Saturday, February 11, 2012

Biimal Dir Clan History Notes Revolt of Dir against Italians

Giacomo Trevis

Giacomo Trevis (nato a Roma il 19 maggio1869 morto a Merka il 12 febbraio 1897) prestò il servizio militare come tenente di complemento. Congedatosi, andò a lavorare presso un istituto bancario romano. Nel 1893 Vincenzo Filonardi, che si trovava a Roma per la costituzione della Compagnia per la Somalia Italiana, lo assunse e lo inviò a Zanzibar per dirigere in sua vece la direzione dell’ufficio della Compagnia e il R. Consolato italiano. In questa sede strinse amicizia con Ugo Ferrandi, Francesco Querini, Vittorio Bottego, Antonio Cecchi e tanti altri connazionali con i quali si prodigò con passione. In seguito si trasferì a Mogadiscio, Gheledi (fu il primo italiano a mettere piede in questa località somala lontana dalla costa dove i bianchi non erano di solito graditi) e Brava. Qui dovette fare un po’ di tutto: “dunque, ricapitolando: statista, architetto, ingegnere, idraulico, stratega. Mi pare che basti!”, come scrisse scherzosamente alla famiglia. Nell’ottobre 1896 prese la direzione della città portuale di Merka. Un mese dopo avvenne a Lafolé la strage della spedizione diretta da Antonio Cecchi, dal quale in quel periodo dipendeva. Cecchi e i suoi compagni della nave Volturno subirono un mortale agguato. A Merka non vi era mai stato prima del Trevis un altro residente italiano, quindi questi si trovò in un ambiente ostile in quanto prevenuto sia contro chi si sapeva essere un nemico dei possessori di schiavi sia per essere un europeo. Il 9 febbraio 1897, subito dopo essere sceso dalla R. N. Staffetta, fu aggredito da un somalo Bimal e pugnalato al fianco destro. La scorta uccise il suo assassino. Trevis si spense dopo tre giorni di agonia. Il fratello Renato divenne tenutario dei suoi documenti, che utilizzò nell’articolo Sulle orme della seconda spedizione Bottego “Da Brava a Lugh” pubblicato nel giugno 1931 nella prestigiosa Rivista delle Colonie Italiane e che fornì allo studioso Eugenio G. Del Monte per il dettagliato saggio biografico Un pioniere africano “Giacomo Trevis” apparso nel 1930 in due puntate nella stessa rivista.



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''Obituary: Antonio Cecchi
The Geographical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Feb., 1897), p. 230.
Jstor


Antonio Cecchi.
The well-known Italian explorer, Antonio Cecchi, has, together with various
officers and men of the Italian gunboats Volturno and Stafletta, lately fallen a
victim to the treachery of the Somalis of the Benadir coast, of which he was
administrator. During a trip towards the Webi Shebeli, the party was suddenly
attacked by night, and, after expending most of its ammunition, was obliged to beat
a retreat, amidst renewed attacks by the Somalis. All the officers lost their lives,
and only three men succeeded in reaching Mogdishu. Cecchi was best known
for his journey to Abyssinia and the Galla countries between the years 1877 and
1882. The expedition, as at first constituted, was nominally under the command
of the Marquis Antinori, Cecchi being entrusted with the astronomical and meteorological
observations ; but of the five Europeans who took part in it, only Cecchi
and Dr. Chiarini proceeded beyond Shoa, the latter subsequently dying of fever,
while the former spent several years as a prisoner in the southern Galla countries
before returning to the coast. The results of this journey were published in two
octavo volumes at Rome in 1886, followed in 1887 by a third dealing with the
topographical surveys. Cecchi was afterwards for some years Italian consul at
Aden, and since 1890 had held a similar post at Zanzibar, where he was universally
respected and beloved.''

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The Italian expansion which culminated in their first expedition into the interior of Benadir was succesfully halted a mere 12 miles out of the city and lead to the death of the man who spearheaded Italian expansion into Somalia.

In the coming installment I'll show how the Somali groups in Benadir first viewed the slow Italian encroachment on the Benadir coast and how the Lafole event sparked the fire of resistance in Benadir and Southern Somalia.

Read:
- Italian Colonialism in Somalia by Robert L. Hess. 1966
- The Shaping of Somali Society, Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900 by Lee V Cassanelli. 1982
-Somali Sultanate, The Geledi City-State over 150 years by Virginia Luling. 2002
-journals about history on Jstor.


For the Murder of Italians at Magadoxo, Africa.

Rome, Dec. 3.—In the chamber of Deputies today the Marquis Visconti Venosti, Minister of Foreign Affaires, confirmed the reports from Zanzibar of the murder of the Italian Consul, Signor Cecchi, the Captains, and a number of officers of the Italian warships Volturno and Staffeta, and the wounding of 100 or more other Italians by Somalis at Magadoxo. The men had fallen into an ambuscade and were attacked without warning.
The Government , the Minister said, would take energetic measures to punish the Somalis who were guilty of the outrage.
The Marquis said that the confirmatory reports showed that fourteen Italians had been killed, together with a number of the escorts of the Italians whose caravan was attacked during the night. Twenty-seven bodies were recovered by a rescue party when hurried to the scene from Magadoxo when the news of fighting reached there. The rescuers arrested a number of the Somalis who participated in the massacre and punished them appropriately. Many of the Somalis tribesmen were also killed by the Italians in the fight that followed the attack on the caravan.

The New York Times
Published: December 4, 1986


In October 1923, De Vecchi di Val Cismon became the first fascist Governor of Somalia marking a change in Italian strategy in the Horn of Africa. De Vecchi set out to exterminate all who opposed his government’s desire for total control over what fascist propaganda called ‘La Grande Somalia’. However, the Somalis were heavily armed and led by men who had been given advanced training during the preparation for the First World War. An estimated 16,000 rifles were in Somali hands. The Governor’s first task, therefore, was to order the confiscation of arms and ammunition from the Somalis, particularly from the clans in the inter-riverine region. In March 1924, Sheikh Hassan Barsane, a leader of the Shabelle valley movement known as the Barsane Revolt, convoked a Shir (meeting of elders) where the participants, inflamed with millenarian zeal, denounced the Governor’s order. On behalf of the Shir, Barsane wrote the following to the Governor:
In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful ... I have received your letter and understood its contents, but must advise that we cannot obey your orders and join with you in a covenant . . . Your government has its laws, and we have ours. We accept no law other than ours. Our law is the law of Allah and his Prophet . . . We are not like other people, none of us has ever enrolled in the Zaptie (colonial forces), never! ... and if you come to our land to fight against us, we will fight you with all possible means ... The world is very close to its end, only 58 years remain. We don’t want to stay in this world. It is better to die while defending our laws.
After some initial success, the Somali resistance crumbled when Barsane was captured by the Italians on 4 April.

:The Storm of the Resistance gathers strength

As became clear from the NY times report (see page 3) on the ‘Lafole Massacre’, the Italian minister of Foreign Affaires commented on the ‘Lafole Massacre’ that the Italian government would take ‘energetic measures’ to punish the Somalis who were 'guilty of the outrage'.
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Now let us discuss these ‘energetic measures’ the Italian government wanted to take, and see whether they could stem the coming tide of the monsoon storm of resistance headed towards the Benadir coast region. As mentioned in part 4, the Italian foreign minister immediately appointed Commander Giorgio Sorrentino as royal commissioner extraordinary for the Benadir. His mission was as Robert L. Hess writes in his book ‘Italian colonialism in Somalia’:

''Sorentino was instructed 'above all to provide for the security and tranquillity of the region’ After a complete investigation of the causes of the attack at Lafolé, he was to take whatever steps should appear indispensable for our dignity and for the security of the colony’’

This investigation would be completed within ten days which was around February 1897 (see part 4). The conclusion Sorrentino drew from the investigation was as follows: ''Within ten days he had determined that Lafolé was neither the precursor of a general urprising against the Italians nor an Ethiopian ambush but an isolated case of action by Wadan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi; who had been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu’’ (Robert L. Hess)

The conclusion Sorrentino drew was that the guilty ones were Wacdaan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi, which meant that these tribesmen would be punished as the Italian foreign minister said in the NY Times report. Also Sorrentino believed that these tribesmen have been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu. These Arabs were Abu Bakr Bin Awod, Filonardi’s interpreter and a certain Islam bin Muhammed.
The first thing, Sorrentino did was arresting Abu Bakr, while Islam bin Muhammed disappeared from the Benadir coast. The second thing, Sorrentino did was to plan a punitive expedition against the Somalis who were 'guilty of the outrage'. For this he had ordered two companies of Eritrean askaris. In the meantime, Sorrentino, researched the conditions prevailing in the Benadir, where he discovered the widespread practice of slavery and domestic servitude. But he could not do something about it, since obviously this meant distrubting the whole plantation economy of the South.

''Under the circumstances-the already difficult relations with the interior tribes- Neither Dulio nor Sorrentino could act immediately against slavery. Such action would have committed the Italians to a costly undertaking of doubtful outcome, a risk that Sorrentino had been ordered not to take.’’ (Robert L. Hess)

Sorrentino and Dulio, the Benadir Company's commissioner, had to content themselves with the expected punitive expedition against the tribes in the interior. Sorrentino was pleased at the prospect of this punitive expedition as he thought of the Somalis as: ‘liars, thieves, and murderers’ A clear grudge from the ‘Lafole massacre’
He wrote in his book Ricordi del Benadir: ‘We’ve got a nasty cat to skin!, May God protect us!’

In March the reinforcements of the two companies of Eritrean askaris finally arrived, and the Italians completed their plans for the punitive expedition against the Wacdaan and Geledi.
On April 20, almost 5 months after the Lafole attack, Sorrentino led his expedition inland and burned first Lafole and then several other villages associated with the Geledi and Murusade clan. The religious settlement of Nimow from where Sheekh Axmed Xaaji preached his religious message, was also bombarded by an Italian warship.

''The Italian bombardment of the small coastal village of Nimow in retaliation for Cecchi’s death marked the first such colonial action against a Somali civilian population.’’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians were joyful about these ‘energetic measures’ against the Somalis who were found guilty. Surprisingly, the Italians thought that these measures would solve everything and concluded that the Sorrentino expedition was a success:

''With Abu Bakr arrested, the Ethiopians in voluntary retreat, Lafole avenged, and leaders of Somali opposition deported, Sorrentino had virtually accomplished his mission by the end of April’’ (Robert L. Hess)


The deported leaders were Hussein Dera of Mogadishu and other Somalis for collaboration with the Ethiopians and instigation of Somali attacks on trading caravans between Lugh and the Coastal towns. Although these punitive expeditions looked impressive, they had no lasting effect, as it further antagonized the Wacdaan and Geledi clans. Also, it became clear that the two Arabs had no influence whatsoever on the clans of the interior, and thus were not the source of opposition to the Italian presence.

''The impression made by the punitive expedition after Lafolé could hardly have been called lasting'' (Robert L. Hess)

This seems to be the case, since the Italians retreated to the coastal cities after the expedition.

''In the decade following the Lafoole incident, the Italians remained at the coast, their colonial policy marked by uncertainty and indecision. Their only major venture into the interior was the establishment of a garrison of Arab soldiers at Baardheere in 1902’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Also, in the book 'Italian colonialism in Somalia' of Robert L Hess, it becomes clear that the punitive expedition to avenge the Lafole attack was not followed by other expeditions into the interior.

''We make no expeditions against tribes guilty (of hostilities) but arrest individuals of that tribe who happen to be in town; (this policy) has persuaded the Bimal and the Somali of Mogadishu that we are not strong''

It thus becomes clear that the Italians retreated to the Coast, and only were visible in the cities of Merca, Mogadishu, Barawe and Warsheekh.

In Somali Sultanate, Virginia Luling also talks about the consequences of Lafole attack, in which she writes: ''On the Italian side, though the repercussions of the disaster delayed by three years the formation of the Benadir Company, in the long run it reinforced the conviction that it was necessary to take military control of the hinterland.’’

What made the punitive expedition not effective on the long run? Why did the Italians retreat to the Coast?
To answer these questions we need to know how the different Somali groups in Benadir responded to the Lafole attack.

''It is clear from colonial reports and from Somali oral recollections that Lafoole precipated a response from all the districts of the hinterland'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

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-To start with the Geledi Sultanate,

The Sultan of Geledi, Sultan Osman, as already discussed in the previous parts, wanted to accomodate the Italian presence on the Benadir coast. Cecchi apparently went to conclude a treaty with the Sultan, in order to penetrate the interior of the Benadir region. The Lafole episode came suddenly, and the Italians mounted their revenge expedition. As a consequence, Sultan Osman quickly succumbed to the Italian pressure and signed a treaty of peace with the Italians.

''The encounter with the Italians subdued the sultan of Geledi, who quickly signed a treaty of peace and pledged obedience to the Italian government'' (Robert L. Hess).

This however did not mean that the Geledi people supported the Italian penetration of the Benadir coast, or accepted the Sultan's treaty with the Italians.
The young people of Geledi were fiercely opposed to the Italians and also played a role in the Lafoole attack.

''Acting-Governor Dulio felt that the young men of Geledi were fiercely opposed to the Italian presence, whereas their elders wanted some sort of accommodation'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Besides the young men, the uncle of Sultan Osman, and others felt that if the sultan wavered in his resistance, Gobroon authority would be weakened for good. This was true, since many from Adawiin lineage, whose religious prestige among the Geledi was second only to the Gobroon, preached a policy of non-accommodation.
The reasons why the Sultan of Geledi succumbed to the Italians were varied. One of them was that Sultan Osman himself considered the possibility of shoring up his waning power through an alliance with the Italians.

The only articulated fierce opposition to the Italians from the Geledi was from the leader of a jamaaca (religious settlement) of the Ahmediya. This leader was Shaykh Abiker Ali Jelle, a member of the sultan’s own Gobroon lineage.

''When Abiker began to preach outright opposition to the colonials sitting threateningly on the coast, he was forced by the Geledi elders to leave the district’’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

This shows on which side the elders stood, and how they along with the Sultan were hesitant to join the resistance and thought accommodation was the best option for the group’s interest. We will see in later installments whether this actually was the case.

-The Wacdaan response:

As already discussed in the previous parts, the Wacdaan were from the beginning fiercely opposed to the Italian penetration of the Benadir. This fierce opposition culminated in the attack of Lafole, in which mainly Wacdaan warriors along with a few Murusade and Geledi warriors, attacked the Cecchi expedition and killed all but three men.
The Italians directed their anger and revenge on mainly this group, by burning Lafole to the ground and bombarding the coastal village of Nimow from the sea. The Sorrentino expedition, with the Italian troops already based in Benadir port-cities and the reinforcements of the two Eritrean Askari companies, was also mainly directed at punishing the Wacdaan and their allies.

These punitive measures however did not subdue the Wacdaan. Instead the Wacdaan remained harassing Italian presence on the Benadir coast by attacking caravans to the Benadir port-cities, organising blockades of the caravan routes that went through their territory to Mogadishu.

''Now the Wacdaan were beginning to blockade the caravan routes that ran through their territory to the coast'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians sought to divide the Wacdaan and persuade sections of the group to submit peacefully. As said earlier the most numerous and militarily strongest section of Wacdaan, the Abubakar (Abukar?) Moldheere were lead by the famous Hassan Hussein, the fierce anti-‘infidel’ leader who along with Sheekh Axmed Xaaji articulated the opposition to the Italian penetration of the Benadir coast. This section of Wacdaan could not be persuaded, and continued to fight the Italians to the bitter end. The other section, the Mahad Moldheere, began slowly to depart from the rest of Wacdaan. They too participated in the Lafole attack, but started to move to the side of the Geledi. This was not suprising since they inhabited the territory contiguous to Afgooye and the fertile lands around Adadleh.

''Their interests coincided more with those of the agricultural Geledi. However, their smaller numbers gave them less influence in Wacdaan clan councils, which came to assume greater importance for policymakers as the Wacdaan began to act independently of the Geledi. While the Mahad Moldheere apparently cooperated in the Lafoole siege, their leader Abiker Ahmed Hassan subsequently struck an independent diplomatic stance.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

When in 1899 the Italians demanded forty hostages to be surrendered to the authorities in Muqdisho as a sign of Wacdaan submission, only the Mahad Moldheere responded. Their leader Abiker became a stipended official, which enhanced his standing among those of pacific persuasion.
The Abubakar Moldheere refused to send the twenty representatives demanded of them and for some years remained openly defiant of Italian authority.

''They continued to attack caravans and occasionally to boycott the market of Muqdisho. There is some evidence to suggest that feuding within the Wacdaan increased after this rift between the two major lineages’( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Biyamaal response:

The Biyamaal were one of the first group to express their support for the Wacdaan in the lafole attack. They boycotted the markets of Merca, and the northern Biyamaal even collaborated with Hassan Husein of the Wacdaan. This collaboration led to the Biyamaal becoming also a target of punitive expeditions.

''After the Lafoole episode, several Biimaal sections boycotted the market of Marka to express their support for the Wacdaan action. The northern Biimaal collaborated with Hassan Hussein of Lafoole in cutting off land communications between Muqdisho and Marka.'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians also targeted the Biyamaal for their support to the Wacdaan. In this they seized Jeziira, 13 miles south of Mogadishu.

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These were the immediate responses of the Italian colonialists and the different Somali groups to the Lafole episode.

These actions and reactions would accelerate in the coming years, as the Italians were determined to colonize Benadir coast as the springboard for the eventual colonization of the rest of Southern Somalia. In this, the Italians would target the two most fiercest resistance groups in the Benadir: the Wacdaan and Biyamaal, who were already allied in their economic sanctions and operations to distrubt the lines of supplies and communication of the Italians in Mogadishu. As will become clear in the next installments the Italians would target the very foundation of the Wacdaan and Biyamaal power: their means of production and thus means of power-->the plantation economy of the Benadir coast.

In the next installment the plantation economy of the Benadir coast and Southern Somalia will be discussed and the Italian strategy to undermine this by their anti-slavery campaign.

This strategy of directly targeting the foundations of the Benadir agricultural society and thus the power of the two most fiercest resistance groups against Italian pentration of the Benadir coast would trigger the monsoon Storm of Resistance that struck the Benadir coast region.



''Southern Somali history is Ajuuraan and Silcis, then Geledi. Geledi are king of kings, every clan in the south knows.''

Here you discharge the centuries old alliance between Geledi and Wacdan by claiming all credit. Weren't Wacdan with you when the Silcis were defeated, the Wacdaan themselves claim to be the ones that defeated them while the Geledi also do the same.

Also, weren't Biyamaal powerful enough to never have submitted to the dominance of Geledi, and even killed Sultan Yusuf and his son at the zenith of Geledi power?

Anyways, never become like the one who is sweettalking to you, never monopolize history and run away with all the fame. If your people behaved in this way, there would not be an alliance that lasted centuries.


''The first thing, Sorrentino did was arresting Abu Bakr, while Islam bin Muhammed disappeared from the Benadir coast''

After that I discuss the socalled punitive actions the Italians took in which they thought they could destroy the Resistance since the ''Osama Binladen and Al-Zahawari'' were taken care of along with the burning of several villages and coastal towns.

''In March the reinforcements of the two companies of Eritrean askaris finally arrived, and the Italians completed their plans for the punitive expedition against the Wacdaan and Geledi.
On April 20, almost 5 months after the Lafole attack, Sorrentino led his expedition inland and burned first Lafole and then several other villages associated with the Geledi and Murusade clan. The religious settlement of Nimow from where Sheekh Axmed Xaaji preached his religious message, was also bombarded by an Italian warship.''


These actions along with the dealing of the two arab men would have stopped the Resistance if it was that simple as SB and co believe, but this is far from the truth. The Resistance was just sparked off, with the powerful Biyamaal been drawn in the Resistance alongside Wacdaan and allies.

As both Robert L Hess and Lee V. Cassanelli acknowledge, the ''punitive actions'' had nearly any effect on the morale of the Resistance, it only reinforced the groups involved and drew the powerful Biyamaal ever closer to the side of the Resistance.

''The impression made by the punitive expedition after Lafole could hardly have been called lasting'' (Robert L. Hess)

''In the decade following the Lafoole incident, the Italians remained at the coast, their colonial policy marked by uncertainty and indecision. Their only major venture into the interior was the establishment of a garrisson of Arab soldiers at Baardheere in 1902'' (Lee V. Cassanelli )

In another passage, Robert L. Hess writes about the Italian commanders remark:

''We make no expeditions against tribes guilty (of hostilities) but arrest individuals of that tribe who happen to be in town; (this policy) has persuaded the Bimal and the Somali of Mogadishu that we are not strong''

It thus becomes clear that the Italians retreated to the Coast, and only were visible in cities/towns like Mogadishu, Merca, Warsheekh and Baraawe.

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For more detailed picture just read Ch5 on page 5 and see who is distorting historical events by photo-copying some pieces as indha-sircaad without looking at the matter seriously and turning a couple of pages around to get a fuller picture. At least I discuss the Lafole event comprehensively.


PS:

One last comment,

On page 215 of the book written by Lee V. Cassanelli, we can see what the reasons were behind the Wacdaan decision to resist. SB and co have presented a silly argument that two arab men ''outsmarted'' the Wacdaan into fighting the Italians, this argument has already been shown to be silly and a blatant lie and distortion of events.

Lets see what Lee V. Cassanelli writes on page 215:

''Two factors bearing heavily on Wacdaan attidutes toward the colonial presence were the internal struggle for leadership, and the economic dislocation brought about by the abolition of the slavery and by the famine years of 1889-95''

It continues, on the same page:

''The dry years of the 1890s only exacerbated the economic situation: it was reported in 1898 that one-half of the Wacdaan population had been forced to abandon its home territory for pastures further inland. Apart from weakening their bonds with the Geledi, these developments, we can surmise, made the Wacdaan extremely fearful of any further threat to their land and well-being. They were, moreover, the first Somalis whose territory was actually invaded by colonial soldiers at the time of Cecchi expedition''

From the above pieces it becomes clear that Wacdaan had various reasons to resist, like their traditional fierce anti-infidel attidute, the hard economic situation around 1890s, combined with the famine years of 1889-95, the abolition of the slavery (the destruction of their means of production) etc etc. So to reduce all these factors into: ''two arab men tricked them and outsmarted them to fight the Italians'' is really chidlesh thinking. And I am not even surprised as the one who makes this argument. What actually surprises me is why I even take the time to respond. But its my duty to educate my fellow Somali people who are still reasoning like kids.
Last edited by Somaliweyn on Fri Mar 21, 2008 2:33 pm, edited

Like for example that the Sultan of Geledi started to accomodate the Italians and started to establish friendly relationshops with the Italian governors of Mogadishu.

Also, I discuss how this combined with the fierce anti-infidel mentality of Wacdaan lead to the alliance been cooled of.

Lee V. Cassanelli writes (for the owners of the book see page 209)

''In fact, the sultan was in a difficult position. Within his own Gobroon lineage, advisers were urging him to stand against the Italians and so restore his prestige among nearby clans who were fearful of the foreigners. Geledi's long-time allies the Wacdaan had apparently acted independently at Lafoole; and they had been assisted by a handful of warriors from the Murursade, also Geledi allies. Now the Wacdaan were beginning to blockade the caravan routes that ran through their territory to the coast. Osman's uncle and others felt that if the sultan wavered in his resistance, Gobroon authority would be weakened for good''

If we analyze this issue further (unlike the indha-sircaad of one page) and go to page 215, about Wacdaan we can see clearly that the alliance cooled off since the Wacdaan (the largest sections) were determined to resist, while the only section that followed Geledi were the Mahad Moldheere (smaller section) who shared more with Geledi since they were farmers etc.

''Apart from weakening their bonds with the Geledi, these developments, we can surmise, made the Wacdaan extremely fearful of any further threat to their land and well-being.'' Page 215, book of Lee V. Cassanelli.

So there goes silly argument nr1.

If we go further to argument nr2, we can see evidence that only reinforces what has been told in this topic.

For example, if we again go to page 5, chapter 5 we can see that the Italians sought to divide the Wacdaan and persuade sections of the group to submit peacefully. This is nothing new in Colonial warfare and strategy (divide and conquer strategy). They succeeded in luring one section which was called Mahad Moldheere. The most numerous and militarily strongest section of Wacdaan, the Abubakar Moldheere stood their ground and continued to resist. See page 5, chapter 5, the Response of Wacdaan.

Also, the reason why Mahad Moldheere was bribed was because they inhabited the territory contiguous to Afgooye and the fertile lands around Adadleh. They shared more with the Geledi (farmers) then with the fierce pastoralists of Benadir like Biyamaal and Wacdaan (Abubakar Moldheere).

''Their interests coincided more with those of the agricultural Geledi. However, their smaller numbers gave them less influence in Wacdaan clan councils, which came to assume greater importance for policymakers as the Wacdaan began to act independently of the Geledi. While the Mahad Moldheere apparently cooperated in the Lafoole siege, their leader Abiker Ahmed Hassan subsequently struck an independent diplomatic stance'' (Lee V. Cassanelli,page 216)

This quotation kills two birds with one stone.

ON the one hand it SHOWS that Wacdaan and Geledi alliance cooled off, and that the Wacdaan acted independently since they wanted to resist while the Sultan of Geledi wanted to accomodate and collaborate with the Italians.

ON the other hand it SHOWS that the Italians divided the Wacdaan, and that they could only bribe one calool-u-shaqeyste (opportunist) called Abiker Ahmed Hassan, and that they could convince Mahad Moldheere (minority section of Wacdan) using this opportunist that they should not resist. In this they succeed since the Mahad Moldheere shared more with the Geledi and saw the Geledi not resisting, hence they diverged from their Wacdaan brothers that went ahead in the Resistance.

After the Italians fully colonized Somalia and crushed all resistance coming from various Somali groups, the collaboreters (traitors) were treated good, while the brave ones who resisted were reduced in numbers and power. Hence why the minority section Mahad Moldheere in the 1960s (after a half century of Italian preferential treatment since they collaborated with the Italians) became powerfull and rose in status.

''In the early 1960s, a man of the Mahad Moldheere was recognized as titular head of all the Wacdaan'' ( Lee V. Cassanelli, page 217)

Doesn't this support all the other evidences presented so far in this topic? Isn't there so far consistency in the discussion of Axad Shiiki?

Now, who is distorting historical events by indha-sircaad (photo-copying) and by his biased (even envious and hateful) attidute?



LA COLONIA SOMALA
Dubat-i Bersaglieri neri
SOMALIA: UN PAESE INVENTATO.
Poche settimane dopo l'occupazione di Massaua, il Regio Avviso "Barbarigo" (nave) ebbe l'ordine di recarsi a Zanzibàr (isola), di visitare le coste di terraferma dipendenti dall'omonimo sultanato (protettorato inglese) e di esplorare le foci del Giuba (fiume). La missione: avviare col sultano negoziati per un trattato commerciale. L'incarico fu affidato al Cap. Antonio Cecchi e al comandante della nave. Nel maggio del 1885 veniva concluso il primo accordo commerciale col sultano. Ulteriori accordi portarono poi all'affitto del Benadir (la fascia di costa meridionale con le città di Mogadiscio e Brava) tramite le imprese private di Filonardi e la Società del Benadir creata appositamente. Ricordiamo che l'Italia aveva aiutato gli Inglesi in Sudan nella guerra contro il Mahdi ed era quindi in credito di favori. Le lotte intestine, gli sconfinamenti di bande dall'interno abissino spingono nel 1889 i sultani di Obbia, (Yusuf Ali) e Migiurtina (Osman Mahamud), due regioni confinanti a nord-est, a chiedere il nostro protettorato. Per conformazione geografica e climatica la Somalia vive dalla costa verso l'interno sui corsi d'acqua torrentizi e stagionali, ma non lungo il litorale collegato da porto a porto via mare. Nei successivi due anni sono colonizzate altre città minori della costa. Filonardi nominato console fonda nel villaggio El Ataleh la nuova colonia Itala.
12 Agosto 1892: preceduta dal protocollo anglo-italiano per determinare la sfera d'influenza delle due potenze nel Corno d'Africa viene firmata la convenzione italo-zanzibarese con la quale si stabilisce l'affitto all'Italia di Uarscéc, Mogadìscio, Mérca, Bràva e territori circostanti per 25 anni. Scaduti i 25 anni l'Italia poteva rinnovare la convenzione per altri 25. Il canone annuo da corrispondere al sultano (Zanzibar) era di 160.000 rupie, ridotte poi a 120.000. L'affitto delle quattro stazioni costiere passò in subconcessione alla Società Filonardi. Dai punti della costa, come era già successo in Eritrea, seguendo i letti dei fiumi, partono le spedizioni scientifiche e geografiche per conoscere le potenzialità dell'interno (su queste coste era tuttora fiorente il commercio "illegale" degli schiavi neri da parte degli arabi).
11 Ottobre 1893: cade a Mérca, ucciso dai Bimàl, il ten. Maurizio Talmone.
26 Novembre 1896: il cap. Cecchi, divenuto console e impegnato per conto della Soc. Benàdir in una pacifica penetrazione a scopo di amicizia col sultano di Ghelédi, è massacrato nella boscaglia di Lafolé a soli 20 Km da Mogadiscio. Persero la vita, insieme a comandanti, ufficiali e alcuni marinai delle navi "Staffetta" e "Volturno", anche alcuni europei. A Lugh, Ugo Ferrandi è costretto a resistere da solo agli attacchi dei razziatori abissini, imbaldanziti dalle sconfitte italiane in Eritrea. La località si chiamerà poi Lugh Ferrandi. Il triangolo compreso fra il Somaliland britannico e la Somalia colonizzata si chiama Ogaden. Qui sorgeranno i primi problemi con i Ras Abissini, che sfoceranno in guerra aperta nel '36 e successivamente nella prima guerra africana fra la Somalia e L'Etiopia.
17 Marzo 1897: nello Scioà è decimata da un attacco etiope la carovana dell'esploratore Vittorio Bòttego che vi trova la morte.
Marzo 1902: la Soc. del Benàdir presenta al Parlamento un programma d'azione vasto e coordinato che porta poi all'occupazione di Bardéra e Lugh, l'istituzione di un servizio di trasporti di terra e di mare e un trattato col sultano di Ghelédi. Le forze militari italiane in quel paese sono veramente esigue e costituite solo da locali o yemeniti mercenari costituiti in bande comandate da Italiani e da eritrei. Due anni dopo, la crisi commerciale della Società del Benadir e la politica restrittiva italiana che prendeva provvedimenti contro la schiavitù delle tribù arabe della costa, portò al primo scontro con la fazione dei Bimal nella zona di Merca. Nostre accuse di schiavismo ritenute infondate e timori di invasione del Mùllah portano alla risoluzione della convenzione con la Soc. del Benàdir. Di fatto, però l'Italia si era sostituita alla Società già da alcuni mesi. Nei successivi quattro anni si conteranno altre due guerre contro questa Tribù.
13 Gennaio 1905: accordo tra Italia e Inghilterra (che rappresentava "tout court !!!" il sultano di Zanzibàr). L'Italia riscatta i quattro scali somali in cambio di un compenso forfettario di 144.000 sterline destinate al governo di Zanzibàr. Con un altro accordo, l'Inghilterra affitta all'Italia un appezzamento di terreno nella baia di Chisimàio. Il terreno è destinato alla costruzione di uno sbarcatoio e di magazzini merci. Nello stesso anno è proclamata la colonia italiana della Somalia (a nordest e sud).
26 Agosto 1905: vittoria italiana a Gilìb contro i ribelli Bimàl, contrari ad abolizione e repressione della schiavitù.
06 Febbraio 1907: sulla costa fra Mérca e Mogadìscio è previsto un concentramento di ribelli Bimàl; per impedirla, 2 colonne (600 ascari comandati dal Ten. Streva e 4 ufficiali) muovono dalle città e disperdono i ribelli ritirandosi poi a Danàne.
Settembre 1907: Menelik invia dall'Etiopia una spedizione per estorcere tributi. Dopo essere stata respinta una prima volta dagli uomini del Mullah, riesce a raggiungere i pozzi di Berdalè presso Lugh dando inizio ad una serie di razzie. I capitani Bongiovanni e Molinari con 300 uomini decidono di intervenire per ottenere pacificamente la restituzione del bottino. Raggiunta Bahallè sono costretti allo scontro dagli abissini e vi trovano la morte. Gli eccessi compiuti nelle razzie verranno puniti dallo stesso Menelik. In seguito a questi fatti si conclude ad Addis Abeba un trattato per la delimitazione dei confini tra Etiopia e Somalia italiana. In pratica però i confini furono fissati solo da Dòlo (a sud) a Lét. Il problema dei confini, che comprendeva anche l'Ogaden, sarà una palla al piede della diplomazia italiana e causa di guerra per noi e dopo di noi.
15 Dicembre 1907-02 Marzo 1908: il cap. Vitali alla testa di 500 ascari batte a Dongàb i ribelli Bimàl, tornati all'azione contro l'estendersi della occupazione italiana. L'azione è sostenuta dalla Regia Nave "Staffetta", con la cooperazione della R.N. "Volta, che dal mare disperdono a cannonate i ribelli presso Danàne.
11-12 Luglio 1908: la spedizione guidata dal magg. Antonino Di Giorgio libera Mérca, minacciata dai ribelli. Scontro a Merére tra i ribelli e gli uomini di Di Giorgio che sono costretti ad incendiare il villaggio ed in seguito ad occupare Afgòi. Il sultano di Ghelédi con 5000 armati si sottomette all'Italia.
01 Agosto 1912: gli italiani occupano Uànle Uén mentre gli inglesi combattono ferocemente contro gli uomini del Mullah che stanno dilagando nel Somaliland. Questi era un ribelle, che passerà alla storia col nome di Mad Mullah “Mullah Matto” noto ai somali come Sayed Mohamed Abdulla Hassan. Tenne impegnate per oltre un trentennio (1889/1920) soprattutto le forze britanniche del Somaliland, ma diede molti fastidi militari, fino alla sua morte, anche alla colonia italiana. Gli strascichi della guerra Italo-Turca coinvolgono anche piccoli scontri a Balad (gennaio 1912) e Scidle (marzo 1912)
19 Giugno 1913: truppe italiane a Bur Acaba e ad Iscia Baidòa.
Febbraio 1920: la grand'offensiva inglese contro il Mullah termina con la fuga di quest'ultimo nel nostro territorio del Nogàl. Egli morirà presso Imi nell'alto Uébi nel 1921. In Italia intanto è costituita a Milano la Società Agricola Italo-Somala su iniziativa di S.A.R. il Duca degli Abruzzi.
15 Luglio 1924 Convenzione di Londra: l'Inghilterra cede il Jubaland all'Italia come compenso post-bellico (per non aver partecipato alla spartizione delle colonie tedesche ?). Nel luglio dell'anno successivo iniziano le operazioni per l'occupazione dello Jubaland sotto il Commissariato Generale dell'Oltregiuba. La Somalia non diventerà mai una colonia di popolamento, anzi la capitale Mogadiscio non arriverà certo alle dimensioni "italiane" di Asmara, arrivando a contare, al massimo dell'immigrazione italiana, non più di 10.000 italiani.






La regione OGADEN nella saga della Somalia. Pagina rielaborata dal sito http://www.italosomali.org/Ogaden.htm.

La provincia era parte integrante del territorio somalo, prima che fosse ceduta al re etiope Menelik II, che nel 1887 andò a Berlino a mendicare presso le grandi potenze uno sbocco verso il mare. I tre firmatari Italia, Gran Bretagna e Francia durante gli anni 1884-1886 cedettero l'Ogaden a titolo di gratificazione all’Etiopia per non aver ostacolato la ricerca delle concessioni territoriali nel corno d'Africa. L’impero Ottomano attraverso il Khedive d’Egitto (e per questo sotto l'ala degli Inglesi), esercitava una sorta di potere coloniale sul territorio, tra cui i tre sultanati di Obbia, Migiurtinia e Zanzibar. Nel 1882, lo Stato italiano decise di rilevare alcune aree per iniziare la sua conquista coloniale, cominciando dall’Eritrea (che sarà colonia l'1/1/1890). Giuseppe Candeo (è a lui che si deve la conoscenza dell'Ogaden e la compilazione della grande carta della stessa regione) fece un viaggio di esplorazione nel 1891 con Baudi di Vesme nella Somalia centrale. Giunti ad Harar, il 22 maggio, furono imprigionati per ordine di Ras Makonnen poi espulsi. L'Italia, dopo la pace dell'ottobre del 1896 stipulò, il 10 luglio del 1900, il trattato relativo alla frontiera. Con questo si cancellava per sempre il Trattato di Uccialli (protettorato italiano sull'Etiopia). Più tardi, vennero due convenzioni: una il 15 maggio del 1902, per la delimitazione del confine tra l'Eritrea, il Sudan e l'Etiopia verso il Setit e, l'altra il 16 maggio del 1908 per il confine tra l'Abissinia e la Somalia italiana e tra l'Abissinia e l'Eritrea verso la Dancalia. Un ribelle, che passerà alla storia col nome di Mad Mullah “Mullah il Matto” (noto ai somali come Sayed Mohamed Abdulla Hassan), tenne impegnate per oltre un trentennio (1889/1920) le forze britanniche del Somaliland, dando, fino alla sua morte, molti fastidi militari anche alla colonia italiana.
1 Giugno 1936: con la costituzione dell'impero, l'Ogaden ex-etiope, è inserito nuovamente nel territorio somalo. Scoppiata la seconda guerra mondiale, la Somalia fu occupata dalle truppe britanniche che, passato il confine dell’Oltregiuba dal Kenya, il 27 febbraio 1941 entravano a Mogadiscio, assumendone l’amministrazione e costituendo il territorio separato dell’Ogaden. L'Ogaden veniva così reso definitivamente all’Etiopia. Nel sud gli inglesi facevano analogo regalo al Kenya della regione somala NFD (North Front District). L’occupazione inglese del Somaliland durò fino al 31 marzo 1950, quando questo divenne indipendente. La Somalia, ad amministrazione italiana, divenne a sua volta indipendente il 1 luglio 1960. A questo punto ci fu l’unione delle due ex colonie. L’Ogaden nell’ambito della storia somala è la regione dove si sono combattute battaglie epiche. Correvano i lontani anni 1541/1543 quando le truppe imperiali etiopi furono salvate da un tracollo militare contro i somali da 400 cattolici portoghesi che aiutarono il negus, cristiano-copto, usando per la prima volta in Africa Orientale i fucili. I rapporti tra i due imperi (Portoghese ed Etiope) erano cominciati nel 1502 e dureranno fino al 1769. Nel 1520 c’era già una Ambasciata portoghese in Etiopia. Ma torniamo agli anni 60, con l’indipendenza della Somalia, che non ha mai cessato di rivendicare la regione dell’Ogaden come entità geografica e politica somala. Con l'allora Capo di Stato Maggiore somalo Daud Mohamed Hersi, ci fu una breve scaramuccia di confine, che gli americani nel periodo protettori di Haile Selassie, circoscrissero immediatamente prima che sfociasse in guerra. Oggi si ricorda invece Giggiga come una delle più ardite operazioni aeromobili condotte dai sovietici in appoggio agli etiopi. Chi ricorda ancora che nell'Ogaden fu combattuta (1977) una delle più sanguinose guerre convenzionali della storia?. Quando la Somalia sotto la guida del dittatore Siad Barre tentò di strappare l'arida regione all'Etiopia, i sovietici comandati dal Generale dell'esercito Vasily Petrov e il Tenente Generale dell'Aviazione G. Dolnikov congiuntamente ai cubani guidati dal Generale di Divisione Arnaldo Ochoa (fucilato poi da Castro per traffico di droga), stabilirono uno stato maggiore congiunto di cui Menghistu fu il leader politico. La forza armata era formata da 5 Generali etiopi, 8 cubani, 5 sovietici 2 yemeniti (lo Yemen inviò 2000 soldati), 50.000 soldati etiopici aiutati da 18.000 cubani, piloti israeliani sugli F5, piloti cubani e yemeniti sui Mig. Ricorrendo ad un imponente ponte aereo in aggiunta alle informazioni militari dei cubani e dei sovietici che avevano armato fino a quel momento il regime di Mohamed Siad Barre, nel giro di un anno ricacciarono i Somali dalle posizioni conquistate, sconfiggendoli nelle battaglie di Diredaua e Giggiga. Restò famosa l'operazione con cui I russi scavalcarono la linea somala trasbordando su una imponente massa di elicotteri un'intera divisione motorizzata. Questa in sintesi la storia dell’Ogaden, terra somala, abitata dagli Ogaden, etnia somala dei Darod. La Somalia attuale conta circa 6.450.000 abitanti su un territorio di 637.650 kmq densità 10 abitanti per kmq. Chi spadroneggia sono ancora i vecchi clan, o signori della guerra come è sempre stato.
DUBAT - I Bersaglieri Neri
Il Governatore De Vecchi diede vita nel 1924 ad una specialità denominata "Bande Armate di Confine" meglio conosciuta con il nome di "Dubat" (Dub=turbanti AT=bianchi). I Dubat erano una truppa intermedia fra regolari e irregolari. La loro principale caratteristica consisteva nell'estrema leggerezza di armamento e di equipaggiamento che permetteva spostamenti rapidissimi. I «dubat» sono snelli e scattanti, dal passo lungo, nerissimi di pelle ma bianchissimi nei turbanti e nell'abbigliamento molto leggero per potersi muovere con agilità a guardia delle frontiere. Sono scelti fra gli uomini più dotati fisicamente e intellettualmente. Vigili e fedeli furono impareggiabili cavalcatori del Generale Graziani, divisi in bande comandate da ufficiali italiani, cui venne affidato il compito di vigilare sul confine. Sempre pronti a reagire contro le incursioni dei razziatori abissini entro i nostri confini, si spostavano attraverso la pianura allagata per raggiungere gli obbiettivi (Ogaden conteso), con zattere abilmente improvvisate, oppure a nuoto, sfidando il pericolo dei coccodrilli. Gli africani, e soltanto loro, possono confrontarsi con i coccodrilli a nuoto. Il più famoso fu Ali Ualie, che comandava il posto di frontiera di Ual-Ual al momento del proditorio attacco del capo predone Omar Sammantar. Questi in precedenza aveva assassinato a pugnalate un nostro ufficiale e con i suoi uomini massacrato i difensori di un nostro presidio. Con la ritirata degli aggressori (sostenuti dal maggiore inglese Chifford del «Camel's Corp» della vicina Somalia britannica) si accese il conflitto italo-etiopico del 1935. Se gli Ascari, come diceva Montanelli, spesso tagliavano la corda col bottino, i Dubat erano gente orgogliosa che andava trattata con gentilezza. Gli dicevi di dare una occhiata alla boscaglia e quelli sparivano. Sparivano per poi ritornare e sapevi vita morte e miracoli in un raggio di 5 km. Il loro addestramento era affidato a graduati indigeni provenienti dai battaglioni coloniali. La gerarchia comprendeva 4 gradi: gregario, sotto capo, capobanda e comandante.
A curiosity: During "Ibis" mission in 1993, a former Somali Dubat sergeant, something like 80 years old, presented himself to the italian parachutists (Folgore) at the embassy in Mogadiscio, speaking perfect italian, holding his M91 musket... he leaved and was treated as an "irregular" for all the period of the mission. Certo la sorpresa fu tanta quando, nei primi giorni del 1993 nel corso dell'operazione RESTORE HOPE (Ibis per noi) lanciata dall'Onu per riportare il Paese fuori dalla guerra intestina, i comandanti si videro comparire davanti un Dubat, di una certa età, che disse " Sono Scirè*, sono stato in servizio (nei "servizi") delle Vostre unità coloniali e voglio riprendere il mio posto" !!!!. A chi pensava fosse uno scherzo non occorse molto per accorgersi che era tutto vero. Fra le mani dello scalzo Scirè era comparso anche un fucile 91 perfettamente funzionante. Senza autorizzazioni particolari si schierò col picchetto e piantò la capanna nel cortile della caserma. Una divisa dovettero anche procurargliela e non c'era persona più ligia e impeccabile nell'eseguire ordini. Un certo imbarazzo sorgeva solo quando all'alzabandiera salutava con la formula "Viva il Re, Viva il Duce, Viva l'Italia". Che in Italia fosse cambiato qualcosa non era cosa che lo riguardava, per lui poi quelli venuti dopo non erano tanto migliori di quelli di prima. *nota: Scirè è una regione dell’Etiopia tra i fiumi Tacazzè e Mareb, teatro degli scontri del 1936 per la conquista dell’Etiopia.
VIE E FERROVIE SOMALI

Le possibilità di sviluppo agricolo in Somalia si evidenziano ben presto ottime. Dopo le opportune bonifiche si possono impiantare, il banano (ancor oggi monopolio Usa), il cotone, l'arachide, il sesamo, il mais etc... Il Duca degli Abruzzi, Luigi di Savoia ottiene una concessione di 25.000 ettari che irriga con una grande diga costruita sullo Uebi Scebeli che col Giuba è il più grande e lungo dei fiumi del Sud (l'Oltregiuba come regione viene ceduta dagli inglesi nel 1924). Ulteriori piccole rettifiche di territorio acquisito si avranno fino al 1929. Durante la stagione delle piogge entrambi i fiumi sono navigabili per lunghi tratti. Per la movimentazione dei raccolti al nuovo porto di Mogadiscio viene costruita una piccola ferrovia, che si sviluppa poi per altri rami fino a raggiungere una lunghezza massima di 114 km. Diverso il discorso per le strade che vennero ritracciate e rinnovate togliendole dai pantani stagionali. La costruzione non può non tenere conto delle nuove aree produttive e commerciali sorte, oltre al Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi già citato, e delle esigenze difensive sia a Nord che a Sud. Viene quindi tracciata una strada carrozzabile di 1484 km che da Mogadiscio per l'interno arriva a Bender Cassim nel Golfo di Aden (1929). Il problema principale è la massicciata che abbisogna di materiale di cava che non esiste nel piano. Con le diramazioni verso la costa e la prosecuzione verso il Kenya il totale delle rete stradale arriva a oltre 10.000 Km.
Così il giornalista Queirolo racconta il suo viaggio a Bender Cassim (Bosaso) sulla strada in via di ultime rifiniture (novembre 1929)"....da Ghersale le nostre auto scendono dal treno e si lanciano su Bulo Burti e Belet Uen.. A Belet Uen è un fervore di opere, sono appena trascorsi 13 mesi da quando l'arteria era stata concepita. Lungo la bella via costruita dalle Bande incontriamo di quando in quando i bianchi turbanti dei Dubat, rigidi nel presentat'arm. Ferfer è banda, in tutta la sua eccezione di provvisorietà, ... villaggio dei Dubat ammogliati, in regolari file di capanne e il campo cintato con la sede del comando di settore. Sono già 400 i km fatti e ci aspettano altri 386 km fino a Rocca Littorio fra incredibili termitai.. un poco ci illudiamo di correre sulla Appia Antica. Qualche posto di guardia, un ridottino di sassi e di solito un maestoso albero sul quale in alto si staglia la figura statuaria del Dubat. Le bianche tute, i bianchi turbanti, i torsi nudi scultorei attraversati dalla cartucciera e alla mano il fucile che non si lascia mai. Si lavora e si fa tutto con la mano libera dal fucile. A Garroe il governatore passa in rivista i Dubat che a sera ci allietano di una fantasia tribale... .. saliamo ai 900 metri di Gardò, e il nostro sguardo spazia su gazzelle, struzzi, licaoni, scimmie ma anche volatili e serpenti. La notte fredda ci ha ritemprato e l'alba tinge l'oriente per l'estrema tappa. ... di quando in quando vediamo alberelli di incenso che non si capisce da dove traggano la linfa aggrappati come sono alla nera roccia.......".
Lungo queste strade parte anche il servizio di autocorriera. (Mogadiscio -Bosaso bi e trimensile, Mogadiscio-Lugh km 425 bimensile etc). Bisogna considerare che per quei tragitti non occorrevano meno di 5/6 giorni di viaggio -quasi 1.500 km-, il tempo di ritornare per la nuova corsa. Anche in colonia si sperimentano i carboni alternativi che sono poi quelli di legna, per rendere nel tempo autonoma l'autotrazione. Si bruciano acacie di vario tipo, molto diffuse su arenili e dune, con rendimenti fino al 20% del peso iniziale. Un'altra risorsa somala del corno d'africa sono le saline il cui sale viene inviato al Porto di Hafun (Dante) con una teleferica.



http://digilander.libero.it/fiammecremisi/dopoguerra1/colonia.htm
La nefasta influenza della politica etiope nel Corno d’Africa.

L'Ogaden e la Somalia i veri obiettivi dell’egemonia etiope nel Corno d'Africa
Da sempre l’Etiopia si comporta e si muove come nemico della Somalia. L’Abissinia è un nemico spietato dell’unità dello stato Somalo, in quanto non accettando un ritorno alla normalità dello stato somalo, attua un passo fondamentale per la sua sicurezza interna. Contemporaneamente, però, ha libertà d’azione nella provincia dell’Ogaden. La politica etiope, in modo particolare in questo frangente, ma da sempre, punta sul “divide et impera” dei somali. Tale procedimento strategico nel passato aveva poche speranze di successo, ora questa tecnica paga; il vistoso risultato è visibile: sono dodici anni (si va per il tredicesimo) che lo stato somalo si è dissolto e, a breve non ci sono soluzioni di un ritorno alla normalità della Somalia. L'Etiopia, ha puntato vistosamente sull’alimentazione dell’odio facendo leva sull’animosità e incuneandosi abilmente fra le differenze dialettiche dei vari clan somali aizzandoli gli uni contro gli altri. Bisogna ammettere che, in questa debolezza caratteriale somala, gli abissini hanno colto l’arma vincente che tuttavia, almeno nel passato, trasformava le animosità interne, le quali erano superate nel momento in cui i somali prendevano coscienza delle minacce etiopi e miracolosamente facevano fronte comune contro il nemico di sempre: il “xabashi”, l'abissino. Era l'unico collante che univa i somali, pare però che anche questa prerogativa dei somali si sia dissolta assieme alle assurdità in atto nel paese. Una colpa da addossare ai "economics war lords" che hanno distrutto e continuano a distruggere la Somalia. La coscienza somala è anestetizzata totalmente.

Mogadiscio 1 Aprile 1951 Secondo lido, sfilata di truppe alla festa della polizia
L’Etiopia è uno dei principali animatori dell’Igad (Inter Governmental Authority on Development), che ha organizzato il Congresso di Riconciliazione in corso a Eldoret in Kenya. Chiaramente l’Etiopia, nel contesto del Congresso, adotta e applica le strategie della sua politica, cioè il suddetto, “divide et impera” ma, con un’aggravante, essa tiene a libro paga una buona fetta di “warlords” che partecipano al Congresso di Riappacificazione fornendo armi, contribuendo alla devastazione e alla destabilizzazione della Somalia. La guerra civile somala, ovviamente di suo, ha fornito alla controparte etiope un'occasione unica di rivincita per le cocenti umiliazioni e per le sconfitte subite sul campo da parte dell’esercito regolare somalo nelle plurime guerre tra Etiopia e Somalia. In questo caso l’occasione strategica della politica abissina è unica: è a costo irrisorio, non ha umiliazioni né perdite militari, ha libero accesso per massacrare la popolazione civile dell’Ogaden. Il sostenere sapientemente da parte del governo etiope il fertile terreno dell’avidità e della bramosia di potere dei fantocci denominati “signori della guerra” che sono sponsorizzati a dozzine è la carta vincente, tutto ciò ovviamente rende felice e trionfante il regime di Meles Zenawi. Incredibile ma vero, attualmente i primi nemici dell’Ogaden sono somali: Abdullahi Yusuf, Shatigaduud, Morgan, Yalahow, Aydid etc e con loro tutti coloro che usufruiscono degli aiuti di Addis Abeba. Costoro stanno aiutando a massacrare la popolazione della regione somala dell’Ogaden. Non sembra vero, ma si è materializzato l’obiettivo di smantellare il baluardo del pansomalismo e la posizione dello scomodo rivale e nello stesso momento l’Etiopia si sta assicurando e ha di fatto sotto controllo i futuri assetti politici della Somalia. Vediamo le contrapposizioni partendo da aspetti storici.
La regione OGADEN nella saga della Somalia.
La provincia era parte integrante del territorio somalo, prima che fosse ceduta al re etiope Menelik II, che nel 1887 andò a Berlino a mendicare presso le grandi potenze uno sbocco verso il mare. I tre firmatari Italia, Gran Bretagna e Francia durante gli anni 1884-1886 cedettero l'Ogaden a titolo di gratificazione all’Etiopia per non aver ostacolato la ricerca delle concessioni territoriali nel corno d'Africa. L’impero Ottomano attraverso il Khedive dell’Egitto esercitava una sorta di potere coloniale sul territorio, tra cui i tre sultanati di Obbia, della Migiurtinia e Zanzibar. Nel 1882, lo Stato italiano decise di rilevare alcune aree per iniziare la sua conquista coloniale, cominciando dall’Eritrea (che sarà colonia l'1/1/1890). In ordine temporale, Giuseppe Candeo- è a lui che si deve la conoscenza dell'Ogaden e la compilazione della grande carta della stessa regione - nel 1891 con Baudi di Vesme fece un viaggio di esplorazione nella Somalia centrale. Giunto a Harar, il 22 maggio fu imprigionato per ordine del Ras Makonnen e il giorno dopo Baudi di Vesme seguì la stessa sorte, in seguito ambedue furono espulsi. L'Italia, dopo la pace dell'ottobre del 1896, che cancellò per sempre il Trattato di Uccialli, che annullava ogni pretesa di protettorato italiano sull'Etiopia, stipulò, il 10 luglio del 1900, il trattato relativo alla frontiera e, più tardi, due convenzioni: una, il 15 maggio del 1902, per la delimitazione del confine tra l'Eritrea, il Sudan e l'Etiopia verso il Setit e, l'altra il 16 maggio del 1908 per il confine tra l'Abissinia e la Somalia italiana, e tra l'Abissinia e l'Eritrea verso la Dancalia. Fu più "tranquilla" la penetrazione italiana in Somalia, partita intorno al 1890 attraverso trattative con i potentati locali tra cui Yusuf Ali sultano di Obbia e Osman Mahamud sultano dei Migiurtini, poi con il Sultano di Zanzibar, che era nominalmente signore di gran parte della zona e quindi l’Italia prese accordi con l'Inghilterra, che aveva immensi interessi in quell'area, tra cui il protettorato su Zanzibar. Inizialmente viene preso in affitto il Benadir - la fascia di costa meridionale con Mogadiscio e Brava - tramite le imprese private di Filonardi e la Società del Benadir,quindi nel 1905 la proprietà è riscattata e nasce la nuova colonia che avrà qualche problema militare con l'Etiopia, per ragioni di confini e con un ribelle, che passerà alla storia col nome di Mad Mullah “Mullah Matto” noto ai somali come Sayed Mohamed Abdulla Hassan, che ha tenuto impegnate per oltre un trentennio (1889/1920) soprattutto le forze britanniche del Somaliland, ma diede molti fastidi militari, fino alla sua morte, anche alla colonia italiana. Dopo la I Guerra Mondiale, l’Italia si arricchirà dell'Oltregiuba, ceduto dalla Gran Bretagna in ossequio ai patti di partecipazione italiana alla Grande Guerra. La Somalia non diventerà mai una colonia di popolamento, anzi la capitale Mogadiscio non arriverà certo alle dimensioni "italiane" di Asmara, arrivando a contare - al massimo dell'immigrazione italiana - non più di 10.000 italiani. 01 Giugno 1936: viene inserito nel territorio provinciale somalo, l'Ogaden ex-etiope. Scoppiata la seconda guerra mondiale, la Somalia venne occupata dalle truppe britanniche che, passato il confine dell’Oltregiuba, il 27 febbraio 1941 entravano nella capitale Mogadiscio, assumendone l’amministrazione e costituendo il territorio separato dell’Ogaden, che veniva incorporato nella Somalia Britannica ed infine reso definitivamente all’Etiopia, nel sud gli inglesi facevano analogo regalo della regione somala NFD (North Front District) con il Kenya. L’occupazione inglese durò fino al 31 marzo 1950. Il 26 Giugno il Somaliland era diventato indipendente, la Somalia italiana a sua volta divenne indipendente il 1 luglio 1960 e ci fu l’unione delle due ex colonie. L’Ogaden era stato cancellato dalla geografia somala e perso dalla Somalia per colpa dei colonialisti italiani (che hanno perso la guerra) e inglesi (che avevano vinto la guerra) a favore dell’Etiopia. L’Ogaden nell’ambito della storia somala è la regione dove si sono combattute battaglie epiche. Correvano i lontani anni 1541/1543, un passato remoto le truppe imperiali etiopi furono salvate da un tracollo militare contro i somali appunto dai cattolici portoghesi (i rapporti tra i due imperi cominciarono nel 1502 fino al 1769 e, nel 1520 c’era già l’Ambasciata portoghese in Etiopia), che aiutarono il negus, cristiano- copto, usando per la prima volta in Africa Orientale i fucili contro i bellicosi musulmani somali. Tuttavia la prima battaglia per importanza e imponenza fu combattuta dai valorosi “dubat”, gli ascari (truppa) e i buluq-bash (sottoufficiali) che erano truppe somale inquadrate nel Regio Esercito italiano.

Truppe etiopi in marcia nell'Ogaden


La regione dell'Ogaden (bbc © MMIII)
Mussolini, prendendo spunto da un incidente di frontiera ai pozzi di Ual-Ual, contesi e rivendicati da Etiopia e Somalia, avviò i preparativi per un attacco. L'invasione ebbe inizio senza formale dichiarazione di guerra, il 3/10/35 (10 mesi dopo dall’ incidente), sotto il comando del Generale De Bono, che muove dal Nord, mentre il fronte Sud della Somalia è affidato al Generale Graziani che doveva avere compiti esclusivamente difensivi ma non sarà così: anche Graziani prese l’iniziativa e partecipò all’invasione proveniente dal sud della Somalia. Il 28 aprile 1936 cadde Sassabane, quattro giorni dopo fu la volta di Dagahbur. Il 5 maggio gli italiani entrarono a Giggiga, città testimone di cento scontri; l'8 seguente capitolò Harar e ventiquattr'ore dopo le forze italiane entrarono a Dire Daua. L'aggressione italiana all’Etiopia costò la condanna della Società delle Nazioni, di cui anche l'Etiopia era membro, con “sanzioni", che però non comprendevano embargo di petrolio, carbone e ferro e soprattutto non venne chiuso il Canale di Suez. Cioè, non successe nulla agli italiani nonostante la condanna. In quella occasione si verificò l'impressionante forza d'urto della moderna tecnica militare contro le armate di Ras Makonen. Arrivando agli anni 60, con l’indipendenza della Somalia, che non ha mai cessato di rivendicare la regione dell’Ogaden come entità geografica e politica somala, Capo di Stato Maggiore somalo era Daud Mohamed Hersi, ci fu una breve scaramuccia di confine, che gli americani nel periodo protettori di Heile Selassie, circoscrissero immediatamente prima che sfociasse in guerra. Oggi, invece Giggiga é entrata nella storia militare come una delle più ardite operazioni aeromobili condotte dai sovietici. Chi ricorda ancora che nell'Ogaden fu combattuta (nel 1977) una delle più sanguinose guerre convenzionali della storia dei due paesi, quando la Somalia sotto la guida del dittatore Siad Barre tentò, rivendicando la sovranità somala sull’Ogaden, di strappare l'arida regione all'Etiopia. Fu allora che i sovietici con a comando il Generale dell'esercito Vasily Petrov e il Tenente Generale dell'Aviazione G. Dolnikov congiuntamente ai cubani guidati dal Generale di Divisione Arnaldo Ochoa (fucilato poi da Castro per traffico di droga), per dirigere le operazioni stabilirono uno stato maggiore congiunto di cui Menghistu fu il leader politico ed era formato da 5 Generali etiopi, 8 cubani, 5 sovietici 2 yemeniti (lo Yemen inviò 2000 soldati), 50.000 soldati etiopici aiutati da 18.000 cubani, piloti israeliani sugli F5, piloti cubani e yemeniti sui Mig e, ricorrendo ad un imponente ponte aereo in aggiunta alle informazioni militari dei cubani e dei sovietici che avevano armato il regime di Mohamed Siad Barre, nel giro di un anno ricacciarono i Somali dalle posizioni conquistate, sconfiggendoli nelle battaglie di Diredaua e Giggiga. Questa in sintesi la storia dell’Ogaden, terra somala, abitata dalli Ogaden, etnia somala dei Darod.
La disgregazione della Repubblica somala, le disgrazie dell’Ogaden e la politica repressiva etiope.
Nel Gennaio 1991, con la fuga di Siad Barre da Mogadiscio, implodeva lo Stato somalo. La liberazione dal regime dittatoriale ha portato disgregazione, distruzione e una maledizione che ha recato discordia nella pur litigiosa ma civile società somala. La guerra civile di liberazione da Siad Barre e la sua cricca ha avuto come conseguenza la dichiarazione d’indipendenza del Somaliland (riconosciuta solo dall’Etiopia), l’autoproclamata Repubblica del Puntland di Abdullahi Yusuf (aiutato dall’Etiopia) e di Jamà Ali Jama, la Repubblica del Sud Ovest di Shatiguddud (aiutato dall’Etiopia) e innumerevoli sventure, incluse repubbliche senza speranza ne d’indipendenza ne di riconoscimento internazionale che spudoratamente aiutano la divisione della Somalia e specialmente aiutano la repressione etiope in Ogaden. Il pansomalismo che puntava ad una situazione opposta a quella oggi drammaticamente in atto nel Corno d’Africa sembra morto. Il recente passato era incentrato nell’ardito sogno dell’unità della grande Somalia, le famose cinque punte della stella della bandiera somala: il Somaliland, la Somalia italiana, Jibuti, l’Ogaden e l’NFD (North Front Disctrict). In tutte le citate regioni l’etnia è prevalentemente somala se non l’unica. E’ chiaro che in questo contesto di disgregazione totale della Somalia, l’Ogaden è sostanzialmente la regione somala che soffre doppiamente in quanto la pressione militare etiope ha mano libera nella repressione del Fronte Nazionale di Liberazione dell’Ogaden ed è in corso una drammatica carestia nella regione. Secondo fattore: l’Etiopia gestisce a modo suo la mobilitazione internazionale della carestia nella regione dell’Ogaden e in altri territori etiopi densamente popolate. Jean Baptiste Nandet su Le Monde ha avanzato seri dubbi sulla reale consistenza della "catastrofe naturale" gridata dall’Etiopia. Non si nega in alcun modo che l’Ogaden, regione semidesertica e molto popolata, soffra di un’autentica carestia dopo due anni e mezzo di piogge insufficienti, ma è anche certo che il quadro dell’insieme del paese è stato dipinto a tinte più fosche di quelle reali dal regime di Zenawi. Tutto ciò non è forse finalizzato per ottenere un aiuto internazionale che non deve servire solo a soccorrere le popolazione dell’Ogaden, ma anche ad alimentare un’economia di guerra? Timori che appaiono oggi giustificati. Dopo aver speso milioni di dollari in armamenti, dopo aver ottenuto gratuitamente centinaia di migliaia di tonnellate di alimenti, l’Etiopia ha lanciato le sue truppe all’assalto delle trincee eritree. È in atto un "tranello umanitario"? Il regime etiopico si sarebbe servito dei buoni sentimenti, della "cattiva coscienza dell’uomo bianco", dell’emozione provocata dalle immagini di bambini denutriti per far tacere la ragione e il senso critico, e raggiungere finalmente i suoi scopi bellici. A ben guardare i mali di cui soffre il secondo paese più popolato dell’Africa subsahariana e uno dei più poveri del pianeta sono più politici che climatici." Le organizzazioni internazionali stanno denunciando e hanno cercato d’inviare aiuti umanitari che Addis Abeba, in quanto destinati per l’Ogaden rifiuta o denuncia che vanno ad alimentare gli uomini ONLF. L’Etiopia come entità nazionale è composta da differenti etnie, la parte predominante dai tempi del negus è prevalentemente abissina o amhara, poi ci sono ovviamente i Somali dell’Ogaden, i Gambella. i Dankali, i Sidama, gli Oromo, gli Afar, i Benshangul, i Tigrai, i Dinka. Ovvio che ci siano fronti interni di ribellione al governo centrale che a sua volta fronteggia le varie guerriglie in atto con l’esercito e con una dura repressione senza pari e, in modo speciale e particolare contro gli uomini del Fronte di Liberazione dell’Ogaden e degli Oromo, due spine nel fianco. Nell'ambito di questi ultimi due conflitti le organizzazioni internazionali hanno denunciato moltissime violazioni dei diritti umani, le truppe governative etiopi colpiscono senza distinzioni anche la popolazione civile in quanto sospettata di sostenere i ribelli. Il personale umanitario nazionale e internazionale che opera in Ogaden rischia aggressioni e minacce non tante velate da parte dell’esercito regolare. Di seguito va aggiunto ciò che politicamente l’Etiopia crea nella regione, comportandosi in modo ambiguo e paradossale.
• L’Etiopia sostiene e arma numerosi warlords somali, perché così facendo distoglie attenzione dalla regione dell’Ogaden e ha mano libera per colpire ONLF;
• L’Etiopia è la capofila nel contesto generale della caccia al terrorismo, a sbraitare presso l’Amministrazione Bush denunciando che la Somalia, Abdiqassim e l’ONLF sono collusi con i terroristi di Al Ittihad e di Al Qaeda, trovando purtroppo credito e appoggi in questa campagna denigratoria; Zenawi stesso ha ammesso con intervista alla BBC di aver infiltrato truppe al fine di prevenzione in territorio somalo. E’ grave che ci sia palese ammissione di violazioni dei confini somali;
• Nel Corno d’Africa, l’Etiopia è la nazione a più alta percentuale di spesa del PIL destinato per l’acquisto di armi;
• E’ il paese con la più alta percentuale di diatribe interne ed esterne: Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya e finanche contenziosi con il lontano Egitto per via delle acque del Nilo;
• L’Etiopia ha fatto fallire tutti i precedenti tentativi di riconciliazione della Somalia avvenuti nel passato tra cui due iniziative del Kenya con Arap Moi, una nel 1996 e una avvenuta nel Novembre 2001. Nella prima l’Etiopia ha contro-convocato una sua riunione denominata “Processo di Sodere” ovviamente processo mai decollato e, nella successiva del 2001 contrappose una riunione dello SRRC di Aidid, Shatiguddud e company in Addis Abeba. Fece fallire la riunione del Cairo (Novembre e Dicembre del 97). Infine, tentò di boicottare anche il processo di Arta; l’intento fortunatamente non andò a buon fine nonostante Addis Abeba protestasse l’intransigenza dei delegati somali riuniti in Jibuti. Il GTN mando delegazioni ad alto livello in Addis Abeba ma incontrarono arroganza, ricatti e tentavi di umiliazione. Il governo di transizione di Mogadiscio ha più volte denunciato pubblicamente l’interferenza etiope nei affari interni somali. A questo punto una domanda sensata da porsi è: che risultati si possono avere dal Congresso IGAD di Eldoret?;
• L’Etiopia non è estranea alla nascita delle presunte autoproclamate repubbliche somale;
• L’esercito etiope è fortemente e direttamente impegnato nel territorio somalo, ha sconfinato innumerevoli volte, fa operazioni di intelligence, arma direttamente e indirettamente alcune fazioni, ha consiglieri militari impegnati in primis. Cosa significa la parola “ingerenza”? Se quello che esegue Addis Abeba in Somalia è tutto ciò, dobbiamo sostenere che allora esiste interferenza in affari interni e boicottaggio di tutti i processi somali;
• Addis Abeba è sede dell’OUA, cioè la sede per dirimere le controversie territoriali e quanto altro dei paesi africani. Dunque la nazione ospitante l’Organizzazione Africana è la nazione africana che sta violando l’Art. 2 della Costituzione dell’OUA, poiché è l’unica nazione che riconosce la Repubblica del Somaliland. Un paradosso giuridico;
• Il 3.02.2003 si è aperta la Conferenza dell’OUA in Addis Abeba, conferenza che disegnerà la nuova Unione Africana. Il nuovo statuto assegnerà un paese leader per area. L’Etiopia ha l’ambizione di essere il paese guida dell’East Africa e, guarda caso, Zenawi si ritrova a fare la corte a Abdulqassim, Presidente del GTN somalo che detiene il diritto di voto per la Somalia in seno dell’OUA. Il governo di transizione e Abdiqassim può mettere a repentaglio l’ambizione di leadership etiope. Dunque si consiglia Abdiqassim ad intraprendere una valida strategia diplomatica, bisogna e si deve giocare da parte della Somalia questo poker istituzionale per rendere inefficace la spinta centrifuga etiope. Zenawi, ha ricevuto in pompa magna all’aeroporto di Addis Abeba Abdiqassim nonostante il governo etiope abbia dichiarato fino il giorno prima che il GTN è una fazione.
La repubblica dell’Ogaden
Una “fondata speranza”, o un vero tentativo provocatorio istituzionale ed internazionale sarebbe quello di rendere all’Etiopia e alla sua sfrontatezza egemonica uno sgarbo: fare una dichiarazione di nascita della Repubblica somala dell’OGADEN, che al pari del Somaliland, abbia adesione e riconoscimento internazionale. La dura realtà, al di là della speranza, rimane il fatto che la popolazione somala dell’Ogaden abbia possibilità di autodeterminazione, sviluppo economico, sociale e un’autonomia di auto governo in quanto popolo, territorio, etnia d’estrazione unica confinato per motivi coloniali in terra straniera. Pensiamo con dolore alla sofferenza della popolo fratello dell’Ogaden per la carestia e per il subire quotidiano dell'oppressione, del dominio territoriale e delle torture coloniali etiopi.
•www.onlf.org
•http://www.ogaden.com
•http://www.ogadennews.com
•http://www.ogadentimes.com
•http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/oscar/ogaden1976.htm
•http://www.onlf.org/PRESS_RELEASE.htm
•http://www.acig.org/acreports/ogadan_Tom_Cooperv1.pdf
•http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/O/Ogaden.asp
•http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/afr25.htm
•http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1999/vol2/ethiopiatr.htm
•Violazione dei diritti umani in Etiopia Orientale







''With government approval, Cecchi prepared for an expedition into the interior. By November 25, he was ready to move; his caravan consisted of seventy askaris, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians, for the most part members of the crews of the two ships. That very night their encampment at Lafolé, some twelve miles inland, was attacked. In the early morning hours, as the caravan once more got under way, it was attacked again. By eight-thirty in the morning of November 26, all but three sailors were dead or dying.''

''First Adowa, then Lafolé; the future of Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa looked very umpromising at the end of 1896''

Italian Colonialism in Somalia, Robert L. Hess 1966.
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This event sparked one of the longest resistance struggles in Southern Somalia (Benadir) against Italian penetration and occupation of Somalia. This long resistance is only second to the heroic great struggle of Sayyid Muhammed Abdulle Hassan and his darawish army.

What happened on that day of November 25-26th of 1896? Who was this Cecchi guy? Who were these mysterious warriors that swiftly defeated this first Italian colonial penetration of the hinterland of Benadir? Why is this event put in the same line as the humiliating defeat of the Italians by Ethiopians in Adowa? And last but not least, what were the consequences of this event in Lafole?


This episode in Somali history is perhaps the least known, although it had crucial impact on the future of Somalia. Instead, most Somalis are not aware of this event while the Italians had built a monument for Antonio Cecchi in Lafole which still stands in the bush unvisited, while throughout the Banaadir 1896 is remembered in the count of the years as Axad Shiiki, the ‘Sunday Year of Cecchi’.


To present an elaborate account of this event, we need to start with the context. Who were the main groups in the Benadir region? Who was Antonio Cecchi and what was his role in the Italian expansion into Somalia? And what were the consequences of this event both for Somali groups and Italy?

In a number of series I'll present the complete story, and show why this event and the shockwave it send throughout Benadir and Southern Somalia is still relevant to this day.

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1: Backrgound on Benadir region.


Benadir region constited of the four Benadir ports of: Warsheekh, Mogadishu, Merca and Baraawe. These four port-cities were inhabited by Somali groups along with arabs and people with mixed origins and traders from the Indian Ocean. The authority of Mogadishu for example was nominally under Omani rule, but the city had two real administrations, one in Xamarweyne and the other in Shangaani.

These four Benadir ports were the linkages between the hinterlands of Somalia and the Indian Ocean trade. Caravan trade flourished in these hinterlands, connecting trade centre’s of Harar and Ogadeniya to Benadir ports, through the trade towns of Lugh, Baardheere and Geledi.

In the hinterland of Benadir diverse groups existed, like Geledi, Hintire, Wacdaan, Biyamaal, Murusade, Shidle etc.

The relevant groups in this discussion of Axad Shiiki are: Geledi Sultanate, Wacdaan, Biyamaal and Murusade.

The Geledi Sultanate

The Geledi Sultanate was a sultanate that came into existence when the clans of Geledi and Wacdaan made an alliance against the Silcis group who then ruled the Shabelle Valley. After this successful revolt, the two clans lived together and linked their future which gradually led to the formation of the Geledi Sultanate.

For two centuries or so the Geledi and their Wacdaan allies had formed a small independent state, that prospered by trade, which they attempted to control, and had for a time held together a much wider clan ‘empire’.

In spite of the differences between them in way of life, language and traditions, Geledi and Wacdaan formed a close and lasting alliance. They were joined later - sometime early in the 19th century – by a section of another Hawiye clan, the Murursade. (Virginia Luling 2002)

The Wacdaan

The Wacdaan is a Mudulood group that settled in Lower Shabelle as early as the 18th century. They were allied with Geledi and Murursade, and lived between Afgoye and the coast region around Mogadishu.

The Biyamaal

The Biyamaal arrived in the Lower Shabelle around the end of 17th century and established control over Merca and the hinterlands. The Biyamaal were in constant war with the Geledi Sultanate, and even killed 2 Sultans of Geledi through out the war.

The Murursade

The Murursade joined the alliance between Wacdaan and Geledi and were granted land northeast of Geledi town, where they established four villages.
2: Italian expansion into Benadir/Somalia


The Italian expansion into Somalia.

Italy was eager to join the leagues of other European imperialist nations like Britain, France and Germany. To achieve this they set their eyes on East Africa, and made their first incursion into Eritrea in which they acquired Massawa port.

Italian expansion in Somalia began in 1885, when Antonio Cecchi, an explorer led an Italian. expedition into the lower Juba region and concluded a commercial treaty with the sultan of Zanzibar. In 1889, Italy established protectorates over the eastern territories then under the nominal rule of the sultans of Obbia and of Alula; and in 1892, the sultan of Zanzibar leased concessions along the Indian Ocean coast to Italy.


Antonio Cecchi's role:


As already becomes clear, Antonio Cecchi spearheaded the Italian expansion into Somalia. He was chosen to lead the mission because of his past and reputation of been a supporter of Italian expansion into East Africa.

''The choice of Cecchi to head the mission was logical, for he had been active in the exploration of northeast Africa. In 1876 he had led an expedition from Zeila to the frontiers of Kaffa in southern Ethiopia. From that time he was an ardent partisan of Italian expansion into the horn. Cecchi was probably the first to succeed in directing Italian attention toward the Somali coast’’ (Robert L Hess)

''In his speeches there was an optimistic ring: the Cecchi mission and others would surely discover vast fertile areas awaiting peaceful cultivation and commercial penetration’’ (Robert L Hess)

After he returned from the Lower Jubba region he became obsessed with Italian expansion into Somalia.

''On the basis of his explorations and his often unfounded enthusiasm for the area, he insisted on the importance of the Juba River as the key to a much larger colonial program:

..Once we acquire with certainty the knowledge that the Juba is navigable…then it is certain that it will become the most natural artery for the exportation of the abundant coffee harvest of Kaffa and the surrounding regions…Now that our Italy has established itself at Massawa…it is possible for Italy to extend its possessions toward the south…The Juba would thus mark the extreme southern boundary of our possessions.'' (Robert L.Hess)

Italy succeeded through negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar to sign commercial treaties with Zanzibar, which allowed Italy to trade with the Banadir region. This initial success was followed by long negotiations in which the Italians wanted to lease the Benadir region. After a while they succeeded in this too, and set up a commercial enterprise named after the Italian trader in East Africa Filonardi. Filonardi Company was lead by Filonardi himself and received some support from Italy in order to penetrate the Benadir and Somalia economically.

''From 1893 to 1896, the Italian presence was limited to a small garrison of soldiers at Luuq on the upper Jubba River, and a few traders along the coast. The Italian outpost at Luuq had been established in 1895 to gather information on Somali trade in the region and to protect Italian interests in the face of Ethiopian claims to the area.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

This insignificant presence of Italian commercial interests in Benadir can hardly be called ‘colonization’. There were a few Italian residents, and the police (askaris) were still Arab who did not went further then their garrisons. Because of this situation, most Somali groups were not pressed to fight this initial penetration since the intentions of Italians were still vague.

''Perhaps because of the Filonardi Company’s limited intervention in Somali affaires, there was only one notable incident of Somali hostility between 1893 and 1896. That occurred on 11 October 1893, the day the Italian flag was first raised over the garesa in Marka. A Somali attacked and killed an Italian soldier; he in turn was killed with three shots from a ‘Wetterly’’ gun.’’ ( Lee V. Cassanelli)


This was the setting in Somalia and Benadir, before Cecchi became dominant in convincing the Italian government to penetrate further into Somalia as he returned to Italy.

''On his return to Italy, however, Cecchi continued to pressure the government to tap the ‘’rich commercial resources’’ of Somalia (Cecchi, Pesaro, to foreign Minister C.F Nicolis di Robilant, August 27, 1886)


Antonio Cecchi was an ardent expansionist who for some time had been urging the Italian government to take over the Benaadir concessions. In seeking to promote his own version of Italian power in Somalia, Cecchi upset the fragile commercial arrangements that Filonardi had constructed. He replaced Filonardi’s influential Hadrami interpreter with Arabs of his own choosing, returned an unpopular Italian resident to Marka, and sent soldiers to the lower Jubba area to try to force Somali caravaneers to unload their wares at Baraawe rather than at the British-held ports of Kismaanyo and Goobweyn. (Lee V. Cassanelli)


Cecchi’s presence also resurrected Somali fears of territorial dispossession … Thus it did not escape public attention when a cousin of Cecchi visited the Benaadir in 1895 to investigate the possibilities for commercial agriculture. There soon followed talk of growing cotton on Italian plantations along the Shabeelle. This cousin was Giorgio Mylius, a wealty Milanese industrialist. The Industrialist was particularly interested in the possibility of growing cotton in Somalia.

Finally, Cecchi appeared to symbolize colonial aggressiveness in the distant interior


About Geledi Sultanate, The Wacdaan were from the beginning in the alliance, they even claim that Wacdaan pastoralists were the first to rise up against the tryants of Silcis, and Geledi too claim they were the first. But one thing is true: Both played a keyrole in this and both were from the beginning of this revolt allyied with each other.













3: The Somali response to Italian expansion

The Somali groups described in part 1 responded differently to the Italians who were expanding slowly but steadily into Benadir coast, and would inevitably venture into the hinterlands.

To start with the Geledi Sultanate,

The Geledi Sultanate was in decline throughout the 19th century. The Sultanate was in the shadow of its former splendid and power. The Geledi confederation headed by the Gobroon shaykhs of Afgooye had lost much of its cohesiveness as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The succession of Osman Ahmed in the 1880s brought to the Geledi sultanate a man of lesser ambitions and more political skills than his illustrious forebears. Osman, for example, did nothing to punish the Biyamaal when they blocked a branch of the Shabeelle River and thus caused severe hardship to Geledi´s agricultural allies downriver. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

Despite these setbacks, Osman inherited baraka (grace) as a member of the Gobroon lineage was still respected by many ordinary Somalis in the region. In the mid 1890s Osman´s army had still been strong enough to defeat their traditional Hintire rivals down the river.

What was the view of the Sultan of the Italian expansion?
First of all what was the general mood in Geledi?

Most people were suspicious of the Italian encroachments and as described earlier people were whispering about Italians taking over the land and their farms. When the Italians came, The Geledi were divided on the issue to resist the penetration of Italians of Benadir coast or accommodate. While the people wanted to resist, the attitude of the Sultan and those in authority was cautiously accommodating the Italian presence in Benadir Coast. The Geledi-Wacdaan alliance came under strain at this time, for many of the Wacdaan were opposed to any compromise with the foreigners.

The Sultan started to accommodate the Italians and he started to establish friendly relationships with the Italian governors in Mogadishu. Cecchi apparently felt that Osman remained a force to be reckoned with, for the ill-fated Lafoole expedition had originated with Cecchi´s scheme for an Italian-Geledi alliance ( Lee V. Cassanelli)


The Wacdaan

The Wacdaan were mainly pastoralist, with a small group turning to farming throughout the centuries of their alliance with the Geledi clan who were mainly agriculturalists. As said above, the Wacdaan were opposed to any compromise with the foreigners. This fierce anti-foreign stance was persistent in the culture of Wacdaan and in the very place of Lafoole. The place has been called Lafoole because apparently the Wacdaan defeated the Gaalo Madoow when they migrated to the Lower Shabelle around the 18th century, hence the translation of Lafoole which is: Bones . ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

Because the Sultan of Geledi seemed hesitant to resist the Italian expansion into Benadir coast, the alliance was cooled off. Apart from the weakening of their bonds with the Geledi, the drought of the 1890s which lead to a large population of Wacdaan abandoning their homelands, the Italians posed the greatest threat to the group. They were, moreover, the first inland Somalis who’s territory was actually invaded by colonial soldiers at the time of the Cecchi expedition.

On of the most influential leaders among the Wacdaan was the leader Shaykh Ahmed Haji Mahhadi. He was not a Wacdaan but became the sheikh of the Wacdaan. He was born in Mogadishu and hailed from a lineage of Mogadishu (Abgal). He had lived there most of his life, teaching alongside such renowned Muslims scholars as Shaykh Sufi and Shaykh Mukhdaar. Like the latter, he found coexistence in a town which housed infidels intolerable, and he chose to retire to the small coastal enclave of Nimow, a little south of Mogadishu. There he set up a small jamaaca which attracted several of the local inhabitants. When Nimow was shelled by an Italian warship in retaliation for the Cecchi ambush, Ahmed Haji fled to Day Suufi (in the heart of Wacdaan territory) where he intensified his preaching against the infidels. As late as 1907, the acting Italian governor considered him ‘the most listened-to propagandist' in this area of the Shabeelle. Even the Geledi turn to him rather than to their own sultan for religious counsel. ( Lee V. Cassanelli)

One of the Wacdaan leaders apparently influenced by Ahmed Haji was Hassan Hussein, titular head of the largest subsection of the Wacdaan clan, the Abubakar Moldheere. The Abubakar Moldheere were the most numerous and hence the most militarily powerful section of the Wacdaan in the late nineteenth century. Hassan Hussein is remembered as one of the first Wacdaan to oppose the Italians: warriors from his lineage were prominent among the forces that attacked Cecchi at Lafoole. Likewise , his lineage was spokesmen for the Abubakar Moldheere who most strenuously urged the blockade of caravan routes to Mogadishu (economic sanctions).


The Biyamaal

This group is the best known group in the southern Somali resistance. Like the other groups in Benadir, the Biyamaal too were wary of Italian expansion into the Benadir coast. In the beginning the Biyamaal were following the actions of the Italians very carefully, while trying to accommodate them if they posed no threat. Yet there is little question that the resistance in Merca district was the fiercest and most prolonged in the Benadir. This is not surprising in light of the earlier history of the Biimaal: their continual struggle against many enemies had given them a cohesiveness and a military organization far tighter than that of most other southern Somali clans ( Lee V. Cassanelli).Throughout the nineteenth century the Biyamaal had stood together to defend their territory and their independence against encroachments by the powerful sultans of Geledi: both Yusuf Muhammad and his son Ahmed Yusuf lost their lives in battle against the Biyamaal. These proud nomads had also firmly resisted the sultan of Zanzibar´s growing influence in Marka by ambushing the governor of that town together with forty askaris in 1876 ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

Not only by sheer force were the Biyamaal able to resist the influence of the sultan of Zanzibar but they could also assure their influence on Marka by placing economic sanctions on the city. When occasional differences arose between the Biyamaal leadership in the interior and the old Arab and Somali families of Marka – who were always more interested than Biyamaal in establishing relations with foreign powers – the Biyamaal would hold up food supplies to the townsmen and divert their exports to smaller outlets along the coast. These boycotts proved extremely effective in assuring Biyamaal influence in urban politics, as the Italians would learn in 1904.

The Biyamaal consisted of four territorial sections spread along the coastal dunes between Jesiira and Mungiya and extending inland to the farmlands along the Shabelle. Each of these sections was represented by a number of religious authorities known generally as macaallimiin and by anumber of politico-military figures known as malaakhs and amaanduule. In times of crises, the leaders from all four sections would gather in shir to work out a common policy of action.

With the arrival of the Italians at the coast in 1890, Biyamaal leaders were almost in constant shir to coordinate their plans for the inevitable showdown between Italian expansion and their resistance. The Italian government always viewed them as its most determined opponent, colonial polcy was geared towards the dividing of Biyamaal leadership and thus divide the opposition. Remarkably the Biyamaal have presented a united front even when they were eventually defeated in 1908.

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The setting of 'Axad Shiiki' is completed, it is time to discuss that very day of 25th Novermber of 1896 and the morning of 26th Novermber of 1896.

What happened on those two days? Who attacked and annihilated the Italian expedition force? And how did this event spark the fire of resistance in the whole of Banadir which would last till 1908?
Italy was not an ''advanced'' and organized colonial power in the world as was Britain. So Italy wrote not as many papers on their colonies than say Britain which had a well-functioning colonial deparments, like the Colonial War Office, which has the most data about Sayyid Muhamed Abdulle Hassan and his darwish army.

And to make matters worse, all the colonial data about Southern Somalia is burried in Italian language. As most Somalis speak by now English, it is difficult to go for Italian account.

I have an Italian book, which takes alot of time to translate, and since it concerns history, one must be very carefull in translation and interpretation.

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Anyways, I will do my utmost best to present the resistance in Benadir-Southern Somalia against Italian expansion. Axad Shiiki (1896) is the sparking point, and I'll continue down to 1910, when Italy succeeded in their occupation of Southern Somalia.

The reasons for resurrecting this history has to do with the current situation in Benadir. The shamefull Ethiopian occupation is something all Somalis who are aware of our greatness strokes in their heart.



The spark that lit the Resistance: Lafoole 25-26th of November 1896

Lafoole as explained earlier was within Wacdaan territory. It lay in an area with thick brush and scrub grass, a suitable spot for a well-prepared ambush. The Wacdaan were waiting for this moment, as Cecchi was despised by all Somali groups in the Benadir, since he embodied colonial aggressiveness which became evident by his plans to ‘tap into the rich resources of Somalia’.

Also, the Wacdaan were from the beginning fiercely opposed to any compromise with the 'infidels'. This attitude was persisent in the culture of Wacdaan as explained earlier. Another impulse to this fierce anti-infidel attitude was the coming of Sheik Axmed Xaaji, the sheikh that found it intolerable to coexist with the 'infidels' in Mogadishu (see part 3). He lived among the Wacdaan, set up a jamaaca (religious school) and became the sheikh of the Wacdaan (religious leader). His ideas have apparently influenced the leader of the largest subgroup of Wacdaan (Abubakar Moldheere): Hassan Hussein.

Hassan Hussein, together with Sheikh Axmed Xaaji were instrumental in articulating the opposition to the Italian presence in Benadir. As already explained this too had its consequences for the political geography in Benadir, mainly the cooling of the alliance between Geledi and Wacdaan. Within the Geledi, the people wanted to resist the Italian expansion but the Sultan and the ones with authority choose for accommodation. In this the Wacdaan were slowly moving away from Geledi, and moving towards the Biyamaal, their erstwhile enemy.

The clash at Lafoole:

On 25th of Novermber in 1896, the moment arrived in which the Italian government gave the approval to venture into the interior, thus effectively leaving the garrisons in Mogadishu. Cecchi too was waiting for this moment since he was eager to sign treaties with the Sultan of Geledi, which he still thought was powerful enough to be instrumental in the Italian plans for Somalia. What he didn’t know however was that the Sultan did not represent the feelings of the people, who were fiercely opposed to Italian expansion. Cecchi and the others in the expedition would find out too late about this fierce anti-infidel attitude of the Somalis.

This expedition consisted of Antonio Cecchi, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians. In the evening when the expedition force set their camp at Lafoole, they were attacked in which a fierce fight followed. Apparently, this attack was not decisive enough to finish off the expedition. The next morning a renewed attack followed which successfully finished off the expedition, with only 3 survivors to tell the story.

''With government approval, Cecchi prepared for an expedition into the interior. By November 25, he was ready to move; his caravan consisted of seventy askaris, Commander Ferdinando Maffei of the Staffetta, Commander Franscesco Mongiardini of the Volturno, and fourteen other Italians, for the most part members of the crews of the two ships. That very night their encampment at Lafolé, some twelve miles inland, was attacked. In the early morning hours, as the caravan once more got under way, it was attacked again. By eight-thirty in the morning of November 26, all but three sailors were dead or dying.'' (Robert. L Hess)

Who were these groups that attacked the Italian expedition?

In the Shaping of Somali Society, (Lee V. Cassanelli) it becomes clear that the group that attacked the Italians were of mainly Wacdaan warriors, accompanied by Murursade and Geledi warriors.

''In November 1896, he and a score of Arab askaris set out to meet with the presumably influential sultan of Geledi. It was the first colonial attempt to penetrate the interior with a military contingent, and it ended disastrously for the Italians. Cecchi’s expedition was besieged and most of it destroyed at a place called Lafoole, along the Muqdisho-Afgooye road by Somali warriors of the Wacdaan clan.''

In another passage the author reveals more about the composition:

''Geledi’s long-time allies the Wacdaan had apparently acted independently at Lafoole; and they had been assisted by a handful of warriors from the Murursade, also Geledi allies''

Virginia Luling instead talks about Wacdaan and others, which thus means Murursade and Geledi warriors, since the alliance consisted of these three groups:

''…Antonio Cecchi, famous as an explorer and one of the most enthusiastic and influential advocates of Italian colonisation, set out from Muqdisho for Geledi with a party of soldiers in Novermber 1896, intending to negotiate with Sultan Cusmaan Axmed.
They were surprised and attacked while camping in Wacdaan territory, at Laafoole at the edge of the deex, where the white earth meets the black, and the thorny bush gives way to more open country. Out of the seventeen Italians, only three survived.
The assailants were from the Wacdaan and perhaps other clans.''

Virginia Luling further sheds light on the location of Laafoole:

''It must be a particularly suitable place for surprise attacks, for fourteen years earlier, Révoil’s caravan had been attacked by Wacdaan at the same spot, and its name ‘place of bones’, comes from a much earlier slaughter, supposedely of the ‘gaalo madow’. ''

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Reactions to the clash:

The ‘Lafoole Massacre’ as the Italian press called it, came less than a year after the humiliating Italian defeat at Adowa in Ethiopia. It was a severe physiological damage to Italian colonial ambitions.

For Somalis, it was a great day, which send a shockwave throughout the Benadir region. The 'Lafoole Massacre' which already severely shocked the Italian colonialists, was immediately followed by sporadic incidents along the whole Benadir coast.

In Mogadishu 100 or more Italians were wounded in a general uprising. In Marka, a young Somali, Omar Hassan Yusuf, assassinated the Italian resident, Giacomo Trevis. According to local accounts, Omar emerged after praying in the small mosque of Shaykh Osman ‘Marka-yaalle’ and knifed the ‘infidel’ Trevis as he walked along the beach. Giacomo Trevis was a hated man in Marka for a lot of reasons, besides been an unwanted colonialist, he was also hated for his policy of compulsory labor. In Warsheekh, a government askari was confronted as he stepped outside the garrison.In Baraawe, the well-known and influential Haji Shaykh Abbas railed against his Somali compatriots and called them ‘woman’ for allowing the Italians free movement there. ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The Italians in Benadir were shocked, and when the news reached Rome, the foreign minister immediately appointed Commander Giorgio Sorrentino as royal commissioner extraordinary for the Benadir. Initialy, the Italians thought that Lafoole was an Ethiopian ambush since Ethiopians were besieging Lugh at that time and since there were rumours of an Ethiopian invasion of Benadir. When Sorrentino landed in Mogadishu,on 26th of January 1897, he immediately started the investigation of Lafole.

''Within ten days he had determined that Lafolé was neither the precursor of a general urprising against the Italians nor an Ethiopian ambush but an isolated case of action by Wadan tribesmen and the tribes of Geledi; who had been spurred to the act by two Arabs from Mogadishu’’ (Robert L. Hess)

This was a gross understatement of the Lafoole incident, and the attitude of the Benadir groups to the Italian presence.

Throughout the Benadir, from Warsheekh to well south of Marka, 1896-97 is remembered as Axad Shiiki ( the ‘Sunday year of Cecchi’). The Biyamaal date the beginning of their twelve-year resistance at Axad Shiiki. ( Lee V. Cassanelli).

The clash at Lafoole is immortalized by this shirib:

Shiin digow Sheikh Axmed Xaaji
Shiiki sheydaan mooho?

Translation:

Writer of (the Koranic verse) shiin, Sheikh Axmed Xaaji
Is not Cecchi a devil?

Sheikh Axmed Xaaji is the well-known religious leader of the Wacdaan who had established the jamaaca to teach Quran, religon etc

----------------------------------------


The Italians have misinterpreted the signs of the coming storm which would engulf the Benadir region.

In the coming part, I'll explain the immediate consequences of the clash at Lafoole. How the Italians reacted to the 'Lafoole Massacre' and how the different Somali groups in Benadir reacted to the event and the wider issue of Italian pressence in Benadir coast. Slowly on from there we will arrive at the heroic struggle of the Biyamaal and their allies, amongst which their erstwhile enemy Wacdaan, against the Italian expansion.

http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/index.htm

http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/indice.htm#illavoro




Vittorio Bottego

http://www.ilcornodafrica.it/pca-vb-bellap.pdf



the Bimaal

Feuding hostilities led to several confrontations between Italy and the Somali tribes. Eno reveals, “Merca, Jilib, Jesira and Dhanane are some of the notable battlefields where the Bimaal (Hawiye) pastoral tribe engaged colonial soldiers constituting Somalis.”27 Nevertheless, revelations such as by Italian naval officer Gaetano Bossi had already done the damage. He recommended the pertinence of a more organized government role. Commander Onorato di Monale who undertook an investigation upon the early announcements of the Benadir Coast slavery scandal wrote another equally discrediting report. Some excerpts of the report, including information given by the local chiefs and other outstanding figures of the community, read:
…not only did slaves enter Benadir ports, but that the last slaves to enter the town date back only to last December. Slaves are bought and sold in the Benadir towns, not only under the eyes of Italian authorities…but according to registry of the cadis of Mogadishu…with the sanction of those authorities. In the Benadir, a slave can be bought, sold, imprisoned, inherited, given as a gift, exploited, and rarely liberated. Far from taking steps towards the gradual disappearance of domestic servitude, the company is perpetrating it and aggravating the condition.28

In a gesture to consolidate its colonial activities firmly, Italy succeeded in the purchase of the Benadir ports for the estimated amount of 3,600,000 Italian Lira , the equivalent of 144,000 British pounds, an achievement seen as a step forward. But within the colony, as Italy was aware, resistance was unavoidable since some tribes were discontented by the abolition policy.
The Somali slave owners, as is paradigmatic of the nomadic psychology, tinted the abolition policy as a religious issue in a bid to gain legitimacy for their cause of war and sympathy from other clans, under the philosophy of Jihad (holy war). Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, the Mad Mullah and leader of the Dervish, assisted the Bimaal cause to that end. The colonial administration recruited soldiers to face the arrogant and unabiding Bimaal. When the battle erupted, several Bimaal villages were torched off. The Bimaal, in retaliation, forged several attempts to overrun the Italian askaris in Dhanane, situated between Merca and Mogadishu. They were all in futility until the Bimaal were relentless subdued.
In a diplomatic move to step up the scale of ‘pacification’, the colonial officials approached chiefs and notables of the various tribes to win their support and maintain good relationship between the colonists and the colony. The Somali pastoral tribes seized the opportunity. The two ensuing reasons were for access to the colonial officials (as a medium between the Italians and the community), and secondly for the payroll which displayed a recognition of their social status as the leadership. The Sultan of the Geledi was one of such leaders who subscribed wholeheartedly to this kind of colonial appeasement.29
Skirmishes between the Bimaal and the Italians continued for quite some time, though
intermittently.30 The colonial troops got a breakthrough and eventually penetrated the towns of Bariire, Malable, Audegle (Aaw-Dheegle) in the Dhoobooy area of Merca, and Afgoi a few kilometers from Mogadishu. The event has finally tamed Bimaal resistance, widening the aspiration for peace and liberty.
Sheikh Hassan Barsane’s Resistance to the Abolition of Slavery
One Sheikh who was exaggeratedly honoured as a hero in Somali history, Sheikh
Hassan Barsane of the Gaal-Jecel sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, has resisted abolition
of slavery to the extent of misinterpreting the Holy Scripture – the Qur’an, by writing to
the Italians:
“All our slaves escaped and went to you and you have set them free.
We are not happy with the [Antislavery] order. We abandoned our
law, for according to our law we can put slaves in prison or force them to work.”
And what law was the ‘respected’ Sheikh referring to?
“The government has its law and we have ours. We accept no law
other than our law. Our law is that of God and of the prophet….
“God has said: The few can defeat the many. The world is near its end;
only 58 years remain…It is better to die following Muslim law. All Muslims are one.31
In the preceding statement, Barsane has made not less than three discrepancies contrary to the Islamic faith. But a Jareer poet who was against enslavement of Muslims, an un-Islamic practice, sets the main response in this verse:
* Ninki Ashahaato Adoon ma Ahaado
Amar Eebe diidi yaa kaa Aqbalaayo32
Translation:
Whoever announces the oneness of Allah in submission, no longer remains a slave;
So, nobody abides by your orders regarding what Allah has illegitimated.
Sheikh Hassan Barsane is one of a few heroes honoured in the history of Somalia. He is, as far as we have seen in the history curricula of schools in the country, dignified as a sharp protestant against the Italian colonialists, and one who died for the cause of nationalism. But on the contrary, he died due to his rejection to free Muslim lives in the campaign to the abolition of slavery and of slave trade. As far as Islam is concerned, a good model is Abubakar who paid money to purchase Bilal’s freedom after the latter converted to Islam. In this case, the two acts of Abubakar and Sheikh Hassan Barsane are contrary to each other, but the former’s gesture accommodates well with the harmonious tenets of Islam. Barsane’s, in retrospect, amounts to a villain’s misuse and abuse of the Holy Scripture.
Previously, many scholars have written concern over the obstruction of the truth about




Urban Woes and Pious Remedies: Sufism in Nineteenth-Century Benaadir (Somalia)
Scott S. Reese
(doi: 10.2979/AFT.1999.46.3-4.168)



Egalitarian in nature, the nomadic Somalis, never let their traditional leaders unbridled on
the exercise of power and other essential functions over the clan. 150 years ago, a British
traveller Burton, in his diary, noted the following quotation:

“Every free-born man holds himself equal to his ruler, and allows no royalties or prerogatives to abridge his birthright of liberty. Yet I have observed that with all their passion for independence, the Somali, when subject to strict rule as in Zayla and Harrar, are both apt to discipline and subservient to command .”7

Leuit. M. Talmone ayaa ahayd markii ugu horaysay ee calan Talyaani la suray dhul Soomaaliyeed. Taariikhdaas madow ee u bilaabatay dadkayagii reer miyiga ahaa, waxay ku beegnayd 11/ 10- 1893-kii. Magaalada Marka ayaa waxay ahayd degmada nasiibka u yeelatay ayaan-darridaas. Waxaase dhacday ninkii calanka surayay oo askari Talyaani ahaa in lagu dilay goobtii uu calanka ka taagayay. Ninka wax dilay oo ahaa nin Soomaaliyeed, una dhashay beesha Biyamaal ayaa isla halkii isna lagu dilay.

Vicenezo Filonardi, oo aanan horay u qorshaysan in uu qaab dagaal ku qabsado degmooyinka Soomaaliyeed ayaa wuxuu qaaday tallaabooyinkii ugu horeeyey ee ciidameed. Odeyaal kamid ah duqeydii beesha ayuu inta xir-xiray dabadeedna u dhoofiyay Eriteeriya. Waxaa kale oo uu magaaladii la dhacay madaafiic laga soo ridayay markabkii ahaa Staffetta dushiisa. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p. 48 & The Collapse of the Somali State. A. M. I. Salwe, 1994. p. 18).


V. Filonardi, isaga oo guddoomiye ka ah shirkad uu ku magacaabay Societa´ Filonardi, ayuu isla bishii oktoober 1893-kii soo gaaray Xamar. Waxaa xusid mudan, qaabka shirkaduhu in ay ahaayeen hannaan ay gumaystayaashu ka bilaabi jireen tallaabooyinka ay ku hooshayeen ummadaha. Hantida shirkadduhu lahaayeena waxay ahayd hantida dadka ay ku socodaan in ay soo bililiqaystaan. Qof kasta oo saamiyada shirkadda wax ku darsada (shakhsi ama dowlad), wuxuu qayb ka heli jiray hantida ma-guurtada ah ee laga boobayo dadkaasi loo socdo hadba kuwooda ayaan darrido haleesho. Filonardi wuxuu haysatay heshiis ku eg saddex sano oo uu shirkadda oday ka ahaanayo, taas oo laga soo ansaxiyay Sensibaar. Magaalada Xamar ayaa waxay ahayd degmada ugu hilan cuslayd degaanka, sidaas darteed ayuu Filonardi u doortay in ay magaalo-madax u noqoto maamulka degmooyinka Soomaaliyeed ee uu gunnimada la damacsan yahay. Xilka uu shirkadda u hayay waxaa u dheeraa isaga oo suldaankii Sensibaar wakiil uga ahaa degaanka, isla markaasna wuxuu ahaa nin ganacsade ah. Si fir-fircooni leh ayuu u guda galay in uu habeeyo howlihii maamulka iyo kuwii ganacsiga ee degaanka. Waxaase jiray caqabado saddex ah oo V. Filonardi u muuqdey, kuwaas oo xal u heliddooda ey ku xirneyd guusha shirkadda. Waxey ahaayeen :
1. Ganacsatada Carabta ah oo dekadaha Banaadir u arkayay in ay yihiin isha dhaqaale ee keliya oo ey heystaan.
2. Xoolo-dhaqatad Soomaaliyeed ee degaankoodu yahay baadiyaha Banaadir iyo Juba, kuwaas oo arkayay in suldaanka Sensibaar iyo Talyaani midkoodna uusan xaq u lahayn in ay dhulkooda ku heshiiyaan.

Commander Incoronato, oo la socday socdaalkii Filonardi, ayaa markuu Xamar gaaray, dowladdii Talyaaniga u soo gudbiyay talooyin wax ku´ool ah oo ku saabsan sidii ay u hooshi lahaayeen Soomaaliya, gaar ahaan gobollada Juba iyo Banaadir. Wuxuu kula taliyey in eeyan ku deg-degin in degmooyinka Soomaaliyeed ay ka bilaabaan hab-maamul u muuqan kara qaab gumeysi, isaga oo ku tilmaamay Soomaalidu dad jeceylka ay nolosha u qabaan uu ka weyn yahay jaceylka ay dagaalka u qabaan . Haddii uu dagaal bilowdona waxaa xayiraad ku imaneysaa dhaqdhaqaaqa ganacsi oo Talyaanigu ka bilaabay degaanka. Wuxuu tilmaamay laba arimood oo dib u dhac ku keenaya howlaha Talyaanigu doonayo in uu ka bilaabo degaanka. Waxay kala yihiin xiriir la´aanta Talyaaniga iyo Soomaalida reer miyiga ah, iyo colaadaha ka dhex aloosan beelaha Soomaaliyeed dhexdooda. Wuxuu si gaar ah u tilmaamay in Soomaalidu ay ku mashquulsan yihiin colaad-beeleedyo dhexdooda ah, taasina ay tahay mid hiilo u ah mashruuca gumaysi-doonka ah ee Talyaanig. Ogaallada uu dhiibay ninkani oo ku saabsan ganacsiga wuxuu ka xusay in dhulka Soomaalidu uu yahay mid hodan ku ah xoolaha nool iyo khudaarta ka baxda beeraha ku tallaalan daamanka webiyada, sidaa darteed walxaha dalkan laga dhoofin karo ay noqon karaan hilibka, xoolaha nool iyo khudaarta. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p. 48-49).

kacdoonkii beesha Biyamaal uu ahaa midka uguna horeeyay uguna milgaha cuslaa, misana kacdoomada teel-teelka ahaa oo reer miyigii Soomaaliyeed ay kala hor yimaadeen maamulkii gumaysiga iyo raggiisii waxaa laga xusi karaa kacdoonkii beesha Gaaljecel ee uu hoggaaminayay Shiikh Xasan Barsane, kacdoonkii beesha Wacdaan iyo kacdoonkii beesha Abgaal. Kacaamadaas oo midba la xilli ahaa marka Talyaanigu gaaro degaanka beeshu degan tahay, ayaa dhamaantood waxaa hoggaaminayay rag culimo ah oo aqoon wanaagsan u lahaa culuumta islaam-baradka. Reerka Biyamaal oo degaankoodu yahay dhulka u dhexeeya Marka iyo Jamaame ayaa markiiba bilaabay dhaqdhaqaaq mucaarad ku ah maamulkan cusub ee ka abuurmay degaanka, gaar ahaan degmada Marka oo Beeshu ey ku xoogan tahay. Dhallinyaradii beesha ayaa waxay bilaabeen in ay xayiraad ku soo rogaan dhamaan waddooyinka isku xira degmada iyo baadiyaha. Taasi waxay joojisay raashinkii ay degmada ka heli jirtay beeraha iyo xoolaha ay Soomaalidu baadiyaha ku haysteen. Dabadeed Filonardi wuxuu bilaabay in uu magaalada ka quudiyo dhanka badda oo maraakiib ayuu raashin ugu keeni jiray. (The Collapse of the Somali State. A. M. I. Salwe, 1994. p. 18).

Kacdoonkaas hore ee reerka Biyamaal ayaa wuxuu ahaa mid aanan si wanaagsan loo agaasimin, sidaa darteed ma noqon mid dhaawac muuqda gaarsiiyay Talyaaniga. V. Filonardi, qudhiisu maahayn nin diyaar u ahaa in uu dagaal culus la galo beelaha Soomaaliyeed. Wuxuu sitay xoogaa hub fudud ah oo uu Eriteeriya kala yimid, kuwaas oo muddo ugu kaydsanaa bakhaarrada Sensibaar.

Gadoodka beesha Biyamaal ayaa iyana culaab kale ahayd oo hor is-taagtay mashruucii shirkadda. Sidaa darteed wuxuu taageero uga baahday dowladdiisii. Wuxuu u diray farriin uu kaga codsanayo in mar kale wada-hadal lala yeesho suldaankii Sensibaar oo laga codsado in heshiiskii lala dhigtay wax laga beddelo si dhaqaalaha kirada ah oo suldaanka lagula heshiiyay uu wax u dhimo. Heshiiskaa hore ayaa wuxuu dhigayay in suldaanka sanad walba la siiyo dul-saar gaaraya 60 % faa´iidada laga helo dekadaha Soomaaliyeed. Ra´iisul-wasaarihii Talyaaniga ayaa, howlaha ka socda Banaadir, u arkay talo qardajeex ah oo Filonardi uu horseede ka yahay, taas oo aanan natiijo wanaagsan laga filayn. Taasi waxay ka dambaysay war-bixin uu ra´iisul wasaaruhu helay ee ku saabsan maamul-xumida Filonardi. Sidaa darteed waa uu diiday in uu yeelo codsigii Filonardi. Wuxuuna tilmaamay in heshiiska lala galay suldaanka Sensibaar uu yahay mid mudan in la xaq-dhowro. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p. 49. Laga soo xigtay Filonardi Report nr. 221. Zenzibar. December 31. 1893).


 qunsulkii markaas Talyaaniga u fadhiyay Sensibaar Antonio Ceechi



Markabkii Staffetta ayaa isna markii ay u dhamaatay muddadiisii, ka baxay xeebaha Banaadir. Bishii abriil, 1894-kii, inteeyan bilowmin bad-xiranka, xafiisyadii shirkadda irridaha ayaa loo xiray. Shaqaalihii Talyaaniga ahaa, Sensibaar ayay u wareegeen. Askartii carabta ahayd ee u shaqaynayay shirkadda, xataa waxaa loo waayay qoryo ay isku difaacaan. Dabadeed Filonardi, wuxuu ku dadaalay in dowladdiisa uu qanciyo si ay u taakulayso shirkadda. Wuxuu tallaabadan ku tilmaamay mid dadka iyo dowladda Talyaaniga u keeni karta magac-xumi. Qoraal cabasho ah oo uu u diray dowladdiisii ayuu sidan u qoray:
" U faa´iidaynta dhulka aabe darteed, shirkad ka howl-gashay dhul aad u ballaaran, maahan mid noolaan karta, haddii eeyan gacan ka helin dowladda. Fudeydka (qormada) iyo hadafka laga leeyahay heshiiska oo ah mid ballaaran oo qallafsan ayaa si aad ah u muujinaya in shirkaddu ay sheegto in ay ku khasban tahay i dowladdu ay la shaqayso. Wadda kale ma jirto. Heshiiska dhex-maray shirkadda iyo dowladda, haddaanan loo garan sidaas oo ifaysa, taasi waxay horseedaysaa in dowladdu ay ka aragti qaadato sabool taag-daran oo aanan lahayn maskax caafimaad qabta ". (Ex-Italian Somaliland. E. Sylvia Pankhurst 1969. p. 54).

Talyaanigu, waxay xilligaas isu diyaariaysay duulaankii ay ku qaaday Xabashida ee la magac baxay Cadawa. Dowladda ayaa u baahnayd dhaqaale badan oo ay ku bixiso mashruucii dagaalkaas. Xilligaas Talyaanigu ma uusan haysan dhaqaale ku filan howlaha dowladeed ee dalka gudihiisa. Sidaa darteed ayaa Barlamaanka waxaa ka dhici jiray doodo culus oo ay siyaasiyiintu isku dhaafsanayeen aragtidooda. Qoraallada ii soo diro General General Oreste Baratieri, oo ahaa hoggaamiyihii maamulkii Ereteeriya, ayaa waxay ahaayeen kuwo barlamaanka laga akhriyo

Labadii maamul ee xilligaas ka jiray Mudug iyo Majeertiinya ayaa waxay ahaayeen kuwa keliya ee degaanka ka dhex-muuqday ee lahaa masaalix siyaasadeed oo dowli ah. Maamulkii boqor Cismaan Maxamuud wuxuu ahaa mid si buuxda ugu howlanaa xirirradii ganacsi ee uu la lahaa ummadaha inala deriska ah. Arintaasi waxay shiiqisay in xiisado siyaasadeed ay ka curtaan degaamadii maamulkan. Taasaa waxay sababtay xasillooni cimrigeedu dheeryahay oo ay heleen dadyowgii ku noolaa degaamadii maamulkaas. Waxaa in la xuso mudan in boqor Cismaan uusan lahayn damac siyaasadeed ee dhaafsiisnaa isu urursanaanta degmaamada maamulkiisa. Ingiriiska oo xilligaas eeyan qorshaha ugu jirin, in uu xoog iyo xeelad ku qabsado degaankan, ayaa sanad walba lacago laaluush ah siin jiray maamulkan. Sababtu waxay ahayd in uu amaan u helo doonyihiisa ukala tallaabayay bad-weynta Hindiya iyo badda Cas ee ku soo dhowaanaya dhulka geeska ah ee uu boqorku ka taliyo.
Suldaan Yuusuf Keynadiid, inkasta oo maamulkiisu uu ahaa mid curdan ah, misana si muuqata ayuu uga cimilo duwanaa noloshii siyaasadeed ee maamulkii ka jiray Majeertiinya. Suldaanku wuxuu ahaa nin han weyn oo xambaarsan damac siyaasadeed ee ballaaran. Wuxuu doonayay in uu maamulka Sensibaar kala wareego dhamaan degmooyinka Soomaaliyeed oo ay Cammaaniyiintu ka taliyaanayeen. Sayid Barqash bin Siciid oo horay u sheegan jiray dhamaan xeebaha Soomaaliyeed ee ku sii jeeda bad-weynta Hindiya ayaa xilligaas wuxuu ku jiray olole siyaasadeed oo uu ku doonayay in loo aqoonsado dhulka gudaha ah ee ka dambeeya degmooyinka xeebaha ku yaal. Suldaanku wuxuu doonayay in uu arrinkan kaga kabto dhaawaca kaga yimid hantidii badnayd oo ay gumaystayaashu kala wareegeen. Keynadiid ayaa isaguna dhankiisa dadaal kaga jiray uu doonayay in uu ku fashilinayo qorshaha Barqash. Isla markaasna wuxuu kaloo doonayay in uu la wareego degmooyinka koonfureed ee uu Barqash sida tooska ah uga taliyo.
Suldaanku wuxuu qaaday tallaabooyin dhaxal-gal ah oo ay kamid ahayd qoraallo uu u diray qunsulladii Sensibaar ka fadhiyay dowladihii reer Yurub. Waxaa kamid ahaa qoraal taariikhdiisu ahayd 1885-kii oo uu sidan ku yiri :
" Aniga ayaa qabsaday Hobyo, waxaana aan ku sikanayaa meelaha uu ka taliyo Sayid Barqash bin Siciid. Cashuuraha iyo dakhliga kale oo halkaas ka soo baxa waa hanti aanu annagu leenahay ". (The Somali Peninsula, Government of the Somalia 1962. p. 3-4).
Keynadiid intaas kuma hakan ee weeraro joogto ah ayaa ciidamadiisu ay ku qaadi jireen meelo kamid ah goobihii ay fadhiyeen ciidamada Barqash, gaar ahaan waqooyiga degmada Warshiikh.
12/ 12- 1888-kii, Keynadiid wuxuu Sensibaar u diray ergo ka kooban saddex nin. Ujeeddada ergada waxay ahayd in ay wada-xaajood la soo yeeshaan qunsulkii Talyaaniga ee jasiiradda fadhiyay Vincenzo Filonardi. Ergadaasi waxaa kale oo ay sideen go´aan ah in suldaanku uusan waxba ka qabin in degaankiisa uu noqdo mid hoos yimaada dul-maamulka dowladda Talyaaniga. Suldaanka ayaa arintan wuxuu ka lahaa dano siyaasadeed oo uu doonayay in uu fushado kaddib markuu xiriir la yeesho Talyaaniga. Taas oo ahayd in uu ciidamadiisa u dheelli-tiro ciidamada labada maamul ee uu xuduudda la lahaa ee xilligaas ka xoog weynaa. Waxay kala ahaayeen Barqash iyo boqor Cismaan. Suldaan Yuusuf Keynadiid, waxaa kale oo uu doonayay in uu Talyaaniga ka dhigto il uu hubka kahelo marka uu bilaabo in uu Barqash kala wareego dhulka. Waxaa xusid mudan in Barqash uu xiriir la lahaa Ingiriiska oo uu ka heli jiray taageero ciidan.
Talyaaniga horay ayuu ugu tala jiray in uu nabad ama colaad ku helo dul-maamulka gobollada bariga iyo bartamaha Soomaaliya. Isaga oo ka faa´iideysanaya fursaddan uga timid dhanka Keynadiid, ayuu wuxuu markiiba bilaabay in ay Ingiriiska ku heshiiyaan halka ay marayso khad-xuduudeedka u dhaxayn doonta dhulka Soomaaliyeed oo ay maamulayaan. Markaasna weli wax heshiis ah oo dhex maray Talyaaniga iyo suldaan Keynadiid ama boqor Cismaan ma jirin. Gumaystayaashu marka ay xuduud samaynayeen waxay adeegsan jireen kaarta joqraafi ah, taas oo dusheeda ay xariiqi jireen. Dabadeed dhulka ayaa waxaa loo soo diri jiray arah kaartadii sidata, kuwaas oo sawirkii xarriiqda ahaa dhulka ka calaamadeeya iyaga oo adeegsanaya dhirta, buuraha, togagga iwl. Marxaladda saddexad ayaa waxay ahayd in la sameeyo calaamado dhismo ah oo muujinaya halka ay xuduuddu marayso.
14/ 1- 1889-kii ayuu dhacay heshiiska xuduudda Talyaaniga iyo Ingiriiska ay ku xariiqdeen khadda ay dhex-dhigeen labada dul-maamul ee waqooyi-bari iyo waqooyi-galbeed. Khaddaas ayaa waxay ka bilaabanaysaa tuulada Bender Seyda oo Boosaaso ka xigta 20 km dhanka galbeed. Tuuladaas oo ku beegan bartamaha afar-geesoodka ay dhisaan labada khad ee taaga ah longtitude 48 iyo 50, iyo labada khad ee legdan latitude 10 iyo 12. Koonfur ayay u xariiqeen illaa iyo bartamaha afar-geesoodka koonfur kaga beegan, dabadeed waxay u weeciyeen xagasha kaga beegan koonfur-galbeed. Waxay halkaas ka qabsanaysaa xuduudda ay Xabashidu wax kala xariiqatay dowladahan gumaystayaasha ahaa.
Markay taariikhdu ahayd 7/ 2- 1889-kii ayuu Vincenzo Filonardi wuxuu soo gaaray Hobyo. Saddex toddobaad kaddib, 28/ 2- 1889-kii ayaa isaga iyo suldaankii ay kala saxiixdeen heshiis qoraalkiisu u dhacay sidan :
" Aniga oo ah Yuusuf Cali Yuusuf, suldaankii Hobyo iyo dhulka la xiriira, laga bilaabo Mareeg illaa iyo Raas-Cawad, waxaan gacantayda ku saxiixay waraaqdan. Aniga oo caddaynaya in aan saldanadaydii Hobyo (ka dhisneed) iyo degaanka la xiriira ee aan soo xusay, Mareeg illaa iyo Raas-Cawad, waxaan oggolaaday in ay hoos timaado maamulka dowladda Talyaaniga ee weyn iyo boqorkooda Umberto I, isaga oo uu ka wakiil yahay qunsulkiisa fadhiya Sensibaar Vincenzo Filonardi .......... ". (Barkhat.1974. p. 234).
Xiriirkii uu V. Filonardi la yeeshay madaxdii maamulkii Hobyo ayuu wuxuu ka ogaaday in boqor Cismaan, gabadha uu ugu jeclaa xaasaskiisa ay tahay gabar uu dhalay suldaan Keynadiid. Talyaaniga ayaa markaas wuxuu bilaabay in uu xiriirka Hobyood kaga faa´iideysto si uu xiriir ula yeesho maamulka Majeertiinya. Si toos ahna madaxdii Hobyo fadhiday ayuu uga codsaday in lala xiriirsho boqor Cismaan. Taasi waxay irridaha u furtay xiriirkii uu Talyaaniga la yeeshay reer bariga, taas oo ku dhamaatay heshiiskii dhacay 1/ 4- 1889-kii oo lagu caddaynayay in Majeertiinya ay kamid noqotay degaanka uu Talyaaniga dusha ka maamulo. Nuqulka heshiiskan ayaa wuxuu lamid ahaa kii suldaan Keynadiid lala saxiixday. Waxaa la xusaa in boqor Cismaan uusan damac siyaasadeed ka lahayn heshiiskan, balse uu u galay si uusan u lumin isu dheeli-tirka xoogga maamulkiisa iyo kan Hobyo. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p.124).
Heshiisyadii dabadeed, Talyaanigu wuxuu degaanka soo booqday sanad kaddib, taas oo ku beegnayd socdaallada joogtada ah oo uu qunsulku ku mari jiray dhulka maxmiyadda u ahaa shirkadda, markaas oo V. Filonardi uu hadiyad u waday suldaan Keynadiid ay kamid ahayd 25 qori iyo 5000 oo rasaas ah. Sanadkii 1993-kii, dowladdii Talyaaniga ayaa waxay qunsulkeeda soo fartay in uu labada maamul gaarsiiyo in ay oggolaadaan qodobo kamid ah heshiisyadii lagu gaaray fadhigii Baljam iyo kii Barliin. Qodobadaasi waxay ahaayeen in la reebo ganacsiga adoomada iyo in la xadeeyo hubka iibka ah oo Afrika la geynayo. Filonardi waxaa xilligaas ka haystay gobolka Banaadir caqabado la xiriira xagga maamulka. Sidaa darteed waxaa adkaa in uu dhambaalkan hor dhigo maamulladii ka jiray bariga iyo bartamaha oo uu ogaa in ay diidayaan. Sanadkii xigay waxaa gobolka loo soo diray ergey hor leh oo la yiraahdo Cecchi. Ganacsiga adoomada oo aanan ku xooganayn degaanka, waxay sababtay in reebitaankeeda uusan ergeygan kala kulmin wax dhib ah. Waxaase ay boqorkii iyo suldaankii ka diideen arrinta ku saabsan in ay joojiyaan soo iibsiga hubka. Taasi waxay abuurtay khilaaf sababay in muddo sanooyin ah uusan degaanka iman markab Talyaani leeyahay. Mar danbe oo Talyaanigii uu bixiyay hadiyado badan oo uu hub kamid ahaa ayay ka heshiiyeen arrintii. (Ibid. p.124-125).
Dhulkii ay Soomaalidu ku noolaayeen, wixii ka baxsanaa xuduuddii labadaas maamul, ayaa waxay ahaayeen meelaha judhii horeba uu saameyn ku yeeshay hooshkii ay dowladaha shisheeyaha ah la damacsanaayeen degaanka. Faransiiska oo soo degay xeebaha waqooyi-galbeed (Jabuuti) ayaa damaciisa wuxuu ku ekaa dhul kooban oo leh ahmiyad istraateejiyadeed. Sidaas darteed ayaa qarniga dabayaaqadiisii wuxuu dhamaystiray mashruuca uu ku qeexayay dhulkii uu ku habsaday. Degmada Jabuuto ayaa dekad iyo magaalo-madaxba u noqotay maxmiyaddii uu ka dhisay halkaas. Waxaa u weheliyay dhul kooban oo ku hareereysan oo uu kaga kaaftoomay in uu kharaj badan ku bixiyo hoosh dhul ballaaran oo gudaha ah.
Ingiriiska oo ku habsaday gobollada waqooyi ayaa markii uu hubsaday in uu ku guulaystay hannaankii dul-maamulka ahaa ee uu halkaas ka dhisay, wuxuu u tallaabay in uu si tartiib ah ugu fido dhulka gudaha ah oo ay Soomaalidu xoolaha daaqsadaan, gaar ahaan dhulka ay degaan beelaha Gadubiirse, Isaaq, qayb kamid ah Ciisaha iyo qaybo beelaha Harti (Dhulbahante iyo Warsangeli). Waxaa kale oo uu ku sikanayay dhulka gudaha ah oo ay degaan beelaha Absame. Ingiriiska,bilowgii hore wuxuu lahaa qorshe uu ku damacsanaa in nadaamka dul-maamul ee uu waqooyiga ka dhisay uu xuduud uga dhigo illaa iyo 100 km. oo gudaha ah, dhul ku bar-bar ah xeebta. Waxaa markaas maamulkiisa hoos imanaya magaalada Biya-qaboobe oo ahayd degmada ugu milgaha adag waddada ay ku socdaali jireen awrta ganacsiga ee ka dhex shaqeeya Harar iyo Seylac. Waxaa kale oo 100-ka km. hoos imanaya degmada Jigjiga oo ku taal dhul biyo badan isla markaasna ah albaabka loo maro dhulka lama-degaanka ah ee glbeedka Soomaaliya.
Talyaaniga ayaa isaguna markii uu cagaha la helay Kismaayo, intuusan Banaadir u tallaabin wuxuu markiiba bilaabay in uu ku sikado dhulka uu maro webiga Juba. Cap. Bottego oo ahaa jaajuus Talyaani ah ayaa wuxuu gaaray degmada Luuq bilowgii sanadkii 1893-kii. Magaaladan ayaa xilligaas waxay ahayd mid uu camiray xiriirkii ganacsi oo ay la lahayd gobollada Banaadir iyo Shawa. Waxaa kale oo magaalada ay ku caan ahayd beeraha waawayn. Biyaha badan oo ay webiga ka heli jirtay ayaa waxay sabab u ahaayeen in dadku ay tabcadaan beeraha. Bishii disember isla sanadkaas ayuu Cap. Bottego ku soo laabtay Luuq isaga oo ciidamo wata. Markuu laabanayay, wuxuu magaaladii kaga tegay ciidan dhan 42 nin iyo bakhaar rasaas ah. Waxaa jirtay in Luuq ay kamid ahayd meelaha uu Menelik isha ku hayay, dood badan oo degmada ku saabsanna waa ay dhex martay isaga iyo Talyaaniga.
Damaca Xabashida oo ka duwanaa damaca gumaystayaasha kale ayaa wuxuu ahaa mid kana xoog weynaa inoogana khatarsanaa. Xabashida oo markaas hoggaan u ahayd qawmiyado badan ayaa waxay sheeganayeen dhamaan dhulka Soomaalidu degaan in uu yahay mid ay iyagu leeyihiin. Waraaqda wareegta oo uu Menelik ku xusey arintan ayuu hoggaamiyayaashii reer Yurub uu kaga helay gacan buuxda. Madaxda ay waraaqdu gaadhay waxaa kamid ahaa qaysarkii Ruushka, embradoorkii Jarmalka, boqorkii Talyaaniga, boqoraddii Ingiriiska iyo madaxweynihii Faransiiska. (The Somali Peninsula, Government of the Somalia 1962. p. 36).
Menelik, wuxuu qorsheystay in uu hoosho dhulka Soomaalidu degaan, hadba inta ay awooddiisa gaarsiiso. Ololihii ciidameed ee uu qaaday bartamihii sanadihii 1890-aadkii, ayaa waxay ku soo gaareen dhulka uu maro webiga Shabeelle, illaa iyo degmada Balcad. Waxay ku soo dhowaadeen Xamar. Beelihii ay sida xun u dhaawaceen waxaa kamid ah beesha Karanle. Soomaalidii, kaddib markii ay dagaallo kharaar la galeen ayay ku guulaysteen in ay iska soo eryaan ciidamadii Xabashida. Beelaha dagaalladaas ka qayb-qaatay waxaa kamid ahaa Jiidle, Jajeello, Moobleen iyo Gabroon. (The Shaping of Somali Society. Lee V. Cassanetti. 1982. p. 199-200).
Beelaha Soomaaliyeed ee ku dhaqan waqooyiga Soomaaliya, qudhooda kama eeyan badbaadin dabkii ciidamada Menelik. Bishii may 1891-kii Cap. Swayne oo ahaa nin wax-badan dhulka Soomaalida maray, wuxuu ku war bixiyay in Xabashidu ay soo direen ergey ka yimid Jigjiga, kaas oo farriin soo gaarsiiyay reerka la yiraahdo Yoonis Jibriil (Gadubiirse). Farriintu waxay ahayd in ay xoolo cashuur ah bixiyaan oo ay siiyaan maamulka boqortooyada Xabashida. Haddii ay oggolaadaan waxaa abaal looga dhigayaa in ciidamada Xabashida eeyan hooshin beesha sida ay ku hayaan beelaha kale ee Soomaaliyeed. Fadhi ay duqeydii reeraha ku qaateen meel u dhexeysa labada tuulo ee Meydir iyo Suurel ayaa waxay ku guddoonsadeen in ey diidaan cashuuraha ay Xabashidu dalbayaan. (The Somali Peninsula, Government of the Somalia 1962. p. 36-37).
Reerka la yiraahdo Nuux Ismaaciil (Habar-Awal) ayaa waxay kamid ahaayeen beelaha Soomaaliyeed oo ay beeshan duddo wadaagta ahaayeen, isla markaasna la qabay dhibaatada ay ciidamada Xabashidu geysanayeen. Shiikh Madar oo kamid ahaa culimadii Soomaaliyeed ee wax ku bartay Harar una dhashay reerka ayaa Ingiriiskii wuxuu ka codsaday in ay hub ka iibiyaan si ay Soomaalidu isaga caabiyaan daandaansiga Xabashida.
Maamulkii Ingiriiska waa uu ka diiday, iyaga oo tilmaamay in degaanku uu yahay mid hoos yimaada dul-maamulka Ingiriiska. Sidaa darteed ay tahay waajib saaran Ingiriiska in uu diyaariyo ciidamo ilaaliya beelaha Soomaaliyeed. (Ibid. p. 36).
Waxaase la hubaa in dowladihii reer Yurub ay ku ballan fureen dadkii Soomaaliyeed oo ay heshiisyada la galeen. Waxay uga dhaqaaqeen meel cidla ah iyaga oo aanan u hurin taageero la bixiyo midda ugu yar ee ah damiir xanuunsada. Soomaalida oo aanan aqoon u lahayn hannaanka cashuurta ayaa waxay arkeen ciidamo dhulkoodii marti ku ah oo misana dadkoodii boob iyo dhac ku haya in ay xaaraan tahay in loogu daro xoolo la siiyo. Arrinkaas Soomaalidu geeri ayay ka xigeen. Xabashiduna wax arxan ah uma eeyan gelin. Falka ay kaga jawaabi jireen diidmada Soomaalida wuxuu ahaa gumaad aanan cidna loo aaba yeelin.
Sandkii 1896, boqor Cismaan Maxamuud iyo suldaan Yuusuf Keynadiid waxay Talyaanigii u soo jeediyeen qorshe ay difaacayaan beelaha Soomaaliyeed kaga daan-daansiga iyo duulaamada kaga imanayay Xabashida. Waxay soo bandhigeen in ay wadajir u soo agaasimaan ciidan tiradiisu dhanyahay 50.000 oo dagaalyahan. Waxay Talyaaniga u sheegeen haddii uu ciidankaasi siiyo qoryo iyo rasaas, in ay Harar ka kicinayaan ciidamada Menelik, oo weliba dadka Soomaaliyeed ee degaanka ku nool ay gacan kaga helayaan arintan. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p.126).
Abwaan Soomaaliyeed ayaa suugaan taariikhda gashay ku tilmaamay goobashada laysugu tegay Soomaalida xilli eeyan diyaar ahayn in ay is difaacaan. Eebe naxariistii janno haka waraabiyo abwaan Faarax Nuur wuxuu tix gabay ah ku yiri :
Ingiriis Axmaariyo Talyaani, wey akeekamiye
Arligaa la kala boobayaa nin u itaal roone
Anse ila ah aakhiro Sabaan iligyadiisiiye
Waa duni la kala iibsaday oon nala ogeysiine
Waa duni ninkaad aamintaa kuu abeeys yahaye
Anse ila ah aakhiro sabaan iligyadiisiiye
Waa duni xaqii la arkayaa la arjumayaaye
Waa duni Akhyaartii lahayd iib ku doon tahaye
Anse ila ah aakhiro sabaan iligyadiisiiy
Afka iyo adduunkaa hadloo oodna sadarkiiye
Ninka gacanta midig oodan tahay laga ilroonaaye
Anse ila ah aakhiro sabaan iligyadiisiiye
Casharkii XXXI-aad


Shirkaddii laga asaasay Sensibaar ee la oran jiray IBEAC (Imperial British East Africa Company) ayaa rool weyn ka cayaartay in Talyaanigu uu ku fido koonfurta Soomaaliya. Shirkaddan oo horay kula heshiisay suldaankii Sensibaar in ay la wareegto maamulka degmooyinka bariga Afrika, ayaa waxay V. Filonardi ku wareejisay gebi ahaan qorshihii ay ka lahayd gobolka Banaadir. Talyaaniga oo xilliyadaas hore aanan fir-fircooni ka muujin xiriirka uu la yeeshay maamulladii ka jiray gobollada bariga iyo bartamaha Soomaaliya, ayaa shirkaddu waxay u suurogelisay in ay caga-dhigtaan gobollada koonfureed ee Soomaaliya.
Waxaa intaa weheliyay Ingiriiska oo mar-kasta suldaanka Sensibaar u shaxaadayay in ay oggolaadaan in uu ka kireeyo Talyaaniga dekadaha Banaadir oo uu maamulkooda ku wareejiyo. Wxaa jirtay waraaq uu suldaankii Sensibaar Xaamid bin Tuwayn u qoray dowladdii Ingiriiska. Waraaqdaas oo uu ku xusay in qsulkii Ingiriiska uu ka codsaday in degaanka Banaadir iyo dekadeheedaba lagu wareejiyo gacanta Talyaaniga, ayuu wuxuu u qoray sidan :
" Zenzibar, may 14 - 1893
(Ammaan dabadeed)
Sida ay saaxiibadaya rajeynayeen, Talyaanigii ayaa la wareegay dekadihii Banaadir. Halkan waxaan idiinku muujinayaa, aniga oo awood buuxda idiin siiyay arintaas in aad ku kacdaan tallaabo kasta oo aad u aragtaan in ay hagaagsan tahay, hadba sida sharaftiina waafaqsan. Waxaan aaminsanahay, wax aanan wanaag ahayn in aydnaadan inoo sameyneen. Waxaa amarka suldaanka ku qoray biddihiisii oo ah Saalem bin Maxamad ". (Ex-Italian Somaliland. E. Sylvia Pankhurst 1969. p. 18).
Talyaaniga dhankiisa ayuu wuxuu ka waday heshiisyo qarsoodi ah oo uu la gelayay qaar kamid ah beelaha Soomaaliyeed ee gobollada koonfureed. Isla markaas wuxuu feer waday wada-hadallo uu Soomaalida ka qariayay oo uu la yeelanayay suldaankii Sensibaar. Shaxaadkii Ingiriiska ee suldaankii Sensibaar iyo wada-hadalladii uu suldaanku la yeeshay Talyaaniga ayaa waxay ku dhamaadeen in sanadkii 1893-kii dekadaha Banaadir lagu kireeyo lacag dhan 50. 000 oo £ oo uu suldaanku qaatay. Waxaa xusid mudan, sanadkii 1905-tii, in isla dhulkaas Talyaanigii uu ska kaga iibsaday oo kula lahaansho-wareegay lacag dhan 144. 000 oo £. (Italian Somaliland. London. 1920. p. 810).
Talyaaniga, ituusan wax tallaabo ah qaadin, wuxuu ishaa-falataysi kaga dhur-sugayay natiijada cadaadiskii uu Ingiriisku saaray kacdoonkii ay wadeen Soomaalidii ku noolayd gobolka Juba-land. Talyaanigu waxay ka baqayeen in kacdoonku ku soo faafo Soomaalida ku nool Banaadir. Ingiriiska oo gacan aanan arxan lahayn ku muquuniyay kacdoonkaas ayaa qudhiisu ka cabsi qabay in kacdoonku u gudbo gobolka Taana, oo xilligaas uu ka waday olole uu ku cadaadinayay xoolo-dhaqatadii Soomaaliyeed si eeyan degaanka ugu fidin.
Maamulkii Ingiriisku ka dhisay gobolka Juba wuxuu bilaabay in uu si tartiib ah xilkii ugu wareejiyo Talyaanigii. Arintaasi waxay ku fulaysay calanka suldaanka hoostiisa iyo saxiix mar-walba laga soo qaadanayay isaga, iyada oo ay dusha kala socotay dowladda Talyaaniga. Kaddib Talyaanigii oo loo xasiliyay dhulkii ayaa la wareegay maamulkii gobolka Juba. Wuxuu bilaabay howlihii lagu ogaa gumaysiga. Wuxuu la wareegay dhamaan dhulkii banaanaa ee aanan la deganayn. Wuxuu dhisay maxkamado iyo xarumo cashuurta lagu ururiyo. Wuxuu qortay rag ciidamo ah iyo howl-wadeeno rayid ah. Waxay hagaajiyeen ganacsigii, iyaga oo habeeyay bangiyo iyo cumlado loo adeegsado lacag ahaan.
Bartamihii sanadkii 1893-kii, wasiirkii dibadda ee Talyaaniga Benedetto Brin ayaa wuxuu la soo xiriiray V. Filonardi. Wasiirku wuxuu soo diray dhambaal uu ku amrayo in la bilaabo sidii xiriiro wanaagsan loola sameysan lahaa odeyada dhaqanka iyo hantoolayaasha ganacsatada ah ee koonfurt Soomaaliya, si ganacsiga Talyaaniga uu u gaaro dekadaha ku yaal gobolka Banaadir. Dowladda Talyaaniga, xilligaas weli diyaar uma ahayn in kharaj iyo ciidan badan ay ku gumaysato dadka Soomaaliyeed. Waxay is-tusiyeen in ay dalka ku qabsadaan qaab ah la wareeg maamul iyo heshiisyo maxmiyadeed.
Filonardi ayaa xilligaas wuxuu ahaa isha keliya oo dowladda Talyaaniga ay ka hesho ogaallada ku saabsan xaaladda nololeed ee ka jirtay gudaha Soomaaliya, gaar ahaan Banaadir. Si ay u helaan il kale ayaa dowladdu waxay soo dirtay sarkaal dhallinyaro ah oo la yiraahdo Leuit. Count Giovanni Lovatelli, kaas oo ka tirsanaa ciidamadii badda ee Talyaaniga. Waxaa xusid mudan in ninkani hadda ka hor loo magacaabay in uu la shaqeeyo arahyo Ingiriis ah oo loo diri jiray Kismaayo iyo gobolka Juba. Arrintaas oo uu guul ka keenay darteed ayaa boqoraddii Ingiriiska Queen Victoria uu kaga helay billad-sharaf. Count G. Lovatelli qoraalladii uu Banaadir ka soo diyaariyay ayuu wuxuu ku sheegay in eeyan u baahnayn kharaj badan si Talyaanigu u maamulo gobolkan. Sababta wuxuu ku sheegay in dadku yahay kuwo u diyaar ah soo dhoweynta Talyaaniga, gaar ahaan kuwa ku nool xeebaha. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p. 40 - 41).
Filonardi wuxuu xiriir toos ah la lahaa wasiirkii dibadda ee Talyaaniga B. Brin. Wakhti badan ma qaadan in uu soo gaarsiiyo hor u marka uu ka gaaray xiriiro uu la yeeshay qaar kamid ah duqeydii Soomaaliyeed iyo ganacsatadii ku nooleyd xeebaha Banaadir. Waxaa jirtay arrin Talyaanigu dhayalsaday oo ku xusnaa qoraalladii Filonardi uu u diray wasaaraddii dibadda ee Talyaaniga. Waxay ahayd talo uu soo jeediyay odey kamid ah duqeyda beesha Biyamaal. Ninkaas oo la yiraahdo Fiqi Caddow, ayaa Filonardi uga digay in uu shaqo siiyo Abuubakar bin Cawad oo ahaa ganacsade kamid ah carabtii ku noolayd gobolka Banaadir. Ninkan ayaa wuxuu xiriir la lahaa ganacsadayaal badan oo ahaa carabtii Banaadir ku nooleyd. Laakiin Soomaalida dareen ayay ka qabeen oo waxay diidanaayeen in uu odey ka noqdo degaanka laga talo-geliyo. Filonardi ayaa wuxuu ninkan ka doonayay in uu kala shaqeeyo geedi-socodka uu ku doonayo in uu ku hanto Banaadir, sidaa darteed buusan dheg u raaricin dareenkii Soomaalida iyo digniintii Fiqi Caddow.
Filonardi oo tan iyo markaas aanan marna hakad gelin howlaha la xiriira mashruuciisa gumaysi-doonka ah, ayaa wuxuu la xiriiray ninka la yiraado Edoardo Incoronato. Ninkani wuxuu ahaa sarkaalkii hoggaaminayay markab weyn oo kuwa dagaalka ah ee uu Talyaanigu lahaa. Markabkaas oo la oran jiray Staffetta ayaa wuxuu ku sugnaa Sensibaar.
Filonardi wuxuu ninkan ka doonayay in uu la dejiyo qorshaha ay ku baxayaan.
Filonardi, intuusan u soo ambabixin Banaadir, wuxuu diyaariyay qoraallo uu ugu talo-galay in uu ku maamulo degaanka. Sidii gobolka Juba ayuu Filonardi ku caddeeyay qoraaladiisaas in maamulkiisu xaq u leeyahay in uu la wareego dhamaan dhulka bannaan oo aanan cidna lahayn. Wuxuu si gaar ah u tilmaamay dhulka hantida dabiiciga ah leh sida dhulka beeraha ku wanaagsan iyo dhulka dhirta waaweyn ee dhuxusha laga shito. Waxaa kale oo uu tilmaamay dhulka macdanta iyo cusbada leh. Dhulalkaas ayaa si looga shaqeysto, sida uu Filonardi qoray, wuxuu ku xiray ruqsad laga haysto maamulka.
Si uu Soomaalida u raali-geliyo, caadifaddoodana u soo jiito ayuu Filonardi qodobka VI-aad ee qoraalkiisa ku xusay in uu degaanka ku dhaqayo shareecadda diinta Islaamka.
Isaga oo ilaalinaya heshiiskii lagu gaaray Baljam ayuu wuxuu reebay ganacsiga addoomada iyo hubka (qoryaha iyo rasaasta). Sidaa darteed wuxuu xusay in dhamaan doonyaha ku soo xiranaya dekadaha Banaadir ay oggolaansho ka heystaan maamulka. Waxaa kale oo qoraalkiisaas ku xusnaa inta ay le´egtahay cashuurta laga qaadayo waxyaabaha laga dhoofinayo dekadaha iyo waxa laga soo dejinayo. (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p. 39 - 43).
5/ 10- 1893-kii waxay ahayd taariikhda uu Filonardi u doortay socdaalkiisii rasmiga ahaa ee uu ku iman lahaa Banaadir. Isaga oo la socda Staffetta ayuu taariikhdaas aanu soo xusnay ka soo degay degmada Baraawe oo uu horay si dadban maamulkeedii ula wareegay. Degmadan ayaa dadka ku nool waxay ahaayeen kuwo aanan culays u arag imaatinka Talyaaniga.
7/ 10- 1893-kii, hoggaamiyihii ciidamadii markabka Edoardo Incoronato ayaa arah u diray dhulka baadiyaha ah ee ka tirsan degmada, iyada oo ujeeddadu tahay in la soo indha-indheeyo. Arahda waxaa kamid ahaa Cap. Ugo Ferrandi oo ganacsade dal-mareen ah iyo Leuit. Maurizzio Talmone oo ahaa takhtarkii markabka. Waxaa weheliyay ciidan dhan 30 askari oo kamid ahaa ciidamadii waaligii Baraawe iyo 10 nin oo lababa ay ka socotay beel kamid ah shan beelood oo reer Baraawe ah. Arahdan oo ku socdaashay waddada magaalada ka baxda ee aadda Baardheere ayaa muddo toban saacadood ah lugeynayay. Ogaallada ay heleen ayaa waxay isugu jireen kuwo soo dhoweyn iyo khatarba lahaa. Arrinta dareenka gelisay, madaxdii arahda, oo si gaar ah qiimo ugu lahayd mashruucoodii gumeysi ayaa waxay ahayd raggii Soomaaliyeed oo ay baadiyaha kula kulmeen oo dhamaantood ku hubeysnaa qalab dagaal. Taas oo kamid ah hiddo-nololeedka ay leeyihiin xoolo-dhaqatadeena ayaa waxay ahayd arrin ku cusbayd raggii gumeysi-doonka ah ahaa. Waxay halkaas ka akhristeen arrin ka duwan fudeydkii ay sugayeen in ay dalka ku maamulaan. Waxaa kale oo ay soo arkeen dhulka beeraha ku wanaagsan oo goofafka ah, kuwaas oo lagu waraabinayay biyaha kanallada ku socda oo laga soo leexiyay webiga Shabeelle. Soo dhoweyn ka muuqatay wejiyadii dadkii ay la kulmeen ayaa waxaa wax ka tilmaamay Leuit. M. Talmone. Qoraal uu socdaalkan ka diyaariyay ayuu wuxuu ku qoray sidan :
" Xasilloonida maamulkayaga Banaadir, xataa haddii hodantooyada aan aamin sanahay awooddeeda uusan helin natiijo si deg-deg ah looga miro dhaliyo, ................ Taasi noqon meyso arrin aanan inoo soo jiidin in aanu ahaano horseedayaal meel haboon u diyaarinaya facaha danbe ee Talyaaniga iyo aayahooda. Halkaas oo noqon doonta meel ay ku soo qul-qulaan dadkayaga iyo wax soo saarkayaga ". (Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Robert L. Hess. 1966 p. 45. Laga soo xigtay Brave to Commander of Staffetta. October 9. 1892. Libro Verde. Doc. 81. anex. Pp. 178-80 ).
Rajadii wanaagsanayd oo xiddigle Talmone ka qaaday booqashadii Baraawe ma noqon mid hesha cimri dheer oo ay ku raagto. Sarkaalkan ayaa markii uu qoraalkiisii dhameeyay, muddo 48 saacadood ah dabadeed waxaa loo geystay dhaawacii uu la dhintay. 10/ 10- 1893-kii, isaga oo ka soo degay doon yar ayaa meel xeebta magaalada Marka ah waxaa waran geliyay nin dhallin-yar oo u dhashay beesha Biyamaal. Ninkii wax dilay isla goobtii ayaa waxaa ku toogtay askari carab ah. Dhacdadan oo aanan lahayn wax hor-dhac u ahaa, ayaa waxay ahayd casharkii ugu horeeyay oo uu Filonardi ku ogaaday in Soomaalidu ay iskala weyn-yihiin Talyaaniga. Dabadeed wuxuu qaaday tallaabooyin cadaadis ah oo uu bulshada ciqaab uga dhigayo. Wuxuu gacanta ka jaray ninkii wax dilay isaga oo meyd ah, magaaladiina waa uu xabadeeyay. Wuxuu waafaqay in ay magaalada ka howl-galaan 280 askari iyo 8 sarkaal oo calooshooda u shaqeystayaal ah, kuwaas oo dhamaantood carab ahaa. Askartaas ayaa waxay hoos imanayeen xarun uu lahaa waali cusub oo uu degmada u magacaabay oo la oran jiray Suleymaan bin Xaamid.
Ma jirin cid u yeeratay iyo cid xataa u baahnayd nimankan doolaaliska ah ee inoo yimid. Iyagu maaheyn dad habow ah oo soo lumay, bal waxay lahaayeen ujeeddo dheer oo ay ku ballameen in ay facahooda danbe u gudbiyaan. Qorshahooda dhabta ah ayaa waxaa inoo turjumay falalkii ay nagula kaceen markii ay inaga itaalka roonaadeen. Soomaalidu maahayn dad garasho ka arradnaa oo kasi waayey ujeeddada gumeysiga. Inkasta oo laysugu tegay oo xoogag badan ay isu kaashadeen hooshka dhulkooda, misana ayaan-darrada keliya oo haysatay baa waxay ahayd maqnaanshaha maamul-dhexe oo mideeya, sida maantaba inoo muuqata.
Sayid Maxamad Cabdaulle Xasan ayaa goor danbe tilmaan wacan ka bixiyay, guud ahaan, heerarka uu marayo geedi-socodka gumeysiga. Isaga oo Soomaalida baraya ayuu gabeygiisii Dar-daaran wuxuu ku tiriyay tixdan :
Marka hore dekaduhuu ku iman daawashiyo beene
Dalxiis in uu yahay idin latahay weydin dagayaaye
Marka xiga dabkuu idin ka dhigi dumar sidiisiiye
Marka xiga dalkuu idin ku oran duunyo dhaafsada´e
Marka xiga dabaaqad ayuu idin dareensiine
Marka xiga dushuu idin ka raran sida dameeraaye
Dalkayaga labadii qarni ee u dambeeyay (kii 19-aad iyo kii 20-aad) gumaysatyaasha Yurub iyo Xabashida (Euro-Abassinian Colonialism) ayaa inta qaybiyay misana sii qaybiyay. Qiimo muuqda oo uu dalkayagu lahaa maahayn arinta sababtay in dhulkayaga la boobo. Maxaa yeelay qallafsanaanta ay leedahay noloshayada xoolo-dhaqatada ah maahayn mid dhiirri gelinaysay raggii ina soo weeraray. Raggaasi waxay nolosha u qiimeeyeen si aanu annagu u qiimayn. Waxay horay u degeen dhul hodan ah oo beeraha ku fiican, hawadiisuna ay wanaagsan tahay. Ujeedooyinka laynoo qabsaday waxaa ka faalooday falalkii ay gumaystayaashu mar danbe sameeyeen. Falalkaasi waxay ahaayeen siyaasadihii anaaniga ahaa oo ay xoogaggii gumaystayaashu nagula keceen. Taas oo ay ka dhigteen waddo ay raacaan, iyaga oo aanan u aaba yeelin masaalixda dad-waynaha soomaaliyeed". Qudbad uu allaha u naxariistee Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmaarke ka jeediyay barlamaankii Soomaaliya 1962-kii


Laitin, David D.: Politics, Language, and Thought
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