2008. © APD

Somali peace processes

| 61

What was your role during the insurgency against the regime

of Siyad Barre?

During the war, I retreated to a small village in Ethiopia, from

where I was active in gathering together elders, military leaders

and sheikhs, to discuss the future of the SNM.

One of the disputes I helped to resolve was the transfer of power

from one chairman of the SNM to another. This change of

leadership was instrumental in restoring the strength and unity

of the movement and averting a potential conflict among its

members. Later on I was involved in the transfer of power from

the SNM military leaders to the Somaliland council of elders

(

Guurti), which enabled Somaliland’s traditional elders to play a

role in building peace and coexistence among Somaliland’s clans.

What was the specific role that you played in the Somaliland

inter-clan reconciliation process?

After the SNM defeated Siyad Barre I returned to Somaliland

and worked with other elders to defuse conflicts between

different clans

. I played a leading part in the various Somaliland

national reconciliation conferences, which discussed the future

of Somaliland and how to incorporate people from clans that

had previously supported the Barre regime. These issues were

ultimately resolved through dialogue.

During the insurgency I had argued that if the SNM proved

successful, it should accommodate clans who supported

the former government. This policy has been followed. It has

maintained the unity of Somalilanders, fostered trust among

people, and defused inter-clan conflict. It has enabled us to

establish a central government and parliament that could

represent the entire people of Somaliland.

What is the role of the

Guurti in conflict resolution?

The main role of the council of elders has been to maintain

peace. They have been able to resolve conflicts in ways that

are familiar to them and to avoid military intervention. Somali

culture provides that elders are representatives of the clans.

They speak on behalf of their clan and also have full authority

to make decisions on its behalf. They have enormous power

that they can exert on two conflicting parties.

Have you played a role in the statebuilding process?

During the 1993 Borama National Reconciliation Conference,

where the Somaliland clans came together to decide upon the

future system of government, I was involved in discussions on

deciding what political systems we should adopt.

I suggested that the best political structure is the presidential

system. I argued the presidential system had three

advantages for the peace and security of the country. Firstly,

a directly elected president would not create tension among

the clans. Secondly, the president needed to be given full

power in order to maintain a strong and effective central

government. And finally, the president could only be removed

from office through an impeachment process and not by

violent means.

During the Borama Conference it was agreed that the

government must draft a constitution to make Somaliland a

constitutional democracy. Have you played a role during the

democratization process of Somaliland?

After adopting a presidential system, the interim government

began drafting a national constitution, which would provide a

baseline for the peace and stability of Somaliland. This took a

long time. During the constitution-making process I helped to

resolve disputes between the executive and the legislature on

the adoption of the constitution. This was achieved through

compromise, dialogue and a vision to rebuild the country

together.

What was your role in the institutionalization of the

Guurti?

On my return to Somaliland I had helped to establish an

informal group of the

Guurti to help defuse conflicts. At the

Borama conference, I lobbied for the

Guurti to be incorporated

into the new political system. This enabled us to preserve

the traditional methods of managing conflict for use when

new conflicts arise. In this way we played a crucial role in the

institutionalization of the

Guurti.

Why have internationally sponsored national peace

conferences for Somalia failed?

During the colonial era, southern Somalia was colonized by

Italy, which destroyed the traditional conflict management

systems, rendering the elders ineffective. So their role in

conflict management and peacebuilding disappeared.

But Somaliland, which was colonized by Britain, kept its

own traditional conflict management mechanisms in place

and these values and norms were not disrupted. These

have ultimately enabled us to reconcile our people and have

nurtured mutual trust and dialogue.

Interview by Mohamed Farah, the Academy for Peace and

Development.

http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_18The%20role%20of%20Somaliland%20elders%20in%20making%20and%20kepping%20peace_2010_ENG.pdf

| Accord | ISSUE 21

Bakaaro market lies in the heart of Mogadishu. As the

economic powerhouse of Somalia it has shown a remarkable

capacity for survival and revival during two decades of

protracted civil conflict. Bakaaro’s story shows the resilience

of the Somali business community and the role it can play in

building peace, or in fuelling war.

History of Bakaaro

The name Bakaaro comes from the underground kilns that

are used to produce lime for construction. In 1950s there

were many such kilns in the current Bakaaro area. The first

makeshift shacks appeared at the northern edge of Bakaaro

in the late 1950s selling meat, milk, dates, salt, tobacco and

other small items. Bakaaro market grew in the 1960s when the

government settled people on a large tract of land to the south.

In the early 1970s Bakaaro market became part of Howlwadaag

district where government employees – civil servants

and military and police officers – were allocated land to

construct houses. By the end of the decade the settlement of

relatively wealthy people in Howl-wadaag, and improved access

due to the construction of four tarmac roads around Bakaaro

encouraged expansion of the market to the east.

The first big food stores, shops, restaurants and hotels in

Mogadishu were constructed in the vicinity of Bakaaro.

Because Mogadishu’s larger markets in Via Egitto, Via Roma,

and the more recently established cloth and electronic

market of Ba’adle in Hamar-weyne district, had little room

for expansion, Bakaaro began to attract well-established

businesses. In 1983 another wave of businesspeople moved to

Bakaaro after fire engulfed Ba’adle market.

The collapse of Siyad Barre’s regime in 1991 unshackled

the creativity of the private sector from constrictive state

regulations. New businesses flourished including

hawala

(money transfer agencies

), telecommunications (particularly

cheap telephones) and new transport and media companies.

In the big cities and towns, particularly Mogadishu,

businesspeople established privately owned hospitals,

schools, electricity generators, drinking water companies and

even a Coca Cola factory. Somali traders started exporting

livestock, skins and hides, fish, and fruits and sesame oil, and

importing all manner of goods: food, construction materials,

petrol and medicines. The vast majority of these economic

activities were based in Bakaaro market. Bakaaro grew to

become one of the largest and busiest markets in East Africa,

supplying a wide variety of imported and locally produced

goods to much of Somalia and the Somali speaking regions of

Ethiopia and Kenya.

Bakaaro also functions as the ‘Wall Street’ of Somalia. Somali

shillings and foreign currency both circulate in the market.

In the absence of a Somali central bank, exchange rates in

many parts of the country are pegged to rates set in Bakaaro.

It houses the main

hawala, such as Dahabshiil, Amal and

Qaran, as well as the major telecommunications companies

– Hormuud, Telecom Somalia and NationLink – and airline

ticketing offices. The most popular media houses, HornAfrik,

Radio Shabelle and Radio Simba also have their headquarters

in Bakaaro.

This bustling market is also an arms bazaar servicing all parties

to the conflict. The weapons market is a notorious feature

of Bakaaro and has earned it the nickname

Cir Toogte (‘Sky

Shooter’), based on the practice of allowing customers to testfire

on the spot all sorts of light weapons, including AK47s.

Imported weaponry ranging from small arms to anti-aircraft

missiles can all be bought there.

Challenges to Bakaaro

Bakaaro market and the people who work there have

overcome many challenges in the last 40 years, including the

oppressive political and economic system of the Barre regime

and recurrent fires. Because of its wealth it has attracted the

attention of warlords, bandits, militias and soldiers. It has

suffered attacks, extortion and looting.

One of the most serious challenges to Bakaaro occurred in

2007-08 as a result of the military alliance between Somalia’s

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops.

Some members of the TFG were convinced that, as the

economic hub of Mogadishu, Bakaaro was a source of funding

for insurgent forces that were operating against it. The former

Mayor of Mogadishu at that time, Mohamed Omar Habeb,

described Bakaaro as a hub for ‘anti-peace elements’. Indeed,

the market did become militarized, with insurgent forces taking

control of the strategic junctions in various districts, including

Howl-wadaag, Blacksea and Bar Ubah.

Business

as usual

Bakaaro market in war

Somali peace processes

| 69

Gaining control of Bakaaro market became one of the

priorities of the TFG and its Ethiopian allies. They used all

means at their disposal to achieve this, from threats and

blackmail to full-scale attacks, causing many casualties and

massive destruction of property (

see box 3).

The TFG did not succeed in bringing Bakaaro under its control.

When Ethiopian troops left Somalia in January 2009 there was a

collective sigh of relief in the market. However it has continued to

be a war zone between the government and insurgents. On several

occasions it has come under intense shelling by the African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and by insurgent forces.

Market forces: private sector contribution to

peacebuilding

People who own and manage big businesses wield enormous

power in Somalia. This can be used in two ways: either to build

peace for the benefit of all; or to collude with warlords and

other elements who gain from instability. In the early 1990s

when clan rivalry was at its peak in Mogadishu there were

many examples of businesspeople who became warlords or

financiers of warlords.

However from the second half of the 1990s animosity among

clans gradually decreased. Many businesspeople started

arming themselves and, more importantly, recruiting staff

from other clans to defend their businesses. Thereafter, mixed

ownership of businesses by people from different clans and

different geographical areas became standard practice.

Today businesspeople from south-central Somalia have booming

businesses in Somaliland and Puntland, and vice versa.

Entrepreneurs are becoming bolder in setting up inter-clan

businesses because they are more profitable. This contributes to

overcoming clan hostilities and to promoting stability.

The private sector has contributed to peacebuilding in Somalia

by paying for the disarmament, rehabilitation and employment

of thousands of former gunmen, although not in an organized

or coordinated fashion. In Mogadishu, many telephone

repairmen, petty traders, drivers and company or business

guards are former gunmen. Business also finances clan elders

in peacemaking processes and usually pays the costs of interclan

meeting venues, transport and lunches.

The business community helps to mitigate the consequences

of conflict by paying for fuel for hospitals regardless of their

location, assisting the victims of drought, paying school fees

regardless of students’ clan affiliation and supplying food and

clothes to internally displaced people in and around Mogadishu

and surrounding areas.

With more organization the role of businesspeople in building

peace could be enhanced still further, even twisting the arms of

the politicians to reach political settlement.

The author is a Somali writer. Author’s identity withheld.

Box 3

Bakaaro Market protection initiative

Between December 2006 and January 2008 local

security forces nominally attached to the TFG

targeted businesses in the Bakaaro district and looted

substantial amounts of money, causing the death of

many traders, labourers, and bystanders. As the fights

against the TFG and Ethiopian occupation intensified

insurgents established a foothold in the market. From

February 2008 attacks on the market increased with

government forces raiding and looting the market on

multiple occasions under the pretext of security sweeps.

Civic activists, representatives from the business

community, human rights activists and religious

leaders undertook an initiative to address the

escalating insecurity. After several discussions they

concluded that the solution was to demilitarize the

market area and establish a community police force.

To achieve this, civic actors created committees to

engage the TFG and the insurgents in dialogue. The

committees increased pressure on the parties, using

both the local and international media to showcase

the plight of the market.

After tough negotiations the committees managed

to broker a Memorandum of Understanding with the

parties. This agreed to:

􀁴􀀁

Demilitarize the market zone

􀁴􀀁

Deploy a 450 person community police force in

the market

􀁴􀀁

Establish a Peace Fund for the protection of the

market and humanitarian services

􀁴􀀁

Establish a coordination committee to monitor

the implementation of the agreement.

All of this was to be achieved within 30 days. The

MOU was implemented and businesses were able to

resume their activities with greater security.

By Mohamed Ahmed Jama, see p. 66

| Accord | ISSUE 21

For two decades Somalia has defied all foreign diplomatic,

military and statebuilding interventions. None of the

governments that have emerged from internationally

sponsored peace processes have been able to establish their

authority or deliver security and law and services to the

Somali people.

Since 2001 international engagement has served to deepen the

humanitarian and political crisis in southern Somalia, leaving

more than three million people in urgent need of humanitarian

assistance in 2009.

In the absence of government, however, Somali people have

employed their own resources and traditions of conflict

resolution to recreate security in many communities. Somaliled

initiatives have succeeded in establishing political and

administrative arrangements that in some places are proving to

be stable.

The northern polities of the Republic of Somaliland and the

Puntland State of Somalia are evidence of what Somalis can

achieve. Even in volatile south central Somalia, there has been

evidence of the positive impact that Somali approaches to

reconciliation and security management can have.

Somalia’s protracted crisis has received intermittent

international attention. In the early 1990s a major humanitarian

and peacekeeping intervention – the UN Mission in Somalia

(UNOSOM) – was mounted. When it failed to revive the

state the wider international community largely lost interest

and Somalia’s neighbours – Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya –

increasingly led the search for solutions.

After 9/11 international attention inevitably swung back to

Somalia because of the perceived link between failed states

and international terrorism. The brief emergence of an Islamist

administration in the capital Mogadishu led to Ethiopian

military intervention in 2006 and the subsequent deployment

of African peacekeeping forces that have been trying to protect

the transitional government. Regional involvement by the

Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) is now a

permanent feature of efforts to restore peace to Somalia.

This publication examines the multiplicity of international

and Somali-led peace initiatives of the past two decades. It

has been a challenge to produce a study of Somali peace

processes against a backdrop of continuing conflict. Violence

has intensified in south central Somalia during the lifetime

of this project, begging the question whether there has been

any peace to study. It is a reflection of the pernicious violence

that three authors in this publication requested anonymity.

But we believe there are important lessons to be drawn

from experiences of Somali peacemaking. We hope that

this publication can help to inform the development of more

complementary and effective peacebuilding strategies.

A collaborative project

This issue of Accord has been produced in collaboration with

Interpeace, whose Somali partners have undertaken pioneering

work on recording, analyzing and supporting Somali-led

peace processes. The insights gained from the work of the

Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in south central

Somalia, the Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC)

in Puntland, and the Academy for Peace and Development

(APD) in Somaliland are integral to this study. It draws on

their work in 2007 in mapping Somali-led and internationallysponsored

peace processes. www.interpeace.org, situating

it within a broader comparative field of international conflict

resolution approaches in Somalia. In doing so it brings Somali

perspectives on conflict resolution to a wider international

Introduction

Whose peace is it anyway? connecting Somali and international

peacemaking

Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy

Somali peace processes

| 7

audience and deepens the debate about how endogenous

peacemaking methods can be better aligned with international

conflict mediation.

Structure of the publication

The publication is divided into four main sections. In the

introductory section we trace the history of the crisis, from a

civil war in the 1980s, through the period of state breakdown,

clan factionalism and warlordism in the 1990s, to a globalized

religious and ideological struggle in the new millennium.

The second section covers internationally-led peace processes,

the third deals with Somali-led peace processes and a fourth

section looks at efforts to build local structures of government. A

final section draws policy lessons for the future. We have sought

throughout to include the views of Somalis and practitioners and

participants in developing a critique of the various processes.

Lessons of international engagement

The first article by Ken Menkhaus asks why intensive

diplomatic interventions have failed to end the Somali crisis.

His critique of six Somali peace conferences identifies lack

of political will, misdiagnosis of the crisis, confusion between

statebuilding and reconciliation and poor mediation skills as

factors that have contributed to failure. It concludes with some

constructive lessons, above all the need to ensure greater

Somali ‘ownership’ of the peace process.

Jeremy Brickhill develops the critique of international

involvement. He explores how security arrangements have

been handled, arguing that the habitual international strategy

of building a state with a monopoly of violence has not worked.

Brickhill points out that security arrangements are central to

endogenous Somali peace processes and demonstrate that,

given the right conditions, Somalis are capable of managing

security outside the framework of the state.

Another intractable problem that international mediators have

faced is who has the right to represent the Somali people in

formal peace talks and in government. As Abdulaziz Xildhiban

and Warsan Cismaan Saalax discuss, political factions have

multiplied at every international peace conference since 1991

creating a recurrent dilemma of how to determine legitimate

and authoritative representation.

In Somali society political representation is a complex issue

related to notions of descent and perceived and self-ascribed

power, size and territorial control of clans. Markus Hoehne’s

article examines Somali notions of ‘belonging’ and reviews

representation in internationally-mediated peace conferences,

and local political representation in Sool region. He concludes

that a delegate’s legitimacy is tied to their ‘accountability’ to the

people who select them.

Lee Cassanelli’s contribution deepens the critique of

international engagement further with an emphasis on

economic factors. He identifies in private sector-led

economic recovery the potential to alter Somalia’s current

political trajectory through entrepreneurship and economic

development. He questions the international focus on politics

and statebuilding as prerequisites for economic recovery and

suggests focusing instead on Somalis as economic actors

and building on what they do best — namely, responding to

economic opportunities.

To provide an international perspective on the Somali conflict

and how to resolve it, we are pleased to have secured four

contributions from international practitioners. Three are senior

diplomats from international organizations whose mandates

charge them with responsibility for managing the Somali crisis.

Charles Petrie, UN Deputy Special Representative of the

Secretary-General (SRSG), reflects on the changing character

In the absence of government,

Somali people have employed

their own resources and

traditions of conflict resolution

to recreate security in many

communities”

“

Erigavo reconciliation conference 1993 © APD

| Accord | ISSUE 21

of UN intervention and the importance of partnership with

Somalis and with other international organizations. H.E. Mahboub

Maalim, Executive Secretary of IGAD, explains how and why

Somalia’s neighbours have shouldered responsibilities to restore

a functioning government and calls for more international support

for IGAD’s initiative. Nicolas Bwakira, Special Representative of

the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, discusses

the role that the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is playing in

support of Somalia’s transitional government.

A fourth article by Meredith Preston McGhie describes the

tactics employed by the UN as mediators in the 2008 peace

talks in Djibouti between the Transitional Federal Government

(TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).

Owning the peace: learning from Somali

peace processes

In part three of the publication we present a series of

articles that explore how Somali communities have achieved

reconciliation, managed their security and reconstructed

viable ways of life. Several of these articles draw on studies

by Interpeace’s partners in south central Somalia, Puntland

and Somaliland. Although little known beyond their immediate

setting, more than 90 local peace processes have been

catalogued in south central Somalia since 1991, more than 30

in Somaliland between 1991 and 1997 and eight in Puntland.

As Pat Johnson and Abdirahman Raghe explain, these

locally-managed processes have proved more effective than

internationally-sponsored national reconciliation initiatives.

In Somaliland and Puntland they have led to the creation of

government structures that enjoy more public consent and are

less predatory than the highly contested ‘national’ authorities

produced by internationally-sponsored processes.

Articles by Ibrahim Ali Amber ‘Oker’ and Abdulrahman Osman

‘Shuke’ describe how local peace processes draw on traditional

practices of negotiation, mediation and arbitration conducted by

clan elders using customary law as a moral and legal framework

[

see glossary for a description of clan, elder and customary law].

This section includes interviews with three senior Somali elders

from south central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland who are

practitioners in reconciliation. The authority of elders is derived

from being delegates of their communities and accountable to

them. Hajji Abdi Hussein Yusuf, Sultan Said and Malaq Isaaq

discuss the qualities that Somali elders are expected to possess

and the role they play in maintaining peace.

Formal public peace processes are only one way in which

Somalis manage conflicts. Articles by Faiza Jama on women

and peacebuilding and Jama Mohamed on ‘neighbourhood

watch’ and on security schemes for Mogadishu’s Bakaaro

market demonstrate that peacemaking is not the sole preserve of

elders. Civic activists have mobilized groups in Mogadishu and

elsewhere to reduce violence and create conditions for dialogue

by demolishing checkpoints, demobilizing militia, monitoring

human rights and interceding between belligerents.

Women in particular, who have very limited opportunities to

participate in formal peace processes, have provided critical

leadership in such civil society peace initiatives. Another ‘non

traditional’ actor is the decentralised local authority of Wajid,

whose endeavours to manage competing clan interests and

maintain access for humanitarian assistance in the midst of

violent political changes in south central Somalia are described

in a further article.

A final contribution in this section explores how social and

cultural components of Somali life can impact on peace and

security. Maxamed Daahir Afrax’s article discusses how Somali

poets, singers and actors have responded to the long crisis. He

explains the importance of understanding war and peace in the

Somali regions through a cultural lens and the power of culture

in influencing attitudes to both.

Frameworks for stability

The fourth section of the publication discusses some of the

efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to create more enduring

systems for the maintenance of peace and order.

Ulf Terlinden and Mohamed Hassan chart the history

of Somaliland’s political development from indigenous

grassroots peacebuilding processes in the early 1990s to the

development of a democratic political system from 2002.

Not withstanding the issue of contested sovereignty over the

eastern regions and the stalled presidential elections in 2009,

Somaliland has emerged as one of the most peaceful polities

in the Horn of Africa.

Hassan Sheikh’s article on Mogadishu describes the many

attempts made since 1991 to establish an administration in the

capital, ranging from political deals between faction leaders to

community initiatives on local level security. The brief authority

of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 that brought security

to the streets of Mogadishu for the first time since 1991 gave

a glimpse of what could be possible. But external interests

prevented this from developing further.

The challenges of constitution-making illustrate the contested

nature of statehood. Three linked articles by Kirsti Samuels,

Ibrahim Hashi Jama, and Ahmed Abbas Ahmed and

Somali peace processes

| 9

Ruben Zamora explore the varying experiences of drawing

up constitutions in Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. In

Somaliland and Puntland this has helped to consolidate

peace and create structures of government, but the lack of a

political settlement in south central Somalia has made progress

impossible.

Islam is a fundamental pillar of Somali society and provides

an important moral compass in Somali peace processes.

An article on Islam explores this, discussing the rise of the

Islamic Courts and the impact of Islamic militancy with which

Somalis are currently grappling. The violence perpetrated by

militant Islamists in Somalia obscures the fact that peace and

reconciliation are fundamental tenants of Islam.

The Somali diaspora has been one of the most important

drivers of economic recovery in Somalia. Khadra Elmi’s

article explores the complex ties of Somali diaspora youth

in Britain to their home country. Their social milieu in the

UK, compounded by generational issues and events in

international politics, has ‘radicalized’ some of these young

people although many more are constructively involved in

responding to humanitarian needs in Somalia. This positive

engagement is something that can be harnessed to bring new

and fresh approaches to Somali peacebuilding.

Somalia has one of the largest internally displaced populations

in the world. Anna Lindley observes that while Somali elite in

the diaspora do exert an influence on Somali politics, the voices

of the displaced and other marginalized people in the country

and overseas need to be heard.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding

The name Somalia remains synonymous with conflict, violence,

warlordism, famine, refugees, terrorism,

jihadism, and piracy.

As this report shows, despite this image, it is not a lawless and

ungoverned land, but one where Somali people over the past

two decades have forged systems of governance to manage

conflict and provide security and law.

With minimal international assistance, Somalis have also rebuilt

their cities and towns, built new schools, universities, medical

facilities, developed multi-million dollar enterprises, created

efficient money transfer systems and established some of the

cheapest and most extensive telecommunication networks in

Africa. It is this Somali talent and capacity that the international

community needs to foster and tap into.

At the heart of the Somali crisis is an unresolved problem

over the nature of statehood. Since the collapse of the

state, power and authority has been fractured and radically

decentralized among the clans and political elites. While

international diplomacy continues to adopt a statebuilding

approach aimed at restoring a sovereign national

government, Somalis themselves have been re-establishing

systems of governance.

What sets Somali and internationally-sponsored peace

processes apart is that they are locally designed, managed,

mediated and financed; in other words ‘Somali-owned’. They

work with the grain of the clan system, are based on consensus

decision-making and focus on reconciliation and the restoration

of public security.

Somaliland and Puntland demonstrate the potential and

sustainability of ‘home-grown’ peacemaking and reconciliation.

They show the desire among Somalis for government and a

capacity for self-governance given the right conditions.

Local reconciliation has proved much more difficult in south

central Somalia, where a combination of local structural

inequalities and greater international attention has made

conflict more intractable. Even here local initiatives have

achieved a great deal, but they are vulnerable to national and

international dynamics. The demobilization exercises organized

by women, the neighbourhood security arrangements that

flourished in Mogadishu and the security brought briefly by the

ICU to parts of south central Somalia all foundered as a result

of national and international pressures.

No single factor can explain the causes of the conflict and there

is no consensus among Somalis on how it should be resolved.

The nature of the crisis has mutated and efforts to resolve it

have been frustrated by a host of domestic and external actors.

Islamist militancy has brought a new dimension to the twentyyear

conflict and has become one of the most pressing issues

for international actors. Somalis are themselves grappling with

how to respond to this as much as the international community.

It is time for the international community to find more effective

ways to move the country out of this protracted crisis and to

develop methods that are more responsive to Somali realities.

Mark Bradbury is a social analyst who has worked extensively in

Somalia and Somaliland with Somali and international organizations.

He is the author of

Becoming Somaliland (James Currey) and is the

Chair of the Board of Conciliation Resources.

Sally Healy is an Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of

International Affairs (Chatham House) and has worked as a Horn of

Africa analyst for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

| Accord | ISSUE 21

Over the past two decades the nature of the Somali crisis and

the international context within which it is occurring have

been constantly changing. It has mutated from a civil war

in the 1980s, through state collapse, clan factionalism and

warlordism in the 1990s, to a globalized ideological conflict

in the first decade of the new millennium.

In this time the international environment has also changed,

from the end of the Cold War to the ‘global war on terror’, which

impacts directly on the crisis and international responses to

it. This poses a problem for Somalis and international actors

working to build peace. Initiatives that may have appeared to

offer a solution in earlier years may no longer be applicable and

there is a risk of fighting yesterday’s war or building yesterday’s

peace. This article traces the evolution of the Somali conflict

and some of the continuities that run through it.

From Cold War to civil war 1988-91

The collapse of the Somali state was the consequence of a

combination of internal and external factors. Externally there

were the legacies of European colonialism that divided the

Somali people into five states, the impact of Cold War politics

in shoring up a predatory state, and the cumulative effect of

wars with neighbouring states, most damagingly the 1977-78

Ogaden war with Ethiopia. Internally, there were contradictions

between a centralized state authority, and a fractious kinship

system and the Somali pastoral culture in which power is

diffused.

Next came the Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 1982

that drew its support from the Isaaq clan. The SNM insurgency

escalated into a full-scale civil war in 1988 when it attacked

government garrisons in Burco and Hargeisa. The government

responded with a ferocious assault on the Isaaq clan, killing some

50,000 people and forcing 650,000 to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Somalia’s collapse was hastened by the ending of the Cold War.

As Somalia’s strategic importance to the West declined, the

foreign aid that had sustained the state was withdrawn. Without

the resources to maintain the system of patronage politics,

Barre lost control of the country and the army. In January 1991

he was ousted from Mogadishu by forces of the United Somali

Congress (USC) drawing support from the Hawiye clans in

south central Somalia.

State collapse, clan war and famine 1991-92

Somalis use the word

burbur (‘catastrophe’) to describe the period

from December 1991 to March 1992, when the country was torn

apart by clan-based warfare and factions plundered the remnants

of the state and fought for control of rural and urban assets. Four

months of fighting in Mogadishu alone in 1991 and 1992 killed an

estimated 25,000 people, 1.5 million people fled the country, and

at least 2 million were internally displaced.

In the midst of drought, the destruction of social and economic

infrastructure, asset stripping, ‘clan-cleansing’ and the disruption

of food supplies caused a famine in which an estimated 250,000

died. Those who suffered most came from the politically

marginalized and poorly armed riverine and inter-riverine agropastoral

communities in the south, who suffered waves of

invasions from the better-armed militia from the major clans.

External responses to Somalia’s collapse were belated because

other wars in the Gulf and the Balkans commanded international

attention. The Djibouti government tried unsuccessfully to broker

a deal in June and July 1991. UN diplomatic engagement began

only in early 1992, when a ceasefire was negotiated between the

two main belligerents in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and

General Mohamed Farah Aideed. A limited UN peacekeeping

mission – the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) – was unable

to stem the violence or address the famine.

Signs that war was radically restructuring the state came in May

1991 when the SNM declared that the northern regions were

seceding from the south to become the independent Republic of

Somaliland (

see box 1).

Endless war

a brief history of the Somali conflict

Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy

Somali peace processes

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Humanitarian intervention

The Somali civil war erupted at a time of profound change in the

international order, as global institutions, with the US at their helm,

shaped up to managing an era of ‘new wars’ and ‘failing states’.

Somalia was to become a laboratory for a new form of engagement

when the international community responded with a humanitarian

and military intervention on an unprecedented scale.

In December 1992 the outgoing US administration authorized

the deployment of US forces to support the beleaguered

UN mission in Somalia. Under US leadership, UNOSOM

mustered a multinational force of some 30,000 troops.

Ostensibly launched for humanitarian reasons, the intervention

also responded to the challenge that the collapsed Somali

state posed to a supposed ‘new world order’, proclaimed by

President George Bush at the end of the Cold War. UNOSOM

dominated Somali politics for the next three years.

UNOSOM turned world attention to a neglected crisis and assisted

in saving lives by securing food supplies. It facilitated some local

agreements that improved security, reopened Mogadishu airport

and seaport, and supported the revival of key services and the

creation of local non-governmental organizations. It also provided

employment and injected huge resources into the economy to the

benefit of a new business class.

However, the mission failed to mediate an end to hostilities or

disarm factions. UN-facilitated peace conferences in Addis Ababa

in 1993 and Kenya in 1994 did not engender a process of national

reconciliation and state revival. The mission has been criticized for

fuelling the war economy, causing a proliferation of factions and

shoring up warlord power structures. Before long UNOSOM itself

became embroiled in the conflict with General Aideed, leading

to the infamous shooting down of US Black Hawk helicopters in

Mogadishu and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces.

Some argue that the seeds of militant Islamist movements were

planted in this period. Osama bin Laden, then based Sudan,

denounced the UN mission as an invasion of a Muslim country.

Governance without government

UNOSOM’s humiliating departure from Somalia was followed

by international disengagement and a decline in foreign aid. Its

departure in March 1995 did not lead to a revival of the civil war,

however. Local political processes that had been ‘frozen’ by the

intervention resumed and clans and factions consolidated the

gains they had made during the war.

In some areas communities drew on traditional institutions, such

as elders and customary law (

xeer), to end violent confrontations,

renegotiate relations between groups and establish local

Box 1

The Republic of Somaliland

On 18 May 1991, at the ‘Grand Conference of

Northern Clans’ in the northern city of Burco, the

SNM announced that the northern regions were

withdrawing from the union with the south and

reasserting their sovereign independence as the

Republic of Somaliland.

The declaration, made under public pressure, has

left a deep rift in Somali politics that has yet to be

resolved. In 1991, however, the move insulated

Somaliland from the war and famine in the south and

enabled people to begin a process of reconstruction

and statebuilding.

That process has not been easy. Between 1992

and 1996 Somaliland experienced two civil wars.

Embargoes on imports of Somali livestock by Gulf

countries, the return of refugees, urban drift, and

contested territorial claims over the eastern regions

have presented challenges.

Yet today Somaliland has all the attributes of a

sovereign state with an elected government that

provides security for its citizens, exercises control

over its borders, manages some public assets,

levies taxes, issues currency and formulates

development policies. This has been achieved

through the resourcefulness and resources of people

in Somaliland and the diaspora, with minimal

international assistance.

Acknowledgment of what has been achieved in

Somaliland has been growing, but no country has

formal diplomatic relations with it and it therefore

has no international legal status or representation in

international forums.

And yet a generation has grown up in Somaliland

that knows no other country than the one they

have been educated in, and no other government

than the one that they are now able to vote for.

Continuing international ambivalence over the status

of Somaliland entrenches the vulnerability of the

new state and ensures that it remains, in essence, a

‘fragile state’.

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governance structures as a transitional step to developing public

administrations and regional and trans-regional polities.

The most successful and sustained of these processes

took place in the secessionist Somaliland state. Elsewhere,

the Rahanweyn clans of Bay and Bakool region created a

Governing Council to administer their regions. Although this did

not survive for long after UNOSOM, it established a precedent

for the decentralized administration of those regions.

In 1998 Puntland Federal State of Somalia was established

in the northeast as an autonomously governed region (

see

box 2

). In 1999 the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), with

Ethiopian backing, won control of Bay and Bakool regions and

also established an administration.

In southern Somalia a variety of institutions emerged,

including two ‘governments’ in Mogadishu, councils of

elders, district councils and

Shari’a courts, which provided

forms of ‘governance without government’. While fragile and

uncoordinated, these structures produced an incremental

improvement in security, so that by the late 1990s the situation

in much of Somalia was described as ‘neither war nor peace’.

These developments were driven by a convergence of internal

and external interests. There was an internal demand for security,

regulation and order from businesspeople, civil society groups

and people in the diaspora. This was underpinned by economic

recovery, stimulated by diaspora remittances, and renewed interclan

cooperation and the resumption of inter-regional trade.

Somalis took advantage of the lack of government and the

global deregulation of trade to establish successful businesses,

including money transfer and telecommunications. Their

participation in

Salafi commercial networks, and an increase

in Islamic charitable funding, spurred the growth of Islamic

organizations including welfare charities,

Shari’a courts and

Islamist movements.

Building blocks and regional initiatives

The disengagement from Somalia of Western governments

resulted in the diplomatic initiative passing regional states and

in particular Ethiopia. Addis Ababa’s engagement was driven

as much by geo-political, security and economic interests as by

concern to end Somalia’s political turmoil.

Ethiopia was especially concerned by the growth of an armed

Islamist group in Somalia, Al Itihad Al Islamiya, with regional

ambitions. Ethiopian forces attacked and destroyed Al Itihad

camps in the border areas during 1997. At the same time,

Ethiopia brought Somali factions together at Sodere and

attempted to broker an agreement.

Egypt, Libya and Yemen and the Arab League also made

endeavours to broker settlements, but reconciliation in Somalia

was actively hindered by competition between these initiatives.

After 1998 the breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and

Eritrea gave a new impetus to the destabilization of Somalia.

Eritrea supported Somali factions opposed to those aligned with

Ethiopia, introducing a new element of proxy war to an already

crowded arena.

In the late 1990s regional rivalries were reflected in different

approaches to statebuilding. The model favoured by Ethiopia

and briefly supported by Western donors was the so-called

‘building-block’ approach. Taking a lead from developments

in Somaliland and Puntland, the RRA administration in Bay

Box 2

Puntland State of Somalia

In 1998 political leaders in northeast Somalia,

frustrated at the lack of progress from internationallymediated

talks in Ethiopia and Egypt, decided to wait

no longer for a national government to emerge.

A series of consultative conferences led to the creation

of Puntland State of Somalia in August 1998, as a

self-governing state in Somalia’s north eastern regions.

Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, military leader of the SSDF, was

selected as Puntland’s first president. He later became

president of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government.

As a non-secessionist state, Puntland epitomizes

a ‘building block’ for a future federal Somali state

within the 1990 state borders and was duly supported

as such by the international community.

Puntland is a form of ‘ethno-state’, founded on the unity

of the Harti clan. Along with the Majeerteen, this includes

the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans of Sool and

Eastern Sanaag regions over which Somaliland also claims

sovereignty. The territorial dispute between Puntland and

Somaliland has at times escalated into violent clashes and

remains a deep fault line in Somali politics.

Puntland has experienced acute internal divisions and

more recently has become internationally known as

the home of Somali pirates. However it has remained a

relatively stable polity and is in the process of reviewing

its constitution and democratizing its political systems.

Somali peace processes

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and Bakool regions and an all-Hawiye peace conference in

Beletweyn in 1999, the approach sought to encourage the

emergence of regional authorities as a first step towards

establishing a federal or confederal Somali state.

Donor and development organizations hoped to encourage

the process by rewarding the areas of stability with ‘peace

dividends’ of aid. Critics of the approach contended that it had

limited applicability in the south, encouraged secessionism

and was designed by foreign states to keep Somalia weak

and divided. The alternative approach, supported by Arab

countries, advocated reviving a centralized Somali state through

a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a

national government.

Competing regional interests led to rival peace conferences

sponsored by Ethiopia in Sodere in 1996, and by Egypt in Cairo

in 1997. These produced two regional administrations: the shortlived

Benadir Administration supported by Egypt and Libya; and

the government of Puntland Federal State of Somalia.

The Benadir Administration collapsed when its leadership failed

to agree on modalities for reopening Mogadishu seaport, while in

Puntland a combination of a community-driven political processes

and strong leadership produced a functional administration.

Somalis were also divided over the right approach. As the

multiple clan-based factions merged into larger regional and

transregional polities in the late 1990s, they also mutated

into broader political coalitions. One such coalition centred

on Mogadishu and the sub-clans of the Hawiye clan-family.

Although the Hawiye had failed to reconcile with each other

and Mogadishu remained a divided city, but political, business,

civic and religious leaders supported the revival of a strong

central state in which they would dominate the capital. The

other coalition, backed by Ethiopia and led by Puntland

President, Abdullahi Yusuf, was dominated by the Darood clan,

was anti-Islamist and favoured a federal state.

In 1999 international support for the building block approach

ended when the government of Djibouti initiated a new national

peace process.

The return of government

Arta process

International diplomatic efforts were re-energized in 2000 when

the Djibouti government hosted the Somalia National Peace

Conference in the town of Arta. The ‘Arta process’ achieved an

important political breakthrough in August 2000 by producing

a Transitional National Government (TNG) that commanded

some national and international support.

This was due, in part, to an innovative peace process that

consulted with Somali society beyond the usual faction leaders.

It also adopted a system of fixed proportional representation of

Somali clans in the conference and in government based on

the so-called ‘4.5 formula’: an equal number of places were

allotted to each of the four major Somali clan-families, and a

‘half place’ to ‘minorities’ and to women.

The TNG became the first authority since the fall of Siyad Barre

to fill Somalia’s seat at the UN and regional bodies. It was

supported by the UN and several Arab states but it failed to

win the backing of Ethiopia or the confidence of major donor

governments. In Somalia the TNG did not follow through on

the reconciliation efforts begun in Arta and became associated

with the powerful Mogadishu clans and the business class,

which included Islamists. The TNG was opposed by a coalition

supported by Ethiopia, called the Somali Restoration and

Reconciliation Council (SRRC) in which Abdullahi Yusuf had a

leadership role.

In the climate of international insecurity that followed

the 9/11 attacks on the US, the failed state of Somalia

attracted renewed interest as a potential haven and breeding

ground for international terrorists. The TNG’s reputation

suffered as the growing influence of Islamic Courts and

Islamic charities increased suspicions about its links with

militant Islamists.

To some Somalis the return of government provided the best

opportunity for Somalia for a decade, and they criticized

Western governments for failing to adequately support it. The

experience of TNG also demonstrated the difficulty of securing

a lasting agreement in Somalia that does not address the

interests and needs of both internal and external actors.

The IGAD initiative

The mandate of the Inter-Governmental Authority on

Development (IGAD) was revised in 1996 to include the

promotion of peace and security, in addition to fostering regional

cooperation and economic development. IGAD had supported

past Somali reconciliation efforts by Ethiopia or Djibouti.

In 2002 IGAD took up the challenge of reconciling the TNG

and the SRRC, each supported by an IGAD member state. The

influence of external actors was apparent during the two-year

reconciliation conference facilitated by Kenya. The Transitional

Federal Government (TFG), which succeeded the TNG in

November 2004, saw Somalia’s leadership shift from the

Mogadishu-centred, Hawiye and Islamist dominated coalition

to the federalist, Darood and Ethiopian backed coalition, with

Abdullahi Yusuf chosen as the transitional president.

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Substantial financial support for the TFG was anticipated with

the inauguration of a World Bank and UNDP Joint Needs

Assessment of the country’s rehabilitation and development

requirements. But like its predecessor the TFG fell short of

being a government of national unity.

Power was concentrated in a narrow clan coalition and

Abdulahi Yusuf was viewed as a client of Ethiopia. His

immediate call for a military force from the African Union (AU)

to help him establish his authority in the capital alienated

his slender support base in Mogadishu. Without dogged

international financial and military support the TFG would

not have survived either its internal divisions or the rise of the

Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006.

The Islamic Courts Union

An important feature of the past two decades has been

the emergence of a variety of Islamist movements seeking

to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. These range from

traditionalist

sufi orders, to progressive Islamist movements

Al Islah, and Salafi and Wahhabi inspired groups like

Al Itihad Al Islamiya pursuing a regional or global agenda.

Their significance came to the fore in April 2006 when a

coalition of Islamic Courts, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in

alliance with other clan militia, ousted a coalition of warlords

(the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter

Terrorism) from Mogadishu that had been backed by the US

government.

The ICU won public support for creating an unprecedented

degree of security in the capital and quickly established a

presence across most of south-central Somalia. It seemed to

offer an alternative political system that could deliver services

and security to the population, in sharp contrast to the failing

authority of the TFG.

When mediation efforts by the Arab League failed to forge an

agreement between the parties, Ethiopian forces, with implicit

backing from Western governments, entered Somalia in

December 2006. They forced out the ICU and installed the TFG

in Mogadishu. The US air force attacked retreating ICU forces

in an unsuccessful effort to kill Al Qaeda operatives allegedly

harboured by the ICU. The ICU leadership took refuge in Eritrea

where, with other opposition figures, they established the

Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somali (ARS) that mobilized

support against the Ethiopian occupation.

In early 2007 a small contingent of AU peacekeepers (the AU

Mission in Somalia – AMISOM) was deployed to Mogadishu

to protect the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). But over

the next two years efforts by the TFG and Ethiopia to impose

a ‘victor’s peace’ provoked violent resistance from a mixture

of clan militia and remnants of the militant wing of the ICU –

Harakat al Shabaab

(‘the youth movement’).

During 2007 alone fighting between the TFG and the

insurgency resulted in the displacement of up to 700,000

people from Mogadishu, and the economic base of the Hawiye

in the city was weakened. The Ethiopian occupation rallied

support to the resistance within Somalia and in the diaspora,

helping to radicalize another generation of Somalis.

Djibouti talks

During his four years in power, Abdullahi Yusuf’s government

failed to implement any of the transitional tasks of government.

By inviting Ethiopia to intervene militarily against the ICU, it

lost all semblance of legitimacy and was unable to establish its

authority over the country.

When UN-mediated talks between the ARS and the TFG in

Djibouti agreed a timetable for Ethiopian withdrawal in late

2008, Abdullahi Yusuf resigned paving the way for the creation

of a new TFG under the presidency of the former Chair of the

ICU, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the establishment

of a new ‘unitary’ TFG created an opportunity to establish a

moderate Islamist government in Somalia that had considerable

backing from Somalis and the international community. Nine

months later Somalia finds itself in even greater turmoil. Al

Shabaab denounced the Djibouti agreement as a betrayal

by the ARS. Under the leadership of Ahmed Godane, who

is widely held responsible for organizing suicide bombs in

Hargeisa and Bosasso in October 2008, Al Shabaab has

declared its support for al Qaeda. The TFG has to date proved

itself incapable of building a coalition to combat Al Shabaab

and Hizbul Islamiya forces that control much of south central

Somalia. The international community has responded by

increasing support for the TFG, including the provision of arms

by the US government.

The three years from 2006-08 were catastrophic for Somalis.

Military occupation, a violent insurgency, rising

jihadism and

massive population displacement has reversed the incremental

political and economic progress achieved by the late 1990s

in south central Somalia. With 1.3 million people displaced by

fighting since 2006, 3.6 million people in need of emergency

food aid, and 60,000 Somalis a year fleeing the country, the

people of south central Somalia face the worst humanitarian

crisis since the early 1990s.