QOUTES ABOUT SOMALI PEOPLE IN COLONIAL ERA

As the Somalis see it, writes Mr. John Drysdale:


"Their frontier dispute is not essentially about land alone

but the people."1





This

historical error prompted the first Somalis President, Dr. Abdirashid Ali

Sharmarky to say this:

"No! Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries, with

whom we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations

are not our neighbors but our Somali kinsmen whose citizen-

ship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary "arrangements".

They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture

lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same

pastoral economy as overselves. We speak the same language.

We sare the same God, the same culture and the same traditions.

How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?"2







The Portion Under Dispute

One, Robert Paul Jordan, an American journalist once wrote:

"The Horn of Africa is a most inhospitable place. A harsh

land this is. Not a desert, but close. High arid country

mostly--a Savannah of acacias, patches of grass, thorny

shrubs, tall ant-hills and rocks. When the scanty rains

fall, it runs cruel. Then, sheep and goats slowly die.

The barrens are strewn with their carcasses."4





As I mentioned earlier, the

Somalia Government considers the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia and the North-

eastern Province of Kenya as forming part of the "Greater Somalia" domain.6

The idea of "Greater Somalia" was conceived in the mind of Mr. Bevin, then

Britain's Foreign Secretary after World War II, who in 1946 proposed to the

House of Commons in London to consider lumping together the British

Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and adjacent parts of Ethiopia into a trust

territory.7 So that, in Mr. Bevin's won words:

"The nomads should live their frugal existence with the least

possible hinderance. They could have a chance to live a decent

economic life."8





Ten days after Mr. Bevin introduced this proposal in the House of Commons,

the British administrators in Somaliland organized meetings to inform the

people the "good news" about their future.9 As it will be learned later,

this pre-emptive move would embarrass the British Government and create a

living but volatile problem in the Horn of Africa.

An Ancient Heritage

The Somalis are a Hamitic people whose ancestors are believed to have

immigrated from the Arabian peninsula long age. They came to settle on the

biblical land of "Punt", the ancient "Aromatic Kingdom" renowned for its

frankincense and myrrh.10 Their traditional geneologies trace the ancestry to

Arab forebears who belonged to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Mohamed, and

ultimately they claim belong to a common ancestor.11 The Somali Prime

Minister, Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky once said:

"Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of the

soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth. These limitations

on our material well-being were accepted and compensated for

by our forefathers from whom we inherited, among other things,

a spiritual and cultural prosperity of inestimable value. The

teaching of Islam on the one hand and lyric poetry on the

other..."12



Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Head

of the Geography Department of Ehtiopia's Haile Selassie I University,

described the Somalis as exhibiting:

"External individualism and utter lack of discipline. The

acute struggle for existence in this harsh environment often

expresses itself in group conflicts over wells or grazing

land."13



The initial British interest in the Horn was on the Somalia Coast for

strategic and logistical reasons. After the British had annexed Aden in

1840, treaties were signed with local chiefs to guarantee the continuous

supply of cattle from inland to feed the garrisons. The opening of the Suez

Canal in 1869 increased the strategic importance of the area and;

consequently, the British entered other long term agreements which gave them

possession of the port of Berbera and several other offshore inlands.

Britain immediately assigned consuls at Berbera, Seylec and Bulhar to

protect her interests.16











These accomplishments

were achieved by exploiting local grievances such as one described in 1892

confidential British diplomatic dispatch to London which read:

"Sheikh Sufi states - The Abysinians read, "Ethiopians" are

always on one side of us, the English on the other. We

(Ogaden tribes) are with the English, and we wish for

English rule. We are your children.

I say that, as a sheep quivers under the blow of a knife,

we, the Ogaden, are quivering under the oppressions of the

Abysinians, who have every year, for the last nine years,

visited us and levied large numbers of sheep, goats, horse,

camels and taken what they liked from us. We have no guns

and are not powerful enough to fight and must submit.

Last season the Abysinians (drove) off all livestock; 990

men, women and children perished. We are Mullahs and we like

to tell the truth."17



The British

Government stand was spelled out by Mr. Peter Thomas as follows:

"Since the British Government would be responsible for Kenya

only a few more months (before her independence in December

1963), the British Government considers that it would be

wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of

Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of

that country; and that agreement should be sought by the

African governments concerned working and negotiating within

an African framework."24

The Somalia delegation led by then, Prime Minister Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky

were disappointed to learn at their first meeting that the British

Government had no intention of making any constructive proposals. He

charged:

"The British had only convened the meeting to explore the

position of the Somalia Republic, which was in any case well

known to them."25

In conclusion, the Somalia Government states:

"It was evident that the British Government has not only

deliberately misled the Somalia Government during the course

of the last eighteen months, but has also deceitfully

encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe

that their right to self-determination could be granted by

the British Government through peaceful and legal means. The

responsibility for the consequences that may follow this

suppression of a fundamental human right lies squarely on

the British Government."26

Shortly after this, the Somalia Government recalled her Ambassador from

Britain and severed diplomatic relations. The Somali people residing in the

North Eastern Province boycotted the elections, took arms, and demanded

self-automony.

For us Kenyans, the Somalis demand that we give up approximately 45,000

square miles of our territory (approximately a fifth of the land mass), not

only is it unacceptable but also violates our Constitution and the OAU

Charter. The Kenyan view was and continues to be similar to that expressed

by the majority of the Organization of African Unit member countries:

"Thus, in almost every country in Africa, there are minority

groups having racial, religious or tribal affinities with

neighboring countries."27

The conference that met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in 1963 to resolve the

boundary issue resloved:

"Countries with widely diverse populations would be quickly

dismembered if each ethnic group was allowed to go its own

way under the banner of self-determination. The resulting

partitioning would create a chaotic potpourri of tiny,

nonviable"Nations" toally incapable of providing even the

barest of government services."28

At the conclusion of the conference, the Somali President Osman had the

following to say:

"By becoming united, the Somali people feel that not only

would their welfare be secured, but that as a single entity

they would be able to contribute effectively to the ideals

of African unity. The people of the Republic cannot be

expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren.

If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to

express their will freely, the government pledges itself to

accept the verdict."29



Somalia joined the Arab League nations in 1974. Being a predominantly

Moslem state, she attracts sympthy from wealthy Arab countries. Saudi

Arabia has become increasingly interested in the Somalia's affair not only

for political reasons but also strategic and economic. Kuwait has invested

heavily in power stations in Mogadishu and Iraq has been supplying her with

crude oil.31 Somalia also maintains cordial relationship with the Sudan.







The Kenya Defense Force Mission is defensive and the government

articulates it thus. Accordingly, may I quote President Reagan's address:

"Our policy is defensive. United States uses its military

force only in response to clear threats to stability and

peace. We pursue this policy knowing fully that our

defensive posture grants several military advantages to a

potential aggressor. He can choose when, where and how to

attack. He can formulate a detailed plan for his operations

to take maximum advantage of his strengths and exploit our

vulnerabilities. He can also mask his pre-attack mobiliza-

tion efforts under the guise of training exercise or

diplomatic crises so that any advance warning we might get

could be cloaked to ambiguity."38



1. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.

2. Drysdale, John., The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964,

Introduction, p. 8.

3. Presidential Address to the Nation on "Kenyatta Day, 20th October,

1965". The Standard Paper.

4. Jordan, Robert Paul. "Somalia's Hour of Need", National Geographic,

June 1981, p. 748.

5. Szaz, Z. Michael. "Somalia's Difficulties", The New York Times,

September 28, 1981, p. 14

3. Presidential Address to the Nation on "Kenyatta Day, 20th October,

1965". The Standard Paper.

4. Jordan, Robert Paul. "Somalia's Hour of Need", National Geographic,

June 1981, p. 748.

5. Szaz, Z. Michael. "Somalia's Difficulties", The New York Times,

September 28, 1981, p. 14

6. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.

7. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,

p. 67.

8. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,

p. 67.

9. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964. Capter 6,

p. 68.

10. Lewis, Ian M. The Modern History of Somaliland. New York: Praeger,

1965, Chapter 1.

11. Lewis, Ian M. The Modern History of Somaliland. New York: Praeger,

1965, Chapter 1.

12. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 8.

13. Mariam, Mesfim Wolde. The Background of the Ethio-Somalia Boundary

Dispute. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam, 1964.

14. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.

15. Norden, Hermann. Africa's Lost Empire. Philadelphia, Macrae-Smith, 1930.

16. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, Chapter 2.

17. Bhasdwaj, Raman G. The Dilema of the Horn of Africa. New Delhi:

Sterling Publishers, 1979.



18. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964.

19. Tibbs, Thurlow. Strategic Appraisal of Sub-Saharan Africa. Air Command

and Staff College, Air University, 1981.

20. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, Chapter 5.

21. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, Tables 20, 21 and 22 (Major Army Weapons,

Air Force Weapons and Naval Weapons, 1981).

22. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, Chapter 5.

23. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, Chapter 5.

24. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 15.

25. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 155.

26. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 15,

p. 158.

27. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 14,

p. 146.

28. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, Chapter 14,

p. 147.

29. Drysdale, John. The Somali Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 148.

30. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, P. XVIII.

31. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University,p. 219.

32. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, p. 220.

33. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, p. 222.

34. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, p. XVIII.

35. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, p. 223.

36. Harold D. Nelson. Somalia: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies,

The American University, p. 262.

37. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense SecDef Annual Report; to

U.S. Congress of March, 1984.

38. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense SecDef Annual Report; to

U.S. Congress of March, 1984.