great Quotes on The Somali people a Noble Race

As the Somalis see it, writes Mr. John Drysdale:
"Their frontier dispute is not essentially about land alone
but the people."1


This
historical error prompted the first Somalis President, Dr. Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarky to say this:
"No! Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries, with
whom we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations
are not our neighbors but our Somali kinsmen whose citizen-
ship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary "arrangements".
They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture
lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same
pastoral economy as overselves. We speak the same language.
We sare the same God, the same culture and the same traditions.
How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?"2



The Portion Under Dispute
One, Robert Paul Jordan, an American journalist once wrote:
"The Horn of Africa is a most inhospitable place. A harsh
land this is. Not a desert, but close. High arid country
mostly--a Savannah of acacias, patches of grass, thorny
shrubs, tall ant-hills and rocks. When the scanty rains
fall, it runs cruel. Then, sheep and goats slowly die.
The barrens are strewn with their carcasses."4


As I mentioned earlier, the
Somalia Government considers the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia and the North-
eastern Province of Kenya as forming part of the "Greater Somalia" domain.6
The idea of "Greater Somalia" was conceived in the mind of Mr. Bevin, then
Britain's Foreign Secretary after World War II, who in 1946 proposed to the
House of Commons in London to consider lumping together the British
Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and adjacent parts of Ethiopia into a trust
territory.7 So that, in Mr. Bevin's won words:
"The nomads should live their frugal existence with the least
possible hinderance. They could have a chance to live a decent
economic life."8


Ten days after Mr. Bevin introduced this proposal in the House of Commons,
the British administrators in Somaliland organized meetings to inform the
people the "good news" about their future.9 As it will be learned later,
this pre-emptive move would embarrass the British Government and create a
living but volatile problem in the Horn of Africa.
An Ancient Heritage
The Somalis are a Hamitic people whose ancestors are believed to have
immigrated from the Arabian peninsula long age. They came to settle on the
biblical land of "Punt", the ancient "Aromatic Kingdom" renowned for its
frankincense and myrrh.10 Their traditional geneologies trace the ancestry to
Arab forebears who belonged to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Mohamed, and
ultimately they claim belong to a common ancestor.11 The Somali Prime
Minister, Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky once said:
"Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of the
soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth. These limitations
on our material well-being were accepted and compensated for
by our forefathers from whom we inherited, among other things,
a spiritual and cultural prosperity of inestimable value. The
teaching of Islam on the one hand and lyric poetry on the
other..."12

Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Head
of the Geography Department of Ehtiopia's Haile Selassie I University,
described the Somalis as exhibiting:
"External individualism and utter lack of discipline. The
acute struggle for existence in this harsh environment often
expresses itself in group conflicts over wells or grazing
land."13

The initial British interest in the Horn was on the Somalia Coast for
strategic and logistical reasons. After the British had annexed Aden in
1840, treaties were signed with local chiefs to guarantee the continuous
supply of cattle from inland to feed the garrisons. The opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 increased the strategic importance of the area and;
consequently, the British entered other long term agreements which gave them
possession of the port of Berbera and several other offshore inlands.
Britain immediately assigned consuls at Berbera, Seylec and Bulhar to
protect her interests.16





These accomplishments
were achieved by exploiting local grievances such as one described in 1892
confidential British diplomatic dispatch to London which read:
"Sheikh Sufi states - The Abysinians read, "Ethiopians" are
always on one side of us, the English on the other. We
(Ogaden tribes) are with the English, and we wish for
English rule. We are your children.
I say that, as a sheep quivers under the blow of a knife,
we, the Ogaden, are quivering under the oppressions of the
Abysinians, who have every year, for the last nine years,
visited us and levied large numbers of sheep, goats, horse,
camels and taken what they liked from us. We have no guns
and are not powerful enough to fight and must submit.
Last season the Abysinians (drove) off all livestock; 990
men, women and children perished. We are Mullahs and we like
to tell the truth."17

The British
Government stand was spelled out by Mr. Peter Thomas as follows:
"Since the British Government would be responsible for Kenya
only a few more months (before her independence in December
1963), the British Government considers that it would be
wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of
Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of
that country; and that agreement should be sought by the
African governments concerned working and negotiating within
an African framework."24
The Somalia delegation led by then, Prime Minister Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky
were disappointed to learn at their first meeting that the British
Government had no intention of making any constructive proposals. He
charged:
"The British had only convened the meeting to explore the
position of the Somalia Republic, which was in any case well
known to them."25
In conclusion, the Somalia Government states:
"It was evident that the British Government has not only
deliberately misled the Somalia Government during the course
of the last eighteen months, but has also deceitfully
encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe
that their right to self-determination could be granted by
the British Government through peaceful and legal means. The
responsibility for the consequences that may follow this
suppression of a fundamental human right lies squarely on
the British Government."26
Shortly after this, the Somalia Government recalled her Ambassador from
Britain and severed diplomatic relations. The Somali people residing in the
North Eastern Province boycotted the elections, took arms, and demanded
self-automony.
For us Kenyans, the Somalis demand that we give up approximately 45,000
square miles of our territory (approximately a fifth of the land mass), not
only is it unacceptable but also violates our Constitution and the OAU
Charter. The Kenyan view was and continues to be similar to that expressed
by the majority of the Organization of African Unit member countries:
"Thus, in almost every country in Africa, there are minority
groups having racial, religious or tribal affinities with
neighboring countries."27
The conference that met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in 1963 to resolve the
boundary issue resloved:
"Countries with widely diverse populations would be quickly
dismembered if each ethnic group was allowed to go its own
way under the banner of self-determination. The resulting
partitioning would create a chaotic potpourri of tiny,
nonviable"Nations" toally incapable of providing even the
barest of government services."28
At the conclusion of the conference, the Somali President Osman had the
following to say:
"By becoming united, the Somali people feel that not only
would their welfare be secured, but that as a single entity
they would be able to contribute effectively to the ideals
of African unity. The people of the Republic cannot be
expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren.
If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to
express their will freely, the government pledges itself to
accept the verdict."29

Somalia joined the Arab League nations in 1974. Being a predominantly
Moslem state, she attracts sympthy from wealthy Arab countries. Saudi
Arabia has become increasingly interested in the Somalia's affair not only
for political reasons but also strategic and economic. Kuwait has invested
heavily in power stations in Mogadishu and Iraq has been supplying her with
crude oil.31 Somalia also maintains cordial relationship with the Sudan.



The Kenya Defense Force Mission is defensive and the government
articulates it thus. Accordingly, may I quote President Reagan's address:
"Our policy is defensive. United States uses its military
force only in response to clear threats to stability and
peace. We pursue this policy knowing fully that our
defensive posture grants several military advantages to a
potential aggressor. He can choose when, where and how to
attack. He can formulate a detailed plan for his operations
to take maximum advantage of his strengths and exploit our
vulnerabilities. He can also mask his pre-attack mobiliza-
tion efforts under the guise of training exercise or
diplomatic crises so that any advance warning we might get
could be cloaked to ambiguity."38

1. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
2. Drysdale, John., The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964,
Introduction, p. 8.
3. Presidential Address to the Nation on "Kenyatta Day, 20th October,
1965". The Standard Paper.
4. Jordan, Robert Paul. "Somalia's Hour of Need", National Geographic,
June 1981, p. 748.
5. Szaz, Z. Michael. "Somalia's Difficulties", The New York Times,
September 28, 1981, p. 14
3. Presidential Address to the Nation on "Kenyatta Day, 20th October,
1965". The Standard Paper.
4. Jordan, Robert Paul. "Somalia's Hour of Need", National Geographic,
June 1981, p. 748.
5. Szaz, Z. Michael. "Somalia's Difficulties", The New York Times,
September 28, 1981, p. 14
6. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
7. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,
p. 67.
8. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,
p. 67.
9. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,
p. 68.
10. Lewis, Ian M. The Modern History of Somaliland. New York: Praeger,
1965, Chapter 1.
11. Lewis, Ian M. The Modern History of Somaliland. New York: Praeger,
1965, Chapter 1.
12. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 8.
13. Mariam, Mesfim Wolde. The Background of the Ethio-Somalia Boundary
Dispute. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam, 1964.
14. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
15. Norden, Hermann. Africa's Lost Empire. Philadelphia, Macrae-Smith, 1930.
16. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, Chapter 2.
17. Bhasdwaj, Raman G. The Dilema of the Horn of Africa. New Delhi:
Sterling Publishers, 1979.

18. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.
19. Tibbs, Thurlow. Strategic Appraisal of Sub-Saharan Africa. Air Command
and Staff College, Air University, 1981.
20. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Chapter 5.
21. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Tables 20, 21 and 22 (Major Army Weapons,
Air Force Weapons and Naval Weapons, 1981).
22. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Chapter 5.
23. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, Chapter 5.
24. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 15.
25. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 155.
26. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 15,
p. 158.
27. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 14,
p. 146.
28. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 14,
p. 147.
29. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 148.
30. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, P. XVIII.
31. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University,p. 219.
32. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 220.
33. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 222.
34. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. XVIII.
35. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 223.
36. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,
The American University, p. 262.
37. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense SecDef Annual Report; to
U.S. Congress of March, 1984.
38. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense SecDef Annual Report; to
U.S. Congress of March, 1984.


Each of these tribes has very elaborate genealogies, carried forward from generation to generation through oral tradition, to show the origin of their sub-tribes and the exact location of each of the their members in the social structure. It has very rightly been pointed out by the social anthropologist, Professor I.M. Lewis1, that what a person's address is in England, his genealogy is to a Somali.


Apart from the oral traditions kept alive in the memories of all the Somali people, travellers like Sir Richard Burton (who visited Northern Somalia during 1852-55) and Italian traveller Ing. Luigi Robecchi Bricchetti2 took considerable pains to collect and record for posterity the genealogies of the Somali tribes.
Sab


.M. Lewis has mentioned this: "In addition to their striking Hamitic physical features, Somalis also exhibit traces of Arabian blood, and in Southern Somalia amongst Digil and Rahanwiin clan-families, physical evidence of their contact with the pre-Hamitic Bantu and Negroid peoples whom they and the Galla before them conquered in the region. But it is their Arabian ancestry which traditionally is their greatest pride. Ultimately, all Somali genealogies go back to Arab origins, to the Prophet's lineage of Quaryesh and those of his companions. With the exception of the matrilaterally related Daarod, the pastoral clan-families trace their descent agnatically from an ancestor Samaale who is generally regarded as the source of the name Somali (properly Soomaali), while the Digil and Rahanwiin trace their origins to an ancestor called Sab...



It is essential to distinguish here the Midgaan, Tumaal, and Yibir bondsmen of northern Somaliland who, though known collectively by the same name as that of the common ancestor of the Digil and Rahanwiin, are quite distinct from them... these three groups are distinguished from noble Somalis, with who they appear to share much the same physical features, by their practice of special crafts as metal-working, and leather work, shoe-making, hunting and hair-dressing -- all activities which noble Somali pastoralists scorn... in their distinctiveness and exclusion from full participation in Somali social relations the Sab have many of the features of an endogamous caste."1

Descent from Arabia through Aqiil Abuu Taalib' of Quaryesh Sab Samaale Digil Irir Rahanwiin Hawiya Aji Dir = Darod Major Tribes of Somalia The most important and dominant tribe is Hawiya (Hawiye or Aijua). They are wealthy and powerful people and most of them are businessmen, intellectuals and capable elites. They are nomads as well as settled people.


Lewis has written as under: "More circumstantial are the traditions which record the arrival from Arabia of the patriarch Sheikh Isaaq and Sheikh Daarood, founders of the corresponding clan-families. The Daarood are regarded as older than the Isaaq; and Sheikh Daarood is supposed to have crossed from Arabia about the tenth or eleventh century and Sheikh Issaq to have followed some two centuries later. Whether or not these traditions are historically valid, they have greater social importance since they provide a charter for the existence of the clan-families descended from two Sheikhs ... the expansion of their descendents led to the dispersal of the Dir who traditionally preceded them in the northern Somaliland ... By the twelfth century, the Dir and the Daarood Somali were pressing upon their southern Galla neighbours and the great sequence of events which ultimately disestablished the latter in Somaliland was under way. The main lines of Somali penetration were either down the system of wells along the Indian Ocean Coast, or from the north-west down the valley of the Shebelle River and its tributaries. From the folk traditions analysed by Cerulli it appears that by the thirteenth century Somali from the north had penetrated southwards to the extent that the coastal area between the present ports of Itala and Merca was occupied by Hawiye Somali, while further South and towards the interior lay the Somali Jidu tribe (Digil-Sab), and finally to the west the Galla. About this time the Ajuraan (derived from the marriage of an immigrant Arabian with a woman of the Hawiye) were expanding and pushing the Galla westwards towards Bur Hacaba in the inter-riverine region in the fifteenth century. The Ajuraan consolidated their position under a hereditary dynasty, and dominating the lower reaches of the Shebelle were linked commercially with the port of Mogadishu. In the seventeenth century their defeat at the hands of the Hawiye and the collapse of their dynasty, contributed to the decline of Mogadishu. Other Somali clans now continued to pour into this region, but in the early part of the century the zone south of Bur Hacaba and between the rivers was still occupied by the Galla. Not long after, however, the Galla were finally driven across the Juba River by the Expanding Rahanwiin.

The Somali advance continued; and by 1909 the Daarood reached the Tana River where in the interests of the other inhabitants of Kenya their advance was arrested by the establishment of a fixed grazing area. This marked the end of the great series of migrations, which, over a space of some nine hundred years, had brought the Somali from their northern deserts into more fertile regions of central and southern Somalia and finally into the Northern Province of Kenya. These movements had great social repercussion. Through contact with the Galla and the absorption of the few Galla who remained behind and through the influence of the earlier Bantu communities, the Digil and Rahanwiin tribes emerged with their distinctive characteristics.

From the Bantu they adopted cultivation, and from Galla temporarily copied their system of military age-grading."6 The Inferior Status of Sab Tribes As we have already mentioned, the main nomadic tribes of Somalia -- Hawiye, Dir, Issaq and Daarood -- consider themselves to be superior or "noble" tribes. They consider the Sab tribes, who are mainly agriculturalists and artisans, and the other tribes like Midgan, Tumal, Yibir, Chachi, etc., as inferior to them in social status. The "noble" tribes have been detesting cultivation and the artisans jobs which these people do. Lewis says, "The sab who practise these occupations form a minute fraction of the total population and, traditionally, were separated from other Somalis by restrictions on marriage and commensality."7

Saadia Touvel in her book "Somali Nationalism" says: "The social organization of the Sab is much more hierarchical and formal than that of the Samalee. The Sab are considered "less war-like, less individualistic, more cooperative and more biddable" than their Samali brethren. Between the Samali and the Sab there is some antipathy to the nomad, the Sab are massakiin, poor not so much in material wealth as in spirit. Their greater respect for authority and Government, founded in their agricultural economy, is at complete variance with the nomadic ideal of the independence of the warrier."8 According to Lewis: "... in contrast to northern nomadic society, there is greater social stratification among Sab."9 In general, three classes of landholders are recognised: Putative descendents of the Original Group. Most of these belong to Digil and Rahanwiin clans who possess the most secure rights to arable land. Longstanding Accreditations. Recently-adopted clients. Those in the second and third categories, especially the last, traditionally enjoy less-secure possession of land. "Membership in any clan is required by a client undertaking to accept all the obligations, including that of solidarity in the blood feud, binding his protectors. Only so long as these duties are fulfilled can a client traditionally continue to cultivate the land which he was been allotted by the hosts."10



They were as under:


1. Mohammed 4. Irir 7. Sarur 2. Hammer 5. Macarre 8. Sarire 3. Harriere 6. Saddi 9. Ismail Out of these nine sons, only two, Irrir and Ismail, produced children. Irrir had two sons -- Hawiye and Higgi. Irir Hawiye Higgi Hawiye had six sons: 1. Guggandable 3. Gurgate 5. Gimbelle 2. Karanle 4. Hasgal 6. Rarane Higgi had two sons: Dagale (Meaning "fighter") and Dir. Higgi Dagale Dir Hawiye's third son was Dame, his son was Sarire, his son was Bardale, and Bardale's son was Herab. Hawiye Sarire Bardale Herab Herab had 15 sons as under: 1. Hudden 6. Mudulod 11. Masoeik 2. Mahudan 7. Huddughen 12. Billan 3. Mahmud 8. Osman 13. Martille 4. Harmassor 9. Madarkeis 14. Samagialle 5. Ormagiallo 10. Barsane 15. Badi Of these 15 sons, only four -- Mahmud, Mudullod, Madarkeis and Martille -- had further progeny who became the founding ancestors of the may different Hawiye clans of today. Somaale's eighth son Sarire had one son, Higgi, and Higgi had two sons, Dagalle and Dir, as mentioned above. Somaale Sarire Higgi Dagalle Dir Dir had three sons: 1. Mahe, 2. Madaitene, and 3. Del. Dir Mahe Madaitene Del Mahe had two sons: Surre and Madallug. Mahe Surre Madallug Surre's son was Hinifitere and Hinfitere's son was Mohammed. Mohammed had five sons: Surre Hinifitere Mohammed 1. Biomal 3. Kuranjobe 5. Dabrobe 2. Issaq 4. Musa One of Mohammed' sons was Biomal Mohammed, whose four sons were Dahow, Bahal, Ismin and Saliman Biomal Mohammed Dahow Bahal Ismin Saliman Ismin's three descendents were: 1. Habr Hara 2. Mallele 3. Habr Ghidir Higgi's son Dagalle had two sons, Digil and Mirifle. Higgi Dagalle Digil Mirifle Higgi's son Bills had nine sons who founded nine tribes, called Sidded (= 9), while Mirifle's son Sab had eight sons who founded either tribes called Sagal (= . Both of these tribes combined are even now called "Nine and Eight". Since all the sons of Digil and Mirifle became robbers and very cruel people, they lost social esteem and social status, and gradually came to be looked down upon by the higher tribes. It is believed by some Somalis that the earliest ancestor Somaale's ninth son Ismail had two sons Daarod and Isaq whose 12 sons were as under: 1. Migiurtin 5. Uarssangheli 9. Tanade 2. Ogaden 6 Abesgui 10. Gheimais 3. Dalbhante 7. Bertiri 11. Jusuf 4. Marehan 8. Cheri 12. Issa On the other hand, many Somalis think that Daarod and Issaqs are not related to Somaale, but they are descendents of Daarod and Issaq, who were religious leaders. Issaq was succeeded by his 10 sons as under: 1. Aual 5. Ibrahim 9. Togiala 2. Garhagis 6. Musa 10. Aiub 3. Issa 7. Gadabursi 4. Burzac 8. Arab One of the famous sons of Daarod was Ogaden, who was the ancestor of Somali Ogadens. He had two sons: Mekabul and Mirwuale. Mekabul had two sons, Habr Heli and Ibrahim, while Mirwuale's two sons were Ba Hale and Tallemoghe. Daarod Ogaden 1. Mekabul 2. Mirwuale 1. Mekabul Habr Heli Ibrahim 2. Mirwuale Ba Hale Tellemoghe



References 1. I.M. Lewis, "A Pastoral Democracy", Oxford University Press, London, 1961, pp. 11-14. 2. Ing. Luigi Robecchi Bricchetti, "Viaggio di esplonazione nell 'Africa Orientale' ", Prime Traversata Della Somalia, Milano. 5. As matter of fact, from their traditions and cultural differences, it is clear that Somali have from the beginning been different from the Gall. All Somali believe so. 6. Lewis, Op. Cit., pp. 22-25. 7. I.M. Lewis, "The Modern History of Somaliland", 1965, p. 10. 8. Saadia Touval, "Somali Nationalism", 1963, p. 16. 9. I.M. Lewis, "The Modern History of Somaliland", p. 10-13. 10. Lewis, Op. Cit., p. 19. 11. I.M. Lewis, "A Pastoral Democracy", pp. 175 - 176. 12. Ibid., pp. 177-180. 13. Ibid., p. 174 14. I.M. Lewis, "Somali Culture, History and Social Instituions", London School of Economics & Political Science, 1931. 15. I.M. Lewis, "A Pastoral Democracy", pp. 211 - 212. 16. Lewis, Op. Cit., pp. 228 - 233. 17. Said S. Samatar, "Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 2021.