THE HISTORY OF SOMALI DIR CLAN: TAARIKHDA BEESHA DIREED DIR
Friday, February 24, 2012
Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook Puntland President involvent in Piracy:
Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook
By David F. Marley
Puntland President involvent in Piracy:
The Pirates of Somalia: Inside Their Hidden World
By Jay Bahadur
The Emergence and Impacts of Islamic Radicalists
By Girma Yohannes Iyassu Menelik
Piracy Off the Horn of Africa
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Piracy and armed robbery at sea: the legal framework for counter-piracy ...
By Robin Geiss, Anna Petrig
http://books.google.ca/books?id=tDIywglWk5UC&pg=PA173&dq=faroole&hl=en&sa=X&ei=I0NIT-WaH8WhiQKbsqzbDQ&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=faroole&f=false
briefing paper
Piracy in Somalia
Threatening global trade, feeding local wars
Roger Middleton
Africa Programme | October 2008 | AFP BP 08/02
Summary points
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has more than doubled in 2008; so far over 60 ships
have been attacked. Pirates are regularly demanding and receiving million-dollar
ransom payments and are becoming more aggressive and assertive.
The international community must be aware of the danger that Somali pirates could
become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms is
helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-
Shabaab.
The high level of piracy is making aid deliveries to drought-stricken Somalia ever more
difficult and costly. The World Food Programme has already been forced to
temporarily suspend food deliveries. Canada is now escorting WFP deliveries but
there are no plans in place to replace their escort when it finishes later this year.
The danger and cost of piracy (insurance premiums for the Gulf of Aden have
increased tenfold) mean that shipping could be forced to avoid the Gulf of Aden/Suez
Canal and divert around the Cape of Good Hope. This would add considerably to the
costs of manufactured goods and oil from Asia and the Middle East. At a time of high
inflationary pressures, this should be of grave concern.
Piracy could cause a major environmental disaster in the Gulf of Aden if a tanker is
sunk or run aground or set on fire. The use of ever more powerful weaponry makes
this increasingly likely.
There are a number of options for the international community but ignoring the
problem is not one of them. It must ensure that WFP deliveries are protected and that
gaps in supply do not occur.
Piracy1 off the coast of Somalia is growing at an
alarming rate and threatens to drastically disrupt international
trade. It provides funds that feed the vicious
war in Somalia and could potentially become a weapon
of international terrorism or a cause of environmental
disaster. For long piracy has been a problem mostly
associated with the Malacca Straits between Indonesia
and Malaysia, but it is now a growing issue for fragile
African states. Up to 25 September 2008, 61 actual and
attempted hijacks had been recorded by the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
International Maritime Bureau (IMB).2 In the last week
of August 2008 alone four vessels were captured, and
the year has seen Somali piracy rise up the news
agenda, propelled by the capture of the Luxury yacht Le
Ponant3 and the kidnap of a German couple who had
been sailing their yacht through the Gulf of Aden.
Since the end of 2007 piracy activity has shifted away
from the Mogadishu port area and into the Gulf of
Aden. The actual number of attacks could well be
higher: not all incidents will have been reported as
there is much illegal activity in Somali waters, and the
official statistics do not measure the impact of piracy
on Somali coastal trade. Some 16,000 ships a year pass
through the Gulf of Aden, carrying oil from the Middle
East and goods from Asia to Europe and North
America. So one of the most important trade routes in
the world is now threatened by the chronic instability
in Somalia.
Piracy has been a problem in Somali waters for at
least ten years. However, the number of attempted and
successful attacks has risen over the last three years
(see Figure 1). The only period during which piracy
virtually vanished around Somalia was during the six
months of rule by the Islamic Courts Union in the
second half of 2006. This indicates that a functioning
government in Somalia is capable of controlling piracy.
After the removal of the courts piracy re-emerged.With
little functioning government, long, isolated, sandy
beaches and a population that is both desperate and
used to war, Somalia is a perfect environment for piracy
to thrive.
Piracy in Somalia
‘ Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).
Piracy is considered to occur in international waters while Armed Robbery at Sea occurs in territorial waters or in port.
2 In their reports the ICC IMB split waters around Somalia into ‘Somalia’ and ‘Gulf of Aden’. This recognizes the overlap with Yemen in the Gulf of Aden. It is
possible, however, to speak of Somali piracy as encompassing both areas; some activity in the Gulf of Aden may originate from Yemen and Yemenis but the
overwhelming majority is Somali-run and -inspired. ICC IMB latest statistics available at www.icc-ccs.org.
3 ‘Somali pirates seize French yacht, 4 April 2008’, BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7331290.stm
Piracy around Somalia
How the pirates operate
Pirates operate using small skiffs with powerful
outboard engines that can be pulled up onto the beach.
These boats are fast and manoeuvrable but they lack
the range necessary for richer pickings. Pirates now
regularly use ‘mother ships’ to increase their range. The
IMB recently put out a warning identifying potential
mother ships.4 These are generally fishing trawlers that
the pirates capture closer to shore and then use as
staging posts for attacks further out to sea. Reports
from a Yemeni fishing vessel that appears to have been
used as a mother ship indicate that the pirates patrolled
the entrance to the Gulf of Aden in the captured vessel
and then deserted it in their skiffs once a suitable target
was spotted.5 The use of mother ships helps to explain
how pirates have managed to increase their range so
dramatically; the old warning to stay at least 50 nautical
miles from the coast has now been replaced by warnings
to stay at least 200 nautical miles away.6
It is generally thought that from sighting pirates to
being boarded takes approximately fifteen minutes.
Such a short space of time helps to explain why even
with international patrols in the area ships are still
captured. To prevent an attack a naval vessel would
need to be close and have a helicopter ready to go at
moment’s notice. This is not to say that prevention is
impossible: the USS Peleliu was able to scare pirates
away from the Gem of Kilakari on 8 August 2008 after
launching helicopters,7 but the Peleliu was only ten
miles away and able to respond quickly. In other
circumstances captains must take whatever evasive
action they can. In one instance a tugboat put itself into
a high-speed spin and continued until the attackers
gave up and left. Other less nauseous ways of
preventing boarding include sonic cannon and water
guns. Sonic cannon can only point in one direction,
however, so an attack by more than one skiff renders
them ineffective. The other serious complaint about
using non-lethal weapons to deter pirates is the lack of
protection they offer to crew members, who become
sitting targets for pirates with automatic weapons and
rocket launchers while operating the device.
It is possible to identify the factors that make a ship
more vulnerable: low sides, low speed, low crew
numbers and lack of adequate watch-keeping. Pirates
have consistently targeted ships with low sides
(including Le Ponant and the Danica White) as these
are easier to board from their own low skiffs. At
present it seems that scaling the high sides of large oil
tankers is beyond their capabilities. It should be
pointed out that this did not prevent them from taking
speculative pot shots at the Japanese tanker MV
Takayama with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).8
Low speeds also make a vessel more vulnerable; the
pirates’ small vessels can move fast and sluggish transport
tankers and pleasure yachts will have difficulty
evading determined attackers. There is little that a
ship-owner with a slow, low-sided ship can do in such
circumstances. But some problems can be ameliorated.
Low crew numbers have become increasingly common
as higher insurance premiums and fuel costs cut into
ship-owner’s margins. Without a full complement of
crew it is impossible to maintain a sufficient watch in
dangerous waters, making evasive measures less
effective.
Where the pirates originate
Puntland, the semi-autonomous region in the northeast
of the country, appears to be the base for most pirates
in Somalia. A small number of acts of piracy in the Gulf
of Aden may originate in Yemen but most illegal
activity originating there is connected to fishing and
4 IMB, Pictures of suspected pirate mother vessels, 13 August 2008. http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/piracy_al.php?newsid=20, accessed 21 August 2008.
5 Sa’eed Al-Batati, ‘The shadow of death in the Arabian Sea’, Yemen Times, available at: http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1169&p=report&a=2, accessed
21 August 2008.
6 IMB, http://www.icc-ccs.org/prc/piracyreport.php.
7 ‘U.S. Navy foils pirate attack on ship’, Chicago Tribune, 9 August 2008. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-pirates_wor_09aug09,0,6414894.story.
8 Johan Lillkung, ‘They opened fire with machine guns and rockets’, The Observer. 27 April 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/27/somalia.
protecting fishing grounds. Traditionally, most pirates,
including the infamous Afweyne, come from
Harardheere (Xaradheere) and Hobyo in Central
Somalia – although Afweyne is reportedly unlikely to be
involved in current operations. The Mayor of Eyl has
asserted that ‘the pirates who hijacked the ships are the
same ones who received ransom payments before’.9
This would support other reports that the pirates are
not engaged only in one-off attacks but are in the business
for the long term.
The fact that the pirates originate from Puntland is
significant as this is also the home region of President
Abdullahi Yusuf. As one expert said, ‘money will go to
Yusuf as a gesture of goodwill to a regional leader’10 – so
even if the higher echelons of Somali government and
clan structure are not directly involved in organizing
piracy, they probably do benefit.
Puntland is one of the poorest areas of Somalia, so
the financial attraction of piracy is strong. Somalia’s
fishing industry has collapsed in the last fifteen years
and its waters are being heavily fished by European,
Asian and African ships.11 Some pirates have claimed
that they are involved in protecting Somalia’s natural
resources and that ransom payments should be viewed
as legitimate taxation. Indeed the pirates captured by
France following the Le Ponant incident had a ‘manual
of good conduct’.12 In any case, in a region where legitimate
business is difficult, where drought means
agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming,
and instability and violence make death a very real
prospect, the dangers of engaging in piracy must be
weighed against the potentially massive returns. (An
unsubstantiated rumour offers a further hint as to the
emergence of piracy in Somalia and illustrates how
good intentions can backfire. In the 1990s a private
security firm had a contract to establish coastguard
facilities. The exercise fizzled out but some analysts
now trace the nautical skills of the pirates to that
experiment and anecdotal evidence suggests that
equipment meant for the coastguard has been used in
piracy expeditions. Captured sailors have also reported
that pirates who held them claimed to have been
former coastguards – see Box 1.)
The small village of Eyl and others right up to the tip
of Somalia have played host to many recently hijacked
ships. The pirates have generally taken captured vessels
to small ports like Eyl and held themthere until ransom
has been paid. The notable exception to this rule was
the case of Jürgen K. and Sabine M., the German
yachters taken into the mountains13 and held on land
for 41 days until they were released on 9 August
following a ransom payment believed to be between
half-a-million and one million dollars.14 Clearly, the
difference here was that the vessel itself held no value
but the two sailors did.
Ransoms
If Somalia provides the perfect environment for piracy,
it is the payment of massive ransoms that provides the
motivation. A few years ago ransoms were in the tens to
hundreds of thousands of dollars range. So far in 2008
they have hovered between half-a-million and two
million dollars, although recent reports indicate that
demands have again shot up; $3.5 million has been
demanded for the release of the MV Stella Maris which
has been held since 20 July.15 Total ransom payments
for 2008 probably lie in the range of US$18–30 million.
Inflation of ransom demands makes this an ever more
lucrative business. Shipping firms, and sometimes
governments, are prepared to pay these sums since they
are relatively small compared with the value of a ship,
let alone the life of crew members. The international
Piracy in Somalia
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9 ‘Somalia: pirates are stronger than us: Eyl Mayor’, Garoweonline.
10 Interview with author, August 2008.
11 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. 4th Chatham House Update and Stakeholder Consultation Meeting – Report, Chatham House, April 2008. Available
at http://www.illegal-fishing.info/item_single.php?item=event&item_id=136&approach_id=8.
12 Thierry Leveque, ‘Somali pirates tell French police of ‘sea militia’, Reuters. 17 April 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL17838540.
13 ’Uns geht es immer schlechter’, Der Spiegel, 22 July 2008.
14 ‘Somali pirates free two Germans’, BBC, 9 August 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7551298.stm.
15 Daniel Wallis, ‘Somali pirates want $8 mln to free three ships’, Reuters, 2 September 2008.
shipping association BIMCO has said that the payment
of ransoms has probably exacerbated the situation and
would prefer the industry not to pay, but it recognizes
that there is little alternative as long as any sort of
rescue or intervention is unlikely. As pirates become
more brazen, it seems unlikely that shipping firms will
be prepared to risk the loss of life and equipment for
the greater good.
New trends
The most noticeable change in the past year has been
the shift in the main area of activity. Whereas in 2007 a
lot of piracy was focused on Southern Somalia and
Mogadishu port where, according to the UNmonitoring
group, port officials helped facilitate several attacks,16
in 2008 the vast majority of attacks have taken place in
the Gulf of Aden. This makes sense since, as noted
above, the Gulf is a major shipping route with around
16,000 vessels passing through each year and offers
much richer pickings than Mogadishu. The funnel-like
shape of the Gulf also means that shipping is easier to
locate and hunt down than in the sea off Somalia’s
southern coast. As will be discussed below, this shift in
focus should be of great concern to the international
community.
The pirates have improved their equipment and now
use GPS systems and satellite phones. It is also likely
that they are plugged into an international network
that feeds information from ports in the Gulf, Europe
and Asia back to Somalia. All this, coupled with their
use of mother ships, now gives them a greater ability to
find and capture potential targets. Pirates are no
longer simply opportunists; their operations are
becoming increasingly sophisticated and are likely to
continue developing in this direction if responses do
not change. Establishing how organized the piracy
gangs are is difficult but the growth in activity in 2008
seems to indicate that this is becoming an increasingly
professional operation. Some reports say numbers of
pirates have increased from the hundreds to the thousands.
17
Worryingly, it appears that pirates are becoming
more aggressive; East Africa analysts report that pirates
are using MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence
Systems) in territorial waters and several recent reports
indicate that they have begun to use RPGs during their
attacks.18 In the past their method of attack was limited
to firing automatic weapons as they approached a vessel,
and the use of grenade launchers introduces a much
greater risk of loss of life and damage to property. The
firing of RPGs at tankers (such as at the Takayama)
should be a reason for grave concern, particularly
because of the risk of fire. In general captured crew are
well treated, although the enormous psychological
strain should not be underestimated, but two examples
demonstrate that there is nothing romantic about being
held by pirates. The two German yachters referred to
earlier reported that they had been beaten,19 and crew
aboard the Lehmann Timber reported that they lacked
food and water and that their captors were becoming
increasingly erratic as their captivity dragged on.20 The
first reported fatality was reported by the Malaysian
International Shipping Corporation (MISC) on 22
August 2008 after pirates had boarded a palm oil tanker
three days earlier.21
If pirates are becoming more ruthless it is likely to be
only a matter of time before more people are killed.
And operating in an area full of rich pickings and with
enormous rewards on offer seems likely to point to a
trajectory of increasing ruthlessness.
Piracy in Somalia
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16 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1766 (2007). 24 April 2008.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/290/68/PDF/N0829068.pdf?OpenElement.
17 ‘Somalia gunmen use piracy ransoms to fund insurgency’, Reuters, 25 August 2008.
18 ‘Pirates fire rockets at French boat far off Somalia’, Reuters, 14 September 2008. http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnLE339233.html.
19 ‘Somali pirates free two Germans’, BBC (see note 14 above).
20 ‘Fears grow for crew seized by Somali pirates’, Russia Today, 16 June 2008. http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/26220.
21 Soraya Permatasari, ‘MISC says there’s “casualty” among crew of hijacked tanker ship’, 22 August 2008.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aljFzZy9XIOs&refer=africa; and ‘Filipino sailor dies on hijacked tanker‘,The Star Online,
26 August 2008. http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/8/26/nation/20080826121000&sec=nation.
Piracy in Somalia
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The international response
The international community has made several attempts
to deal with the issue of piracy around Somalia. The most
successful has been escorts for World Food Programme
ships which had been unable to enter Somali waters until
France, Denmark, the Netherlands and most recently
Canada agreed to provide naval escorts from November
2007 to June 2008.22 A more general approach has focused
on Combined Taskforce 150 (CTF150), a coalition naval
taskforce covering the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman,
Box 1: A victim’s story
Captain Darch was the skipper of the Svitzer Korsakov when it was boarded by pirates on 1 February 2008. He and his five
crew mates were held for 47 days, until 18 March.
At about 3pm on Friday 1 February, seventy miles north of Cape Gwardafuy, I was alerted by a shout. On our starboard side were
five pirates in a six-metre white plastic boat powered by 48hp Yamaha engines. I thrashed the tug to the left, then right, forcing them
to sheer away. This cat and mouse game continued until another boat with four more approached. I knew we couldn’t avoid them so
I stopped our engine. The pirates next attempted to winch their boats to ours but only succeeded in dumping their spare ammunition
into the sea. Later the first onto to the bridge said; ‘I am Andrew and speak English. This is Omar, our Captain. Do as you are told.’
On the orders of ‘Capt. Omar’ we moved south. By late Sunday we arrived in Eyl where15 more pirates boarded our ship. From
then on around twenty were always aboard, including their personal Mullah. I convinced Omar to let us go north to Gabbac, a more
sheltered spot. One pirate called Ahmed told us he had been in the coastguard, and only Ahmed and one or two others who had also
been coastguards understood our engines. From then on we were trailed by a US warship and smaller Somali boats resupplied us.
The pirates, armed with AK47s, spent every day chewing khat. We survived on cigarettes, water, goat, camel’s milk and chapattis.
Our relationship with the pirates was mostly amicable except for one incident. Omar kept saying ‘go on – go on’ but the
anchorage wasn’t safe. He hit me across the back of my head. I said we wouldn’t go anywhere if he hit me again and he didn’t.
Later another man called Omar joined us. He said he was there to make sure we were looked after. During the ordeal, I lost weight
but was never really hungry. Genuinely, I think they just needed the money.
Ten days after our capture the Chief Engineer – Fred – and I hatched a plan. I tried to get a coded message to the Americans via
Copenhagen. At midnight on the 11th we blacked out the ship and blockaded ourselves into the ballast tank.We listened for the attack,
but all we could hear was the Somalis trying to get at us. At five in the afternoon we tried to give ourselves up but they had bolted us in.
We thumped on the door and they let us out at seven. After this we lost all our privileges and they followed us everywhere. Sometimes, as
time dragged on, the younger pirates suggested killing the Russians and sinking the boat. They thought Fred and I were more valuable.
Every day we talked about the ransom. Initially they asked for $2.5 million but Fred convinced them the company would never give
that much. During the negotiations one time the new interpreter (Geli), a schoolteacher, said: ‘Look, here this is your last chance –
give us the money in three days or the crew will be shot, you can put that in your pipe and smoke it.’ The negotiations were handled
by Control Risks who have experience at that. They later tried $900,000 but eventually settled for $678,000. The money was assembled
as cash in Dubai where they hoped a Somali businessman would handle the delivery for them, but no one would. In the end the
money came on a boat. It came alongside with the crew hidden. Our pirates went over and moved the money across. Now the pirates
had the boat, the crew and the money! All night the pirates divided the money between themselves. Most left in the morning but Omar
and the schoolteacher said it wasn’t safe for them to go ashore here, so we dropped them further north.
Next day we met up with the warship. I asked why they didn’t attack; one guy said they hadn’t received the message; another
said: ‘Even if we had received it we’d need an order from higher up to do anything.’ We were held for 47 days. We went from
Oman to Dubai, where we met our wives. I said it was the trip to end all trips but I’ve been on a few since then.
Source: Interview with the author, 15 September 2008.
22 WFP, Where we work – Somalia. http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=706.
www.chathamhouse.org.uk
page 8
Piracy in Somalia
Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. CTF150’s
primary responsibility is to assist in the ‘war on terror’, so
piracy is lower on their list of priorities. However some of
the roughly fifteen ships making up CTF150 have been
involved in deterring pirate attacks. To strengthen the
hand of international naval forces, on 2 June 2008 the UN
Security Council passed the US/France-sponsored resolution
1816 that gives foreign warships the right to enter
Somali waters ‘for the purposes of repressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea’ by ‘all necessary
means’.23 Themost recent initiative involves the establishment
of a ‘Maritime Security Patrol Area’ (MSPA) which
coalition navies will patrol. The hope is that shipping will
stay in these zones and hence be in range ofmilitary assistance
if they are threatened. To date these measures do
not seem to have had much impact, although it is too
early to comment on the efficacy of the MSPA.
The hijack of two Malaysian tankers prompted
Malaysia to send three ships to the Gulf of Aden in
September 2008; however, these will only have responsibility
for escorting MISC ships.24
In recent years India has begun to take a greater
interest in the African side of the Indian Ocean Rim for
a number of reasons including a desire to compete with
China, but the danger of piracy is also of concern.25 The
Indian navy has indicated a willingness to send support
to the Gulf of Aden.26 Indeed it has gone so far as to
remind the government that it is ready to help ships
carrying Indian nationals. However, analysts assert that
the Indian government is reluctant to involve itself with
the internal affairs of another country.27
To date France is the country that has taken the most
robust stand against piracy off Somalia. Following the
ransom payment and the release of Le Ponant, French
naval special forces tracked down and arrested six pirates
who are now awaiting trial in France. Again, when a
French pleasure yacht was captured on 2 September,
President Sarkozy authorized a successful assault on the
boat that rescued the sailors, killed one pirate and
captured the rest.28 Although French action is robust, it is
unlikely to act as a deterrent for future attacks since the
potential rewards of piracy still far outweigh the potential
risks. So far the two operations have not resulted in the
death of a hostage but that is a danger that must be
considered before future operations are launched.
Resources concentrated on preventing piracywill produce
greater benefits than those used on dramatic rescues.
The EU has established a mission under the ESDP
(European Security and Defence Policy) to provide a coordination
cell (EU NAVCO) for the fight against piracy.29
Coordination of the different naval and air assets in the
region could help to improve the efficacy of the fight against
piracy.However, at present this cell consists of Commander
Andres Breijo-Claur, seconded from the Spanish navy, and
only four others, who will receive only €60,000 to facilitate
theirwork.While it is to bewelcomed that the EUis taking
some action, and the difficulty in organizing common
defence action is recognized, this effortmay well turn out
to bemore symbolic than practical. The area of coordination
is one in which the EU could provide very useful
assistance if the cell is properly staffed and financed.
Why it matters to the international
community
There are deeper reasons why the international community
needs to take heed of this problem than simple law
enforcement. They can be divided into four areas:
what piracy does to Somalia;
what it does to international trade, especially oil;
the danger to the environment;
the potential terrorist threat.
23 UN SC Resolution 1816. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC,,SOM,,48464c622,0.html.
24 ‘Egyptian ship hijacked near Somalia’, AP, 5 September 2008.
25 Alex Vines and Bereni Oruitemeka, India’s Engagement with the African Indian Ocean Rim States. Chatham House Africa Programme Paper 08/01, 2008.
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/africa/papers/view/-/id/607/.
26 ‘India, Yemen Act to Combat Pirates’, Sail-World, 28 August 2008.
27 Interview with author, 22 September 2008.
28 Charles Bremner, ‘French special forces seize pirates in operation to free yacht hostages’, The Times, 17 September 2008.
29 Official Journal of the European Union L 252/39, 20 September 2008. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do.
What piracy does to Somalia
The danger of Somali waters in late 2007 forced the WFP
to suspend food deliveries by sea (delivery by land is just
as risky and is impractical for transporting large quantities
of food aid). According to the WFP, Somalia will
require at least 185,000 tonnes of food aid in 2008. This
was temporarily solved by the naval escorts for WFP
vessels mentioned above. TheWFP was forced to stop for
two months when the Netherlands completed its stint
until Canada announced that the HMCS Ville de Québec
would escort WFP deliveries. Without the naval escorts
and the regular delivery of food aid, Somalia’s food stocks
were seriously threatened. In a country without a functioning
central government that is suffering fromdrought
and war, and with over a million internally displaced
people,30 imported food aid is essential. The uncertainty
surrounding escorts for WFP ships needs to end and
escorts should be pledged in advance so that dangerous
gaps in food delivery can be avoided. If the international
community does only one thing, then ensuring the safe
delivery of food aid should be the priority.
Somalia is one of the most dangerous and violent
places in the world. Arms are freely available throughout
the country and there are almost daily reports of explosions,
murders, skirmishes, battles and kidnappings
across the country. While pirates themselves keep the
majority of the funds they generate, a significant amount
is passed on to important locals, some of whom are
involved in the ongoing war. These regular injections of
cash undoubtedly help to finance the war. Some reports31
link piracy money to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab,
which emerged as a youth militia during the rule of the
Islamic Courts and is now fighting an insurgency against
Ethiopian and government troops. Eradicating piracy
will not stop the war, but it may reduce the money available
for arms purchases.
The lack of maritime security also allows a busy
people- and arms-smuggling trade to flourish and
encourages illegal fishing in Somali waters. Greater
efforts by the international community to combat piracy
should have a positive impact in these areas as well.
What piracy does to international trade
Clearly a company whose cargo is prevented from
reaching its destination on time will lose money. Add to
this the cost of paying ransoms and already the damaging
economic effect of Somali piracy can be seen. The consequences
are not limited only to companies whose vessels
are hijacked; of wider concern is the growth of insurance
premiums for ships that need to pass through the Gulf of
Aden. The danger means that war risk insurance
premiums must now be paid: premiums are reported to
have risen tenfold in a year.32 If the cost of extra insurance
becomes prohibitive, or the danger simply too great,
shipping companiesmay avoid the Gulf of Aden and take
the long route to Europe and North America around the
Cape of Good Hope. Indeed this option is mentioned by
shipping industry insiders as a very real possibility. The
extra weeks of travel and fuel consumption would add
considerably to the cost of transporting goods. At a time
when the price of oil is a major concern, anything that
could contribute to a further rise in prices must be
considered very serious indeed.
Potential environmental catastrophe
Large oil tankers pass through the Gulf of Aden and the
danger exists that a pirate attack could cause amajor oil spill
in what is a very sensitive and important ecosystem. During
the attack on the Takayama the ship’s fuel tanks were
penetrated and oil spilled into the sea. The consequences
of amore sustained attack could bemuchworse.As pirates
become bolder and use ever more powerful weaponry a
tanker could be set on fire, sunk or forced ashore, any
of which could result in an environmental catastrophe
that would devastate marine and bird life for years to
come. The pirates’ aim is to extort ransom payments
and to date that has been their main focus; however, the
possibility that they could destroy shipping is very real.
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Piracy in Somalia
30 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Internal Displacement – Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2007, April 2008. http://www.internal-displacement.org/.
31 ‘Somalia gunmen’, Reuters, 25 August 2008 (see note 17 above).
32 Miles Costello, ‘Shipping insurance costs soar with piracy surge off Somalia’, The Times, 11 September 2008.
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4727372.ece.
Possible co-opting by international terrorist networks
The otherworst-case scenario is that pirates become agents
of international terrorism. It should be emphasized that to
date there is no firmevidence of this happening.However,
in a region that saw the attacks on the USS Cole, seaborne
terrorism needs to be taken very seriously. For example,
a large ship sunk in the approach to the Suez Canal would
have a devastating impact on international trade. Terrorism
at sea could take many forms: direct attacks on naval or
commercial shipping, such as the 6 October 2002 attack on
theMV Limburg,33hostages frompleasure boats being used
as bargaining chips for terrorists or high-profile victims
of an atrocity, and hijacked ships being used as floating
weapons. Terrorist networks could also use the financial
returns of piracy to fund their activities around the world.
The potentially massive consequences of this
scenario must be taken into account along with the
more likely scenario that piracy money is being routed
to Al-Shabaab.34 As has been seen over the last year,
pirates in Somalia have become ever more dangerous,
but it is impossible to tell what will happen next. It is
best to act to prevent the worst-case scenarios rather
than try to solve the problem once it has escalated.
Options for the international community
Although the international community must recognize
that only a political solution in Somalia offers a long-term
solution to the issue of piracy, it is also crucial to understand
that measures can be taken to improve the
situation while efforts continue towards a political settlement.
Set out below are a number of options that could be
considered by the international community, the African
Union and Somalia’s neighbours to reduce the risks of
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. It
may be that elements fromeach option could be adopted.
1. Organize shipping into a safe lane.
At the end of August 2008 coalition naval forces in the Gulf
of Aden announced that they had established a ‘Maritime
Security Patrol Area’ (MSPA) which would be patrolled by
coalition warships and aircraft. Following a standard route
shouldmake it easier for international forces in the area to
monitor shipping and respond to distress calls. Problems
with this approach arise if the international presence is too
light. Shipping organized in a lane would potentially offer
an easier target for pirates and, as one senior naval
commander explained, ‘the pirates will just change their
tactics’. The approach will also fail to reduce the danger for
ships steaming north-south rather than east-west.
However, this move is to be welcomed. The international
community should recognize that even if attacks decrease
the threat will not have disappeared, and it will need to
remain vigilant until Somalia has a full political settlement.
2. Provide a coastguard for Somalia.
In the absence of a reliable and long-term government of
Somalia it is unlikely that the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) has the capacity to operate effective
coastguard facilities. An effective option may be to create
an internationally sanctioned and administered coastguard
for Somalia. This could be run by the UN or African
Union and established with external funds. The cost of
running a coastguard could be met, at least in part, from
collecting fishing dues and import revenue. The money
and the force could be held in trust for Somalia. Clearly
lessons can be learned from the previous experience of
private military companies trying to provide maritime
security (see Box 2); hence this option would need to be
firmly under the control of an international body.
3. A large naval presence
A proposal popular for its simplicity and straightforwardness
is for the deployment of amuch largermultinational
naval force in the Gulf of Aden and along the Somali coast
with a specific mandate to combat piracy. At present the
12–15 ships of Combined Taskforce 150 are primarily
involved in the war on terror and combating piracy is an
ancillary concern. A much larger dedicated fleet would be
likely to reduce the incidence of piracy but is almost
certainly prohibitively expensive. It seems more realistic
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Piracy in Somalia
33 ‘Yemen ship attack “was terrorism”’, BBC,13 October 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2324431.stm.
34 ‘Somalia gunmen’, Reuters, 25 August 2008 (see note 18 above).
to hope for some augmentation of the current force to
patrol the MSPA and perhaps the ongoing discussions in
Europe and India will produce such a result.
4. Pay no ransoms
This option has been suggested by the shipping industry.
Certainly it seems likely that if ransompayments stopped,
the incentives to be involved in piracy would decrease.
Two problems are evident here. The first is that there is no
reason why pirates would not change their tactics and,
copying examples fromIndonesia and elsewhere, begin to
see the value not in ransom but in capturing ships and
creating phantom ships, where a stolen ship is re-registered
and used to carry new cargoes which are then
stolen,35 or simply targeting vessels to steal their cargo.
The second problem is of course that non-payment could
very well include the loss of life. It seems unlikely that any
shipping company wants to be the first to refuse to pay
when the price could be so high. However, a concerted
effort to deflate prices (there is no need to pay exactly
what is demanded) could have a positive impact.
5. Do nothing
Accepting that the only real solution lies in a political
solution inside Somalia, the international community
could calculate that some forty ships captured out of
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Piracy in Somalia
Box 2: Private security and Somali piracy
Private security firms have a long history of involvement in attempting to combat Somali piracy. To date, however, none have been
very effective and in the majority of cases it is hard to see that anything at all was achieved.
Secopex
This French private security firm signed an agreement in May 2008 with TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf to provide maritime security
for Somalia and a bodyguard for the president. The TFG insists that the deal will be paid for by the international community,
but so far the $50–200 million needed has not been forthcoming.
Topcat
In November 2005 the TFG signed a $50 million or $55 million contract with the US security firm Topcat to target ‘mother ships’
being used by Somali pirates. The chief executive of Topcat told the BBC, ’We will end the piracy very quickly; there is no question
about that’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4471536.stm). Topcat’s deployment was blocked by the US State Department,
which judged that it would breach the arms embargo on Somalia.
Al-Habiibi Marine Service
This Saudi-based company was appointed by the government of Puntland in December 2005. However its employees were
unable to take up their positions in Somalia.
SOMCAN – Somali Canadian Coastguard
SOMCAN held a contract from the government of Puntland from 2002 to 2005 to provide coastguard facilities for Puntland. Its
effectiveness was called into question as three of the company’s employees were sentenced to ten years in jail in Thailand for
piracy, although they claimed to have been protecting a Thai fishing boat.
Puntland International Development Corporation
PIDC was contracted in 2000 by the government of Puntland to combat piracy. It subcontracted the work to Hart Security.
HART Security
Hart undertook to provide training for a 70-man maritime force in Puntland from November 1999. A vessel was secured and arms
were procured through local arms markets. Hart staff took up residence in Somalia. The scheme was supposed to be funded
through the collection of fishing dues. Hart wrapped up its operations in June 2002 when it became unclear if a new administration
in Puntland had the authority to honour their contract.
35 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism – The Threat to International Security. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2007, pp. 36–7
16,000 is such a small number that the resources
required to protect them would be wasted. However, as
we have seen, the issue of piracy is not divorced from
Somalia’s internal problems, and the potential for an
environmental disaster, a terrorist attack or major
disruption of trade and subsequent increase in oil
prices makes the case for preventative action a strong
one.
Conclusion
Whatever the international community decides to do, it
must not be at the expense of efforts to secure a political
solution inside Somalia. Themost powerful weapon
against piracy will be peace and opportunity in
Somalia, coupled with an effective and reliable police
force and judiciary. Containing or ignoring Somalia
and its problems is not an option that will end well.
Piracy is a very real threat to seafarers, the shipping
industry, the environment, international trade and
most of all Somalia and Somalis. There is no single
solution, but this paper has highlighted some of the
actions that may assist in reducing the threat.
If nothing else, it is essential that the international
community formulate a plan to ensure that the supply
of food aid to Somalia is not interrupted. In the next
three months it is of paramount importance that a
replacement for Canada is found to escortWFP ships. If
there is no permanent solution to the issue of escorting
WFP ships, then Somalis will starve and the already
severe problems in the region are likely to get worse.
The international community cannot view the issue
of Somali piracy as a sideline issue. The danger that
international shipping will avoid the Gulf of Aden and
that the subsequent increased costs will be passed on to
consumers should be of grave concern during a time of
economic uncertainty. The potential environmental
damage from a botched attack could be catastrophic
and long-lasting. And if the nightmare scenario occurs
and Somali pirates become tools of international
terrorism, failure to act now will seem very reckless.
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Piracy in Somalia
Chatham House has been the home of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs for over eight decades.
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world for all.
Roger Middleton is a consultant researcher working for
the Africa Programme at Chatham House. He specializes
in the politics of the Horn of Africa, African peace and
security architecture and Africa’s relations with the EU.
This paper is the first publication in a proposed project
on ‘Addressing maritime insecurity in Africa’.
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