Macalin Dhiblaawe(Abgaal) --------------------->Baaba Xasan (Shiiqal, Gendershe)
Macalin Dhiblaawe(Abgaal)<---------------------->Macalin Dhiblawe(Siwaqron)
Cawrmale(Warsangeli)<---------------------------Cawrmale(Gardhere,Samale)
Wagardhac(Mareexan)--------------------------->Qayad(Dhulbahante)
TagalaWaq(Ogaden)<------------------------------>Habarawal(Isaaq)
Leelkase(Xawaadle)<------------------------------Leelkase(Daarood)
Warsangeli (Harti Darod)<-------------------------Warsangeli(Harti, Abgal)
Sacad(Habargidir)---------------------------------Amuudaan(Ogaaden)
Cumar Dher(Habar Gidir)<------------------------>Mareexaan
Cabdalle Aden dhulbahante---------------------Akisho Dir
Xawadle-----------------------------------------Leykase
Layiile Dir------------------------------------Layiile Reer Gadiid Habar Awal
Reer Liibaan Habar awal------------------Tagal Waaq Reer Liibaan
Madigaaan Gumcadle Dir------------------Bah Gari Ogadeen Gumacadle
Reer Kuul Madhibaan---------------Bah Gari ama Habar Yonis
Kumurte Bimaal Dir------------------Kumurte Tunni Digil
Quranyow Maxammed Dir
and more.by the Invention of Somalia
Qabaa’ilka Soomaalidu ma isbahaysi baa,
mise waa dhalasho?
Wq. Maxamed Hirad
April 26, 2010
Muuqaalka oday Soomaaliyeed oo xidhan koofiyaddii duqayda lagu yaqaannay
Arar:
Runtii waa su’aal ay adag tahay in jawaab waafi ah laga bixiyo. Waxa taas daliil u ah, siina adkaynaya innaga oo aan illaa maanta hayn qoraallo ama dokumantiyo taariikhi ah oo arrintaas wax ka yidhi. Waxa keliya ee aynu cuskannaa inta badan waa qoraallo kooban oo dad ajnebi ahi ay qoreen, xilliyo mudada laga joogaa ay aad u yar tahay, marka la barbar dhigo inta ay qowmiyadda Soomaaliyeed soo jirtay. Waxa intaas dheer, kuwaas oo aan dhul badan oo Soomaaliyeed marin, sidaa awgeedna xogta ay ururiyeen ay ku salaysan tahay dad iyo degaanno kooban.
Mar haddii xaal sidaas yahay, qofka doonaya in uu baadhitaan ku sameeyo mawduucan oo kale waxa ku adkaanaya in uu helo qoraallo badan oo uu raadraaco. Marka maqaalkan kooban waxa uu xooggiisu ku salaysan yahay aqoonta duqay Soomaaliyeed oo degaanno door ah oo kala geddisan deggen ama ku barbaaray, aqoon fiicanna u leh qabaa’ilka iyo xogo kale oo aan ka soo ururiyay qoraallo kooban. Waxa intaas dheer oo aan qoraalkan yar iyana u adeegsanayaa suugaanta Soomaalida oo ay ku jiraan sheekooyinka iyo odhaahaha Soomaalida dhexdeeda caanka ka ah.
Aqoonayahanada dersa asalka Soomaalidu waxa ay sheegeen in magaca Soomaali oo qoran ay markii u horraysay ku arkeen hees Xabashi ahi oo ay ku tilmaamayaan qoladaasi sida ay uga guulaysteen dagaal dhex maray iyaga iyo Soomaalida. Marka waxa la dhihi karaa ama muuqata in aan magaca Soomaali laftiisa xog badan laga hayn wixii ka horreeyay dagaaladii Imaam Axmed Guray. Waxase jirta ama laysla garan karaa markii diinta islaamku soo gaadhay dalkan, in dad badani ku noolaayeen degaanka Soomaalida. Kuwaas oo magac, Diin, iyo dhaqan u gaar ah lahaa. Waxa illaa haddeer jira wax badan oo ka sii baaqi ah raadadkii iyo dhaqamadii dadkaas. Waxa tusaale inoogu filan, dab shidka, xabaalaha, sida taallo tiiryaadka, curraafaynta iyo samaanyaha oo dhammaan laga helo ama ka jira geyiga Soomaaliyeed.
Iimaam Axmed Guray
Waxa ay aqoonyahanno badani iyana isku raacsan yihiin in dhulkii loo yaqaannay Punt uu hadda ka mid yahay degaanka Soomaalida, dadkii ku dhaqnaana ay Soomaalidu asal ku leedahay.
Daraasado lagu sameeyay hiddaha (genetics) Soomaalida ayaa iyana caddeeyay in dadka Soomaaliyeed ay asal la wadaagaan dadyowga kale ee ku dhaqan Itoobiya, Ereteriya iyo Waqooyiga Afrika sida qawmiyadaha Oromada, Canfarta, Berberka iyo xataa Carabta Waqooyiga Afrika. Waxa intaas dheer afafka qowmiyadahaasi ku hadlaan oo ay isku bah yihiin afka Soomaaliga. Daraasadaha hiddaha asalka Soomaalida lagu sameeyay waxa ay caddeeyeen in dadyowga ku dhaqan Geeska Afrika ee ay Soomaalidu ka mid tahay ay yihiin ummad gaar ah (Distinct Seperate Race) oo ka duwan ummadaha la jaarka ah sida Carabta iyo Afrikaanka kale. Waxa intaas dheer oo daraasadahaas koobani sheegayaan in qawmiyadda Soomaalidu ay jirtay muddo ka badan 4,000 oo sano.
Markii diinta Islaamku ka dhalatay Jasiiradda Carbeed oo sida aynu wada ognahay bad yari u dhaxayso iyada iyo Soomaaliya ayaa waxa markiiba ay si hawl yar ugu soo tallowday dhinaca degaanka Soomaalida. Diintaas oo dabcan muddo dheer qaadatay in Soomaali oo dhan ay wada gaadho. Hase yeeshee waxa xaqiiqo ah in ay raad weyn ku yeelatay dhaqanka Soomaalida oo xilligan la joogo dhammaantood wada Muslim ah. Waxase adag in la aamino ama waxa aynu odhan karnaa macquul ma aha dhawr wadaad baa qaran dhan sahal ku qabsaday muddo qaaban. Ama dhawrka Shiikh ee ay Soomaalidu sheegato iyo carruurtiisii baa ka adkaaday oo qaarna dadkii dalkan ka buuxay laayey, intii kalena bara kiciyey oo dhulkii ka qaaday. Midda kale waxa isweydiin mudan meeye dadkii diinta ay u laqimayeen ee dhexdooda diinta ka faafinayeen? Iyagii keliya iyo carruurtoodii baa dalkii oo dhan u hadhay, waa arrin aad cajiib u ah oo caqligu aanu qaadan karin!
Markaynu qodobkan ka hadalkiisa soo koobno, sida la garan karo Soomaalidu waxa ay ka soo jeeddaaa dadkii dalka joogay ee diinta la soo gaadhsiiyay muddo hadda kun sano ka badan laga joogo. Waxa ayse dhaqan badan la wadaagaan muslimiinta ku dhaqan Bariga Dhexe iyo dalalka kale ee caalamka Islaamkaba.
Hayb beddelashada Soomaalida:
Ugu horrayn marka aynu arrintan ka hadalaynno waxa mudan marka hore in aan isweydiinno Soomaalida ma dhacdaa in ay haybtoodii hore ka guuraan? Jawaabta su’aashaas oo koobani waxa ay tahay “Haa”. Waxa hubaal ah kollay in lixdankii sannadood ee aan anigu wax kala garanayey dad badani ay haybtoodii bedesheen oo qolo kale ku biireen. Si aynu arrintaa xaqiiqooyin cad ugu keenno waxa aan halkan ku soo bandhigayaa dhowr tusaale oo innoo iftiiminaya sida qabaa’ilka Soomaaliyeed u hayb bedeshaan.
Waxa haddaba jira qabaa’illo badan oo aan la isku diidanayn in ay yihiin bahwadaag ama isbahaysi. Waxa qolyahaas ka mid ah Digil iyo Mirifle, Jaarso, Ciise, Akisho, Bursuug, Garre, Maalin Guur, Muddulood iyo kuwo kale oo badan.
I970 kii ayaa waxa aan fasax damcay in aan ku tego magaalada Baydhabo. Xilligaas waxa waddanka ka dillaacay cudurka loo yaqaan Daacuun Calooleedka. Taas oo dhalisay in magaalooyinka iyo gobolada la kala xidho. Waxa aan ku xannibmay tuulo yar oo Baydhabo iyo Buur Hakaba u dhaxaysa. Dadkii deganaa ayaan qof keliyana ka af garan waayey. Akhirkii waxaan masaajid yar ka helay oday saagaashan jir ah oo caalim ah oo na tujinayey. Isagii baan isku af garanay luqadda carabiga oo fusxa ah. Laba habeen oo aan wadaadkaas meel la joogay waxyaabo badan baan ka faa’iiday oo ka qortay. Waxaan waydiiyey, dadka dhulkan degani waa ayo? Waxa uu iigu jawaabay waa Soomaali. Yay ka yihiin baan idhi? Waxa uu iigu jawaabay waa Soomaali oo idil. Waxaan weydiiyey Raxan Weyn waa ayo? Wuxuu igu yidhi waa dhulka oo waxa uu magacaasi tilmaamayaa, waa dhulkii raaxada badnaa. Waxa kale oo aan waydiiyey Digil iyo Mirifle waa ayo? Wuxuu iigu jawaabay dadkaa qaarna beeraha ayay ku dhaqmaan oo waa Digil, Miriflena waa xoolalay. Sida odaygaasi qirayo Raxan Weyn waa is bahaysi ka kooban qabaa’illo badano oo Soomaaliyeed.
Waxa sidoo kale iyana ah qabiilka Ciisaha oo waxa la yidhaa waxa ay u kala baxaan jilibadoodu Ciise iyo soo raac oo sida magacaasi tlimaamayo innoo iftiiminaysa in ay isbahaysi yihiin. Jilibada soo raaca ayaa waxa inta badan dhacda in qabaa’il badani yidhaahdaan annaga ayay asal ahaan naga soo jeedaan.
Sawir ay faraacinadii hore ku muujiyeen xaaskii ninkii xukumi jiray Punt. Punt waxa la rumaysan yahay in ay ku taallay geyiga Soomaaliyeed
Qabaa’ilkan iyagu qirta in ay isbahaysi yihiin sida kuwa aan kor ku soo sheegnay, waa kuwa inta badan ay qabiilooyinka kale bililiqaystaan, gaar ahaan beryahan dambe ee qabyaaladdu siyaasadda aad u gashay ee ay xamaasadda badan yeelatay. Haddaan tusaale kooban kuwaas ka bixiyo jilibo dhowr ah oo Jaarso ah, gaar ahaan Warro Dhaqo ayaa intii ka dambaysay dagaalkii 1977 iyana u digarogtay reer Haaruun (reer, Isaaq, Ogaadeen) iyo Laylkase. Waxa sidoo kale iyana noqday xilliyadan dambe Jibriil Abokor (Sacad Muuse) Warro Oogo oo ahayd Jilib Akisho ah. Waxa iyana sheeko caan ah ka ah Hargeysa iyo inta galbeed ka xigta odhaahda ah Akishadii Cabbanowday. Sheekadaas oo tilmaamaysa qoysas Akisha ahaa oo u hayb bedeshay reer Cabbane (Sacad Muuse). Waxa maanta jira Qoys intooda Jigjiga deggenina yihiin Akisho, inta Hargeysa ku dhaqanina yihiin reer Cabbane.
Hayb bedelashadu kuma koobna beelahaas aan kor ku soo tilmaamay oo qudha. Qabaa’ilada kale sida Daaroodka, Isaaqa, Hawiyaha iyo kuwa kale ee faraha badanba waa arrin si weyn uga jirta. Aan ku bilaabo Shiikhaash (Shiikhaal) oo berigii hore la odhan jiray waxa ay ka soo jeedaan Abubakar Siddiiq, sida ku qoran kitaabka la yidhaahdo Nasrul Mu’miniin ee uu qoray Shiikh Cabdullahi Qudubi, awowgoodna ahaa shiikha ku aasan magaalada Sheekh looguna magacdaray iyo reer shiikh Xasan Kalweyn oo sheegan jiray in ay ka soo jeedaan Cusmaan bin Cafaan. Haddaba Shiikhaash (Loo Boge, Aw Qudub, iyo Gendershe) iyo reer Xasan Kalweyn maanta waa hal reer oo loo bixiyay Martiile Hiraab, ahna qabiil Hawiye ah. Waxa iyana jira qabaa’ilka Xawaadle, Saransoor (Digoodi iyo Gaal Jecel), Gugundhabe iyo Odaajeen oo maanta aynu u naqaan in ay Hawiye yihiin, horese u ahaa qabaa’il iskood u taagnaa.
Waxa sidoo kale isna ahaa qabiillo iskood u taagan oo sheegan jiray in ay Saado yihiin ama Carab, reerka Isaxaaqa la yidhaa ee maanta ka midka ah jilibada Habar Yoonis iyo reer Doodka oo Habar Jeclo ka mid ah. Qolada Isaxaaqu waxa ay haybtoodii hore ka guureen illaa 50 kii sano ee u dambeeyay oo aan aniga laftaydu soo gaadhay, halka ay reer Doodku iyagu beri dhaweyd uun toos u sheegteen Habar Jeclo. Waxa iyana intii xornimada ka dambaysay hayb bedeshay Fiqi Shinni oo ahaa Ajuuraan, haddase ah Ayaanle, Cayr, Habar Gidir. Waxa kale oo la sheegaa qolada la yidhaa Cumar dheer oo maanta ah Wagar Dhac oo Mareexaan ah, in ay asal ahaan ka soo jeedaan Cayr, Habar Gidir. Qolada kale ee hadda la yidhaa Damal Muuse ee dega Galkacayo ayaa iyana illaa 64 kii ka hayb bedeshay Dir oo noqday Muuse Carre oo Habar Yoonis ah.
Waxa halkan malaha mudan in aan ku xuso sheeko beri dhexdii ahayd lagu faafiyay qaar ka mid ah wargeysyada ka soo baxa magaalada Hargeysa. Kaas oo qoray sheeko ku saabsanayd laba reer oo haddeer kala ah Gadabuursi iyo Isaaq in ay wada siyaartaan hal oday oo ay wada sheegtaan in ay ka soo jeedaan. Labadaas reer ayaa qoraalku sheegay in ay istuseen in malaha ay isku asal yihiin, balse qolo weliba ku adkaysatay in ay halkeeda ku negaato.
Qolada Gadabuursiga oo marar qaar dadku ku tilmaamo isbahaysi waxa jira reero badan oo aan lagu murmin in ay qolyo kale yihiin. Waxa reerahaas ka mid ah Xeeb Jire oo la sheego in ay Shiikhaash yihiin, Muuse Fiin oo la yidhaa waa Ogaadeen iyo reer Nuurka oo dadka qaarkiis ku sheego in ay Ciidagale ahaayeen.
Dhinaca gobolada bariga oo dad badani ku tilmaamo meesha Soomaalidu ay asalkeedii ka soo fidday ayaa waxa la sheegaa reero badan oo ku dhaqnaan jiray, maantase aan cidi ka joogin. Waxa qabaa’ilkaas ka mid ahaa Reer Waa Rag, Leg dhufso, Odayo qoyan, Qabsan Dulle, Qayraanshe iyo qolyo kale oo badan. Kuwaas oo maanta dhammaantood ku dhex milmay reerka Majeeteerteen ee Hartiga ah. Reerka Dhulbahantaha ayaa iyana la sheegaa in qolyo badani ku dhex milmeen. Tusaale ahaan waxa Dhulabahantaha dhexdiisa caan ka ah magaca la yidhaa Ilma Halal Gob ah oo la sheego in ay ahaayeen qabiil jiray, balse maanta Dhulabahante uun ka mid ah. Waxa iyana dhowr iyo tobankii sano ee u dambeeyay soo baxay qolada Jambeel oo la yidhi waa Cabdi Koombe. Anigu intii aan wax kala gartay oo 60 sano kor u dhaafay waxa aan maqli jiray Koombe waa 4: Geri, Harti, Xarle iyo Jiiraan. Jambeel waxa aan marar maqlay waa reer Cabdi oo Geri ah. Si kastaba ha ahaatee Cabdi Koombe waa wax aan hore u jirin, qoladaasina waxa suuragal ah in ay ama Geri yihiin ama Harti.
Haddaan qaybtan soo duuduubo waxa aan jecelahay in aan xuso qola Madhibaan ah oo sannadkan horraaantiis qolyo ka mid ah iyaga iyo xubno ka tirsan beesha Habar Yoonis isku dayeen in ay haybtooda u bedelaan qolo ay u bixiyeen Kuul Carre. Sheekadaas oo muddo dhowr bilood ah socotay waxa ay akhirkii ku baaba’day ka dib markii xubno muhiim ah oo ka tirsan labada dhinac ay ka horyimaaddeen mashruucaas.
Runtii halkan kuma dhamma tusaaleyaasha laga bixin karo hayb bedelashada iyo qabaa’ilka Soomaalida. Waxase aan la dafiri Karin in hayb ka guurku uu yahay arrin aan ku cusbayn Soomaalida dhexdeeda, balse loo baahan yahay in si cilmiyaysan loo derso. Waxa xaqiiqo ah in aanu jirin Soomaalida dhexdeeda qabiil odhan kara waxa aannu nahay saafi oo iskuma dhex walaaqnin. Haddii malaha DNA dooda la baadhi lahaa wax badan baa malahayga soo bixi lahaa oo kala caddaan lahaa.
Reer Guuraanimadu waa dhaqan qadiimi ah oo Soomaaliyeed
Sheekooyinka caanka ka ah Soomaalida dhexdeeda:
Soomaalidu wax badan taariikhdeeda qoraal laguma wada hayo. Ha yeeshee waxa in badan laga heli karaaa suugaanta oo tix iyo tiraabba leh. Waxa iyana aad u badan sheekooyin iyo odhaahyo si weyn innoogu iftiimin kara mawduucan maqaalku ku saabsan yahay ee ah hayb ka guurka.
Haddaan qaar kooban ka xusno sheekooyinkaas tilmaamaya in dadku isku dhafan yihiin waxa ka mid ah: Ogaadeen waa wiil tagoogo iyo wiil talo. Taas oo macanaheedu yahay dadka reerkaas wada sheegta qaybina waa dhalasho, inta kalena heshiis bay Ogaadeen ku noqdeen. Waxa odhaah taas la mid ah iyana laga sheegaa reerka Abgaal oo waxa la yidhaa: Abgaal waa Abgaal iyo muggiis oo laga wado inta dhalasho Abgaal ku ah iyo inta kale wey isle’eg yihiin. Dadka qaar baa magaca Abgaal ku fasira waa Gaalle oo dhan. Kuwa sidan dambe wax u tilmaamaa waa kuwa qaba in Soomaalidu ay Oromada asal ahaan ka soo jeeddo.
Waxa iyana Soomaalida dhexdeeda caan ka ah beyd gabay ku jiray oo la yidhaa “Sacad waa Ogaadeen haddii loo abtirinaayo” oo tibaaxaysa sheegashada ah in reerka Sacad la yidhaa aanu ahayn Habar Gidir oo uu yahay Makaahiil, Ogaadeen. Waxa sheekadaa barbartaal mid kale oo wax ka sheegta reerka kale ee Habar Gidir ee la yidhaa Saruurka. Waxa la yidhaa Odaygii Madar Kicis Hiraab ahaa ee Habar Gidirta dhalay oo wiilkiisii bahal ka cunay ayaa ku ducaystay in kan Eebbe uga dhigo inankiisii. Odayga oo la sheego in uu indha la’aa baa la yidhaa waxa uu ku ducaystay sidan: San weynaa oo sarara weynaa Ilaahow Saruur Madar Kicis iiga dhig. Waxa iyana dadku aad u yidhaahdaan Odaygii Daarood ahaa weli waa dhalaa. Taas oo looga jeedo in xilli walba aad arkayso qolo cusub oo Daarood ah.
Si kastaba ha ahaatee waxa aan shaki ku jirin in qabaa’ilka Soomaalidu yihiin dad isku dhafan, haybsooca ay isku samaysaana aanu sal iyo raad toona lahayn. Waxa kale oo iyana xaqiiqo ah sida lagu xusay daraasado kooban oo lagu sameeyay hiddaha Soomaaliyeed in ay Soomaalidu tahay qawmiyad ka da’ weyn odayada ay sheegato in ay ka soo jeedaan.
Gabagabo:
Ugu damabayn waxa dhab ah in aan maqaalkan yar ee kooban oo aan ka soo dheegay buug yar oon aan qoraalkiisa ku guda jiro, kana hadlaya Hayb Takoorka in aan lagu soo koobi karin arrinta ku saabsan hayb bedelashada. Runtii waa mawduuc weli dihan, una baahan in daraasdo badan lagu sameeyo. Waxase xaqiiqo ah oo aan la iska indho tiri karin in qabaa’ilka Soomaalidu aanay sal mug weyn leh ku fadhiyin, khaasatan dhinaca sheegashada isirka.
Raadraac:
1- Risch et al. (1999), Categorization of humans in biomedical research: genes, race and disease, Genome Biol. 2002; 3(7): comment2007.1–comment2007.12.
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_people
3. http://somalitalk.com/2009/11/18/baaq-uu-soo-saaray-af-hayeenka-beelaha-kuul-carre
3. http://somalilandinfo.com/node/6362
4. http://wardheernews.com/News_09/November/19_Beel_u-diga_roganaysa_beel_kale.html
Maxamed Hirad
E-mail: xagar2000@yahoo.com
----
* Maqaalkani waxa uu qayb ka yahay buug yar oo aan qoraalkiisa ku guda jiro oo la yidhaa Hayb Takoor.
Maqaalada kale ee Maxamed Hirad ee lagu daabacay degelkan:
* Wadaadadda Cusub: Colaaddeer Dami weydey & Cidhib Dambeedkeeda
* Casharada Wadaadadii Hore & Kuwa Cusub Camaladooda
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http://www.abtirsi.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=849
Jilo on Thu Nov 26, 2009 6:16 am
Hi James,
so far I've only been looking into the Somali genealogy, and I was quite surprised to see how the Oromo genealogy fits into the Somali one. Is this from a Somali perspective or an Oromo one? Could you give me some more information on the Oromo genealogy, maybe the sources you've used, etc.?Jilo
Posts: 11
Joined: Wed Nov 25, 2009 7:30 am
Location: Nairobi, KenyaTop
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Re: Oromo genealogy
by James Dahl on Thu Nov 26, 2009 8:49 pm
Both groups claim the connection, but in very indirect ways.
The first connection is with Dir. Tradition lists 4 sons of Dir: Maahe, Madaxweyne, Madoobe and Maaladuqu. However Dir usually also include a fourth group, the "Qalho Dir", who include the Afran Kallo, a group of Barentuma Oromo clans. Oromo likewise consider various Dir to be Oromo, such as the Akishu (Maxamuud Cali Madaxweyne Dir).
This is made more complicated as Oromo do not organize their confederations based on lineage, but rather on geographic proximity. 'Barentu' for instance means east-facing, and may not even refer to a historic person.
Now this could be chalked up to adoption or assimilation, but genetic studies have shown that many Somalis and Oromos share a paternal ancestry as well.
However I was happily surprised to learn that Oromos do actually keep precise records of their lineages, they just have no political significance so they are much less well known compared to Somali lineages. And I almost fell out of my chair when, while reading the Tuulama lineage, the name before Boorana is Saamaaloo. None of the other names I could see match up.
For a time I considered this interesting, if impossible to prove, until I found a copy of a Kenyan Ajuuraan abtiris that traced back many generations before Ajuuraan, all the way to a 'Shimaal'.
It all fell into place, the lineage had many names, with slightly different spellings, on the Tuulama Borana AND the Afran Kallo lineages, tied into Irir Samaale, and essentially tied up the entire Samaale lineage.
To prove it however I would need to test the Y chromosomes of Tuulama, Hawiye, Dir, Jaarso and Ajuuraan men, who if my hypothesis is correct, should all share a common ancestor who lived 40-50 generations ago.James Dahl
Site Admin
Posts: 123
Joined: Mon Oct 06, 2008 5:19 amTop
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Re: Oromo genealogy
by Jilo on Fri Nov 27, 2009 6:18 am
Your discoveries are exciting. Yet I'm still a bit confused.
In your post http://www.abtirsi.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9#p12 you say that genetic evidence will give you an accuracy of 100-500 generations (the time between mutations). So you might prove a common link with Aqee bin Abu Talib but you can't pove he is the link.
I would think in the same way you could prove that there is a link between Oromo and Somali, but you wouldn't be able to narrow it down to 40-50 generations. And you wouldn't be able to prove whether it happened before or after Saamaalo.
I don't doubt that there is some link between the Oromo and Somali (after all, they speak related languages, live in the same region and even physically resemble each other!). But I would assume that this link is at least 100 generations in the past, if not more.
I still don't quite understand how the genealogical history links in with the linguistic history. You might have come across all those articles written by historical linguists that show how the Oromo and Somali languages both originated at least 3000 years ago in south-eastern Ethiopia, and how they then split and moved into different directions. Of course you can't prove that the people who spoke the language then are the ancestors of the people who speak the language now. But it would seem quite likely to me that (especially with the big groups like Somali and Oromo) that language and ethnic groups roughly correspond to each other.
So if the Oromo and Somali languages split at least 3000 years ago, how could the genealogies split only less than 1500 years ago?
Also. I would be really careful with a genealogy found among the Kenyan Ajuuraan. In Kenya, the system of sheegad was practiced very extensively, and the Ajuuraan, for example, were vassals of the Borana for probably around 300 years. I wouldn't be surprised if the oral traditions got mixed up a bit during that time, or if quite a number of Kenyan Ajuuraan are actually Borana who married into the clan.
I've also come across the theory that the Kenyan Ajuuraan are not actually Ajuuraan but part of the Garre-Rendille group that has inhabited Kenya for a very long time. According to this hypothesis, some of the "true" Ajuuraan came to Kenya and intermarried with these people. When it was politically convenient, the whole group then adopted the ancestry of their (minority) Ajuuraan elements and thus became the Kenyan "Ajuuraan". During this process, obviously, there would be quite a bit of manipulation of genealogies.
It was fascinating for me to come across a statement made by a Kenyan Ajuuraan some 50 years ago: "We used to be Borana, but now we are Somali"!
I would still be very interested in the sources you used for the Oromo genealogies. If they are published, maybe I can get access to them here. I do have to read more about Oromo history...Jilo
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Re: Oromo genealogy
by James Dahl on Fri Nov 27, 2009 7:18 am
I'm very sceptical about anthropologists claiming that the Somali and Oromo languages differed so long ago. Languages can change very rapidly, especially in invasions. The English were conquered by the Normans who changed the English language drastically in about 400 years. Somalis were as influenced by Arabs as the English were by the Normans.
Also haplogroups are very distantly related but you can do more accurate tests that can show high statistical probability of common paternal ancestry to within only a few generations, and with precise accuracy to within 10. 40-50 would be no problem at all.
I'll write more later.James Dahl
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Re: Oromo genealogy
by Jilo on Tue Dec 01, 2009 5:45 am
I totally agree with you, that languages can change rapidly during an invasion. The Borana invasion of Northern Kenya is a nice example, of how Somali groups switched to speaking Borana within a short period of time. I would also agree that the strong Arab influence might have changed Somali language quite rapidly.
Nevertheless, I don't think we can attribute the major differences in language between Oromo and Somali to Arab influence. If the classification of the Eastern Cushitic languages is at all correct, the split is not between Oromo and Somali alone, but between Oromo and Omo-Tana. Omo-Tana includes the Rendille, the Boni, the El-Molo and the Dhassanach. All of these groups have had little if any Arab influence, yet their languages are closer to Somali than to Oromo. So I would assume that the major language shift that divides Oromo and Somali today was not due to Arab influence.
I would also say that of all the Somali dialects it is Standard (Northern) Somali that is most influenced by Arabic, whereas among all the Southern languages - Maay, Jiddo, Tonni, Garre, Dabarre - there is a lot less Arabic influence. Somalis would generally say these languages are closer to Oromo (because they don't have the harsh sounds of Standard Somali, for example), but linguists would say, they are closer to Rendille, Boni, etc., but still clearly within the Omo-Tana group of Eastern Cushitic.
If it is true that the El-Molo and Dhassanach along the Lake Turkana are linguistically closer to the Somalis than the Oromo, the split between these two language groups must have happened a long time ago to allow for all this (pre-Arabic) differentiation.Jilo
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Re: Oromo genealogy
by James Dahl on Thu Dec 03, 2009 6:32 pm
Most Oromo dialects have been heavily influenced as well, but by Amharic and Omotic languages rather than Arabic. The root language of both Somali and Oromo is what linguistic anthropologists refer to as "Proto East Cushitic". The influence of Omotic on Oromo is why Omotic languages are often times included in Cushitic but most linguists today dispute their relatedness due to other factors, and consider the Omotic languages to be their own family.
Omotic's original classification as Cushitic was, argued by Harold C. Fleming (1974) and M. Lionel Bender (1975), based on bad science, and proposed that the language be reclassified as it's own branch of Afroasiatic, while more recent work by Rolf Theil (2006) places Omotic outside of even Afroasiatic as an isolate language.
At the same time as Omotic has been steadily reclassified further from Cushitic, work has at the same time been showing that South Cushitic is actually a branch of Lowland East Cushitic. From wiki:
"Hetzron (1980:70ff) and Ehret (1995) have suggested that the Rift languages (South Cushitic) are a part of Lowland East Cushitic. Kießling & Mous (2003) have suggested more specifically that they be linked to a Southern Lowland branch, together with Oromo, Somali, and Yaaku-Dullay".
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KU CIBRO QAADO CAYNABA!!{Mohamed Nuur Mooge(Somali6)
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Muran ka taagan beel ka mid ah kuwa la haybsooco oo la sheegay in ay u xuub siibatay beel kale
London, November 19, 2009 (WDN) - Waxaa isa soo taraya muran xooggan oo ka taagan beel Soomaaliyeed oo ka mid ah beelaha la haybsooco, oo la sheegay inay u digarogatay isir ahaan beel kale oo ka mid beelaha laan dheeranimada sheegta.
Beesha Maxaad Barre oo ka mid ah beelaha la haybsooco ee Madhibaan, ayaa lagu soo warramayaa in ay hadda u xuubsiibatay beesha Kuul Carre oo iyadu ka soo jeedda Habar Yoonis, Isaaq.
Suldaan Yuusuf Muxumed Xiiray oo ka mid ah Salaaddiinta magaalada Hargeysa oo la sheegay in uu isagu lafdhabar u yahay ololaha beesha Maxaad Barre ugu digaroganayso Habaryoonis oo hadda booqasho ku maraya dalka Biritayn, ayaa dhawaan ku baaqay in magaalada Burco lagu qabto shir ballaadhan oo lagu soo dhaweynayo beeshan ku soo biirtay jilibada Habaryoonis.
Warka ayaa waxa uu intaa ku darayaa in Salaaddiin, odayo iyo waxgarad kale oo ka tirsan beesha Maxaad Barre ay arrintaasi gaashaanka ku dhufteen, iyagoo islamarkaana ku tilmaamay wax aan loo dul qaadan karin oo been lagaga sheegayo Isirka beeshooda.
Qoraal dheer oo ay saxaafadda u kala direen oo ku socday salaaddiinta, odayada iyo waxgaradka beesha Habar Yoonis, ayay ku canbaareeyeen wax ay ugu yeedheen marin habaabinta lagu samaynayo abtirsiinyaha beesha Maxaad Barre ee Madhibaan.
“Annaga oo ah Odayaasha iyo Waxgaradka Beesha Maxaad Barre ee dagan Somaliland iyo Soomaaliyaba, waxaan halkan ku caddaynaynaa in aysan waxba ka jirin, arrimo beryahan lagu marin habaabinayo abtirsiinyaha beesha oo ay Yurub ka wadaan koox yar oo ka tirsan beeshayada iyo koox ka tirsan beesha Habar Yoonis”, ayay waxgaradkaasi ku sheegeen bayaankooda.
Salaaddiinta iyo waxgaradka beesha Maxaad Barre, ayaa waxay kaloo bayaankooda ku xuseen in kooxdan yari ay ku andacoodeen, in beesha Maxaad Barre ay tahay Kuul Carre, Habar Yoonis, arrintaasna aanay waxba ka jirin. “Arrimaha la yaabka leh ayaa ah in beel isirkeeda la yaqaan, oo qarniyaal soo jirtey in maanta la isku dayo in taariikda isirkeeda la khaldo, ayadoo laga faa’iidaysanayo dhibaatooyinka gaarka u haysta beesha iyo beelaha la midka ah, iyadoo dad kooban loo dirayo dhaqaale si loo jahawareeriyo sooyaalka taariikheed”, ayay salaaddiinta iyo waxgaradkaasi kale ku caddeeyeen bayaankooda.
Salaaddiinta iyo odayaasha Maxaad Barre ee bayaankan soo saaray, ayaa sidoo kale waxay sheegeen in ay xidhiidh la sameeyeen salaaddiin iyo waxgarad ka tirsan beesha Habar Yoonis. Kuwaas oo sheegay in wararka hadda la faafinayo aanay waxba ka jirin, laguna marin habaabinayo taariikhda iyo abtirka beesha Maxaad Barre, isla markaana aysan raalli ka ahayn. Waxa ay qireen cuqaashaasi sida bayaanka lagu sheegay in beesha Maxaad Barre aysan isir wada dhalasho la wadaagin beelaha Isaaq, gaar ahaan beesha Habar Yoonis.
Shir isna ka dhacay magaalada Nayroobi oo ay isugu yimaadeen mas’uuliyiin, siyaasiyiin iyo wax garad ka tirsan beesha Gabooye ee bariga Afrika ayay ku cambaareeyeen wax ay ugu yeedheen kala qaybinta ay salaaddiin ka tirsan Somaliland ku hayaan beesha Gabooye. Waxa isna lagu taageeray bayaanka salaaddiinta qaoraallo ay warbaahinta u gudbiyeen qaar ka mid ah madax dhaqameedka beelaha kale ee Gabooye
Dhanka kale bayaan uu soo saaray Maxamed Jaamc Cawil oo isagu isku tilmaamay afhayeenka beesha Kuul Carre ee Habar Yoonis, ayaa waxa uu ugu baaqay dhammaan xubnaha beesha ee ku kala nool dunida dacaladdeedu in ay u diyaar garoobaan ka soo qaybgalka shirweynaha dhawaan la filayo in uu ka dhaco magaalada Burco, ee xarunta gobolka Tog Dheer ee beesha Habar yoonis ku soo dhawaynayso walaalahooda Kuul Carre.
“Waxaan beelaha Kuul Carre ku wergelinayaa inay dhowaanahan soo shaac baxeen, shakhsiyaad tira yar oo doonaya inay carqaladeeyaan, ama is hortaagaan shirweynaha ka dhici doona magaalada Burco ee gobolka Togdheer ee Somaliland, ee ay hore ugu heshiiyeen, guurtida iyo salaadiinta Beelweynta Habar Yoonis iyo cuqaasha iyo waxgaradka beelaha Kuul Carre”, ayuu afhayeenku ku sheegay qoraalkiisa.
Warku waxa uu intaa ku darayaa in sidoo kale ay qurbajoog badan oo ka tirsan beesha Habar Yoonis ay taageereen, soona dhaweeyeen shirka lagu soo dhawaynayo beesha Kuul Carre oo la filayo in uu ka dhaco magaalada Burco 20 ka bisha January ee sannadka foodda innagu soo haya.
Beelaha la hayb sooco oo aalaaba ay Soomaalida inteeda kale ku hayaan dulmi iyo xaqiraad, ayaa taasi waxay ku keentaa in shakhsiyaad ka mid ahi, si ay uga badbaadaan bahdilka iyo quudhsiga ay mararka qaar sheegtaan beelo kale. Hase yeeshee waa markii ugu horreysay ee beel dhan oo ah kuwa la hayb sooco ay u xuub siibato beel kale, loona qabanqaabiyo shirweyne soo dhawayn ah.
Aqoonyahan deggen magaalada London oo ay WardheerNews arrintan wax ka weydiisay ayaa sheegay in beelaha la hayb soocaa aanay u baahnayn in la isir gediyo, balse ay mudan yihiin in laga daayo dulmiga iyo quudhsiga, loona arko in ay la mid yihiin beelaha kale ee Soomaaliyeed, loona ogolaado in ay xidhiidh is dhexgal iyo xididtinimo la yeeshaan beelaha kale siiba dhinaca guurka.
Wararka gobolada Somaliland oo waayadan dambe ay aad ugu badnaayeen beel ka soo digarogatay xisbi siyasaadeed oo ku biirtay mid kale iyo xaflado lagu soo dhaweeynayo, ayaa la isweydiin karaa in xaalku hadda wixii ka dambeeya isku bedeli karo beel ka soo digarogatay beel kale, kuna soo biirtay mid kale oo xaflad lagu soo dhaweeyay.
WardheerNews
Flexibility and fluctuation are key words when one tries to understand the
clan system. Catherine Besteman indicates this in her controversial examination
of the processes in which individuals changed places between lineages or
changed affiliation within the lineage. One may gain a formal affiliation through
a process called sheegad. The clan elders determine the conditions of acceptance,
The Journal of Conflict Studies
59
usually consisting of some kind of payment in kind, such as livestock. After making
such payment, the individual gains access to physical and financial protection
by their new clan family.12 Her study focused on Juba valley, the area with
perhaps the most flexible clan structures in Somalia; nevertheless she and other
researchers also stress this flexibility for the whole of Somalia.13 The alliances
within all the Somali lineages have been notoriously unstable during the last 12
years and intra-clan fighting, often with one group of a clan allied to another faction
from a different clan, was and still is common.14
Adoption, Patronage, Clientship and Occupational Castes in Somalia
9Before I discuss the present day ethnic classifications and labels it is useful to go back to detailed studies describing some processes which brought agriculturalist settlers of the Juba and Shebeli Somali Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, etc.) to be progressively overwhelmed by pastoral populations arriving from northern areas and seeking accessible water points along the Rivers.
10As inquired about in the second and third decade of the twentieth century and, later, diligently described, the struggle over the River access points and, to some extent, to rainfed cultivable lands, gave rise to repeated bloody clashes and violent fighting which resulted in different kinds of agreements between lineages and groups of people (Cerulli 1964: 78). The nature of such agreements have been described in terms of relationships of patronage, adoption and alliance (iskashaato); however, jural and actual nuances of these forms of interaction were a matter of negotiation and depended on the skills in public relations of the individuals, groups and communities involved, on the resources at stake and on the size of the groups involved.
11Patronage in Somalia is a relation in which groups of people seek an agreement of mutual dependence although one becomes patron and the other a client. A patronage relationship, for instance, occurs when agriculturalists give to a certain lineage/clan of pastoral people exclusive rights to River access points close to their village; in exchange for such an exclusive license, the agriculturalists may receive an annual payment in animals and a permanent protection against the intrusion of other foreign shepherds who might not respect their cultivated fields while approaching the River access points. The relationship of the agriculturalists Makanne with the pastoralists Badi Caddo is said to have been of this kind, during the first decades of the twentieth century (ibid.: 84), as well as that of the agriculturalists Shidle with the pastoralists Mobileen (ibid.: 78). There are also relationships of patronage between pastoralists; for example, it is reported that scattered Somalis (Harti, Ogaadeen and Marrehaan) entered the lower Juba area as clients of the “Galla” (Oromo) people. Initially, the Somalis looked after the “Galla’s” animals. Thereafter, the Somalis’ number increased and they gained a foothold: revolted against their patrons and started controlling those lands (ibid.: 79).
* 5 See the case reported in Lewis (1969: 72-74), although the case is mentioned to argue another point (...)
12Adoption between descent groups named “haliif” (in Arabic) or “arifa” (ibid.: 68), in a mangled Italianised way, was especially widespread among the Somalis Hawiye. This was an agreement through which the adopter (a clan, a lineage or one of the family of the lineage), under request, took complete responsibility for the protection of the adopted; the adopted (person or group), on the other hand, was to refrain from jeopardising the peace of the adopter group (ibid.: 67). Among the Hareyn—as possibly, in most cases of adoption—the adopted formally renounced to their birth place in terms of clan/lineage and promised to accompany the adopter’s clan/lineage in peace and war for ever (Lewis 1969: 66). This also entailed a partial or total transferral of blood compensation rights and duties from one’s original group to the adopter’s clan/lineage (ibid.: 67). The reciprocal obligations entailed by the agreement of adoption could cease for two reasons: when an adopted group migrated from the territory and when an adopted group became strong enough to constitute an autonomous ethnic unity, as recognised by the adopter. Of course, power conflicts would also determine the cessation of an adoption (Cerulli 1964: 73). The end of an adoption involved the clearing out of the territory previously granted for agriculture or other purposes by the adopter (ibid.: 67-68). From the adoption system arose several complicated issues in the consuetudinary law and examples of such are reported for the twenties (ibid.: 68, 70-75) and the sixties (Lewis 1969: 72-74). The institution could be used by a group for establishing itself in an area and, thereafter, claiming such territory permanently by force. Moreover, allegiance of an adopted lineage or family with its original clan could continue after many years of permanence in far away areas. When adopted people kept old allegiances with lineages/clans of enemies they became unpleasant and dangerous guests in case of conflicts. Finally, when governments banned the use of tribal criteria from the national legal system, adopted people could try to use their old relations of adoption in order to claim permanent rights over other clans’ cultivable lands 5again fostering conflicts. Yet, relations of adoption protected some agriculturalists before other regimes of land property were set up in Somalia. For instance, during the Siyaad Barre government, disregarding relations of adoption, tracts of land were expropriated for national purposes (i.e. setting up of state farms, etc.), taken from people who had less links with the lineages/clans of the governments’ members, mainly agriculturalist riverine peoples.
13During the years, the interactions created through adoption and patronage, fostered certain pastoral people to convert themselves to good farmers by occupying more and more arable land. Along the Shebeli River, Cerulli mentions some such people as: the Hillibi, the Daacud of the Balad area, the Mobileen, the Molkal, the Badi Caddo (Cerulli 1964: 83). Yet, some Somali pastoral groups were adopted in villages of riverine people; for instance, in the Shidle village of Shanloo, along the Shebeli, lived families of Somali Wacesla (ibid.: 82) and in the Zigula village of Mugambo, along the Juba, lived families of Somalis who spoke the Bantu language kizigula.
14Therefore, despite the general understanding of what is Somali society, there have been very complex ethnic interactions among pastoralists and agriculturalists in the last centuries; it would be difficult to keep track of all such interactions. These involved the concession of temporary rights over the use of land and territory, but did not necessarily entail that the adopted people (agriculturalists or pastoralists) were the losers (ibid.: 84). In fact, especially before colonial times, a patron/client relationship was one of mutual support in different economic activities or for the control of a territory rather than one of domination of a group over another. Until the present time a “distinction is made between those born into a clan and those who have become members by adoption” (Helander 1988: 133). However, case studies from the Hubeer (ibid.: 43) and the Hareyn (Lewis 1969: 68) show that in many cases those who have been adopted outnumber the others.
* 6 The Ajuraan were patrons of the Shebeli valley North of Mogadishu.
* 7 Fieldnotes, 1985.
15Adoptions also involved people of those occupational castes considered inferior to the others. An analysis made by Cerulli (1964: 90) points out at low castes people, as descendants of those subdued during the successive invasions of the Horn of Africa in the last centuries. No conqueror completely destroyed the enemy nor was free from contacts and intermarriages with the defeated people. This occurred even though the latter were put in an inferior jural condition (ibid.: 88). Several different kinds of groups have been assimilated to such low castes on the base of their jural inferior situation; such groups have included corporation of people practising special jobs considered vile and suspect, such as blacksmiths, wood workers, potters, tanners, magicians, shoe makers, hunters and gatherers and sometimes fishermen. Therefore, according to Cerulli, people belonging to low castes share similarities in development and historical formation rather than linguistic, cultural or geographic origins (id. 1959: 113). The names of the most well known low castes in Somalia are Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc. The names are not accurate if seen as referring to specific lineages or occupations, rather, the way people from different occupational castes are named is positional. It depends much on the geographic area of the Somali country where they live and the lineage membership of those who speak about them. For instance, at the beginning of the 1920, there were blacksmiths Tumal in Mogadishu who considered themselves as poor descendants of the Ajuraan 6(id. 1964: 91-92) and blacksmiths called Gacansibir among the Marrehaan of the Juba; yet, Muusa Deryo among the Rahanwiin were potters and blacksmiths unlike the Muusa Deryo of the Habar Awal (id. 1959: 101-113). Hunters and gatherers along the Juba River in 1985 were called Bon by both Shanbara and Zigula and only very few intermarriages would occur. Nevertheless, Shanbara reported that at the beginning of their settlement in the Gosha area a group of men abducted women from a village of the Bon people and married them7.
* 8 Cerulli gives some information about the jural status of such castes among the Majeerteen (1959: 24 (...)
16A common characteristic of the occupational castes is that they have established long term patron/client relationships with one of the predominant lineage in the area where they live. Such relationship entails consuetudinary agreements with the patrons as regards payment of bloodwealth, dispute resolution and marriage rules which vary from group to group. Basically, because their specialised work is necessary in any lineage, people from such castes usually have long term relations of adoption with stronger clans. Moreover, they are not in a large number nor have strength enough to defend themselves alone. As adopted people, low castes cannot take political initiatives but enjoy some sort of protection depending on the lineage/clan of their patrons8. In the past, low caste people and slaves held different legal status (Cerulli 1959: 19-29) which varied according to lineages and geographical areas. Often was recognised a real blood compensation for the death of low caste people (id. 1964: 72). It is impossible to dwell on the analysis of all such jural differences as regards people scattered in so many different areas of Somalia. It would be enough to say that, despite conspicuous differences within their legal status at the beginning of the twentieth century, low castes, freed slaves and slaves were held an unequal and inferior jural condition as compared to those considered ethnic Somali.
17During the twentieth century this local system of distinction and social stratification, initially based on a need for regulating access to natural resources as well as for managing specialisation of occupations, has been modified and divisions have been stressed as well as reinforced to fit within different ruling systems.
Rationale for Labelling: Past and Present
18Following the substantial flow of refugees since the end of 1990, for the first time the international community appeared to became aware of the existence of Bantu among the Somalis. However, in the history of Somalia, this sort of ethnic category had been used by colonialists for political purposes joining together all those Somali people who were skilled in farming or in other practical works (people belonging to the occupational castes). Such categorisation reflected and certainly emphasised an existing local ideology which considers all agriculturalists of the Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, Shanbara, Zigula, Gosha9, Mushunguli10, etc.) together with occupational castes (Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc.) inferior groups as compared to pastoralists. Disregard of both kind of people was part of the ideology which magnified the image of pastoral nomads. Among pastoralists could be found the bilis, i.e. “nobles” and among agriculturalists the “slaves” or “ex-slaves”.
* 9 The name Gosha points out at all riverine people of the Juba River.
* 10 Mushunguli is a mangled name for mzigula, i.e. person belonging to the Zigula people; the term has (...)
* 11 Such argument is supported in all three Cerulli’s volumes titled Somalia (1957; 1959; 1964). Howeve (...)
19In the first decades of the twentieth century the Italian colonialists reinforced such an ideology by mistakenly emphasising the pastoralists power over supposedly ex-slaves. The fact that Cerulli puts forward a great deal of evidence against the very inaccuracy of calling “liberti”, i.e. freed slaves, the whole “negro” populations of the Shebeli and Juba Rivers corroborates the argument. It seems that the diplomat was opposing a very common view among colonial officers of the times11.
* 12 In Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana, 73, 1910 (English translation of the author).
20Despite internal divisions and distinctions, at the beginning of this century Italian colonialists paid special attention to the descendants from slaves for their skill in farming. The following paragraph illustrates how this characterisation was linked to the problem of recruiting agricultural manpower: “Hand power in the Benadir is scarce for a complex series of reasons of a moral, economic and demographic kind: [. . .]overall there is a natural slothfulness of pure Somalis towards work in the fields: only slaves and freed slaves practice this dishonourable activity; it is only among them that we gather the small amount of manpower which is available.” 12
21The categorisation of these people according to economic activities, which was drawn in a local existing distinction, was consistent with the viewpoint of the Europeans of the colony. This consonance resulted in the reinforcement of divisions among people because Italians needed farmers for agriculture in the colony. All free people who farmed by tradition, whether slaves or ex-slaves or agriculturalists who had always been free, were basically included into the same category.
22Later, from 1925 to the end of Fascist Rule in Somalia determined in 1941 by the upwind of the British Military Administration, Italians continued to base ethnic categorisations on economic activities, in order to “recruit” people into forced labour to apparently build public infrastructures (Serrazanetti 1933: 20) and work on farms (Del Boca 1992: 203).
23Although they knew that many different lineages and group identities existed among the riverine agriculturalists, Italians did not hesitate to lump them all together into a unique whole of those who could be of some use as forced manpower. An informant imitated an Italian scolding Gosha farmers who attempted to escape conscription with the following words: “I do not accept your saying ‘I am a Mushunguli’, ‘I am a Bartire’, ‘I am a Shabelle’, ‘I am a Cawlyahan’, ‘I am a Marexan’. These do not exist for you. You are lying. You are all Mushunguli Mayasid [Bantu]. You have to participate [in forced labour]” (Besteman 1994: 52).
* 13 Nowadays, people who act this way are called in Somali shegato. This term in Somalia is also used t (...)
24In reality, for the farmers who live along the Rivers in Somalia, claiming membership in a Somali lineage, such as Marrehaan, Cawliyahan, Bartire, etc., can mean two different things: belonging to a group which is under a relation of adoption, patronage or alliance with a certain Somali lineage/ clan or descending from ancestors who had been slaves of people from that lineage. In fact, people might call themselves with the name of their masters; this was, for example, the case of those who had been taken as slaves when they were children, because they did not know their original family names13. In the first instance, the claim can aim at defending one’s rights as people protected by a Somali lineage/clan because in some sort of alliance with it or because descendants of ex-slaves of such lineage/clan. On the other hand, for those Zigula who had obtained their freedom in the territory of the Juba River by winning the war over the Ogaadeen at the turn of the century, the claim of being a Mushunguli (a mangled way of saying Mzigula, i.e. Zigula person) could be part of a strategy to obtain the same rights as “pure Somalis” who were not forced to work in the Italian farms. In other words, claiming a Mushunguli identity might aim at enabling supposedly slave descendants to claim the same status as descendants from free people, like the “pure Somalis”. Under such claim lies the very criteria that authority and dominant position of a group could be based on the autonomous control of a territory by a group and not on the status of people by descent. Finally, the very fact that people claimed such alliances in front of the Italian officer suggests that conscription to forced labour was organised by stressing traditional criteria of alliance and authority; the Somalis with pastoral origins were co-opted in subduing to such labour people with agriculturalist origins.
25Unfortunately, the nature of slavery in Somalia at the turn of the century has not been studied in depth as yet; however, scattered information suggests that mobility among social strata followed criteria nowadays imponderable. For instance, among the Majeerteen the sultan could free a male slave and such slave could then marry a free Somali woman, unlike other freed slaves (Cerulli 1964: 24). And yet, Borana captives were made slaves by the Marrehaan: however, if a Borana woman was taken as a captive, then married a Marrehaan and thereafter delivered a child she became free and equal to any other wife of the Marrehaan (id. 1959: 83).
26The fact that a certain mobility from one social strata to another for individuals and groups existed in Somalia has been overlooked; all “agriculturalists” were homogenised under the label of “liberti”, “freed slaves”, and became farmers who could be forced into labour.
27Along the Shebeli and Juba Rivers, agriculturalists men and women, all considered to be slave descendants or related peoples, were recruited through forced corvées and mostly under the Bertello farming contract (Del Boca 1992). So called “pure Somalis”, possibly bilis or “nobles” were to choose people belonging to those groups who were under their control to be forced into such corvées, under pressure of the colonial government. Chiefs of “docile” and “dedicated” clans had to send a set contribution of manpower to the estates (Serrazanetti 1933: 10-11). In other words, Italian colonialism supported the ethnic division of the Somali population by economic activities, which stigmatised agriculturalists in many aspects.
* 14 Fieldnotes, 1988.
28A singular phenomenon which reinforced only one kind of ethnic identity created a gendered and unequal one: agriculturalists men were co-opted into a policy that restricted agriculturalist women’s freedom in marriages. Men to be conscripted into forced labour were given the right to choose any woman they wanted as a wife, without her consent or that of her relatives (Declich 1995b: 111-113; Menkhaus 1989: 259). New young couples without children were preferred in the estates. The regulation waved new husbands from paying marriage transactions for the spouses (Serrazanetti 1933: 11). Fathers were co-opted into ceding their daughters under threat of being conscripted themselves or their sons (ibid.). It is amazing that, in order to restrain reactions of men against conscription such an abuse of power over women should be authorised to them. Indeed, several demonstrations against conscription were held in the lower Juba area14; yet, many conscripted escaped from estates every where in Somalia (Serrazanetti 1933); however, as informants from the Juba area hinted at with irony, without the company of a woman most young men would have run away from conscription.
* 15 See “Legge sull’eliminazione di alcuni termini indicanti sottocaste”, in Bollettino Ufficiale, Legg (...)
* 16 See, for instance, “Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and Prospects for Peace in Somalia”, Afric (...)
29With Independence (1960) and following the Socialist Revolution (1969), some expressions of tribalism were banned and laws prohibited the use of words which highlighted or signified racial disdain such as addon (slave), Midgan and Ybir (names of some occupational castes), and jareer (i.e. person with curly hair, hinting at a progeny of slaves)15. Despite the apparent effort to eliminate racial discrimination within the country, in practice discrimination continued and worsened with the eruption of the civil war at the end of 199016.
30A local system of oppositions among the others characterises nowadays membership in groups and is matter of distinction within people. A first subdivision distinguishes jareer from jileec. The jareer are those who are said to have curly hair and large noses; these features clearly identify them as originating from East Africa, and associates them with descendants from slaves who are believed to deserve scorn. The jileec are said to be Somalis with straight hair and a long-limbed build. The classification jareer/jileec is based on physical characteristics although not all those who in principle should look like jileec because of clan affiliation have a clear semblance of jileec. In fact, if ideally intermarriages between jileec and jareer do not occur, in practice during the centuries several dynamics, among which some have been described above, have fostered an intermingling of the members of the groups in different ways according to the geographical and political circumstances. The jareer/jileec classification, therefore, is an imprecise one but remains a sensitive issue in terms of identity for the Somali people: it takes a positional meaning depending on the geographical and cultural context in which it is mentioned. For somebody living along the Juba River a jareer who had sleek hair, because of one of her/is ancestors, might be considered slightly an outsider if not proving special commitment with the jareer’s way of life. On the other hand, the very fact of living among jareer makes of such person a jareer in the view of jileec. The jareer are believed to come from agricultural families, whereas the jileec are most often of pastoralist origin. Before the outburst of the civil war in 1990 such distinctions were already stereotypical. However, in the context of daily life relationships, these continued to be powerful distinctions which were used to marginalise jareer from access to jobs, benefits, education and family networks. Yet, descendants from families of ex-slaves in Mogadishu enjoyed some form of protection from the descendants of their relatives’ masters.
31Among the jareer of the riverine area of the Juba, however, other oppositions existed and people classified themselves into many other categories with specific positive and negative connotations. Oral traditions of the Zigulas, for instance, record their liberation from enslavement by escaping en masse, using this to explain why they have kept their Zigula language (Declich 1995b). The Somali Zigula—people who speak the Zigula language—call those who no longer speak a Bantu language “Mahaway”, which is a scoff at their pronunciation of the Somali language. The latter, on the other hand, call themselves Shanbara or Shanbarani which means, descendants from five original brothers who belonged to east African groups such as the Yao, Makua, Nyasa, Nyamwesi and others (id. 1987).
32The word “Bantu” to identify riverine peoples of Somalia was used in colonial times by racist anthropologists, like Puccioni (1937). The term “Negro” was instead used by more accurate Italian colonial officers, among whom the most famous are the lawyer Massimo Colucci (1924) and the orientalist and diplomat Enrico Cerulli. The latter, was in charge of studying Somali dialects at the R. Istituto Orientale in Naples in 1916 (Cerulli 1959: 9) and spent years in the Shebeli valley in Somalia during the first half of the twentieth century (1919-1922). As he attended a great deal of dispute settlements in those years, his reports are invaluable for the details he attaches to the many cases he describes. Puccioni was a member of the school of anthropology in Florence which advocated scientific reasons for the inferiority of the Bantu as a human “race”. Cerulli, using a more accurate approach to the study of the Somali people, clarifies that not all Somali “Bantu” were, indeed, descendants from slaves; rather, they were farmers who had originally inhabited the riverine areas that were later overwhelmed by Galla (i.e. Oromo) and further Somali (Cushitic language speaker) pastoral populations and runaway slaves (id. 1957: 161-163). The fact that they no longer spoke Bantu-based languages did not mean that they had been slaves. As such, Bantu had become a minority in an area largely inhabited by pastoral Somalis and because of their physical semblance to those who had been brought as slaves from the East African Coast, they had all been identified as descendants of slaves.
33Nowadays, within the civil war in Somalia and in the refugee camps, several factors foster the creation of a new ethnic consciousness and its internalisation by those who have been called jareer in Somalia. One such factor is the definition of different levels and strata of beneficiaries for the distribution of humanitarian aid, with the aim of providing equal access to all, in the refugee camps.
The Construction of Bantu Ethnicity in Refugee Camps
34As they arrive in reception areas newcomers are divided into groups usually by lineage, ethnic group, or village of origin (Declich 1995a) and, therefore, “if necessary, by clan” (Gallagher & Forbes Martin 1992: 18). The registration form which is used by UNHCR includes the tribe/clan/sub-clan as information to be gathered about the people who register17. In much literature about Africa the very concept of “tribe” or “clan” has been largely criticised for being inadequate, imprecise and a result of colonialists’ constructions (Iliffe 1979; Hobsbawn & Ranger 1984; Southall 1970; Vail 1989). Although the meaning of the words “tribe” and “clan” may still be unclear, such classification, apparently, is nonetheless useful in order to confer some control and order to the camps, as well as to allow people who trust each other to settle together. Nevertheless, the use of such classifications definitely reinforces certain criteria of hierarchy by lineages. Somalis from a pastoral background are known to be subdivided into patrilineages and the process of registration in the camps may strengthen patrilineal ties, even among those Somali groups for which such ties are not otherwise very important.
* 17 Branch Office for Kenya-Nairobi, Registration Form, UNHCR, n.d.
35People who do not have clear affiliation to Somali patrilineages and who have curly hair are now classified through a process of registration as “Bantu” by the refugee camps authorities. Such classification, has been applied by the UNHCR despite the fact that only a few of them actually speak a Bantu-based language (Declich 1995b). Ironically, the “Bantu” categorisation helps the jareer to increase their visibility in the camps, in which they would have been otherwise marginalised because of racial discrimination. However, the category “Bantu” was completely unknown to them before arriving in the camps. People I knew from Somalia, had never heard the word “Bantu” before, and said “we are now Bantu, we, the Zigula, are called Bantu here in the camp”. In an attempt to endow the jareer with some ethnic dignity and recognition, a field officer classified the Bantu as “Mushunguli” (Lehman 1993); a project manager identified them as Shanbarani—a name farmers of the Juba River who only speak Somali language give to themselves—, because the women she interviewed identified her group as such and distinguished such group from other Bantu in the camp (Musse 1993: 13). The different names people have used for themselves in different contexts in Somalia have been discussed elsewhere (Declich 1987; 1995b).
* 18 “The nightmare continues... Abuses against Somali Refugees in Kenya”, African Rights, September, 19 (...)
36In the camps close to Daddab, the fact that Bantu are considered to be a different sort of people from pastoralist Somalis allows camp authorities to identify them as one vulnerable group. Otherwise, they would risk not receiving the benefits to be distributed. If the Bantu were mixed or hidden among other Somalis, they would risk starvation, because their food would be simply looted. Due to their ill-regarded descent, they have been poorly treated by other Somalis in Somalia and in the camps and have became preferred target of bandits. In keeping with occasional reports by observers that a large number of Bantu have arrived at the frontier in very weak shape (Gallagher & Forbes Martin 1992: 19), conversations and reports of officers working along the Juba River during the war 18confirm that the newlyascribed Bantu categorisation—that had become widespread after 1990 as a result of forced displacement—has been important in affording them visibility.
37The label of “Bantu”, however, has no precise meaning aside from singling out those who do not belong to Somali patrilineages, and thus, is a sort of device used by humanitarian agencies in order to identify this particular kind of beneficiary. On the other side, those who are called Bantu, even if they never defined themselves as such before then, for the first time in the camps meet vested interests in being pulled together under the same umbrella name. Not the jareer classification, as it was used in Somalia, nor the fact of being all agriculturalists, had been strong enough reasons to foster a common consciousness among these marginalised people in Somalia. In the camps, however, it has become clear that these people are a minority group and would have problems in receiving benefits if these were to be channelled through key persons among the Somali patrilineages.
* 19 See Africa Report, May-June, 1995: 25.
38Moreover, such non-affiliation has already put them at risk in Kenya due to lack of responsibility/guarantee in terms of bloodwealth. At the beginning of their stay in the camps, the Bantu became an easier target than others for bandits and/or thieves and women were raped in such occasions. Different groups of bandits and thieves, both Kenyans and Somalis, were raiding the refugee camps especially attracted by the distribution of items. In order to defend themselves, the Bantu had to arrange to reside next to each other in the three camps, and, autonomously fenced their quarters with thorny shrubs to constitute fortified compounds 19(Lehman 1993: 6). Moreover, they made bows and arrows and kept stores of stones to scare bandits and thieves who, for this reason, became afraid to approach their compounds.
Downplaying Female Gender in the New Ethnic Construction
39Undoubtedly, identifying the Bantu as a different ethnic group from other Somalis may help them to be protected, and to receive a share of the benefits provided by humanitarian agencies which they need in order to survive displacement. In other words, this strategy worked as a way to defend their access to benefits, incentives and, ultimately, human rights. In fact, by being allowed to settle together in one area of the camp, the so-called Bantu can benefit from channels of distribution managed by their own representatives, rather than by other Somali groups. However, it is exactly by claiming such equal access to benefits, combined with the “emergency” situation, that officers in the camp make choices which downplay the importance of women’s roles in crucial decision making processes. I would like to dwell on the usual procedure that officers apply to foster some participation in decision making in the refugee camps. This entails singling out those seen to be responsible persons, who wield some authority and control over groups of people, to be recognised as heads of clusters of compounds within the camps. They become councillors of sorts, who represent the wishes of the groups. Using such a method and participatory approach, a group of Bantu male elders were settled together in the refugee camp of Dagahaley.
* 20 Ibid.: 5.
40In March 1994, I had the chance to meet them. They were identified as the ones responsible for clan subdivisions among the Bantu refugees. The elders had prepared a statement about their wish to be resettled in Tanzania, where they hoped to find land, start agriculture, and reconstruct a living. Yet, also to some UNHCR representatives resettlement in an African country appeared to be a concrete, plausible, and durable alternative to the forced displacement of Somali Bantu. The area along the Juba River was not peaceful enough for repatriation, nor was a safer situation envisaged in the near future. Some Bantu lands had been invaded and most of the Bantu who remained were forced to share crops with newly arrived masters20. Moreover, the racial discrimination these people had suffered in Somalia and would have to face again if they returned there, were other considerations. The concern of the UNHCR’s officers for this marginal group was perfectly understandable and praiseworthy and a good reason for considering their resettlement in another area where they could practice agriculture again. Daddab is located in a dry area where scarcity of water prevents cultivations from taking place on a large scale. It is likely that most of the Bantu, if asked, would have endorsed the idea of finding a resettlement area in another African country for their families.
41What was questionable, however, was the criteria of “representativeness” which was used to gather this group of male elders. The elders were supposed to represent each of the lineages/tribes/clans, or whatsoever these unexplained words meant, among the Bantu; the nature of such “ethnic” sections for the Bantu was not clear to the field officers of the camp. Yet, the Bantu themselves, had learned in Somalia that it was safer to keep underneath, without disclosing, their own traditional ways of being; rather, they should adapt publicly to what they were requested to be in order to be accepted among the Somali (Declich 1995b). The officers, therefore, assumed that, at registration, new arrivals to the camp declared their clanic subdivision, and that these were structured, more or less, as they were among Somalis. The assumption was that their “clans” must have been something like patrilineages. Accordingly, in order to foster a participation process representatives should be selected by field officers for each of the subdivisions (mviko and/or kolwa) of the “Bantu”: Makua, Yao, Nyasa, Zigula, Zalamo, etc. The point is that these “representatives” had never been recognised as such in Somalia because a pyramidal structure based on linear descent did not exist. No one, for example, during fieldwork in Somalia had ever claimed to be the chief of the Zalamo subdivision, which was a very small group of people. I suspect that the name Zalamo was, possibly, a loan word from the Tanzanian group living in the vicinity of Dar-es-Salaam, with whom the Bantu of the camp attempted to establish a fictive connection. In other words, in consideration of previous data about them in Somalia, I had the clear impression that through the camp’s experience those elders had been given the chance to negotiate their own power space within their group.
42The choice which the officers made, although driven by an understandably scarce knowledge of the kinship system of the Bantu, seemed to me even more cryptic because I knew the nature of the lineage system among the so-called “Bantu”. These Bantu do not have patrilineages, nor do they have chiefs who wield power over people of the same patri-lines. The mviko groups are mostly matri-kin groupings, namely, group of people united by the fact of recognising common female ancestors, deputed to the management and organisation of mviko rituals; the heads of such rituals are not necessarily men and most people can claim belongings to mviko of the father’s and mother’s line (id. 1994: 199, 203-204; 1995b: 107-108). As rituals are important in a public context, mainly because of their prophetic aspects, people involved in the organisation of such rituals, men or women, have a certain influence, sometimes a strong one, in the public life of their group. From an individual point of view, although the matri-kin grouping of the mother is the most important to anybody’s life, people can also claim belonging to the matri-kin grouping of the father, depending on the situation and the need for certain rituals. While the kinship system provides an opportunity to emphasise both the mother’s and father’s lines, in the camp only the father’s line was given recognition by the UNHCR authority.
43One could claim that all criteria of representativeness are questionable in one way or another because they always exclude someone from direct decision making; yet, some sort of screening, as well as negotiation of power, occurs in any case. This commonly occurs among refugees. For instance a recent article argues that the elite of refugees from Burundi eventually acquire a special role (Sommers 1995). However, it is not at all clear why women should be the ones who become marginal in the new invention of political representatives.
* 21 For clarifications about such ethnic groups see Declich (1995b and 1987).
44Certainly the plight, constraints and risks of remaining in the vicinity of the camps and the general context has reinforced the common feelings of Bantu men and women, that they were all once marginalised, and that they were sharing similar needs and desires for the future. It was the first time, in fact, since fieldwork in Somalia, that I had seen Zigula and Shanbara 21joining together towards reaching the same aim and supporting the same requests in a non Muslim religious context. During peaceful times in Somalia, divisions were also emphasised, at times (Declich 1995b), in order to describe one’s identity and difference. However, for some reason, possibly shaped by the situation of emergency, women in such a new ethnic unity were not provided for as public actors, nor even given the chance. In other words, a new ethnic invention was taking place and male elders were called to publicly construct it, leaving apart women.
45When such processes occur in the field, it is difficult to disentangle what really happened while the participatory process was being established. If questioned about the way the elder representatives were selected in a group, managers commonly give many good reasons why men had to be chosen, neglecting women. Explanations such as “. . .when we did ask for representatives from the Bantu, we were pointed toward these men”, or “women would have been more at risk if they were put in such a group of elders” or “this matter was a concern of the male elders and we got them together in order to give them voice” or “the issue of resettlement is such a difficult one that there is more chance to succeed if male elders present the requests for resettlement” are put forward. However, by knowing the nature of matri-kin groupings among the Bantu and the non-existence of patrilineages like those of other Somalis, a question arises about whether none of the field officers 1) thought about looking for both, women and men representatives and 2) knew that women, as well as men, discuss whether they prefer to be resettled in Tanzania or somewhere else. Moreover, women were among the people who most felt at risk of being raped in the camps, especially if they found themselves without partners; it would seem logical to have female elder representative of them to be involved in decisions about leaving the camp.
46At any rate, as a result of all these conditions, the group of elders who were called together to analyse the feasibility or interest of a goal such as a group resettlement, only included men. In other words, no women elders were summoned to discuss the issue nor were women elders consulted to give their point of view on the idea of resettlement for the entire group. Women were left to speak among themselves about possible resettlement without be given a public space to express so, unlike male elders. The pattern of male representation established among the Somali Zigula during colonial time and followed by the Somali governments was repeated by representatives of the international community in the very person of the UNHCR’a officers.
47Besides the actual marginalisation women experience in such a decision making context for the specific issue of resettlement of the group, an important point is the influence such a choice may have on those women for the future. Elder and younger mostly uneducated women who for the first time enter an “international” context or community so directly may believe that in what they see as “modern” social contexts is not appropriate that women decide over the movement of their group or have not the right to do so, as it is shown to them by the officers of the humanitarian aid system. For the first time in centuries, the Bantu found themselves in a context where they are not discriminated against as a group. This brought about a relaxation of social tensions within the Bantu community so that, for example, women did not pay much attention to their public role being downplayed.
48The point is how influential can be such a negligence over the confidence of those elder and younger women as regards the appropriateness of their actions in the new international context, their appropriateness in such context and their right to decide over the movement of the entire group.
49In other words, the crucial choice of neglecting women elders was made with the commendable aims of supporting the rights of the “Bantu” group to seek a durable solution to displacement and of encouraging participation within the camp’s decision making system. Nevertheless, this choice had influential structural effects on power relations between genders within the public domain.
50Whether unintentional or for reasons deemed to be acceptable, the organised provision of international humanitarian aid wielded considerable power in the group’s gender relations, affecting both authority and personal identity. First, the procedure recognised the authority of male elders as important, while ignoring female elders in the camp; in fact, male elders were called to discuss the future plans and movements of the whole group in a plight, whereas female elders were not consulted and, therefore, excluded from public authority, with few chances to reverse the decisions. In the “Bantu” villages in Somalia, there were certain aged women with special authority as regards either ritual performances or other activities at the village level. It is not clear the reason why this sort of leaders were not singled out rather a new sort of ethnic chiefs was supported and given authority through the participation exercise. Secondly, only one kind of individual identity was reinforced and imbued with the status of being “relevant”: that which highlights membership in matri-kin groupings, as if they were patrilineages. In other words, the personal identity which is recognised as relevant within the camp is one for which the representative must be a male elder. Importance was attributed to the matri-kin group of the father, rather than the reverse.
51In conclusion, a rationale which was, perhaps, unconscious, underlined the procedure for managing camp’s issues. Camp personnel assumed first, that the “clanic” system of the Bantu, whatever this could mean, was strictly patrilineal, and second that, in patrilineal systems, women have no rights or choices to decisions about where to move with the family or group in future years. This of course would even be a misunderstanding in treating the actual patrilineal Somalis this way. All these assumptions, embedded in the procedural system of the UNHCR, concretely disempowered women in their possible future “resettlement” in Tanzania or elsewhere. Ironically, this happened also to Bantu speakers among the Somali Bantu, such as the Zigula, who maintain strong oral traditions about their previous forced displacements. In such traditions, women had an important role: the most famous personality in their oral narratives is a woman heroine, Wanankhucha, who lead the largest groups of them away from slavery. She is said to have been a prophet and diviner (mganga) who organised the flight from the Somali villages where the Zigula had been captives. She is remembered as having fostered community feeling among the Zigula by organising repeated performances of traditional Zigula songs. During the flight she was able to help the Zigula avoid danger by means of her divination and visions (ibid.: 105-108; Cassanelli 1987: 221; Grottanelli 1953).
Powerlessness and Persecution of Women by Rape
52In interviews with women and men in the refugee camps, most of whom had been my acquaintances in Somalia five to eight years previously, the major factors which they then asserted provoked their flight from Somalia became clear. Especially, at the end of 1991 and early 1992, raids by armed thieves and bandits increased. Refugees remembered that, in order to obtain money, food, clothes and other available items, bandits did not hesitate to commit crimes of many sorts and would threaten, kill, and/or if the victim was a woman, rape, those who did not surrender.
53Rape had become so frequent that, whenever women left the village to fetch firewood, they risked multiple rape. Almost all of the twenty women interviewed had been raped once, yet, parties of bandits commonly groupraped individual women. Another way to convince victims to surrender their property was to rape a woman in front of her relatives. Description of the brutal cases which occurred would be endless and I only mention one such narrative story here. One woman recounted that she would never forget the image of her friends chased by bandits. They were two sisters one of whom was pregnant. The women attempted to escape from gunmen, who wanted to rape them, by running towards the river. The pregnant sister could not run fast enough and was shot dead; the other sister, however, managed to escape by crossing the crocodile-infested water. Suffice it to say that rape was always mentioned by both women and men as a very good reason to seek a safer home.
54A male acquaintance of mine from Somalia explained why he had decided to flee. After repeated theft of food from his household, the choice was to flee or to remain at home without food and endure the regular rape of young women (daughters, wives, nieces and granddaughters) before his eyes. Adolescent females of thirteen to fifteen years of age were at the greatest risk of rape. Bandits generally preferred to rape young women. If they happened to arrive at night, bandits would rape both younger and older women, but if they arrived during the day they would only pick the younger ones. This acquaintance reported that before the 1992, when he flew from the Juba, in his village of origin, not less than two hundred women were raped out of approximately 1,500 female inhabitants. He warned me that many women do not admit to having been raped, because they are ashamed.
* 22 See Information Bulletin, UNHCR, February 1994: 7; Refugee Women Victims of Violence. A Special Pro (...)
55Although, in 1994, the camps surrounding Daddab were still rather insecure for women, who continued to be raped when they left the camp to collect firewood or when bandits would attack the camp to steal22, such sexual persecution seemed to be less common than when the refugees were settled along the Juba River.
56Another striking memory was that bandits would steal everything, even clothes, often leaving the victim almost naked. More than one woman claimed that her clothes had been stolen after she had been raped. This practice demonstrates that assailants had reached an exceptional and excessive level of cruelty. Leaving someone who has already been abused, without anything, even clothes, marks a wish to render this person completely defenceless, i.e. unable even to present herself among other human beings.
* 23 See UNHCR, October 1993: 4, op. cit.
57I was told that a new cloth was one of the very few commodities that people, who could prepare their “luggage” before escaping from Somalia, carried with them; in order to avoid theft, this was hidden among the old rags they used to wear in Kisimayu. The possibility of wearing a nice, clean and “respectable” cloth was viewed as an important part of one’s identity. This symbol of clothing parallels its significance among women victims of violence in the refugee camp. As social workers have noted, women who were forced to continue wearing the same clothes in which they had been assaulted, faced severe psychological problems23.
58The experience of rape and the prospect of facing it again permanently alters women’s hopes for the future and, specifically, their plans about where they would like to settle next. One woman said: “We saw such terrible things. They raped everyone; I would like to return to Somalia, but the very idea that the war could begin there again, stops me.” Another woman emphasised the point that the memories of the violence that she witnessed and suffered could jeopardise her future pregnancies.
59In short, starvation and sexual violence, perceived as persecution were mentioned as the most important factors for fleeing Somalia during war. The rape of women created a context of powerlessness for both men and women during the war. Although sexual persecution was directed towards women, men were also humiliated by being forced to watch their relatives raped in front of them. Such feeling powerlessness was in addition to the usual impotence which characterises life conditions refugee camps.
Some Characteristics of Powerlessness: Alteration of Production/Reproduction Relationships
60One characteristic of Somali refugees in Daddab is that they have undergone a process of alteration in the production/reproduction relationships within the group. Refugees in the camp cannot produce for their own consumption nor is any improvement envisaged in the immediate future. This entails different problems depending upon the main economic activity of the Somali group involved. Whatever the main economic activity of the group, whether pastoral or agricultural, people without a means of production are unable to maintain the roles which are usual to gender in daily life. For instance, female farmers who are used to grow vegetables and sell them in the market, find themselves without the activity which allows them some control over their income; male farmers who do not have a plot of land where to grow staple food have no means to provide their wives with the prescribed daily maintenance. Pastoral women without camels are in trouble because their usual activity of distributing and selling milk is not possible any longer and young men are not ascribed their traditional responsibility of grazing cattle in the bush. In other words, most of the activities women and men of different ages perform daily are no longer possible.
61In the camps, both pastoral and agricultural people have no work and, almost literally, nothing to do during the day. For agriculturalists in 1994 there was not enough water to practice agriculture, and the few small gardens which had been set up by NGOs to produce vegetables could not be expanded because they consumed too much of the little water resources available in the camp. Traditional means of production for agriculturalists, such as the availability of fertile land to cultivate for both male and female farmers, were not forthcoming. Similarly, pastoral people had no way of maintaining their productive activities: most of the families had lost their camels and cows, and women no longer had goats. Even if all pastoral people had been provided with animals to raise, these activities would not have been sustainable because of obvious environmental constraints. There was neither sufficient water nor grass in the area for many big herds of camels, cattle or sheeps/goats.
* 24 As also reported in Gallagher & Forbes Martin (1992: 23).
62For the refugees, permanence in the camps means passing through a stage in which both men and women are deprived of the chance, albeit for insurmountable reasons, to maintain their productive roles. Such conditions put them in a rather weak position. In fact, the absence of productive roles in a refugee camp not only aggravates the lack of food and commodities that could be produced and then exchanged or sold: this absence also causes refugees to lose the daily life context in which their actions have some effects that they can control and to lose the sense that they can support themselves through their own work. In these terms, the very few productive activities in which Somalis could engage affected women and men equally, in terms of the control on their own lives. Although women continued to perform some of their “domestic” activities like cooking and taking care of the children24, it should not be underestimated that Somali women, both from a pastoral and an agricultural background, have always played an important role in productive activities as well. This role used to give them some control over the production of food for household consumption, as well as leverage in household decisions; cooking and distributing food that has been autonomously produced is different from doing the same with scarce rations, received from outside authorities. Such a feeling was epitomised by a common saying: “When we go back home we will not even be able to prepare tea for our own pleasure.”
63The change in the system of supplying goods for their survival created opportunities to renegotiate the control of provision and distribution channels; moreover, also provided a new arena for such renegotiation. This was because the control over resources, which was at the base of power dynamics within the group and between genders, no longer went through the same channels. Moreover, the new channels for distributing goods become arenas in which hopes for a future and survival are at stake.
64Individual and social dynamics were transformed by the arrival of convoys carrying food and non-food items for the supply of the camps. In 1994, the number of assaults and attacks on the camps by bandits increased on the days assigned to food distribution, when distribution vehicles were kidnapped and bandits attacked convoys transporting provisions. It was not only UNHCR that had to adopt measures to control and protect food provisions; each group of refugees and/or families also had to take particular care to defend their supplies. When provisions were available in the households, they had successfully avoided many chances of being stolen. The power wielded by distributors was magnified in relation to the powerlessness existing in the camps.
Distributing Benefits...
65It is precisely in the mechanisms for distributing benefits that outsiders, such as humanitarian and emergency aid agencies, become important and terribly potent in managing new sources of power, in predetermining opportunities and in offering capabilities (Sen 1994: 63-67, 1993: 86-87) to one individual in preference to another. Benefits do not only include goods needed for survival, such as food, housing and cooking material, but also other incentives, such as employment opportunities, which can change a refugee’s life forever.
66One case in point is illustrated by the story of a Zigula woman who had been a teacher and farmer when she lived in Somalia. I met her again after seven years in the Ifo camp where she was appointed as a social worker, because she knew how to read and write. Among Somali farmers this is a rather rare skill because, after literacy campaigns in the 1970’s, the level of education in rural areas was not been maintained; the woman had been educated by missionaries when she was a girl and had been chosen because she was an orphan. Between 1986 and 1988, in many villages of the Lower Juba district in Somalia the schools opened for just a few days due to the low salaries teachers received. As the school was opened only sporadically until the war broke out, the teacher had not practised her skills much in recent years; at the time, I almost doubted that she remembered how to read and write.
67After having escaped from Somalia where she had left her husband, however, and after having spent two years in the Ifo refugee camp together with her five children, she had undergone remarkable changes. She spoke much better Italian than she had six years previously in Somalia, was learning some English, and spoke Kiswahili as well. She was eager to find a way for her children to study, because she realised how important such skills had been for her survival after displacement. While working as a social worker, she had been sent to Tanzania for a short training course on bookkeeping and micro-credit for small enterprises; when I offered some money for the time she had spent accompanying me in the camp, she wanted me to show her a dollar bill, because she had never seen one before since mostly only trade men dealt with this currency. She considered whether she should ask me for Kenyan shillings or US dollars, and asked if dollars could be used anywhere in the world and if Kenyan shillings were valid in Europe. Moreover, being a social worker, she was in a key position to distribute commodities in the camp. Since it was she who made the lists of the families, she controlled how many items would be distributed to each person on distribution days.
68In other words, she used me as an informant since I had no vested interests in manipulating her and she took every opportunity to obtain new or better jobs. As a social worker, she was lucky to find herself in the right position to strategise in the distribution of commodities within the camp and, like other social workers, she played the game. She had been chosen as a social worker because she had the skills and was a single woman with children.
Micro-mechanisms of Empowerment and Disempowerment
69Simple and basic mechanisms like those described (new ethnic construction and job incentives) may appear small and rather irrelevant as compared to the need to solve problems as quickly as possible in the disrupted situation of a refugee camp. Some rationales for actions and choices are based upon the need for moving fast in order to solve problems. Other actions are justified as avoidance of problems connected with including women in the decision making process, whereas particular attention should be given to the effects of empowerment or disempowerment entailed in most actions taken.
* 25 See one for all Harrell-Bond (1986).
70Whatever the choices made, in fact, they carry long lasting consequences in the power relations between genders within a group. Many writers 25have highlighted the powerlessness that a camp’s life entails for male and female refugees. In this context of powerlessness, actions undertaken by those who manage the camps may have the strength to support or devalue certain groups or classes of people. Because people, women in this case, are in so powerless context do not complain nor find opportunities for resisting. The gravity of the situation, combined with the expectations created by the very recognition of a group of male elders by camp authorities could become strong enough reasons for female refugees not to complain about the lack of recognition of their role. This may be true especially for people like the Bantu who, after having been marginalised in their country for more than a century, are particularly pleased that outsiders have finally shown some trust in the group. Their desire for a future without war might be even stronger than for others, as well as their willingness to surrender their traditional power, if they can avoid the persecution they have undergone in the distant and recent past.
Tribal Labelling as a Way to Strengthen Patrilineal Hierarchies?
71In a refugee camp, therefore, people are categorised by “tribes”, not very differently from the way they were during colonial times, because of insufficient knowledge and for practical reasons on the part of camp authorities. The consequences of labelling, however, may differ according to historical contexts. In Somalia at the beginning of the century, the ethnic categorisation “Bantu” satisfied the need for singling out a class of agricultural labourers. There were no distinctions by gender and such categorisation served, during the Fascist rule in Somalia, to conscript people to forced labour and “Bantu” women to forced marriages and forced labour (Declich 1995b: 111-113). A question rises as to whether a tribal classification should imply supporting the authority of men over women or whether there can be different and more accurate patterns of actions.
72In a refugee camp, ethnic classifications seem to satisfy the need for defining beneficiaries of certain commodities (food and non-food items of humanitarian aid in this case), as well as for fostering an “equal” distribution of benefits. However, a tribal label may not meet the interests of all beneficiaries. Rather, humanitarian and international agencies may support or create a new hierarchy among people, through tribal classification, in order to be able to distribute benefits.
73*
74In conclusion, humanitarian aid systems act through organising and distributing commodities, food and shelter materials in camps. The benefits distributed (e.g. food, housing, etc.) become not just goods needed for survival, but potential opportunities for camp residents to renegotiate their power, within the camp. Power within the camp, however, may also mean power in the future, after the camp’s life.
75The situation of powerlessness which is created in a refugee camp endows the humanitarian aid system with considerable power over refugees’ lives. In such a context, refugees need recognition from the outside because one of the traditional systems of managing power, based on the control of the means of production, is no longer in their hands. Key positions of control in the distribution of commodities and decision making in the camp become sources of power. When these are held unequally by men and women, such positions already have an a priori influence over the future development of gender relationships within a group. Although people react differently to similar pressures based upon a variety of factors, such as their traditions, cultural background, and historical experience, processes in a refugee camp may favour certain groups and objectives over others. This is especially true with regards to new opportunities and benefits, etc., presented to men and women after displacement.
76Because people respond differently to similar options and opportunities, it is not possible to forecast with certainty subsequent cultural changes; it is important, however, to highlight the micro-dynamics which endow some people with authority and disempower others.
77* University of Urbino, Urbino, 1997.
If it was impossible to recruit a big enough group along patrilineal principles – whether due to the distance from other segments of one’s own clan, or to its limited demographic growth –
there was still the option of forming diya-paying groups with segments of other clans in the
same position, on a contractual basis. The principle of tol, of patrilineal descent, or the
segmentary lineage system, and, the principle of xeer (heer), the association by contract, were
the two recruitment mechanisms used to constitute the divisions of Somali society; divisions
which were internally peaceful, but tendentially aggressive towards outsiders. Xeer were
contracts between equals. Groups that were too small or weak to present themselves as
independent partners in a contractual arrangement could also enter into pseudo-kinshiprelations
with stronger groups. These relationships are called sheegat from the verb
sheeganaya, “I name”. In this case one names the forefathers of another group as one’s own,
that is, one subordinates oneself to it in terms of genealogy. In any event, one’s chances of
survival depend on support from a powerful group. This principle is aptly reflected in the
Somali motto, “either be a mountain, or else lean against one (Lewis 1961, 1962, 1972).
Cunning is a highly-valued cultural attribute among Somali. And it is regarded as highly
cunning to break a contractual agreement, whether it be based on xeer or on sheegat, at an
opportune moment. Like the stories of the Icelandic Vikings or of Byzantine court intrigues,
Somali history bristles with treachery and massacres of former protectors. The latter are
struck down and robbed of their women and herds the moment their dependents have grown
strong enough under their protection.23
23 Cf. e. g. Turnbull 1955: 2 et passim, Schlee 1989: 46f. That the Somali place cultural value on cunning, and
that a well-staged swindle is much admired, can be inferred from a series of folk tales collected by Muuse Haaji
Ismaa’iil Galaal, edited by B.W. Andrzejewski, (1956). Cf. e. g. no. 4, p. 33, which is reproduced here in my
own translation from the Somali:
Cousin, teach me cunning!
One day a man came to another. He said: “I would like you to teach me cunning.” The other replied: “Milk your
camel for me!” So the man milked his camel for him, and when he had drunk the milk, the one who had brought
the milk said: “And now, teach me cunning!” Whereupon the other said: “I’ve done that already. I’ve had your
milk, haven’t I?” The man’s mouth dropped open in surprise.
16
The ever-present threat of treachery restricted the growth of internally peaceful and
cooperative groups. The tendency of groups to become larger, thus reducing the individual’s
risks vis-à-vis dangers from the outside, was countered by suspicion of distant clan kin and
allies from other clans, which produced a tendency towards fission, and thus a reduction in
group size.
However, a series of factors caused the tendency towards unity to outweigh the tendency
towards division, and thus larger groups were formed. First of all, obviously, there was the
threat from outside. Then the skill of politically gifted personalities also contributed. While
simple Somalis often married within their own clans, and being relatives, were released from
paying part of the brideprice, leaders often contracted strategic marriages across clan
boundaries. Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, who defied several colonial powers at once
from 1900-1920, made extensive use of this mechanism.
Cali Geri(Dhulbhante)<-------------------------->Duduble(Hawiye)
Macalin Dhiblaawe(Abgaal) --------------------->Baaba Xasan (Shiiqal, Gendershe)
Macalin Dhiblaawe(Abgaal)<---------------------->Macalin Dhiblawe(Siwaqron)
Cawrmale(Warsangeli)<---------------------------Cawrmale(Gardhere,Samale)
Wagardhac(Mareexan)--------------------------->Qayad(Dhulbahante)
TagalaWaq(Ogaden)<------------------------------>Habarawal(Isaaq)
Leelkase(Xawaadle)<------------------------------Leelkase(Daarood)
Warsangeli (Harti Darod)<-------------------------Warsangeli(Harti, Abgal)
Sacad(Habargidir)---------------------------------Amuudaan(Ogaaden)
Cumar Dher(Habar Gidir)<------------------------>Mareexaan
and more
by the Invention of Somalia
Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by Ugaas Diini » 12 Feb 2007 02:59
[quote]Wagardhac(Mareexan)--------------------------->Qayad(Dhulbahante)[/quote]
What? Maxaa ka wadaa?
Ugaas Diini
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Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by RIIGHAYE » 12 Feb 2007 03:02
That is not me, I found it in the book called the Invention of Somalia
RIIGHAYE
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Location: When I recognize the special significance it has for African Americans and the special pride" McCain
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Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by Ugaas Diini » 12 Feb 2007 03:05
That dude is making up stuff. The only clans I ever heard of being from another clan is the sacad being ogaden. I heard about Cali geri being duduble too. But duduble are so far from Caligeri.
Ugaas Diini
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Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by RIIGHAYE » 12 Feb 2007 03:09
I was surprised when he made the connection btw the two Warsangelis. One is a subclan of Abgal and the other is a tribe. I was told that Garad hassan(Xamar Gale) fathered them.
I heard about the CaliGeri/Duduble thing but never believed it.
.
Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by Niya » 12 Feb 2007 03:11
Riighaye, check an article that recently was posted at Wardheer News site,regarding a review of "Daybreak is Near' authored by the guy who edited and contributed to the Invention of Somalia. The book should have been titled the Re-invention of Somalia and maybe published as fiction.
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Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by RIIGHAYE » 12 Feb 2007 03:23
Niya, he makes very absurd claims in the whole book. From my understanding, the whole intention of the book was to rewrite Somali history and discredit our oral and written beloved history. Jimcale, as an editor, compiles incoherent articles from less popular authors and they all seem to draw horns and intestinal fortitude in emphasizing fabrication. In his article, Daybreak is near, he writes that the scions of Ina Abdule Hassan wrote Somali history with the collaboratin of people in authority of the academic department of Somalia knows as Akademiya.
.
Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by DawladSade » 12 Feb 2007 03:25
somebody didnt read when they heard "popular folklore".
Qansa, this dhullo lady was once joking with my grandma about wagardhac being lost dhullo.
.
Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by KUN-DILE » 12 Feb 2007 03:56
"TagalaWaq(Ogaden)<------------------------------>Habarawal(Isaaq)"
What is he trying to say here? That Habarawal are lost Ogaden tribe? Who ever wrote this xaar was full of it.
.
Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by sadeboi » 12 Feb 2007 09:26
Wagardhac(Mareexan) is dhulbahante..
..very funny the only reason why some say that is because wagerdhac's mom was this dhulbahante lady..and the dhulbahantes say the lady was pregnate before she left....but the funny thing is..she is also the mother of a sub-clan of reer hassan..(wagerdhac uncle)..and she married that man first..and she is also the mother of talxe amaanreer (wagerdhacs brother)..so its just absurd that wagerdhac only "would be dhulbahante"
.
Re: Contraversies of Fission and fusion of Somali clans
by Sadaam_Mariixmaan » 14 Feb 2007 03:01
[quote="sadeboi"]Wagardhac(Mareexan) is dhulbahante..
..very funny the only reason why some say that is because wagerdhac's mom was this dhulbahante lady..and the dhulbahantes say the lady was pregnate before she left....but the funny thing is..she is also the mother of a sub-clan of reer hassan..(wagerdhac uncle)..and she married that man first..and she is also the mother of talxe amaanreer (wagerdhacs brother)..so its just absurd that wagerdhac only "would be dhulbahante" [/quote]
who Reer Yusuf?
.
Adoption, Patronage, Clientship and Occupational Castes in Somalia
Before I discuss the present day ethnic classifications and labels it is useful to go back to detailed studies describing some processes which brought agriculturalist settlers of the Juba and Shebeli Somali Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, etc.) to be progressively overwhelmed by pastoral populations arriving from northern areas and seeking accessible water points along the Rivers.
As inquired about in the second and third decade of the twentieth century and, later, diligently described, the struggle over the River access points and, to some extent, to rainfed cultivable lands, gave rise to repeated bloody clashes and violent fighting which resulted in different kinds of agreements between lineages and groups of people (Cerulli 1964: 78). The nature of such agreements have been described in terms of relationships of patronage, adoption and alliance (iskashaato); however, jural and actual nuances of these forms of interaction were a matter of negotiation and depended on the skills in public relations of the individuals, groups and communities involved, on the resources at stake and on the size of the groups involved.
Patronage in Somalia is a relation in which groups of people seek an agreement of mutual dependence although one becomes patron and the other a client. A patronage relationship, for instance, occurs when agriculturalists give to a certain lineage/clan of pastoral people exclusive rights to River access points close to their village; in exchange for such an exclusive license, the agriculturalists may receive an annual payment in animals and a permanent protection against the intrusion of other foreign shepherds who might not respect their cultivated fields while approaching the River access points. The relationship of the agriculturalists Makanne with the pastoralists Badi Caddo is said to have been of this kind, during the first decades of the twentieth century (ibid.: 84), as well as that of the agriculturalists Shidle with the pastoralists Mobileen (ibid.: 78). There are also relationships of patronage between pastoralists; for example, it is reported that scattered Somalis (Harti, Ogaadeen and Marrehaan) entered the lower Juba area as clients of the “Galla” (Oromo) people. Initially, the Somalis looked after the “Galla’s” animals. Thereafter, the Somalis’ number increased and they gained a foothold: revolted against their patrons and started controlling those lands (ibid.: 79).
Adoption between descent groups named “haliif” (in Arabic) or “arifa” (ibid.: 68), in a mangled Italianised way, was especially widespread among the Somalis Hawiye. This was an agreement through which the adopter (a clan, a lineage or one of the family of the lineage), under request, took complete responsibility for the protection of the adopted; the adopted (person or group), on the other hand, was to refrain from jeopardising the peace of the adopter group (ibid.: 67). Among the Hareyn—as possibly, in most cases of adoption—the adopted formally renounced to their birth place in terms of clan/lineage and promised to accompany the adopter’s clan/lineage in peace and war for ever (Lewis 1969: 66). This also entailed a partial or total transferral of blood compensation rights and duties from one’s original group to the adopter’s clan/lineage (ibid.: 67). The reciprocal obligations entailed by the agreement of adoption could cease for two reasons: when an adopted group migrated from the territory and when an adopted group became strong enough to constitute an autonomous ethnic unity, as recognised by the adopter. Of course, power conflicts would also determine the cessation of an adoption (Cerulli 1964: 73). The end of an adoption involved the clearing out of the territory previously granted for agriculture or other purposes by the adopter (ibid.: 67-68). From the adoption system arose several complicated issues in the consuetudinary law and examples of such are reported for the twenties (ibid.: 68, 70-75) and the sixties (Lewis 1969: 72-74). The institution could be used by a group for establishing itself in an area and, thereafter, claiming such territory permanently by force. Moreover, allegiance of an adopted lineage or family with its original clan could continue after many years of permanence in far away areas. When adopted people kept old allegiances with lineages/clans of enemies they became unpleasant and dangerous guests in case of conflicts. Finally, when governments banned the use of tribal criteria from the national legal system, adopted people could try to use their old relations of adoption in order to claim permanent rights over other clans’ cultivable lands 5again fostering conflicts. Yet, relations of adoption protected some agriculturalists before other regimes of land property were set up in Somalia. For instance, during the Siyaad Barre government, disregarding relations of adoption, tracts of land were expropriated for national purposes (i.e. setting up of state farms, etc.), taken from people who had less links with the lineages/clans of the governments’ members, mainly agriculturalist riverine peoples.
During the years, the interactions created through adoption and patronage, fostered certain pastoral people to convert themselves to good farmers by occupying more and more arable land. Along the Shebeli River, Cerulli mentions some such people as: the Hillibi, the Daacud of the Balad area, the Mobileen, the Molkal, the Badi Caddo (Cerulli 1964: 83). Yet, some Somali pastoral groups were adopted in villages of riverine people; for instance, in the Shidle village of Shanloo, along the Shebeli, lived families of Somali Wacesla (ibid.: 82) and in the Zigula village of Mugambo, along the Juba, lived families of Somalis who spoke the Bantu language kizigula.
Therefore, despite the general understanding of what is Somali society, there have been very complex ethnic interactions among pastoralists and agriculturalists in the last centuries; it would be difficult to keep track of all such interactions. These involved the concession of temporary rights over the use of land and territory, but did not necessarily entail that the adopted people (agriculturalists or pastoralists) were the losers (ibid.: 84). In fact, especially before colonial times, a patron/client relationship was one of mutual support in different economic activities or for the control of a territory rather than one of domination of a group over another. Until the present time a “distinction is made between those born into a clan and those who have become members by adoption” (Helander 1988: 133). However, case studies from the Hubeer (ibid.: 43) and the Hareyn (Lewis 1969: 68) show that in many cases those who have been adopted outnumber the others.
Adoptions also involved people of those occupational castes considered inferior to the others. An analysis made by Cerulli (1964: 90) points out at low castes people, as descendants of those subdued during the successive invasions of the Horn of Africa in the last centuries. No conqueror completely destroyed the enemy nor was free from contacts and intermarriages with the defeated people. This occurred even though the latter were put in an inferior jural condition (ibid.: 88). Several different kinds of groups have been assimilated to such low castes on the base of their jural inferior situation; such groups have included corporation of people practising special jobs considered vile and suspect, such as blacksmiths, wood workers, potters, tanners, magicians, shoe makers, hunters and gatherers and sometimes fishermen. Therefore, according to Cerulli, people belonging to low castes share similarities in development and historical formation rather than linguistic, cultural or geographic origins (id. 1959: 113). The names of the most well known low castes in Somalia are Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc. The names are not accurate if seen as referring to specific lineages or occupations, rather, the way people from different occupational castes are named is positional. It depends much on the geographic area of the Somali country where they live and the lineage membership of those who speak about them. For instance, at the beginning of the 1920, there were blacksmiths Tumal in Mogadishu who considered themselves as poor descendants of the Ajuraan 6(id. 1964: 91-92) and blacksmiths called Gacansibir among the Marrehaan of the Juba; yet, Muusa Deryo among the Rahanwiin were potters and blacksmiths unlike the Muusa Deryo of the Habar Awal (id. 1959: 101-113). Hunters and gatherers along the Juba River in 1985 were called Bon by both Shanbara and Zigula and only very few intermarriages would occur. Nevertheless, Shanbara reported that at the beginning of their settlement in the Gosha area a group of men abducted women from a village of the Bon people and married them7.
A common characteristic of the occupational castes is that they have established long term patron/client relationships with one of the predominant lineage in the area where they live. Such relationship entails consuetudinary agreements with the patrons as regards payment of bloodwealth, dispute resolution and marriage rules which vary from group to group. Basically, because their specialised work is necessary in any lineage, people from such castes usually have long term relations of adoption with stronger clans. Moreover, they are not in a large number nor have strength enough to defend themselves alone. As adopted people, low castes cannot take political initiatives but enjoy some sort of protection depending on the lineage/clan of their patrons8. In the past, low caste people and slaves held different legal status (Cerulli 1959: 19-29) which varied according to lineages and geographical areas. Often was recognised a real blood compensation for the death of low caste people (id. 1964: 72). It is impossible to dwell on the analysis of all such jural differences as regards people scattered in so many different areas of Somalia. It would be enough to say that, despite conspicuous differences within their legal status at the beginning of the twentieth century, low castes, freed slaves and slaves were held an unequal and inferior jural condition as compared to those considered ethnic Somali.
During the twentieth century this local system of distinction and social stratification, initially based on a need for regulating access to natural resources as well as for managing specialisation of occupations, has been modified and divisions have been stressed as well as reinforced to fit within different ruling systems.
Francesca Declich
Fostering Ethnic Reinvention
Artificial or fictive kinship refers to customs in which a person is given kin status by attribution rather than by birth. The prime example is ADOPTION. In another type of pseudo-kinship, called figurative usage, kinship terms are extended to non-kin in order to stress an aspect of the person's role that is similar to that of a kinsperson. Children are taught, for example, to call a close female friend of their parents "aunt" because she plays an avuncular role. Ritual kinship, a third type of pseudo-kinship, entails a formalized relationship that is similar to but distinct from actual kinship, such as bloodbrotherhood and ritual coparenthood, or compadrazgo, a kind of mutual cogodparenthood.
James Lowell Gibbs, Jr.
Brainwashing is the process of deliberately subjecting individuals to physical and psychological hardship in order to alter their thoughts, attitudes, and actions. It differs from other forms of persuasion or instruction, not only in the key element of coercion but in the radical intent to clear the mind totally of one set of ideas and replace them by another, often completely opposed set. The term indoctrination is applied to the implanting of new ideas, but indoctrination may take place without brainwashing.
The term brainwashing is a literal translation of the Chinese: xi nao, referring to thought reform. When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they sought to reeducate the intellectuals and middle classes by brainwashing techniques; they applied the same methods to prisoners taken during the KOREAN WAR. Similar efforts to control the minds of individuals have been made by authorities in other countries.
The two aspects of brainwashing are confession of past crimes or errors, and reeducation to new beliefs. Prisoners are brought to confess by lack of sleep and food and other forms of intense physical discomfort, isolation from familiar surroundings, a prison routine requiring absolute obedience and humility, and social pressure from cell mates. The last includes mutual criticism and self-criticism sessions, which play particularly on the generalized guilt feeling that all people have to some extent. At the same time regular indoctrination sessions are conducted. The acceptance of the new ideas is again fostered by group pressure and the anticipated reward of freedom.
Improved understanding of psychology and neurophysiology have enabled modern totalitarian regimes to create extremely effective brainwashing programs. Some of their techniques, however, have been used for centuries; the INQUISITION, for example, elicited confessions from alleged heretics by similar methods. In the context of religion, some scholars have noted a parallel between brainwashing for political purposes and the techniques used by some religious groups to generate religious excitement and conversion. The parallel is observable in religions that use physical means (such as scourging, rhythmic dancing and drumming, and sometimes drugs) to induce a trancelike state in which the individual is open to conversion. It is also apparent in the mind-control practices of some of the RELIGIOUS CULTS of the 20th century, most notably the People's Temple group of Guyana, whose membership committed mass suicide in 1978.
Bibliography: Bromley, D. G., and Richardson, J. T., eds., The Brainwashing-Deprogramming Controversy (1984); Sargant, William, Battle for the Mind (1957, repr. 1971); Schein, Edgar H., et al., Coercive Persuasion (1971).
Fictive kinship
Fictive kinship is the process of giving someone a kinship title and treating them in many ways as if they had the actual kinship relationship implied by the title. People with this relationship are known as fictive kin. Fictive kinship is also known as relatedness.
Fictive kinship is seen by most current anthropologists as working alongside (or within) but not replacing traditional kinship. Kinship is the most basic principle of organizing individuals into social groups, roles, and categories. ...
Janet Carsten developed the idea of "relatedness" in response to David M. Schneider's 1984 work on Symbolic Kinship (A Critique of The Study of Kinship). Carsten developed her initial ideas from studies with the Malays in looking at what was socialized and biological. Here she uses the idea of relatedness to move away from a pre-constructed analytics opposition which exists in anthropological thought between the biological and the social (1995, The substance of kinship and the heat of the hearth; feeding, personhood and relatedness among the Malays in Pulau Langkawi, American Ethnologist). Carsten argued that relatedness should be described in terms of indigenous statements and practices, some of which fall outside what anthropologists have conventionally understood as kinship (Cultures of Relatedness, 2000).
A noted Gurung tradition is the institution of "Rodi" where teenagers form fictive kinship bonds and become Rodi members to socialize, perform communal tasks, and find marriage partners. Selected ethnic groups of Nepal; Bhotia, Sherpa, Thakali Gurung Kiranti, Rai, Limbu Newari Pahari Tamang The Gurung is an ethnic group from the Central region of Nepal. ...
In Western culture, a person may refer to close friends of one's parents as "aunt" or "uncle" (and their children as "cousin"), or may refer to close friends as "brother" or "sister". In particular, college fraternities and sororities usually use "brother" and "sister" to refer to members of the organization. For this articles equivalent regarding the East, see Eastern culture. ...
The term has such a broad usage as to suggest that it might be spurious. Compadrazgo, common membership in a unilineal descent group, and legal adoption are among the phenomena which are described as examples of fictive kinship. An alternative standpoint would be that "either you're related or you aren't". The modern Latin American ritual of friendship. ... For other uses, see Adoption (disambiguation). ...
Fictive kinship was discussed by Jenny White in her work on female migrant workers in Istanbul (Money Makes Us Relatives, 1995). In her work she draws on ideas of production and the women she works with being drawn together through 'webs of indebtedness' through which the women refer to each other as kin. Istanbul (Turkish: , Greek: , historically Byzantium and later Constantinople; see other names) is Turkeys most populous city, and its cultural and financial center. ...
Carsten, Janet, ed. (2000). Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521656273.
Carsten, Janet (May, 1995). "The Substance of Kinship and the Heat of the Hearth: Feeding, Personhood, and Relatedness among Malays in Pulau Langkawi". American Ethnologist 22 (2): 223-241.
Schneider, David M. (1984). A Critique of the Study of Kinship. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press. OCLC 10605668.
White, Jenny B. (2004). Money Makes Us Relatives: Women's Labor in Urban Turkey, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge. ISBN 0203240421.
See also
resulted in different kinds of agreements between lineages and groups of people (Cerulli 1964: 78). The nature of such agreements have been described in terms of relationships of patronage, adoption and alliance (iskashaato); however, jural and actual nuances of these forms of interaction were a matter of negotiation and depended on the skills in public relations of the individuals, groups and communities involved, on the resources at stake and on the size of the groups involved.
Patronage in Somalia is a relation in which groups of people seek an agreement of mutual dependence although one becomes patron and the other a client. A patronage relationship, for instance, occurs when agriculturalists give to a certain lineage/clan of pastoral people exclusive rights to River access points close to their village; in exchange for such an exclusive license, the agriculturalists may receive an annual payment in animals and a permanent protection against the intrusion of other foreign shepherds who might not respect their cultivated fields while approaching the River access points. The relationship of the agriculturalists Makanne with the pastoralists Badi Caddo is said to have been of this kind, during the first decades of the twentieth century (ibid.: 84), as well as that of the agriculturalists Shidle with the pastoralists Mobileen (ibid.: 78). There are also relationships of patronage between pastoralists; for example, it is reported that scattered Somalis (Harti, Ogaadeen and Marrehaan) entered the lower Juba area as clients of the “Galla” (Oromo) people. Initially, the Somalis looked after the “Galla’s” animals. Thereafter, the Somalis’ number increased and they gained a foothold: revolted against their patrons and started controlling those lands (ibid.: 79).
Francesca Declich
Fostering Ethnic Reinvention
WAA DOOD INTERNETKA Ah
WACEYSLE WAA CALI-GAAF, DHIBLAAWE & ISKAASHATO!
August 26 2002 at 12:35 PM
No score for this post Nin dhashay (no login)
________________________________________
Xaqii ayaa daahiray, waa la is-xasuuqay, waa la kala dhintay, waxaa soo baxday in ninkii ugu faan badnaa uu dadka ugu liito. Waceysle wuxuu u qeybsamay 3 xoog oo isku mid ah, tiro iyo tayaba, waxeyna kala yihiin:
1- CALI-GAAF: (Waceys, Caddaan, Yabar Muuse iyo Yabadhaalo)
2- DHIBLAAWE: (Eybakar-gaab, Maxaa-cadde, Cabdi Macallin iyo Cismaan Macallin)
3ISKAASHATO: (Haarun, Cabdiraxmaan, Dhegaweyne, Absuge iyo Faqay-Cumar)
Tan waxaa na tusay dagaalkii Masagawaay, waa buray beenti iyo faanki, ciddii xoog yar tabarteeda ayaa reebeysa, ciddi aan dhalanna cuqdo ayaa reebeysa.
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Balcad-yare
(no login) Re: WACEYSLE WAA CALI-GAAF, DHIBLAAWE & ISKAASHATO!
No score for this post August 26 2002, 12:44 PM
Waa dhambaalkii ugu xaqiiqsanaa ee aan ka aqristo Somalitalk
Mahadsanid walaal.
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Muhamad
(no login) maxaa isku diray Horta?taas ma isweydiiseen?
No score for this post August 26 2002, 4:39 PM
waxaan umaleynayaa in abgaal xaalkiisu yahay kan Puntland iyo reer baydhabo oo kale afar tuug baa kala gatay oo iyagii isku laayey,ilaa aad inta jaajuus ah oo dad kale kabo qaad u ah laga baabiinaayo arrinta abgaal,puntland iyo Baydhabo sidaas bay ahaan, iyaga ayaaana is dilin dhexdooda..dagaalka ka dhacaya masagawaa in mashquul lagu noqdo runtii ma ah ee waa in lagu mashquulo sidii uu u yimid oo wax laga qabtaa taas.
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Anonymous
(no login) Abgaal dhibaato ka bixi maayo illaa wacalka Dhiblaawe iska saaro.
No score for this post August 27 2002, 2:26 PM
Ma jiraan wax dhibaatooyin ah oo ka dhex aloosan Abgaal. Waa niman gob ah, oo laan-dheere, uguna tiro iyo tayo badan Hawiyaha. Ma jirto cid uu ku gardarroonayo ama dhulkiisa ku duulayo, wuxuuna mudan yahay inuu soomaali hoggaamiyo, hase yeeshee taasi dhici meyso ilaa uu iska saaro wacalkaas Dhiblaawe ah, ee aan marnaba oggoleyn inuu Abgaal wax noqdo.
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gobta macalin dhiblaawe
(no login) Re: Abgaal dhibaato ka bixi maayo illaa wacalka Dhiblaawe iska saaro.
No score for this post September 7 2002, 7:15 AM
ninkii laga xooga badansho ayaa ceytamo ileena wax aad isku heysaan ma jirto ilaa gobta macalin dhiblaawe. waligiina waa leydan goomeysan lahaa iyaga laantooda. nin is faansho waa waa ri is noogtay hadii aad wax isku heyso ninka la dhaho ceel qooxa maant tagtida goobta lagaga baahan yahay dagaalka halkaan looguma baahna.
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Abdirashid farah
(no login) Abgaal wacal iyo wax u dhaw ma qabo ninkii wacal ku tilmaamayCabdi malin asgaa wacal ah
No score for this post September 24 2002, 9:35 AM
Nin intaan tuug dhihin ayuu tuug ku yiraahd
marka waxaa dhab ah in aad tahy wacalk dhabta aad shegayso.
abgal wacal iyo wax u dhaw ma qabee waxaa tahay kuwii caansir haa ee xamar ka soo cararay.
wax aan ku dhih lahay ninkii ceerta cabaa caydaad yaqaan.
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Sahal
(no login) DHIBLAAWE HADDAADAN WACAL AHEYN SOO ABTIRSO
No score for this post September 30 2002, 12:32 PM
Dhiblaawe inuu wacal yahay waxaa u daliil ah wuxuu markasta ka shaqeeyaa ruufiyaannimo iyo lug-gooyo Abgaal. Tii ugu dambeysay waxey aheyd isagoo Carta soo dejiyay Hotel Towfiiq, haddii uusan Abgaal ka baqi laheynna suuq-bacaad iyo Kaaraan ayuuba keeni lahaa. Waa su'aale goormey wacalladu gob noqdeen? Xooggase xaggeed ka keentay hal tuulo oo Masagawaay la yiraahdo oo aad weerartay ayaad qabsan weyday 60 mooryaanna waa lagaa dilay ayagoo sii ordaya. Awalba waxaa kuu dagaallami jiray Abgaal kale, sida Haarun Waceysle, Faqay Cumar Waceysle, Sahal-Wacbuudhan iyo kuwo la mid ah.
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Anonymous
(no login) Re: DHIBLAAWE HADDAADAN WACAL AHEYN SOO ABTIRSO
No score for this post October 9 2002, 6:09 AM
Wax kaloon idiin sheego ma aqaan,laakiin waxaa muuqata in Abgaal cisman furihii xikmadu ceel dheer uga dhacay oo ay iska daba wareegayaan sidii wax sixran.
Hada hadaad wacayslow is kala gur gurto ood ku dadaasho inaad qaarkiin banaanka usaarto maxaad helaysaa waa yaabe!
Dad miyiga ku dagaalamay oo adinka idinkaga baahan inaad kala celisaan ha ukala hiilina,waxna yaysan idinla noqon hadaad dad tihiin!
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Anonymous
(no login) aniga dhaqaal dhag udhigimaa'h
No score for this post October 22 2002, 4:39 PM
umada somalia aad iyo aad bey u taqaan maclin dhib laawe adigana aad baad utaqaan oo waad ku abtirsan jirtay oo waa lagu yaqaan dhaqaalka reerka baad tahay
markahadii aad rabtid in aad kabaxdo daqaalkii waad kabixi kartaa laakiin kuu ma ogolaan dono in aad dib ugusoo noqoto wadna lasocotaa in hada kahor dhaqaal kii horay ufalaagowey kadibna soo labtay yirina gob waa gobteedii gaboyna waa geed keedii
si ay taa kuugu dhin waa in aad
tadkii aad dhaqaalka u aheed cudur daar u fidisaa
hadii kale mid ogow ilaah baa mahad iyo shugri lahaaday
in ay maclin dhiblaawe marna ogeen in aad jito iyo in kale balse adaa tabi doono marka ceyrta ay kusiin jireen ay joo jiyaan
mida kale hadii aad is leedahay intarneedka wax kunoqo ama ciil iyo cloolyowga ku haysto siga baabi
laf cad ayaad toobin ku haysaa
maclin dhiblawe waa jibka ugu badan waceysle
magac waceslana waa iyaga ciidana waa horyaal oo masheygalaan waalawada ogsoonyahay waana dadabeecad wanag lagu sifeeyay waa dad nabada jecel niman goobta
colaadeed gadaal aan fiirin waaniman cuqaal iyo culumo
isugu jira
marka wiilow ma waxaad dooneysaa inaad intarnedka
aad naga barto maclin dhib lawe waa wacl ama waa dad
aan la aqoon
hadii aan kuu sheego maclin dhiblaawe waxaa ku dhexnool qabiil kasta oo soomaliyeed [10]fac iyo in ka badan anigan kula hadlayo ayaa kamid ah aslkeyga waxaan kasoo jeedaa [darood]/[majeerteen] waligey kaab-kaab wax aan wanaag ahayn oo laynalagu dhaqmay majiraan
walina dad keygii wuu katirsan yahay qomiyadaha ku dhxnool [macalin-dhiblawe]wana ku faraxsanahay in aan ku dhaxnoolado anaga kalia maa hee waxaa kudhe nool
ciidaa in ka badan oo[haweye,iyo darood ba leh]
mana ku qasbaan in ay iyaga sheegtaan
balse waxey ka caaweyaan dhaqaale iyo daafacaadooda
dadnimo
marka waxaan rabaa wiilkani iyo kuwa kale oo macalin-magac xumaada ladoonayo waxkama tari kartaan dad diin iyo toliyo aliba aqli iyo dhaqaale kaa badan
jawaabta waa maya waqtiga ku xisaab tan
hadii kale reerkiina kasoo rar ceeldheer
ee ku biiri kuwa aad isleedahay macalin dhiblaawe wey ka dhaqan wanaag san yihiin ogwna [gob-waa-gob teedii gaboyna waa geed keedii]
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Anonymous
(no login) Re: aniga dhaqaal dhag udhigimaa'h
Score 5.0 (1 person) October 23 2002, 2:30 AM
Waxan ka codsanayaa dadka maamulo Websidkan in laga joojiyo waxa qiimaha yar ee ay qorayaan dadka ka hadlayaan arinta Wacaysle, dagaal waa dhacaa waana kii dhamado, arintaas waa laga heshiiyey wana dad walaalo ah waxa dagalamay, fadlan u sheega wiilasha wax soo qorayaan oo ku nool dalal nafaqaysan in ay dadkooda u turaan oo u raadiyaan wax horumar ah, waxay ka hadlayaan waa wax laga xishoodo oo aan waxba u taraynin dadkooda, xaqliga ha taliyo
Flexibility and fluctuation are key words when one tries to understand the
clan system. Catherine Besteman indicates this in her controversial examination
of the processes in which individuals changed places between lineages or
changed affiliation within the lineage. One may gain a formal affiliation through
a process called sheegad. The clan elders determine the conditions of acceptance,
The Journal of Conflict Studies
59
usually consisting of some kind of payment in kind, such as livestock. After making
such payment, the individual gains access to physical and financial protection
by their new clan family.12 Her study focused on Juba valley, the area with
perhaps the most flexible clan structures in Somalia; nevertheless she and other
researchers also stress this flexibility for the whole of Somalia.13 The alliances
within all the Somali lineages have been notoriously unstable during the last 12
years and intra-clan fighting, often with one group of a clan allied to another faction
from a different clan, was and still is common.14
Adoption, Patronage, Clientship and Occupational Castes in Somalia
9Before I discuss the present day ethnic classifications and labels it is useful to go back to detailed studies describing some processes which brought agriculturalist settlers of the Juba and Shebeli Somali Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, etc.) to be progressively overwhelmed by pastoral populations arriving from northern areas and seeking accessible water points along the Rivers.
10As inquired about in the second and third decade of the twentieth century and, later, diligently described, the struggle over the River access points and, to some extent, to rainfed cultivable lands, gave rise to repeated bloody clashes and violent fighting which resulted in different kinds of agreements between lineages and groups of people (Cerulli 1964: 78). The nature of such agreements have been described in terms of relationships of patronage, adoption and alliance (iskashaato); however, jural and actual nuances of these forms of interaction were a matter of negotiation and depended on the skills in public relations of the individuals, groups and communities involved, on the resources at stake and on the size of the groups involved.
11Patronage in Somalia is a relation in which groups of people seek an agreement of mutual dependence although one becomes patron and the other a client. A patronage relationship, for instance, occurs when agriculturalists give to a certain lineage/clan of pastoral people exclusive rights to River access points close to their village; in exchange for such an exclusive license, the agriculturalists may receive an annual payment in animals and a permanent protection against the intrusion of other foreign shepherds who might not respect their cultivated fields while approaching the River access points. The relationship of the agriculturalists Makanne with the pastoralists Badi Caddo is said to have been of this kind, during the first decades of the twentieth century (ibid.: 84), as well as that of the agriculturalists Shidle with the pastoralists Mobileen (ibid.: 78). There are also relationships of patronage between pastoralists; for example, it is reported that scattered Somalis (Harti, Ogaadeen and Marrehaan) entered the lower Juba area as clients of the “Galla” (Oromo) people. Initially, the Somalis looked after the “Galla’s” animals. Thereafter, the Somalis’ number increased and they gained a foothold: revolted against their patrons and started controlling those lands (ibid.: 79).
* 5 See the case reported in Lewis (1969: 72-74), although the case is mentioned to argue another point (...)
12Adoption between descent groups named “haliif” (in Arabic) or “arifa” (ibid.: 68), in a mangled Italianised way, was especially widespread among the Somalis Hawiye. This was an agreement through which the adopter (a clan, a lineage or one of the family of the lineage), under request, took complete responsibility for the protection of the adopted; the adopted (person or group), on the other hand, was to refrain from jeopardising the peace of the adopter group (ibid.: 67). Among the Hareyn—as possibly, in most cases of adoption—the adopted formally renounced to their birth place in terms of clan/lineage and promised to accompany the adopter’s clan/lineage in peace and war for ever (Lewis 1969: 66). This also entailed a partial or total transferral of blood compensation rights and duties from one’s original group to the adopter’s clan/lineage (ibid.: 67). The reciprocal obligations entailed by the agreement of adoption could cease for two reasons: when an adopted group migrated from the territory and when an adopted group became strong enough to constitute an autonomous ethnic unity, as recognised by the adopter. Of course, power conflicts would also determine the cessation of an adoption (Cerulli 1964: 73). The end of an adoption involved the clearing out of the territory previously granted for agriculture or other purposes by the adopter (ibid.: 67-68). From the adoption system arose several complicated issues in the consuetudinary law and examples of such are reported for the twenties (ibid.: 68, 70-75) and the sixties (Lewis 1969: 72-74). The institution could be used by a group for establishing itself in an area and, thereafter, claiming such territory permanently by force. Moreover, allegiance of an adopted lineage or family with its original clan could continue after many years of permanence in far away areas. When adopted people kept old allegiances with lineages/clans of enemies they became unpleasant and dangerous guests in case of conflicts. Finally, when governments banned the use of tribal criteria from the national legal system, adopted people could try to use their old relations of adoption in order to claim permanent rights over other clans’ cultivable lands 5again fostering conflicts. Yet, relations of adoption protected some agriculturalists before other regimes of land property were set up in Somalia. For instance, during the Siyaad Barre government, disregarding relations of adoption, tracts of land were expropriated for national purposes (i.e. setting up of state farms, etc.), taken from people who had less links with the lineages/clans of the governments’ members, mainly agriculturalist riverine peoples.
13During the years, the interactions created through adoption and patronage, fostered certain pastoral people to convert themselves to good farmers by occupying more and more arable land. Along the Shebeli River, Cerulli mentions some such people as: the Hillibi, the Daacud of the Balad area, the Mobileen, the Molkal, the Badi Caddo (Cerulli 1964: 83). Yet, some Somali pastoral groups were adopted in villages of riverine people; for instance, in the Shidle village of Shanloo, along the Shebeli, lived families of Somali Wacesla (ibid.: 82) and in the Zigula village of Mugambo, along the Juba, lived families of Somalis who spoke the Bantu language kizigula.
14Therefore, despite the general understanding of what is Somali society, there have been very complex ethnic interactions among pastoralists and agriculturalists in the last centuries; it would be difficult to keep track of all such interactions. These involved the concession of temporary rights over the use of land and territory, but did not necessarily entail that the adopted people (agriculturalists or pastoralists) were the losers (ibid.: 84). In fact, especially before colonial times, a patron/client relationship was one of mutual support in different economic activities or for the control of a territory rather than one of domination of a group over another. Until the present time a “distinction is made between those born into a clan and those who have become members by adoption” (Helander 1988: 133). However, case studies from the Hubeer (ibid.: 43) and the Hareyn (Lewis 1969: 68) show that in many cases those who have been adopted outnumber the others.
* 6 The Ajuraan were patrons of the Shebeli valley North of Mogadishu.
* 7 Fieldnotes, 1985.
15Adoptions also involved people of those occupational castes considered inferior to the others. An analysis made by Cerulli (1964: 90) points out at low castes people, as descendants of those subdued during the successive invasions of the Horn of Africa in the last centuries. No conqueror completely destroyed the enemy nor was free from contacts and intermarriages with the defeated people. This occurred even though the latter were put in an inferior jural condition (ibid.: 88). Several different kinds of groups have been assimilated to such low castes on the base of their jural inferior situation; such groups have included corporation of people practising special jobs considered vile and suspect, such as blacksmiths, wood workers, potters, tanners, magicians, shoe makers, hunters and gatherers and sometimes fishermen. Therefore, according to Cerulli, people belonging to low castes share similarities in development and historical formation rather than linguistic, cultural or geographic origins (id. 1959: 113). The names of the most well known low castes in Somalia are Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc. The names are not accurate if seen as referring to specific lineages or occupations, rather, the way people from different occupational castes are named is positional. It depends much on the geographic area of the Somali country where they live and the lineage membership of those who speak about them. For instance, at the beginning of the 1920, there were blacksmiths Tumal in Mogadishu who considered themselves as poor descendants of the Ajuraan 6(id. 1964: 91-92) and blacksmiths called Gacansibir among the Marrehaan of the Juba; yet, Muusa Deryo among the Rahanwiin were potters and blacksmiths unlike the Muusa Deryo of the Habar Awal (id. 1959: 101-113). Hunters and gatherers along the Juba River in 1985 were called Bon by both Shanbara and Zigula and only very few intermarriages would occur. Nevertheless, Shanbara reported that at the beginning of their settlement in the Gosha area a group of men abducted women from a village of the Bon people and married them7.
* 8 Cerulli gives some information about the jural status of such castes among the Majeerteen (1959: 24 (...)
16A common characteristic of the occupational castes is that they have established long term patron/client relationships with one of the predominant lineage in the area where they live. Such relationship entails consuetudinary agreements with the patrons as regards payment of bloodwealth, dispute resolution and marriage rules which vary from group to group. Basically, because their specialised work is necessary in any lineage, people from such castes usually have long term relations of adoption with stronger clans. Moreover, they are not in a large number nor have strength enough to defend themselves alone. As adopted people, low castes cannot take political initiatives but enjoy some sort of protection depending on the lineage/clan of their patrons8. In the past, low caste people and slaves held different legal status (Cerulli 1959: 19-29) which varied according to lineages and geographical areas. Often was recognised a real blood compensation for the death of low caste people (id. 1964: 72). It is impossible to dwell on the analysis of all such jural differences as regards people scattered in so many different areas of Somalia. It would be enough to say that, despite conspicuous differences within their legal status at the beginning of the twentieth century, low castes, freed slaves and slaves were held an unequal and inferior jural condition as compared to those considered ethnic Somali.
17During the twentieth century this local system of distinction and social stratification, initially based on a need for regulating access to natural resources as well as for managing specialisation of occupations, has been modified and divisions have been stressed as well as reinforced to fit within different ruling systems.
Rationale for Labelling: Past and Present
18Following the substantial flow of refugees since the end of 1990, for the first time the international community appeared to became aware of the existence of Bantu among the Somalis. However, in the history of Somalia, this sort of ethnic category had been used by colonialists for political purposes joining together all those Somali people who were skilled in farming or in other practical works (people belonging to the occupational castes). Such categorisation reflected and certainly emphasised an existing local ideology which considers all agriculturalists of the Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, Shanbara, Zigula, Gosha9, Mushunguli10, etc.) together with occupational castes (Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc.) inferior groups as compared to pastoralists. Disregard of both kind of people was part of the ideology which magnified the image of pastoral nomads. Among pastoralists could be found the bilis, i.e. “nobles” and among agriculturalists the “slaves” or “ex-slaves”.
* 9 The name Gosha points out at all riverine people of the Juba River.
* 10 Mushunguli is a mangled name for mzigula, i.e. person belonging to the Zigula people; the term has (...)
* 11 Such argument is supported in all three Cerulli’s volumes titled Somalia (1957; 1959; 1964). Howeve (...)
19In the first decades of the twentieth century the Italian colonialists reinforced such an ideology by mistakenly emphasising the pastoralists power over supposedly ex-slaves. The fact that Cerulli puts forward a great deal of evidence against the very inaccuracy of calling “liberti”, i.e. freed slaves, the whole “negro” populations of the Shebeli and Juba Rivers corroborates the argument. It seems that the diplomat was opposing a very common view among colonial officers of the times11.
* 12 In Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana, 73, 1910 (English translation of the author).
20Despite internal divisions and distinctions, at the beginning of this century Italian colonialists paid special attention to the descendants from slaves for their skill in farming. The following paragraph illustrates how this characterisation was linked to the problem of recruiting agricultural manpower: “Hand power in the Benadir is scarce for a complex series of reasons of a moral, economic and demographic kind: [. . .]overall there is a natural slothfulness of pure Somalis towards work in the fields: only slaves and freed slaves practice this dishonourable activity; it is only among them that we gather the small amount of manpower which is available.” 12
21The categorisation of these people according to economic activities, which was drawn in a local existing distinction, was consistent with the viewpoint of the Europeans of the colony. This consonance resulted in the reinforcement of divisions among people because Italians needed farmers for agriculture in the colony. All free people who farmed by tradition, whether slaves or ex-slaves or agriculturalists who had always been free, were basically included into the same category.
22Later, from 1925 to the end of Fascist Rule in Somalia determined in 1941 by the upwind of the British Military Administration, Italians continued to base ethnic categorisations on economic activities, in order to “recruit” people into forced labour to apparently build public infrastructures (Serrazanetti 1933: 20) and work on farms (Del Boca 1992: 203).
23Although they knew that many different lineages and group identities existed among the riverine agriculturalists, Italians did not hesitate to lump them all together into a unique whole of those who could be of some use as forced manpower. An informant imitated an Italian scolding Gosha farmers who attempted to escape conscription with the following words: “I do not accept your saying ‘I am a Mushunguli’, ‘I am a Bartire’, ‘I am a Shabelle’, ‘I am a Cawlyahan’, ‘I am a Marexan’. These do not exist for you. You are lying. You are all Mushunguli Mayasid [Bantu]. You have to participate [in forced labour]” (Besteman 1994: 52).
* 13 Nowadays, people who act this way are called in Somali shegato. This term in Somalia is also used t (...)
24In reality, for the farmers who live along the Rivers in Somalia, claiming membership in a Somali lineage, such as Marrehaan, Cawliyahan, Bartire, etc., can mean two different things: belonging to a group which is under a relation of adoption, patronage or alliance with a certain Somali lineage/ clan or descending from ancestors who had been slaves of people from that lineage. In fact, people might call themselves with the name of their masters; this was, for example, the case of those who had been taken as slaves when they were children, because they did not know their original family names13. In the first instance, the claim can aim at defending one’s rights as people protected by a Somali lineage/clan because in some sort of alliance with it or because descendants of ex-slaves of such lineage/clan. On the other hand, for those Zigula who had obtained their freedom in the territory of the Juba River by winning the war over the Ogaadeen at the turn of the century, the claim of being a Mushunguli (a mangled way of saying Mzigula, i.e. Zigula person) could be part of a strategy to obtain the same rights as “pure Somalis” who were not forced to work in the Italian farms. In other words, claiming a Mushunguli identity might aim at enabling supposedly slave descendants to claim the same status as descendants from free people, like the “pure Somalis”. Under such claim lies the very criteria that authority and dominant position of a group could be based on the autonomous control of a territory by a group and not on the status of people by descent. Finally, the very fact that people claimed such alliances in front of the Italian officer suggests that conscription to forced labour was organised by stressing traditional criteria of alliance and authority; the Somalis with pastoral origins were co-opted in subduing to such labour people with agriculturalist origins.
25Unfortunately, the nature of slavery in Somalia at the turn of the century has not been studied in depth as yet; however, scattered information suggests that mobility among social strata followed criteria nowadays imponderable. For instance, among the Majeerteen the sultan could free a male slave and such slave could then marry a free Somali woman, unlike other freed slaves (Cerulli 1964: 24). And yet, Borana captives were made slaves by the Marrehaan: however, if a Borana woman was taken as a captive, then married a Marrehaan and thereafter delivered a child she became free and equal to any other wife of the Marrehaan (id. 1959: 83).
26The fact that a certain mobility from one social strata to another for individuals and groups existed in Somalia has been overlooked; all “agriculturalists” were homogenised under the label of “liberti”, “freed slaves”, and became farmers who could be forced into labour.
27Along the Shebeli and Juba Rivers, agriculturalists men and women, all considered to be slave descendants or related peoples, were recruited through forced corvées and mostly under the Bertello farming contract (Del Boca 1992). So called “pure Somalis”, possibly bilis or “nobles” were to choose people belonging to those groups who were under their control to be forced into such corvées, under pressure of the colonial government. Chiefs of “docile” and “dedicated” clans had to send a set contribution of manpower to the estates (Serrazanetti 1933: 10-11). In other words, Italian colonialism supported the ethnic division of the Somali population by economic activities, which stigmatised agriculturalists in many aspects.
* 14 Fieldnotes, 1988.
28A singular phenomenon which reinforced only one kind of ethnic identity created a gendered and unequal one: agriculturalists men were co-opted into a policy that restricted agriculturalist women’s freedom in marriages. Men to be conscripted into forced labour were given the right to choose any woman they wanted as a wife, without her consent or that of her relatives (Declich 1995b: 111-113; Menkhaus 1989: 259). New young couples without children were preferred in the estates. The regulation waved new husbands from paying marriage transactions for the spouses (Serrazanetti 1933: 11). Fathers were co-opted into ceding their daughters under threat of being conscripted themselves or their sons (ibid.). It is amazing that, in order to restrain reactions of men against conscription such an abuse of power over women should be authorised to them. Indeed, several demonstrations against conscription were held in the lower Juba area14; yet, many conscripted escaped from estates every where in Somalia (Serrazanetti 1933); however, as informants from the Juba area hinted at with irony, without the company of a woman most young men would have run away from conscription.
* 15 See “Legge sull’eliminazione di alcuni termini indicanti sottocaste”, in Bollettino Ufficiale, Legg (...)
* 16 See, for instance, “Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and Prospects for Peace in Somalia”, Afric (...)
29With Independence (1960) and following the Socialist Revolution (1969), some expressions of tribalism were banned and laws prohibited the use of words which highlighted or signified racial disdain such as addon (slave), Midgan and Ybir (names of some occupational castes), and jareer (i.e. person with curly hair, hinting at a progeny of slaves)15. Despite the apparent effort to eliminate racial discrimination within the country, in practice discrimination continued and worsened with the eruption of the civil war at the end of 199016.
30A local system of oppositions among the others characterises nowadays membership in groups and is matter of distinction within people. A first subdivision distinguishes jareer from jileec. The jareer are those who are said to have curly hair and large noses; these features clearly identify them as originating from East Africa, and associates them with descendants from slaves who are believed to deserve scorn. The jileec are said to be Somalis with straight hair and a long-limbed build. The classification jareer/jileec is based on physical characteristics although not all those who in principle should look like jileec because of clan affiliation have a clear semblance of jileec. In fact, if ideally intermarriages between jileec and jareer do not occur, in practice during the centuries several dynamics, among which some have been described above, have fostered an intermingling of the members of the groups in different ways according to the geographical and political circumstances. The jareer/jileec classification, therefore, is an imprecise one but remains a sensitive issue in terms of identity for the Somali people: it takes a positional meaning depending on the geographical and cultural context in which it is mentioned. For somebody living along the Juba River a jareer who had sleek hair, because of one of her/is ancestors, might be considered slightly an outsider if not proving special commitment with the jareer’s way of life. On the other hand, the very fact of living among jareer makes of such person a jareer in the view of jileec. The jareer are believed to come from agricultural families, whereas the jileec are most often of pastoralist origin. Before the outburst of the civil war in 1990 such distinctions were already stereotypical. However, in the context of daily life relationships, these continued to be powerful distinctions which were used to marginalise jareer from access to jobs, benefits, education and family networks. Yet, descendants from families of ex-slaves in Mogadishu enjoyed some form of protection from the descendants of their relatives’ masters.
31Among the jareer of the riverine area of the Juba, however, other oppositions existed and people classified themselves into many other categories with specific positive and negative connotations. Oral traditions of the Zigulas, for instance, record their liberation from enslavement by escaping en masse, using this to explain why they have kept their Zigula language (Declich 1995b). The Somali Zigula—people who speak the Zigula language—call those who no longer speak a Bantu language “Mahaway”, which is a scoff at their pronunciation of the Somali language. The latter, on the other hand, call themselves Shanbara or Shanbarani which means, descendants from five original brothers who belonged to east African groups such as the Yao, Makua, Nyasa, Nyamwesi and others (id. 1987).
32The word “Bantu” to identify riverine peoples of Somalia was used in colonial times by racist anthropologists, like Puccioni (1937). The term “Negro” was instead used by more accurate Italian colonial officers, among whom the most famous are the lawyer Massimo Colucci (1924) and the orientalist and diplomat Enrico Cerulli. The latter, was in charge of studying Somali dialects at the R. Istituto Orientale in Naples in 1916 (Cerulli 1959: 9) and spent years in the Shebeli valley in Somalia during the first half of the twentieth century (1919-1922). As he attended a great deal of dispute settlements in those years, his reports are invaluable for the details he attaches to the many cases he describes. Puccioni was a member of the school of anthropology in Florence which advocated scientific reasons for the inferiority of the Bantu as a human “race”. Cerulli, using a more accurate approach to the study of the Somali people, clarifies that not all Somali “Bantu” were, indeed, descendants from slaves; rather, they were farmers who had originally inhabited the riverine areas that were later overwhelmed by Galla (i.e. Oromo) and further Somali (Cushitic language speaker) pastoral populations and runaway slaves (id. 1957: 161-163). The fact that they no longer spoke Bantu-based languages did not mean that they had been slaves. As such, Bantu had become a minority in an area largely inhabited by pastoral Somalis and because of their physical semblance to those who had been brought as slaves from the East African Coast, they had all been identified as descendants of slaves.
33Nowadays, within the civil war in Somalia and in the refugee camps, several factors foster the creation of a new ethnic consciousness and its internalisation by those who have been called jareer in Somalia. One such factor is the definition of different levels and strata of beneficiaries for the distribution of humanitarian aid, with the aim of providing equal access to all, in the refugee camps.
The Construction of Bantu Ethnicity in Refugee Camps
34As they arrive in reception areas newcomers are divided into groups usually by lineage, ethnic group, or village of origin (Declich 1995a) and, therefore, “if necessary, by clan” (Gallagher & Forbes Martin 1992: 18). The registration form which is used by UNHCR includes the tribe/clan/sub-clan as information to be gathered about the people who register17. In much literature about Africa the very concept of “tribe” or “clan” has been largely criticised for being inadequate, imprecise and a result of colonialists’ constructions (Iliffe 1979; Hobsbawn & Ranger 1984; Southall 1970; Vail 1989). Although the meaning of the words “tribe” and “clan” may still be unclear, such classification, apparently, is nonetheless useful in order to confer some control and order to the camps, as well as to allow people who trust each other to settle together. Nevertheless, the use of such classifications definitely reinforces certain criteria of hierarchy by lineages. Somalis from a pastoral background are known to be subdivided into patrilineages and the process of registration in the camps may strengthen patrilineal ties, even among those Somali groups for which such ties are not otherwise very important.
* 17 Branch Office for Kenya-Nairobi, Registration Form, UNHCR, n.d.
35People who do not have clear affiliation to Somali patrilineages and who have curly hair are now classified through a process of registration as “Bantu” by the refugee camps authorities. Such classification, has been applied by the UNHCR despite the fact that only a few of them actually speak a Bantu-based language (Declich 1995b). Ironically, the “Bantu” categorisation helps the jareer to increase their visibility in the camps, in which they would have been otherwise marginalised because of racial discrimination. However, the category “Bantu” was completely unknown to them before arriving in the camps. People I knew from Somalia, had never heard the word “Bantu” before, and said “we are now Bantu, we, the Zigula, are called Bantu here in the camp”. In an attempt to endow the jareer with some ethnic dignity and recognition, a field officer classified the Bantu as “Mushunguli” (Lehman 1993); a project manager identified them as Shanbarani—a name farmers of the Juba River who only speak Somali language give to themselves—, because the women she interviewed identified her group as such and distinguished such group from other Bantu in the camp (Musse 1993: 13). The different names people have used for themselves in different contexts in Somalia have been discussed elsewhere (Declich 1987; 1995b).
* 18 “The nightmare continues... Abuses against Somali Refugees in Kenya”, African Rights, September, 19 (...)
36In the camps close to Daddab, the fact that Bantu are considered to be a different sort of people from pastoralist Somalis allows camp authorities to identify them as one vulnerable group. Otherwise, they would risk not receiving the benefits to be distributed. If the Bantu were mixed or hidden among other Somalis, they would risk starvation, because their food would be simply looted. Due to their ill-regarded descent, they have been poorly treated by other Somalis in Somalia and in the camps and have became preferred target of bandits. In keeping with occasional reports by observers that a large number of Bantu have arrived at the frontier in very weak shape (Gallagher & Forbes Martin 1992: 19), conversations and reports of officers working along the Juba River during the war 18confirm that the newlyascribed Bantu categorisation—that had become widespread after 1990 as a result of forced displacement—has been important in affording them visibility.
37The label of “Bantu”, however, has no precise meaning aside from singling out those who do not belong to Somali patrilineages, and thus, is a sort of device used by humanitarian agencies in order to identify this particular kind of beneficiary. On the other side, those who are called Bantu, even if they never defined themselves as such before then, for the first time in the camps meet vested interests in being pulled together under the same umbrella name. Not the jareer classification, as it was used in Somalia, nor the fact of being all agriculturalists, had been strong enough reasons to foster a common consciousness among these marginalised people in Somalia. In the camps, however, it has become clear that these people are a minority group and would have problems in receiving benefits if these were to be channelled through key persons among the Somali patrilineages.
* 19 See Africa Report, May-June, 1995: 25.
38Moreover, such non-affiliation has already put them at risk in Kenya due to lack of responsibility/guarantee in terms of bloodwealth. At the beginning of their stay in the camps, the Bantu became an easier target than others for bandits and/or thieves and women were raped in such occasions. Different groups of bandits and thieves, both Kenyans and Somalis, were raiding the refugee camps especially attracted by the distribution of items. In order to defend themselves, the Bantu had to arrange to reside next to each other in the three camps, and, autonomously fenced their quarters with thorny shrubs to constitute fortified compounds 19(Lehman 1993: 6). Moreover, they made bows and arrows and kept stores of stones to scare bandits and thieves who, for this reason, became afraid to approach their compounds.
Downplaying Female Gender in the New Ethnic Construction
39Undoubtedly, identifying the Bantu as a different ethnic group from other Somalis may help them to be protected, and to receive a share of the benefits provided by humanitarian agencies which they need in order to survive displacement. In other words, this strategy worked as a way to defend their access to benefits, incentives and, ultimately, human rights. In fact, by being allowed to settle together in one area of the camp, the so-called Bantu can benefit from channels of distribution managed by their own representatives, rather than by other Somali groups. However, it is exactly by claiming such equal access to benefits, combined with the “emergency” situation, that officers in the camp make choices which downplay the importance of women’s roles in crucial decision making processes. I would like to dwell on the usual procedure that officers apply to foster some participation in decision making in the refugee camps. This entails singling out those seen to be responsible persons, who wield some authority and control over groups of people, to be recognised as heads of clusters of compounds within the camps. They become councillors of sorts, who represent the wishes of the groups. Using such a method and participatory approach, a group of Bantu male elders were settled together in the refugee camp of Dagahaley.
* 20 Ibid.: 5.
40In March 1994, I had the chance to meet them. They were identified as the ones responsible for clan subdivisions among the Bantu refugees. The elders had prepared a statement about their wish to be resettled in Tanzania, where they hoped to find land, start agriculture, and reconstruct a living. Yet, also to some UNHCR representatives resettlement in an African country appeared to be a concrete, plausible, and durable alternative to the forced displacement of Somali Bantu. The area along the Juba River was not peaceful enough for repatriation, nor was a safer situation envisaged in the near future. Some Bantu lands had been invaded and most of the Bantu who remained were forced to share crops with newly arrived masters20. Moreover, the racial discrimination these people had suffered in Somalia and would have to face again if they returned there, were other considerations. The concern of the UNHCR’s officers for this marginal group was perfectly understandable and praiseworthy and a good reason for considering their resettlement in another area where they could practice agriculture again. Daddab is located in a dry area where scarcity of water prevents cultivations from taking place on a large scale. It is likely that most of the Bantu, if asked, would have endorsed the idea of finding a resettlement area in another African country for their families.
41What was questionable, however, was the criteria of “representativeness” which was used to gather this group of male elders. The elders were supposed to represent each of the lineages/tribes/clans, or whatsoever these unexplained words meant, among the Bantu; the nature of such “ethnic” sections for the Bantu was not clear to the field officers of the camp. Yet, the Bantu themselves, had learned in Somalia that it was safer to keep underneath, without disclosing, their own traditional ways of being; rather, they should adapt publicly to what they were requested to be in order to be accepted among the Somali (Declich 1995b). The officers, therefore, assumed that, at registration, new arrivals to the camp declared their clanic subdivision, and that these were structured, more or less, as they were among Somalis. The assumption was that their “clans” must have been something like patrilineages. Accordingly, in order to foster a participation process representatives should be selected by field officers for each of the subdivisions (mviko and/or kolwa) of the “Bantu”: Makua, Yao, Nyasa, Zigula, Zalamo, etc. The point is that these “representatives” had never been recognised as such in Somalia because a pyramidal structure based on linear descent did not exist. No one, for example, during fieldwork in Somalia had ever claimed to be the chief of the Zalamo subdivision, which was a very small group of people. I suspect that the name Zalamo was, possibly, a loan word from the Tanzanian group living in the vicinity of Dar-es-Salaam, with whom the Bantu of the camp attempted to establish a fictive connection. In other words, in consideration of previous data about them in Somalia, I had the clear impression that through the camp’s experience those elders had been given the chance to negotiate their own power space within their group.
42The choice which the officers made, although driven by an understandably scarce knowledge of the kinship system of the Bantu, seemed to me even more cryptic because I knew the nature of the lineage system among the so-called “Bantu”. These Bantu do not have patrilineages, nor do they have chiefs who wield power over people of the same patri-lines. The mviko groups are mostly matri-kin groupings, namely, group of people united by the fact of recognising common female ancestors, deputed to the management and organisation of mviko rituals; the heads of such rituals are not necessarily men and most people can claim belongings to mviko of the father’s and mother’s line (id. 1994: 199, 203-204; 1995b: 107-108). As rituals are important in a public context, mainly because of their prophetic aspects, people involved in the organisation of such rituals, men or women, have a certain influence, sometimes a strong one, in the public life of their group. From an individual point of view, although the matri-kin grouping of the mother is the most important to anybody’s life, people can also claim belonging to the matri-kin grouping of the father, depending on the situation and the need for certain rituals. While the kinship system provides an opportunity to emphasise both the mother’s and father’s lines, in the camp only the father’s line was given recognition by the UNHCR authority.
43One could claim that all criteria of representativeness are questionable in one way or another because they always exclude someone from direct decision making; yet, some sort of screening, as well as negotiation of power, occurs in any case. This commonly occurs among refugees. For instance a recent article argues that the elite of refugees from Burundi eventually acquire a special role (Sommers 1995). However, it is not at all clear why women should be the ones who become marginal in the new invention of political representatives.
* 21 For clarifications about such ethnic groups see Declich (1995b and 1987).
44Certainly the plight, constraints and risks of remaining in the vicinity of the camps and the general context has reinforced the common feelings of Bantu men and women, that they were all once marginalised, and that they were sharing similar needs and desires for the future. It was the first time, in fact, since fieldwork in Somalia, that I had seen Zigula and Shanbara 21joining together towards reaching the same aim and supporting the same requests in a non Muslim religious context. During peaceful times in Somalia, divisions were also emphasised, at times (Declich 1995b), in order to describe one’s identity and difference. However, for some reason, possibly shaped by the situation of emergency, women in such a new ethnic unity were not provided for as public actors, nor even given the chance. In other words, a new ethnic invention was taking place and male elders were called to publicly construct it, leaving apart women.
45When such processes occur in the field, it is difficult to disentangle what really happened while the participatory process was being established. If questioned about the way the elder representatives were selected in a group, managers commonly give many good reasons why men had to be chosen, neglecting women. Explanations such as “. . .when we did ask for representatives from the Bantu, we were pointed toward these men”, or “women would have been more at risk if they were put in such a group of elders” or “this matter was a concern of the male elders and we got them together in order to give them voice” or “the issue of resettlement is such a difficult one that there is more chance to succeed if male elders present the requests for resettlement” are put forward. However, by knowing the nature of matri-kin groupings among the Bantu and the non-existence of patrilineages like those of other Somalis, a question arises about whether none of the field officers 1) thought about looking for both, women and men representatives and 2) knew that women, as well as men, discuss whether they prefer to be resettled in Tanzania or somewhere else. Moreover, women were among the people who most felt at risk of being raped in the camps, especially if they found themselves without partners; it would seem logical to have female elder representative of them to be involved in decisions about leaving the camp.
46At any rate, as a result of all these conditions, the group of elders who were called together to analyse the feasibility or interest of a goal such as a group resettlement, only included men. In other words, no women elders were summoned to discuss the issue nor were women elders consulted to give their point of view on the idea of resettlement for the entire group. Women were left to speak among themselves about possible resettlement without be given a public space to express so, unlike male elders. The pattern of male representation established among the Somali Zigula during colonial time and followed by the Somali governments was repeated by representatives of the international community in the very person of the UNHCR’a officers.
47Besides the actual marginalisation women experience in such a decision making context for the specific issue of resettlement of the group, an important point is the influence such a choice may have on those women for the future. Elder and younger mostly uneducated women who for the first time enter an “international” context or community so directly may believe that in what they see as “modern” social contexts is not appropriate that women decide over the movement of their group or have not the right to do so, as it is shown to them by the officers of the humanitarian aid system. For the first time in centuries, the Bantu found themselves in a context where they are not discriminated against as a group. This brought about a relaxation of social tensions within the Bantu community so that, for example, women did not pay much attention to their public role being downplayed.
48The point is how influential can be such a negligence over the confidence of those elder and younger women as regards the appropriateness of their actions in the new international context, their appropriateness in such context and their right to decide over the movement of the entire group.
49In other words, the crucial choice of neglecting women elders was made with the commendable aims of supporting the rights of the “Bantu” group to seek a durable solution to displacement and of encouraging participation within the camp’s decision making system. Nevertheless, this choice had influential structural effects on power relations between genders within the public domain.
50Whether unintentional or for reasons deemed to be acceptable, the organised provision of international humanitarian aid wielded considerable power in the group’s gender relations, affecting both authority and personal identity. First, the procedure recognised the authority of male elders as important, while ignoring female elders in the camp; in fact, male elders were called to discuss the future plans and movements of the whole group in a plight, whereas female elders were not consulted and, therefore, excluded from public authority, with few chances to reverse the decisions. In the “Bantu” villages in Somalia, there were certain aged women with special authority as regards either ritual performances or other activities at the village level. It is not clear the reason why this sort of leaders were not singled out rather a new sort of ethnic chiefs was supported and given authority through the participation exercise. Secondly, only one kind of individual identity was reinforced and imbued with the status of being “relevant”: that which highlights membership in matri-kin groupings, as if they were patrilineages. In other words, the personal identity which is recognised as relevant within the camp is one for which the representative must be a male elder. Importance was attributed to the matri-kin group of the father, rather than the reverse.
51In conclusion, a rationale which was, perhaps, unconscious, underlined the procedure for managing camp’s issues. Camp personnel assumed first, that the “clanic” system of the Bantu, whatever this could mean, was strictly patrilineal, and second that, in patrilineal systems, women have no rights or choices to decisions about where to move with the family or group in future years. This of course would even be a misunderstanding in treating the actual patrilineal Somalis this way. All these assumptions, embedded in the procedural system of the UNHCR, concretely disempowered women in their possible future “resettlement” in Tanzania or elsewhere. Ironically, this happened also to Bantu speakers among the Somali Bantu, such as the Zigula, who maintain strong oral traditions about their previous forced displacements. In such traditions, women had an important role: the most famous personality in their oral narratives is a woman heroine, Wanankhucha, who lead the largest groups of them away from slavery. She is said to have been a prophet and diviner (mganga) who organised the flight from the Somali villages where the Zigula had been captives. She is remembered as having fostered community feeling among the Zigula by organising repeated performances of traditional Zigula songs. During the flight she was able to help the Zigula avoid danger by means of her divination and visions (ibid.: 105-108; Cassanelli 1987: 221; Grottanelli 1953).
Powerlessness and Persecution of Women by Rape
52In interviews with women and men in the refugee camps, most of whom had been my acquaintances in Somalia five to eight years previously, the major factors which they then asserted provoked their flight from Somalia became clear. Especially, at the end of 1991 and early 1992, raids by armed thieves and bandits increased. Refugees remembered that, in order to obtain money, food, clothes and other available items, bandits did not hesitate to commit crimes of many sorts and would threaten, kill, and/or if the victim was a woman, rape, those who did not surrender.
53Rape had become so frequent that, whenever women left the village to fetch firewood, they risked multiple rape. Almost all of the twenty women interviewed had been raped once, yet, parties of bandits commonly groupraped individual women. Another way to convince victims to surrender their property was to rape a woman in front of her relatives. Description of the brutal cases which occurred would be endless and I only mention one such narrative story here. One woman recounted that she would never forget the image of her friends chased by bandits. They were two sisters one of whom was pregnant. The women attempted to escape from gunmen, who wanted to rape them, by running towards the river. The pregnant sister could not run fast enough and was shot dead; the other sister, however, managed to escape by crossing the crocodile-infested water. Suffice it to say that rape was always mentioned by both women and men as a very good reason to seek a safer home.
54A male acquaintance of mine from Somalia explained why he had decided to flee. After repeated theft of food from his household, the choice was to flee or to remain at home without food and endure the regular rape of young women (daughters, wives, nieces and granddaughters) before his eyes. Adolescent females of thirteen to fifteen years of age were at the greatest risk of rape. Bandits generally preferred to rape young women. If they happened to arrive at night, bandits would rape both younger and older women, but if they arrived during the day they would only pick the younger ones. This acquaintance reported that before the 1992, when he flew from the Juba, in his village of origin, not less than two hundred women were raped out of approximately 1,500 female inhabitants. He warned me that many women do not admit to having been raped, because they are ashamed.
* 22 See Information Bulletin, UNHCR, February 1994: 7; Refugee Women Victims of Violence. A Special Pro (...)
55Although, in 1994, the camps surrounding Daddab were still rather insecure for women, who continued to be raped when they left the camp to collect firewood or when bandits would attack the camp to steal22, such sexual persecution seemed to be less common than when the refugees were settled along the Juba River.
56Another striking memory was that bandits would steal everything, even clothes, often leaving the victim almost naked. More than one woman claimed that her clothes had been stolen after she had been raped. This practice demonstrates that assailants had reached an exceptional and excessive level of cruelty. Leaving someone who has already been abused, without anything, even clothes, marks a wish to render this person completely defenceless, i.e. unable even to present herself among other human beings.
* 23 See UNHCR, October 1993: 4, op. cit.
57I was told that a new cloth was one of the very few commodities that people, who could prepare their “luggage” before escaping from Somalia, carried with them; in order to avoid theft, this was hidden among the old rags they used to wear in Kisimayu. The possibility of wearing a nice, clean and “respectable” cloth was viewed as an important part of one’s identity. This symbol of clothing parallels its significance among women victims of violence in the refugee camp. As social workers have noted, women who were forced to continue wearing the same clothes in which they had been assaulted, faced severe psychological problems23.
58The experience of rape and the prospect of facing it again permanently alters women’s hopes for the future and, specifically, their plans about where they would like to settle next. One woman said: “We saw such terrible things. They raped everyone; I would like to return to Somalia, but the very idea that the war could begin there again, stops me.” Another woman emphasised the point that the memories of the violence that she witnessed and suffered could jeopardise her future pregnancies.
59In short, starvation and sexual violence, perceived as persecution were mentioned as the most important factors for fleeing Somalia during war. The rape of women created a context of powerlessness for both men and women during the war. Although sexual persecution was directed towards women, men were also humiliated by being forced to watch their relatives raped in front of them. Such feeling powerlessness was in addition to the usual impotence which characterises life conditions refugee camps.
Some Characteristics of Powerlessness: Alteration of Production/Reproduction Relationships
60One characteristic of Somali refugees in Daddab is that they have undergone a process of alteration in the production/reproduction relationships within the group. Refugees in the camp cannot produce for their own consumption nor is any improvement envisaged in the immediate future. This entails different problems depending upon the main economic activity of the Somali group involved. Whatever the main economic activity of the group, whether pastoral or agricultural, people without a means of production are unable to maintain the roles which are usual to gender in daily life. For instance, female farmers who are used to grow vegetables and sell them in the market, find themselves without the activity which allows them some control over their income; male farmers who do not have a plot of land where to grow staple food have no means to provide their wives with the prescribed daily maintenance. Pastoral women without camels are in trouble because their usual activity of distributing and selling milk is not possible any longer and young men are not ascribed their traditional responsibility of grazing cattle in the bush. In other words, most of the activities women and men of different ages perform daily are no longer possible.
61In the camps, both pastoral and agricultural people have no work and, almost literally, nothing to do during the day. For agriculturalists in 1994 there was not enough water to practice agriculture, and the few small gardens which had been set up by NGOs to produce vegetables could not be expanded because they consumed too much of the little water resources available in the camp. Traditional means of production for agriculturalists, such as the availability of fertile land to cultivate for both male and female farmers, were not forthcoming. Similarly, pastoral people had no way of maintaining their productive activities: most of the families had lost their camels and cows, and women no longer had goats. Even if all pastoral people had been provided with animals to raise, these activities would not have been sustainable because of obvious environmental constraints. There was neither sufficient water nor grass in the area for many big herds of camels, cattle or sheeps/goats.
* 24 As also reported in Gallagher & Forbes Martin (1992: 23).
62For the refugees, permanence in the camps means passing through a stage in which both men and women are deprived of the chance, albeit for insurmountable reasons, to maintain their productive roles. Such conditions put them in a rather weak position. In fact, the absence of productive roles in a refugee camp not only aggravates the lack of food and commodities that could be produced and then exchanged or sold: this absence also causes refugees to lose the daily life context in which their actions have some effects that they can control and to lose the sense that they can support themselves through their own work. In these terms, the very few productive activities in which Somalis could engage affected women and men equally, in terms of the control on their own lives. Although women continued to perform some of their “domestic” activities like cooking and taking care of the children24, it should not be underestimated that Somali women, both from a pastoral and an agricultural background, have always played an important role in productive activities as well. This role used to give them some control over the production of food for household consumption, as well as leverage in household decisions; cooking and distributing food that has been autonomously produced is different from doing the same with scarce rations, received from outside authorities. Such a feeling was epitomised by a common saying: “When we go back home we will not even be able to prepare tea for our own pleasure.”
63The change in the system of supplying goods for their survival created opportunities to renegotiate the control of provision and distribution channels; moreover, also provided a new arena for such renegotiation. This was because the control over resources, which was at the base of power dynamics within the group and between genders, no longer went through the same channels. Moreover, the new channels for distributing goods become arenas in which hopes for a future and survival are at stake.
64Individual and social dynamics were transformed by the arrival of convoys carrying food and non-food items for the supply of the camps. In 1994, the number of assaults and attacks on the camps by bandits increased on the days assigned to food distribution, when distribution vehicles were kidnapped and bandits attacked convoys transporting provisions. It was not only UNHCR that had to adopt measures to control and protect food provisions; each group of refugees and/or families also had to take particular care to defend their supplies. When provisions were available in the households, they had successfully avoided many chances of being stolen. The power wielded by distributors was magnified in relation to the powerlessness existing in the camps.
Distributing Benefits...
65It is precisely in the mechanisms for distributing benefits that outsiders, such as humanitarian and emergency aid agencies, become important and terribly potent in managing new sources of power, in predetermining opportunities and in offering capabilities (Sen 1994: 63-67, 1993: 86-87) to one individual in preference to another. Benefits do not only include goods needed for survival, such as food, housing and cooking material, but also other incentives, such as employment opportunities, which can change a refugee’s life forever.
66One case in point is illustrated by the story of a Zigula woman who had been a teacher and farmer when she lived in Somalia. I met her again after seven years in the Ifo camp where she was appointed as a social worker, because she knew how to read and write. Among Somali farmers this is a rather rare skill because, after literacy campaigns in the 1970’s, the level of education in rural areas was not been maintained; the woman had been educated by missionaries when she was a girl and had been chosen because she was an orphan. Between 1986 and 1988, in many villages of the Lower Juba district in Somalia the schools opened for just a few days due to the low salaries teachers received. As the school was opened only sporadically until the war broke out, the teacher had not practised her skills much in recent years; at the time, I almost doubted that she remembered how to read and write.
67After having escaped from Somalia where she had left her husband, however, and after having spent two years in the Ifo refugee camp together with her five children, she had undergone remarkable changes. She spoke much better Italian than she had six years previously in Somalia, was learning some English, and spoke Kiswahili as well. She was eager to find a way for her children to study, because she realised how important such skills had been for her survival after displacement. While working as a social worker, she had been sent to Tanzania for a short training course on bookkeeping and micro-credit for small enterprises; when I offered some money for the time she had spent accompanying me in the camp, she wanted me to show her a dollar bill, because she had never seen one before since mostly only trade men dealt with this currency. She considered whether she should ask me for Kenyan shillings or US dollars, and asked if dollars could be used anywhere in the world and if Kenyan shillings were valid in Europe. Moreover, being a social worker, she was in a key position to distribute commodities in the camp. Since it was she who made the lists of the families, she controlled how many items would be distributed to each person on distribution days.
68In other words, she used me as an informant since I had no vested interests in manipulating her and she took every opportunity to obtain new or better jobs. As a social worker, she was lucky to find herself in the right position to strategise in the distribution of commodities within the camp and, like other social workers, she played the game. She had been chosen as a social worker because she had the skills and was a single woman with children.
Micro-mechanisms of Empowerment and Disempowerment
69Simple and basic mechanisms like those described (new ethnic construction and job incentives) may appear small and rather irrelevant as compared to the need to solve problems as quickly as possible in the disrupted situation of a refugee camp. Some rationales for actions and choices are based upon the need for moving fast in order to solve problems. Other actions are justified as avoidance of problems connected with including women in the decision making process, whereas particular attention should be given to the effects of empowerment or disempowerment entailed in most actions taken.
* 25 See one for all Harrell-Bond (1986).
70Whatever the choices made, in fact, they carry long lasting consequences in the power relations between genders within a group. Many writers 25have highlighted the powerlessness that a camp’s life entails for male and female refugees. In this context of powerlessness, actions undertaken by those who manage the camps may have the strength to support or devalue certain groups or classes of people. Because people, women in this case, are in so powerless context do not complain nor find opportunities for resisting. The gravity of the situation, combined with the expectations created by the very recognition of a group of male elders by camp authorities could become strong enough reasons for female refugees not to complain about the lack of recognition of their role. This may be true especially for people like the Bantu who, after having been marginalised in their country for more than a century, are particularly pleased that outsiders have finally shown some trust in the group. Their desire for a future without war might be even stronger than for others, as well as their willingness to surrender their traditional power, if they can avoid the persecution they have undergone in the distant and recent past.
Tribal Labelling as a Way to Strengthen Patrilineal Hierarchies?
71In a refugee camp, therefore, people are categorised by “tribes”, not very differently from the way they were during colonial times, because of insufficient knowledge and for practical reasons on the part of camp authorities. The consequences of labelling, however, may differ according to historical contexts. In Somalia at the beginning of the century, the ethnic categorisation “Bantu” satisfied the need for singling out a class of agricultural labourers. There were no distinctions by gender and such categorisation served, during the Fascist rule in Somalia, to conscript people to forced labour and “Bantu” women to forced marriages and forced labour (Declich 1995b: 111-113). A question rises as to whether a tribal classification should imply supporting the authority of men over women or whether there can be different and more accurate patterns of actions.
72In a refugee camp, ethnic classifications seem to satisfy the need for defining beneficiaries of certain commodities (food and non-food items of humanitarian aid in this case), as well as for fostering an “equal” distribution of benefits. However, a tribal label may not meet the interests of all beneficiaries. Rather, humanitarian and international agencies may support or create a new hierarchy among people, through tribal classification, in order to be able to distribute benefits.
73*
74In conclusion, humanitarian aid systems act through organising and distributing commodities, food and shelter materials in camps. The benefits distributed (e.g. food, housing, etc.) become not just goods needed for survival, but potential opportunities for camp residents to renegotiate their power, within the camp. Power within the camp, however, may also mean power in the future, after the camp’s life.
75The situation of powerlessness which is created in a refugee camp endows the humanitarian aid system with considerable power over refugees’ lives. In such a context, refugees need recognition from the outside because one of the traditional systems of managing power, based on the control of the means of production, is no longer in their hands. Key positions of control in the distribution of commodities and decision making in the camp become sources of power. When these are held unequally by men and women, such positions already have an a priori influence over the future development of gender relationships within a group. Although people react differently to similar pressures based upon a variety of factors, such as their traditions, cultural background, and historical experience, processes in a refugee camp may favour certain groups and objectives over others. This is especially true with regards to new opportunities and benefits, etc., presented to men and women after displacement.
76Because people respond differently to similar options and opportunities, it is not possible to forecast with certainty subsequent cultural changes; it is important, however, to highlight the micro-dynamics which endow some people with authority and disempower others.
77* University of Urbino, Urbino, 1997.
If it was impossible to recruit a big enough group along patrilineal principles – whether due to the distance from other segments of one’s own clan, or to its limited demographic growth –
there was still the option of forming diya-paying groups with segments of other clans in the
same position, on a contractual basis. The principle of tol, of patrilineal descent, or the
segmentary lineage system, and, the principle of xeer (heer), the association by contract, were
the two recruitment mechanisms used to constitute the divisions of Somali society; divisions
which were internally peaceful, but tendentially aggressive towards outsiders. Xeer were
contracts between equals. Groups that were too small or weak to present themselves as
independent partners in a contractual arrangement could also enter into pseudo-kinshiprelations
with stronger groups. These relationships are called sheegat from the verb
sheeganaya, “I name”. In this case one names the forefathers of another group as one’s own,
that is, one subordinates oneself to it in terms of genealogy. In any event, one’s chances of
survival depend on support from a powerful group. This principle is aptly reflected in the
Somali motto, “either be a mountain, or else lean against one (Lewis 1961, 1962, 1972).
Cunning is a highly-valued cultural attribute among Somali. And it is regarded as highly
cunning to break a contractual agreement, whether it be based on xeer or on sheegat, at an
opportune moment. Like the stories of the Icelandic Vikings or of Byzantine court intrigues,
Somali history bristles with treachery and massacres of former protectors. The latter are
struck down and robbed of their women and herds the moment their dependents have grown
strong enough under their protection.23
23 Cf. e. g. Turnbull 1955: 2 et passim, Schlee 1989: 46f. That the Somali place cultural value on cunning, and
that a well-staged swindle is much admired, can be inferred from a series of folk tales collected by Muuse Haaji
Ismaa’iil Galaal, edited by B.W. Andrzejewski, (1956). Cf. e. g. no. 4, p. 33, which is reproduced here in my
own translation from the Somali:
Cousin, teach me cunning!
One day a man came to another. He said: “I would like you to teach me cunning.” The other replied: “Milk your
camel for me!” So the man milked his camel for him, and when he had drunk the milk, the one who had brought
the milk said: “And now, teach me cunning!” Whereupon the other said: “I’ve done that already. I’ve had your
milk, haven’t I?” The man’s mouth dropped open in surprise.
16
The ever-present threat of treachery restricted the growth of internally peaceful and
cooperative groups. The tendency of groups to become larger, thus reducing the individual’s
risks vis-à-vis dangers from the outside, was countered by suspicion of distant clan kin and
allies from other clans, which produced a tendency towards fission, and thus a reduction in
group size.
However, a series of factors caused the tendency towards unity to outweigh the tendency
towards division, and thus larger groups were formed. First of all, obviously, there was the
threat from outside. Then the skill of politically gifted personalities also contributed. While
simple Somalis often married within their own clans, and being relatives, were released from
paying part of the brideprice, leaders often contracted strategic marriages across clan
boundaries. Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, who defied several colonial powers at once
from 1900-1920, made extensive use of this mechanism.
Flexibility and fluctuation are key words when one tries to understand the
clan system. Catherine Besteman indicates this in her controversial examination
of the processes in which individuals changed places between lineages or
changed affiliation within the lineage. One may gain a formal affiliation through
a process called sheegad. The clan elders determine the conditions of acceptance,
The Journal of Conflict Studies
59
usually consisting of some kind of payment in kind, such as livestock. After making
such payment, the individual gains access to physical and financial protection
by their new clan family.12 Her study focused on Juba valley, the area with
perhaps the most flexible clan structures in Somalia; nevertheless she and other
researchers also stress this flexibility for the whole of Somalia.13 The alliances
within all the Somali lineages have been notoriously unstable during the last 12
years and intra-clan fighting, often with one group of a clan allied to another faction
from a different clan, was and still is common.14
Adoption, Patronage, Clientship and Occupational Castes in Somalia
9Before I discuss the present day ethnic classifications and labels it is useful to go back to detailed studies describing some processes which brought agriculturalist settlers of the Juba and Shebeli Somali Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, etc.) to be progressively overwhelmed by pastoral populations arriving from northern areas and seeking accessible water points along the Rivers.
10As inquired about in the second and third decade of the twentieth century and, later, diligently described, the struggle over the River access points and, to some extent, to rainfed cultivable lands, gave rise to repeated bloody clashes and violent fighting which resulted in different kinds of agreements between lineages and groups of people (Cerulli 1964: 78). The nature of such agreements have been described in terms of relationships of patronage, adoption and alliance (iskashaato); however, jural and actual nuances of these forms of interaction were a matter of negotiation and depended on the skills in public relations of the individuals, groups and communities involved, on the resources at stake and on the size of the groups involved.
11Patronage in Somalia is a relation in which groups of people seek an agreement of mutual dependence although one becomes patron and the other a client. A patronage relationship, for instance, occurs when agriculturalists give to a certain lineage/clan of pastoral people exclusive rights to River access points close to their village; in exchange for such an exclusive license, the agriculturalists may receive an annual payment in animals and a permanent protection against the intrusion of other foreign shepherds who might not respect their cultivated fields while approaching the River access points. The relationship of the agriculturalists Makanne with the pastoralists Badi Caddo is said to have been of this kind, during the first decades of the twentieth century (ibid.: 84), as well as that of the agriculturalists Shidle with the pastoralists Mobileen (ibid.: 78). There are also relationships of patronage between pastoralists; for example, it is reported that scattered Somalis (Harti, Ogaadeen and Marrehaan) entered the lower Juba area as clients of the “Galla” (Oromo) people. Initially, the Somalis looked after the “Galla’s” animals. Thereafter, the Somalis’ number increased and they gained a foothold: revolted against their patrons and started controlling those lands (ibid.: 79).
* 5 See the case reported in Lewis (1969: 72-74), although the case is mentioned to argue another point (...)
12Adoption between descent groups named “haliif” (in Arabic) or “arifa” (ibid.: 68), in a mangled Italianised way, was especially widespread among the Somalis Hawiye. This was an agreement through which the adopter (a clan, a lineage or one of the family of the lineage), under request, took complete responsibility for the protection of the adopted; the adopted (person or group), on the other hand, was to refrain from jeopardising the peace of the adopter group (ibid.: 67). Among the Hareyn—as possibly, in most cases of adoption—the adopted formally renounced to their birth place in terms of clan/lineage and promised to accompany the adopter’s clan/lineage in peace and war for ever (Lewis 1969: 66). This also entailed a partial or total transferral of blood compensation rights and duties from one’s original group to the adopter’s clan/lineage (ibid.: 67). The reciprocal obligations entailed by the agreement of adoption could cease for two reasons: when an adopted group migrated from the territory and when an adopted group became strong enough to constitute an autonomous ethnic unity, as recognised by the adopter. Of course, power conflicts would also determine the cessation of an adoption (Cerulli 1964: 73). The end of an adoption involved the clearing out of the territory previously granted for agriculture or other purposes by the adopter (ibid.: 67-68). From the adoption system arose several complicated issues in the consuetudinary law and examples of such are reported for the twenties (ibid.: 68, 70-75) and the sixties (Lewis 1969: 72-74). The institution could be used by a group for establishing itself in an area and, thereafter, claiming such territory permanently by force. Moreover, allegiance of an adopted lineage or family with its original clan could continue after many years of permanence in far away areas. When adopted people kept old allegiances with lineages/clans of enemies they became unpleasant and dangerous guests in case of conflicts. Finally, when governments banned the use of tribal criteria from the national legal system, adopted people could try to use their old relations of adoption in order to claim permanent rights over other clans’ cultivable lands 5again fostering conflicts. Yet, relations of adoption protected some agriculturalists before other regimes of land property were set up in Somalia. For instance, during the Siyaad Barre government, disregarding relations of adoption, tracts of land were expropriated for national purposes (i.e. setting up of state farms, etc.), taken from people who had less links with the lineages/clans of the governments’ members, mainly agriculturalist riverine peoples.
13During the years, the interactions created through adoption and patronage, fostered certain pastoral people to convert themselves to good farmers by occupying more and more arable land. Along the Shebeli River, Cerulli mentions some such people as: the Hillibi, the Daacud of the Balad area, the Mobileen, the Molkal, the Badi Caddo (Cerulli 1964: 83). Yet, some Somali pastoral groups were adopted in villages of riverine people; for instance, in the Shidle village of Shanloo, along the Shebeli, lived families of Somali Wacesla (ibid.: 82) and in the Zigula village of Mugambo, along the Juba, lived families of Somalis who spoke the Bantu language kizigula.
14Therefore, despite the general understanding of what is Somali society, there have been very complex ethnic interactions among pastoralists and agriculturalists in the last centuries; it would be difficult to keep track of all such interactions. These involved the concession of temporary rights over the use of land and territory, but did not necessarily entail that the adopted people (agriculturalists or pastoralists) were the losers (ibid.: 84). In fact, especially before colonial times, a patron/client relationship was one of mutual support in different economic activities or for the control of a territory rather than one of domination of a group over another. Until the present time a “distinction is made between those born into a clan and those who have become members by adoption” (Helander 1988: 133). However, case studies from the Hubeer (ibid.: 43) and the Hareyn (Lewis 1969: 68) show that in many cases those who have been adopted outnumber the others.
* 6 The Ajuraan were patrons of the Shebeli valley North of Mogadishu.
* 7 Fieldnotes, 1985.
15Adoptions also involved people of those occupational castes considered inferior to the others. An analysis made by Cerulli (1964: 90) points out at low castes people, as descendants of those subdued during the successive invasions of the Horn of Africa in the last centuries. No conqueror completely destroyed the enemy nor was free from contacts and intermarriages with the defeated people. This occurred even though the latter were put in an inferior jural condition (ibid.: 88). Several different kinds of groups have been assimilated to such low castes on the base of their jural inferior situation; such groups have included corporation of people practising special jobs considered vile and suspect, such as blacksmiths, wood workers, potters, tanners, magicians, shoe makers, hunters and gatherers and sometimes fishermen. Therefore, according to Cerulli, people belonging to low castes share similarities in development and historical formation rather than linguistic, cultural or geographic origins (id. 1959: 113). The names of the most well known low castes in Somalia are Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc. The names are not accurate if seen as referring to specific lineages or occupations, rather, the way people from different occupational castes are named is positional. It depends much on the geographic area of the Somali country where they live and the lineage membership of those who speak about them. For instance, at the beginning of the 1920, there were blacksmiths Tumal in Mogadishu who considered themselves as poor descendants of the Ajuraan 6(id. 1964: 91-92) and blacksmiths called Gacansibir among the Marrehaan of the Juba; yet, Muusa Deryo among the Rahanwiin were potters and blacksmiths unlike the Muusa Deryo of the Habar Awal (id. 1959: 101-113). Hunters and gatherers along the Juba River in 1985 were called Bon by both Shanbara and Zigula and only very few intermarriages would occur. Nevertheless, Shanbara reported that at the beginning of their settlement in the Gosha area a group of men abducted women from a village of the Bon people and married them7.
* 8 Cerulli gives some information about the jural status of such castes among the Majeerteen (1959: 24 (...)
16A common characteristic of the occupational castes is that they have established long term patron/client relationships with one of the predominant lineage in the area where they live. Such relationship entails consuetudinary agreements with the patrons as regards payment of bloodwealth, dispute resolution and marriage rules which vary from group to group. Basically, because their specialised work is necessary in any lineage, people from such castes usually have long term relations of adoption with stronger clans. Moreover, they are not in a large number nor have strength enough to defend themselves alone. As adopted people, low castes cannot take political initiatives but enjoy some sort of protection depending on the lineage/clan of their patrons8. In the past, low caste people and slaves held different legal status (Cerulli 1959: 19-29) which varied according to lineages and geographical areas. Often was recognised a real blood compensation for the death of low caste people (id. 1964: 72). It is impossible to dwell on the analysis of all such jural differences as regards people scattered in so many different areas of Somalia. It would be enough to say that, despite conspicuous differences within their legal status at the beginning of the twentieth century, low castes, freed slaves and slaves were held an unequal and inferior jural condition as compared to those considered ethnic Somali.
17During the twentieth century this local system of distinction and social stratification, initially based on a need for regulating access to natural resources as well as for managing specialisation of occupations, has been modified and divisions have been stressed as well as reinforced to fit within different ruling systems.
Rationale for Labelling: Past and Present
18Following the substantial flow of refugees since the end of 1990, for the first time the international community appeared to became aware of the existence of Bantu among the Somalis. However, in the history of Somalia, this sort of ethnic category had been used by colonialists for political purposes joining together all those Somali people who were skilled in farming or in other practical works (people belonging to the occupational castes). Such categorisation reflected and certainly emphasised an existing local ideology which considers all agriculturalists of the Rivers (Shabelle, Shidle, Makanne, Eyle, Elay Baydabo, Shanbara, Zigula, Gosha9, Mushunguli10, etc.) together with occupational castes (Ybir, Midgan, Tumal, Gacansibir, Muusa Deryo, Ribi, Bon, Kabtol, etc.) inferior groups as compared to pastoralists. Disregard of both kind of people was part of the ideology which magnified the image of pastoral nomads. Among pastoralists could be found the bilis, i.e. “nobles” and among agriculturalists the “slaves” or “ex-slaves”.
* 9 The name Gosha points out at all riverine people of the Juba River.
* 10 Mushunguli is a mangled name for mzigula, i.e. person belonging to the Zigula people; the term has (...)
* 11 Such argument is supported in all three Cerulli’s volumes titled Somalia (1957; 1959; 1964). Howeve (...)
19In the first decades of the twentieth century the Italian colonialists reinforced such an ideology by mistakenly emphasising the pastoralists power over supposedly ex-slaves. The fact that Cerulli puts forward a great deal of evidence against the very inaccuracy of calling “liberti”, i.e. freed slaves, the whole “negro” populations of the Shebeli and Juba Rivers corroborates the argument. It seems that the diplomat was opposing a very common view among colonial officers of the times11.
* 12 In Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana, 73, 1910 (English translation of the author).
20Despite internal divisions and distinctions, at the beginning of this century Italian colonialists paid special attention to the descendants from slaves for their skill in farming. The following paragraph illustrates how this characterisation was linked to the problem of recruiting agricultural manpower: “Hand power in the Benadir is scarce for a complex series of reasons of a moral, economic and demographic kind: [. . .]overall there is a natural slothfulness of pure Somalis towards work in the fields: only slaves and freed slaves practice this dishonourable activity; it is only among them that we gather the small amount of manpower which is available.” 12
21The categorisation of these people according to economic activities, which was drawn in a local existing distinction, was consistent with the viewpoint of the Europeans of the colony. This consonance resulted in the reinforcement of divisions among people because Italians needed farmers for agriculture in the colony. All free people who farmed by tradition, whether slaves or ex-slaves or agriculturalists who had always been free, were basically included into the same category.
22Later, from 1925 to the end of Fascist Rule in Somalia determined in 1941 by the upwind of the British Military Administration, Italians continued to base ethnic categorisations on economic activities, in order to “recruit” people into forced labour to apparently build public infrastructures (Serrazanetti 1933: 20) and work on farms (Del Boca 1992: 203).
23Although they knew that many different lineages and group identities existed among the riverine agriculturalists, Italians did not hesitate to lump them all together into a unique whole of those who could be of some use as forced manpower. An informant imitated an Italian scolding Gosha farmers who attempted to escape conscription with the following words: “I do not accept your saying ‘I am a Mushunguli’, ‘I am a Bartire’, ‘I am a Shabelle’, ‘I am a Cawlyahan’, ‘I am a Marexan’. These do not exist for you. You are lying. You are all Mushunguli Mayasid [Bantu]. You have to participate [in forced labour]” (Besteman 1994: 52).
* 13 Nowadays, people who act this way are called in Somali shegato. This term in Somalia is also used t (...)
24In reality, for the farmers who live along the Rivers in Somalia, claiming membership in a Somali lineage, such as Marrehaan, Cawliyahan, Bartire, etc., can mean two different things: belonging to a group which is under a relation of adoption, patronage or alliance with a certain Somali lineage/ clan or descending from ancestors who had been slaves of people from that lineage. In fact, people might call themselves with the name of their masters; this was, for example, the case of those who had been taken as slaves when they were children, because they did not know their original family names13. In the first instance, the claim can aim at defending one’s rights as people protected by a Somali lineage/clan because in some sort of alliance with it or because descendants of ex-slaves of such lineage/clan. On the other hand, for those Zigula who had obtained their freedom in the territory of the Juba River by winning the war over the Ogaadeen at the turn of the century, the claim of being a Mushunguli (a mangled way of saying Mzigula, i.e. Zigula person) could be part of a strategy to obtain the same rights as “pure Somalis” who were not forced to work in the Italian farms. In other words, claiming a Mushunguli identity might aim at enabling supposedly slave descendants to claim the same status as descendants from free people, like the “pure Somalis”. Under such claim lies the very criteria that authority and dominant position of a group could be based on the autonomous control of a territory by a group and not on the status of people by descent. Finally, the very fact that people claimed such alliances in front of the Italian officer suggests that conscription to forced labour was organised by stressing traditional criteria of alliance and authority; the Somalis with pastoral origins were co-opted in subduing to such labour people with agriculturalist origins.
25Unfortunately, the nature of slavery in Somalia at the turn of the century has not been studied in depth as yet; however, scattered information suggests that mobility among social strata followed criteria nowadays imponderable. For instance, among the Majeerteen the sultan could free a male slave and such slave could then marry a free Somali woman, unlike other freed slaves (Cerulli 1964: 24). And yet, Borana captives were made slaves by the Marrehaan: however, if a Borana woman was taken as a captive, then married a Marrehaan and thereafter delivered a child she became free and equal to any other wife of the Marrehaan (id. 1959: 83).
26The fact that a certain mobility from one social strata to another for individuals and groups existed in Somalia has been overlooked; all “agriculturalists” were homogenised under the label of “liberti”, “freed slaves”, and became farmers who could be forced into labour.
27Along the Shebeli and Juba Rivers, agriculturalists men and women, all considered to be slave descendants or related peoples, were recruited through forced corvées and mostly under the Bertello farming contract (Del Boca 1992). So called “pure Somalis”, possibly bilis or “nobles” were to choose people belonging to those groups who were under their control to be forced into such corvées, under pressure of the colonial government. Chiefs of “docile” and “dedicated” clans had to send a set contribution of manpower to the estates (Serrazanetti 1933: 10-11). In other words, Italian colonialism supported the ethnic division of the Somali population by economic activities, which stigmatised agriculturalists in many aspects.
* 14 Fieldnotes, 1988.
28A singular phenomenon which reinforced only one kind of ethnic identity created a gendered and unequal one: agriculturalists men were co-opted into a policy that restricted agriculturalist women’s freedom in marriages. Men to be conscripted into forced labour were given the right to choose any woman they wanted as a wife, without her consent or that of her relatives (Declich 1995b: 111-113; Menkhaus 1989: 259). New young couples without children were preferred in the estates. The regulation waved new husbands from paying marriage transactions for the spouses (Serrazanetti 1933: 11). Fathers were co-opted into ceding their daughters under threat of being conscripted themselves or their sons (ibid.). It is amazing that, in order to restrain reactions of men against conscription such an abuse of power over women should be authorised to them. Indeed, several demonstrations against conscription were held in the lower Juba area14; yet, many conscripted escaped from estates every where in Somalia (Serrazanetti 1933); however, as informants from the Juba area hinted at with irony, without the company of a woman most young men would have run away from conscription.
* 15 See “Legge sull’eliminazione di alcuni termini indicanti sottocaste”, in Bollettino Ufficiale, Legg (...)
* 16 See, for instance, “Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and Prospects for Peace in Somalia”, Afric (...)
29With Independence (1960) and following the Socialist Revolution (1969), some expressions of tribalism were banned and laws prohibited the use of words which highlighted or signified racial disdain such as addon (slave), Midgan and Ybir (names of some occupational castes), and jareer (i.e. person with curly hair, hinting at a progeny of slaves)15. Despite the apparent effort to eliminate racial discrimination within the country, in practice discrimination continued and worsened with the eruption of the civil war at the end of 199016.
30A local system of oppositions among the others characterises nowadays membership in groups and is matter of distinction within people. A first subdivision distinguishes jareer from jileec. The jareer are those who are said to have curly hair and large noses; these features clearly identify them as originating from East Africa, and associates them with descendants from slaves who are believed to deserve scorn. The jileec are said to be Somalis with straight hair and a long-limbed build. The classification jareer/jileec is based on physical characteristics although not all those who in principle should look like jileec because of clan affiliation have a clear semblance of jileec. In fact, if ideally intermarriages between jileec and jareer do not occur, in practice during the centuries several dynamics, among which some have been described above, have fostered an intermingling of the members of the groups in different ways according to the geographical and political circumstances. The jareer/jileec classification, therefore, is an imprecise one but remains a sensitive issue in terms of identity for the Somali people: it takes a positional meaning depending on the geographical and cultural context in which it is mentioned. For somebody living along the Juba River a jareer who had sleek hair, because of one of her/is ancestors, might be considered slightly an outsider if not proving special commitment with the jareer’s way of life. On the other hand, the very fact of living among jareer makes of such person a jareer in the view of jileec. The jareer are believed to come from agricultural families, whereas the jileec are most often of pastoralist origin. Before the outburst of the civil war in 1990 such distinctions were already stereotypical. However, in the context of daily life relationships, these continued to be powerful distinctions which were used to marginalise jareer from access to jobs, benefits, education and family networks. Yet, descendants from families of ex-slaves in Mogadishu enjoyed some form of protection from the descendants of their relatives’ masters.
31Among the jareer of the riverine area of the Juba, however, other oppositions existed and people classified themselves into many other categories with specific positive and negative connotations. Oral traditions of the Zigulas, for instance, record their liberation from enslavement by escaping en masse, using this to explain why they have kept their Zigula language (Declich 1995b). The Somali Zigula—people who speak the Zigula language—call those who no longer speak a Bantu language “Mahaway”, which is a scoff at their pronunciation of the Somali language. The latter, on the other hand, call themselves Shanbara or Shanbarani which means, descendants from five original brothers who belonged to east African groups such as the Yao, Makua, Nyasa, Nyamwesi and others (id. 1987).
32The word “Bantu” to identify riverine peoples of Somalia was used in colonial times by racist anthropologists, like Puccioni (1937). The term “Negro” was instead used by more accurate Italian colonial officers, among whom the most famous are the lawyer Massimo Colucci (1924) and the orientalist and diplomat Enrico Cerulli. The latter, was in charge of studying Somali dialects at the R. Istituto Orientale in Naples in 1916 (Cerulli 1959: 9) and spent years in the Shebeli valley in Somalia during the first half of the twentieth century (1919-1922). As he attended a great deal of dispute settlements in those years, his reports are invaluable for the details he attaches to the many cases he describes. Puccioni was a member of the school of anthropology in Florence which advocated scientific reasons for the inferiority of the Bantu as a human “race”. Cerulli, using a more accurate approach to the study of the Somali people, clarifies that not all Somali “Bantu” were, indeed, descendants from slaves; rather, they were farmers who had originally inhabited the riverine areas that were later overwhelmed by Galla (i.e. Oromo) and further Somali (Cushitic language speaker) pastoral populations and runaway slaves (id. 1957: 161-163). The fact that they no longer spoke Bantu-based languages did not mean that they had been slaves. As such, Bantu had become a minority in an area largely inhabited by pastoral Somalis and because of their physical semblance to those who had been brought as slaves from the East African Coast, they had all been identified as descendants of slaves.
33Nowadays, within the civil war in Somalia and in the refugee camps, several factors foster the creation of a new ethnic consciousness and its internalisation by those who have been called jareer in Somalia. One such factor is the definition of different levels and strata of beneficiaries for the distribution of humanitarian aid, with the aim of providing equal access to all, in the refugee camps.
The Construction of Bantu Ethnicity in Refugee Camps
34As they arrive in reception areas newcomers are divided into groups usually by lineage, ethnic group, or village of origin (Declich 1995a) and, therefore, “if necessary, by clan” (Gallagher & Forbes Martin 1992: 18). The registration form which is used by UNHCR includes the tribe/clan/sub-clan as information to be gathered about the people who register17. In much literature about Africa the very concept of “tribe” or “clan” has been largely criticised for being inadequate, imprecise and a result of colonialists’ constructions (Iliffe 1979; Hobsbawn & Ranger 1984; Southall 1970; Vail 1989). Although the meaning of the words “tribe” and “clan” may still be unclear, such classification, apparently, is nonetheless useful in order to confer some control and order to the camps, as well as to allow people who trust each other to settle together. Nevertheless, the use of such classifications definitely reinforces certain criteria of hierarchy by lineages. Somalis from a pastoral background are known to be subdivided into patrilineages and the process of registration in the camps may strengthen patrilineal ties, even among those Somali groups for which such ties are not otherwise very important.
* 17 Branch Office for Kenya-Nairobi, Registration Form, UNHCR, n.d.
35People who do not have clear affiliation to Somali patrilineages and who have curly hair are now classified through a process of registration as “Bantu” by the refugee camps authorities. Such classification, has been applied by the UNHCR despite the fact that only a few of them actually speak a Bantu-based language (Declich 1995b). Ironically, the “Bantu” categorisation helps the jareer to increase their visibility in the camps, in which they would have been otherwise marginalised because of racial discrimination. However, the category “Bantu” was completely unknown to them before arriving in the camps. People I knew from Somalia, had never heard the word “Bantu” before, and said “we are now Bantu, we, the Zigula, are called Bantu here in the camp”. In an attempt to endow the jareer with some ethnic dignity and recognition, a field officer classified the Bantu as “Mushunguli” (Lehman 1993); a project manager identified them as Shanbarani—a name farmers of the Juba River who only speak Somali language give to themselves—, because the women she interviewed identified her group as such and distinguished such group from other Bantu in the camp (Musse 1993: 13). The different names people have used for themselves in different contexts in Somalia have been discussed elsewhere (Declich 1987; 1995b).
* 18 “The nightmare continues... Abuses against Somali Refugees in Kenya”, African Rights, September, 19 (...)
36In the camps close to Daddab, the fact that Bantu are considered to be a different sort of people from pastoralist Somalis allows camp authorities to identify them as one vulnerable group. Otherwise, they would risk not receiving the benefits to be distributed. If the Bantu were mixed or hidden among other Somalis, they would risk starvation, because their food would be simply looted. Due to their ill-regarded descent, they have been poorly treated by other Somalis in Somalia and in the camps and have became preferred target of bandits. In keeping with occasional reports by observers that a large number of Bantu have arrived at the frontier in very weak shape (Gallagher & Forbes Martin 1992: 19), conversations and reports of officers working along the Juba River during the war 18confirm that the newlyascribed Bantu categorisation—that had become widespread after 1990 as a result of forced displacement—has been important in affording them visibility.
37The label of “Bantu”, however, has no precise meaning aside from singling out those who do not belong to Somali patrilineages, and thus, is a sort of device used by humanitarian agencies in order to identify this particular kind of beneficiary. On the other side, those who are called Bantu, even if they never defined themselves as such before then, for the first time in the camps meet vested interests in being pulled together under the same umbrella name. Not the jareer classification, as it was used in Somalia, nor the fact of being all agriculturalists, had been strong enough reasons to foster a common consciousness among these marginalised people in Somalia. In the camps, however, it has become clear that these people are a minority group and would have problems in receiving benefits if these were to be channelled through key persons among the Somali patrilineages.
* 19 See Africa Report, May-June, 1995: 25.
38Moreover, such non-affiliation has already put them at risk in Kenya due to lack of responsibility/guarantee in terms of bloodwealth. At the beginning of their stay in the camps, the Bantu became an easier target than others for bandits and/or thieves and women were raped in such occasions. Different groups of bandits and thieves, both Kenyans and Somalis, were raiding the refugee camps especially attracted by the distribution of items. In order to defend themselves, the Bantu had to arrange to reside next to each other in the three camps, and, autonomously fenced their quarters with thorny shrubs to constitute fortified compounds 19(Lehman 1993: 6). Moreover, they made bows and arrows and kept stores of stones to scare bandits and thieves who, for this reason, became afraid to approach their compounds.
Downplaying Female Gender in the New Ethnic Construction
39Undoubtedly, identifying the Bantu as a different ethnic group from other Somalis may help them to be protected, and to receive a share of the benefits provided by humanitarian agencies which they need in order to survive displacement. In other words, this strategy worked as a way to defend their access to benefits, incentives and, ultimately, human rights. In fact, by being allowed to settle together in one area of the camp, the so-called Bantu can benefit from channels of distribution managed by their own representatives, rather than by other Somali groups. However, it is exactly by claiming such equal access to benefits, combined with the “emergency” situation, that officers in the camp make choices which downplay the importance of women’s roles in crucial decision making processes. I would like to dwell on the usual procedure that officers apply to foster some participation in decision making in the refugee camps. This entails singling out those seen to be responsible persons, who wield some authority and control over groups of people, to be recognised as heads of clusters of compounds within the camps. They become councillors of sorts, who represent the wishes of the groups. Using such a method and participatory approach, a group of Bantu male elders were settled together in the refugee camp of Dagahaley.
* 20 Ibid.: 5.
40In March 1994, I had the chance to meet them. They were identified as the ones responsible for clan subdivisions among the Bantu refugees. The elders had prepared a statement about their wish to be resettled in Tanzania, where they hoped to find land, start agriculture, and reconstruct a living. Yet, also to some UNHCR representatives resettlement in an African country appeared to be a concrete, plausible, and durable alternative to the forced displacement of Somali Bantu. The area along the Juba River was not peaceful enough for repatriation, nor was a safer situation envisaged in the near future. Some Bantu lands had been invaded and most of the Bantu who remained were forced to share crops with newly arrived masters20. Moreover, the racial discrimination these people had suffered in Somalia and would have to face again if they returned there, were other considerations. The concern of the UNHCR’s officers for this marginal group was perfectly understandable and praiseworthy and a good reason for considering their resettlement in another area where they could practice agriculture again. Daddab is located in a dry area where scarcity of water prevents cultivations from taking place on a large scale. It is likely that most of the Bantu, if asked, would have endorsed the idea of finding a resettlement area in another African country for their families.
41What was questionable, however, was the criteria of “representativeness” which was used to gather this group of male elders. The elders were supposed to represent each of the lineages/tribes/clans, or whatsoever these unexplained words meant, among the Bantu; the nature of such “ethnic” sections for the Bantu was not clear to the field officers of the camp. Yet, the Bantu themselves, had learned in Somalia that it was safer to keep underneath, without disclosing, their own traditional ways of being; rather, they should adapt publicly to what they were requested to be in order to be accepted among the Somali (Declich 1995b). The officers, therefore, assumed that, at registration, new arrivals to the camp declared their clanic subdivision, and that these were structured, more or less, as they were among Somalis. The assumption was that their “clans” must have been something like patrilineages. Accordingly, in order to foster a participation process representatives should be selected by field officers for each of the subdivisions (mviko and/or kolwa) of the “Bantu”: Makua, Yao, Nyasa, Zigula, Zalamo, etc. The point is that these “representatives” had never been recognised as such in Somalia because a pyramidal structure based on linear descent did not exist. No one, for example, during fieldwork in Somalia had ever claimed to be the chief of the Zalamo subdivision, which was a very small group of people. I suspect that the name Zalamo was, possibly, a loan word from the Tanzanian group living in the vicinity of Dar-es-Salaam, with whom the Bantu of the camp attempted to establish a fictive connection. In other words, in consideration of previous data about them in Somalia, I had the clear impression that through the camp’s experience those elders had been given the chance to negotiate their own power space within their group.
42The choice which the officers made, although driven by an understandably scarce knowledge of the kinship system of the Bantu, seemed to me even more cryptic because I knew the nature of the lineage system among the so-called “Bantu”. These Bantu do not have patrilineages, nor do they have chiefs who wield power over people of the same patri-lines. The mviko groups are mostly matri-kin groupings, namely, group of people united by the fact of recognising common female ancestors, deputed to the management and organisation of mviko rituals; the heads of such rituals are not necessarily men and most people can claim belongings to mviko of the father’s and mother’s line (id. 1994: 199, 203-204; 1995b: 107-108). As rituals are important in a public context, mainly because of their prophetic aspects, people involved in the organisation of such rituals, men or women, have a certain influence, sometimes a strong one, in the public life of their group. From an individual point of view, although the matri-kin grouping of the mother is the most important to anybody’s life, people can also claim belonging to the matri-kin grouping of the father, depending on the situation and the need for certain rituals. While the kinship system provides an opportunity to emphasise both the mother’s and father’s lines, in the camp only the father’s line was given recognition by the UNHCR authority.
43One could claim that all criteria of representativeness are questionable in one way or another because they always exclude someone from direct decision making; yet, some sort of screening, as well as negotiation of power, occurs in any case. This commonly occurs among refugees. For instance a recent article argues that the elite of refugees from Burundi eventually acquire a special role (Sommers 1995). However, it is not at all clear why women should be the ones who become marginal in the new invention of political representatives.
* 21 For clarifications about such ethnic groups see Declich (1995b and 1987).
44Certainly the plight, constraints and risks of remaining in the vicinity of the camps and the general context has reinforced the common feelings of Bantu men and women, that they were all once marginalised, and that they were sharing similar needs and desires for the future. It was the first time, in fact, since fieldwork in Somalia, that I had seen Zigula and Shanbara 21joining together towards reaching the same aim and supporting the same requests in a non Muslim religious context. During peaceful times in Somalia, divisions were also emphasised, at times (Declich 1995b), in order to describe one’s identity and difference. However, for some reason, possibly shaped by the situation of emergency, women in such a new ethnic unity were not provided for as public actors, nor even given the chance. In other words, a new ethnic invention was taking place and male elders were called to publicly construct it, leaving apart women.
45When such processes occur in the field, it is difficult to disentangle what really happened while the participatory process was being established. If questioned about the way the elder representatives were selected in a group, managers commonly give many good reasons why men had to be chosen, neglecting women. Explanations such as “. . .when we did ask for representatives from the Bantu, we were pointed toward these men”, or “women would have been more at risk if they were put in such a group of elders” or “this matter was a concern of the male elders and we got them together in order to give them voice” or “the issue of resettlement is such a difficult one that there is more chance to succeed if male elders present the requests for resettlement” are put forward. However, by knowing the nature of matri-kin groupings among the Bantu and the non-existence of patrilineages like those of other Somalis, a question arises about whether none of the field officers 1) thought about looking for both, women and men representatives and 2) knew that women, as well as men, discuss whether they prefer to be resettled in Tanzania or somewhere else. Moreover, women were among the people who most felt at risk of being raped in the camps, especially if they found themselves without partners; it would seem logical to have female elder representative of them to be involved in decisions about leaving the camp.
46At any rate, as a result of all these conditions, the group of elders who were called together to analyse the feasibility or interest of a goal such as a group resettlement, only included men. In other words, no women elders were summoned to discuss the issue nor were women elders consulted to give their point of view on the idea of resettlement for the entire group. Women were left to speak among themselves about possible resettlement without be given a public space to express so, unlike male elders. The pattern of male representation established among the Somali Zigula during colonial time and followed by the Somali governments was repeated by representatives of the international community in the very person of the UNHCR’a officers.
47Besides the actual marginalisation women experience in such a decision making context for the specific issue of resettlement of the group, an important point is the influence such a choice may have on those women for the future. Elder and younger mostly uneducated women who for the first time enter an “international” context or community so directly may believe that in what they see as “modern” social contexts is not appropriate that women decide over the movement of their group or have not the right to do so, as it is shown to them by the officers of the humanitarian aid system. For the first time in centuries, the Bantu found themselves in a context where they are not discriminated against as a group. This brought about a relaxation of social tensions within the Bantu community so that, for example, women did not pay much attention to their public role being downplayed.
48The point is how influential can be such a negligence over the confidence of those elder and younger women as regards the appropriateness of their actions in the new international context, their appropriateness in such context and their right to decide over the movement of the entire group.
49In other words, the crucial choice of neglecting women elders was made with the commendable aims of supporting the rights of the “Bantu” group to seek a durable solution to displacement and of encouraging participation within the camp’s decision making system. Nevertheless, this choice had influential structural effects on power relations between genders within the public domain.
50Whether unintentional or for reasons deemed to be acceptable, the organised provision of international humanitarian aid wielded considerable power in the group’s gender relations, affecting both authority and personal identity. First, the procedure recognised the authority of male elders as important, while ignoring female elders in the camp; in fact, male elders were called to discuss the future plans and movements of the whole group in a plight, whereas female elders were not consulted and, therefore, excluded from public authority, with few chances to reverse the decisions. In the “Bantu” villages in Somalia, there were certain aged women with special authority as regards either ritual performances or other activities at the village level. It is not clear the reason why this sort of leaders were not singled out rather a new sort of ethnic chiefs was supported and given authority through the participation exercise. Secondly, only one kind of individual identity was reinforced and imbued with the status of being “relevant”: that which highlights membership in matri-kin groupings, as if they were patrilineages. In other words, the personal identity which is recognised as relevant within the camp is one for which the representative must be a male elder. Importance was attributed to the matri-kin group of the father, rather than the reverse.
51In conclusion, a rationale which was, perhaps, unconscious, underlined the procedure for managing camp’s issues. Camp personnel assumed first, that the “clanic” system of the Bantu, whatever this could mean, was strictly patrilineal, and second that, in patrilineal systems, women have no rights or choices to decisions about where to move with the family or group in future years. This of course would even be a misunderstanding in treating the actual patrilineal Somalis this way. All these assumptions, embedded in the procedural system of the UNHCR, concretely disempowered women in their possible future “resettlement” in Tanzania or elsewhere. Ironically, this happened also to Bantu speakers among the Somali Bantu, such as the Zigula, who maintain strong oral traditions about their previous forced displacements. In such traditions, women had an important role: the most famous personality in their oral narratives is a woman heroine, Wanankhucha, who lead the largest groups of them away from slavery. She is said to have been a prophet and diviner (mganga) who organised the flight from the Somali villages where the Zigula had been captives. She is remembered as having fostered community feeling among the Zigula by organising repeated performances of traditional Zigula songs. During the flight she was able to help the Zigula avoid danger by means of her divination and visions (ibid.: 105-108; Cassanelli 1987: 221; Grottanelli 1953).
Powerlessness and Persecution of Women by Rape
52In interviews with women and men in the refugee camps, most of whom had been my acquaintances in Somalia five to eight years previously, the major factors which they then asserted provoked their flight from Somalia became clear. Especially, at the end of 1991 and early 1992, raids by armed thieves and bandits increased. Refugees remembered that, in order to obtain money, food, clothes and other available items, bandits did not hesitate to commit crimes of many sorts and would threaten, kill, and/or if the victim was a woman, rape, those who did not surrender.
53Rape had become so frequent that, whenever women left the village to fetch firewood, they risked multiple rape. Almost all of the twenty women interviewed had been raped once, yet, parties of bandits commonly groupraped individual women. Another way to convince victims to surrender their property was to rape a woman in front of her relatives. Description of the brutal cases which occurred would be endless and I only mention one such narrative story here. One woman recounted that she would never forget the image of her friends chased by bandits. They were two sisters one of whom was pregnant. The women attempted to escape from gunmen, who wanted to rape them, by running towards the river. The pregnant sister could not run fast enough and was shot dead; the other sister, however, managed to escape by crossing the crocodile-infested water. Suffice it to say that rape was always mentioned by both women and men as a very good reason to seek a safer home.
54A male acquaintance of mine from Somalia explained why he had decided to flee. After repeated theft of food from his household, the choice was to flee or to remain at home without food and endure the regular rape of young women (daughters, wives, nieces and granddaughters) before his eyes. Adolescent females of thirteen to fifteen years of age were at the greatest risk of rape. Bandits generally preferred to rape young women. If they happened to arrive at night, bandits would rape both younger and older women, but if they arrived during the day they would only pick the younger ones. This acquaintance reported that before the 1992, when he flew from the Juba, in his village of origin, not less than two hundred women were raped out of approximately 1,500 female inhabitants. He warned me that many women do not admit to having been raped, because they are ashamed.
* 22 See Information Bulletin, UNHCR, February 1994: 7; Refugee Women Victims of Violence. A Special Pro (...)
55Although, in 1994, the camps surrounding Daddab were still rather insecure for women, who continued to be raped when they left the camp to collect firewood or when bandits would attack the camp to steal22, such sexual persecution seemed to be less common than when the refugees were settled along the Juba River.
56Another striking memory was that bandits would steal everything, even clothes, often leaving the victim almost naked. More than one woman claimed that her clothes had been stolen after she had been raped. This practice demonstrates that assailants had reached an exceptional and excessive level of cruelty. Leaving someone who has already been abused, without anything, even clothes, marks a wish to render this person completely defenceless, i.e. unable even to present herself among other human beings.
* 23 See UNHCR, October 1993: 4, op. cit.
57I was told that a new cloth was one of the very few commodities that people, who could prepare their “luggage” before escaping from Somalia, carried with them; in order to avoid theft, this was hidden among the old rags they used to wear in Kisimayu. The possibility of wearing a nice, clean and “respectable” cloth was viewed as an important part of one’s identity. This symbol of clothing parallels its significance among women victims of violence in the refugee camp. As social workers have noted, women who were forced to continue wearing the same clothes in which they had been assaulted, faced severe psychological problems23.
58The experience of rape and the prospect of facing it again permanently alters women’s hopes for the future and, specifically, their plans about where they would like to settle next. One woman said: “We saw such terrible things. They raped everyone; I would like to return to Somalia, but the very idea that the war could begin there again, stops me.” Another woman emphasised the point that the memories of the violence that she witnessed and suffered could jeopardise her future pregnancies.
59In short, starvation and sexual violence, perceived as persecution were mentioned as the most important factors for fleeing Somalia during war. The rape of women created a context of powerlessness for both men and women during the war. Although sexual persecution was directed towards women, men were also humiliated by being forced to watch their relatives raped in front of them. Such feeling powerlessness was in addition to the usual impotence which characterises life conditions refugee camps.
Some Characteristics of Powerlessness: Alteration of Production/Reproduction Relationships
60One characteristic of Somali refugees in Daddab is that they have undergone a process of alteration in the production/reproduction relationships within the group. Refugees in the camp cannot produce for their own consumption nor is any improvement envisaged in the immediate future. This entails different problems depending upon the main economic activity of the Somali group involved. Whatever the main economic activity of the group, whether pastoral or agricultural, people without a means of production are unable to maintain the roles which are usual to gender in daily life. For instance, female farmers who are used to grow vegetables and sell them in the market, find themselves without the activity which allows them some control over their income; male farmers who do not have a plot of land where to grow staple food have no means to provide their wives with the prescribed daily maintenance. Pastoral women without camels are in trouble because their usual activity of distributing and selling milk is not possible any longer and young men are not ascribed their traditional responsibility of grazing cattle in the bush. In other words, most of the activities women and men of different ages perform daily are no longer possible.
61In the camps, both pastoral and agricultural people have no work and, almost literally, nothing to do during the day. For agriculturalists in 1994 there was not enough water to practice agriculture, and the few small gardens which had been set up by NGOs to produce vegetables could not be expanded because they consumed too much of the little water resources available in the camp. Traditional means of production for agriculturalists, such as the availability of fertile land to cultivate for both male and female farmers, were not forthcoming. Similarly, pastoral people had no way of maintaining their productive activities: most of the families had lost their camels and cows, and women no longer had goats. Even if all pastoral people had been provided with animals to raise, these activities would not have been sustainable because of obvious environmental constraints. There was neither sufficient water nor grass in the area for many big herds of camels, cattle or sheeps/goats.
* 24 As also reported in Gallagher & Forbes Martin (1992: 23).
62For the refugees, permanence in the camps means passing through a stage in which both men and women are deprived of the chance, albeit for insurmountable reasons, to maintain their productive roles. Such conditions put them in a rather weak position. In fact, the absence of productive roles in a refugee camp not only aggravates the lack of food and commodities that could be produced and then exchanged or sold: this absence also causes refugees to lose the daily life context in which their actions have some effects that they can control and to lose the sense that they can support themselves through their own work. In these terms, the very few productive activities in which Somalis could engage affected women and men equally, in terms of the control on their own lives. Although women continued to perform some of their “domestic” activities like cooking and taking care of the children24, it should not be underestimated that Somali women, both from a pastoral and an agricultural background, have always played an important role in productive activities as well. This role used to give them some control over the production of food for household consumption, as well as leverage in household decisions; cooking and distributing food that has been autonomously produced is different from doing the same with scarce rations, received from outside authorities. Such a feeling was epitomised by a common saying: “When we go back home we will not even be able to prepare tea for our own pleasure.”
63The change in the system of supplying goods for their survival created opportunities to renegotiate the control of provision and distribution channels; moreover, also provided a new arena for such renegotiation. This was because the control over resources, which was at the base of power dynamics within the group and between genders, no longer went through the same channels. Moreover, the new channels for distributing goods become arenas in which hopes for a future and survival are at stake.
64Individual and social dynamics were transformed by the arrival of convoys carrying food and non-food items for the supply of the camps. In 1994, the number of assaults and attacks on the camps by bandits increased on the days assigned to food distribution, when distribution vehicles were kidnapped and bandits attacked convoys transporting provisions. It was not only UNHCR that had to adopt measures to control and protect food provisions; each group of refugees and/or families also had to take particular care to defend their supplies. When provisions were available in the households, they had successfully avoided many chances of being stolen. The power wielded by distributors was magnified in relation to the powerlessness existing in the camps.
Distributing Benefits...
65It is precisely in the mechanisms for distributing benefits that outsiders, such as humanitarian and emergency aid agencies, become important and terribly potent in managing new sources of power, in predetermining opportunities and in offering capabilities (Sen 1994: 63-67, 1993: 86-87) to one individual in preference to another. Benefits do not only include goods needed for survival, such as food, housing and cooking material, but also other incentives, such as employment opportunities, which can change a refugee’s life forever.
66One case in point is illustrated by the story of a Zigula woman who had been a teacher and farmer when she lived in Somalia. I met her again after seven years in the Ifo camp where she was appointed as a social worker, because she knew how to read and write. Among Somali farmers this is a rather rare skill because, after literacy campaigns in the 1970’s, the level of education in rural areas was not been maintained; the woman had been educated by missionaries when she was a girl and had been chosen because she was an orphan. Between 1986 and 1988, in many villages of the Lower Juba district in Somalia the schools opened for just a few days due to the low salaries teachers received. As the school was opened only sporadically until the war broke out, the teacher had not practised her skills much in recent years; at the time, I almost doubted that she remembered how to read and write.
67After having escaped from Somalia where she had left her husband, however, and after having spent two years in the Ifo refugee camp together with her five children, she had undergone remarkable changes. She spoke much better Italian than she had six years previously in Somalia, was learning some English, and spoke Kiswahili as well. She was eager to find a way for her children to study, because she realised how important such skills had been for her survival after displacement. While working as a social worker, she had been sent to Tanzania for a short training course on bookkeeping and micro-credit for small enterprises; when I offered some money for the time she had spent accompanying me in the camp, she wanted me to show her a dollar bill, because she had never seen one before since mostly only trade men dealt with this currency. She considered whether she should ask me for Kenyan shillings or US dollars, and asked if dollars could be used anywhere in the world and if Kenyan shillings were valid in Europe. Moreover, being a social worker, she was in a key position to distribute commodities in the camp. Since it was she who made the lists of the families, she controlled how many items would be distributed to each person on distribution days.
68In other words, she used me as an informant since I had no vested interests in manipulating her and she took every opportunity to obtain new or better jobs. As a social worker, she was lucky to find herself in the right position to strategise in the distribution of commodities within the camp and, like other social workers, she played the game. She had been chosen as a social worker because she had the skills and was a single woman with children.
Micro-mechanisms of Empowerment and Disempowerment
69Simple and basic mechanisms like those described (new ethnic construction and job incentives) may appear small and rather irrelevant as compared to the need to solve problems as quickly as possible in the disrupted situation of a refugee camp. Some rationales for actions and choices are based upon the need for moving fast in order to solve problems. Other actions are justified as avoidance of problems connected with including women in the decision making process, whereas particular attention should be given to the effects of empowerment or disempowerment entailed in most actions taken.
* 25 See one for all Harrell-Bond (1986).
70Whatever the choices made, in fact, they carry long lasting consequences in the power relations between genders within a group. Many writers 25have highlighted the powerlessness that a camp’s life entails for male and female refugees. In this context of powerlessness, actions undertaken by those who manage the camps may have the strength to support or devalue certain groups or classes of people. Because people, women in this case, are in so powerless context do not complain nor find opportunities for resisting. The gravity of the situation, combined with the expectations created by the very recognition of a group of male elders by camp authorities could become strong enough reasons for female refugees not to complain about the lack of recognition of their role. This may be true especially for people like the Bantu who, after having been marginalised in their country for more than a century, are particularly pleased that outsiders have finally shown some trust in the group. Their desire for a future without war might be even stronger than for others, as well as their willingness to surrender their traditional power, if they can avoid the persecution they have undergone in the distant and recent past.
Tribal Labelling as a Way to Strengthen Patrilineal Hierarchies?
71In a refugee camp, therefore, people are categorised by “tribes”, not very differently from the way they were during colonial times, because of insufficient knowledge and for practical reasons on the part of camp authorities. The consequences of labelling, however, may differ according to historical contexts. In Somalia at the beginning of the century, the ethnic categorisation “Bantu” satisfied the need for singling out a class of agricultural labourers. There were no distinctions by gender and such categorisation served, during the Fascist rule in Somalia, to conscript people to forced labour and “Bantu” women to forced marriages and forced labour (Declich 1995b: 111-113). A question rises as to whether a tribal classification should imply supporting the authority of men over women or whether there can be different and more accurate patterns of actions.
72In a refugee camp, ethnic classifications seem to satisfy the need for defining beneficiaries of certain commodities (food and non-food items of humanitarian aid in this case), as well as for fostering an “equal” distribution of benefits. However, a tribal label may not meet the interests of all beneficiaries. Rather, humanitarian and international agencies may support or create a new hierarchy among people, through tribal classification, in order to be able to distribute benefits.
73*
74In conclusion, humanitarian aid systems act through organising and distributing commodities, food and shelter materials in camps. The benefits distributed (e.g. food, housing, etc.) become not just goods needed for survival, but potential opportunities for camp residents to renegotiate their power, within the camp. Power within the camp, however, may also mean power in the future, after the camp’s life.
75The situation of powerlessness which is created in a refugee camp endows the humanitarian aid system with considerable power over refugees’ lives. In such a context, refugees need recognition from the outside because one of the traditional systems of managing power, based on the control of the means of production, is no longer in their hands. Key positions of control in the distribution of commodities and decision making in the camp become sources of power. When these are held unequally by men and women, such positions already have an a priori influence over the future development of gender relationships within a group. Although people react differently to similar pressures based upon a variety of factors, such as their traditions, cultural background, and historical experience, processes in a refugee camp may favour certain groups and objectives over others. This is especially true with regards to new opportunities and benefits, etc., presented to men and women after displacement.
76Because people respond differently to similar options and opportunities, it is not possible to forecast with certainty subsequent cultural changes; it is important, however, to highlight the micro-dynamics which endow some people with authority and disempower others.
77* University of Urbino, Urbino, 1997.
If it was impossible to recruit a big enough group along patrilineal principles – whether due to the distance from other segments of one’s own clan, or to its limited demographic growth –
there was still the option of forming diya-paying groups with segments of other clans in the
same position, on a contractual basis. The principle of tol, of patrilineal descent, or the
segmentary lineage system, and, the principle of xeer (heer), the association by contract, were
the two recruitment mechanisms used to constitute the divisions of Somali society; divisions
which were internally peaceful, but tendentially aggressive towards outsiders. Xeer were
contracts between equals. Groups that were too small or weak to present themselves as
independent partners in a contractual arrangement could also enter into pseudo-kinshiprelations
with stronger groups. These relationships are called sheegat from the verb
sheeganaya, “I name”. In this case one names the forefathers of another group as one’s own,
that is, one subordinates oneself to it in terms of genealogy. In any event, one’s chances of
survival depend on support from a powerful group. This principle is aptly reflected in the
Somali motto, “either be a mountain, or else lean against one (Lewis 1961, 1962, 1972).
Cunning is a highly-valued cultural attribute among Somali. And it is regarded as highly
cunning to break a contractual agreement, whether it be based on xeer or on sheegat, at an
opportune moment. Like the stories of the Icelandic Vikings or of Byzantine court intrigues,
Somali history bristles with treachery and massacres of former protectors. The latter are
struck down and robbed of their women and herds the moment their dependents have grown
strong enough under their protection.23
23 Cf. e. g. Turnbull 1955: 2 et passim, Schlee 1989: 46f. That the Somali place cultural value on cunning, and
that a well-staged swindle is much admired, can be inferred from a series of folk tales collected by Muuse Haaji
Ismaa’iil Galaal, edited by B.W. Andrzejewski, (1956). Cf. e. g. no. 4, p. 33, which is reproduced here in my
own translation from the Somali:
Cousin, teach me cunning!
One day a man came to another. He said: “I would like you to teach me cunning.” The other replied: “Milk your
camel for me!” So the man milked his camel for him, and when he had drunk the milk, the one who had brought
the milk said: “And now, teach me cunning!” Whereupon the other said: “I’ve done that already. I’ve had your
milk, haven’t I?” The man’s mouth dropped open in surprise.
16
The ever-present threat of treachery restricted the growth of internally peaceful and
cooperative groups. The tendency of groups to become larger, thus reducing the individual’s
risks vis-à-vis dangers from the outside, was countered by suspicion of distant clan kin and
allies from other clans, which produced a tendency towards fission, and thus a reduction in
group size.
However, a series of factors caused the tendency towards unity to outweigh the tendency
towards division, and thus larger groups were formed. First of all, obviously, there was the
threat from outside. Then the skill of politically gifted personalities also contributed. While
simple Somalis often married within their own clans, and being relatives, were released from
paying part of the brideprice, leaders often contracted strategic marriages across clan
boundaries. Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, who defied several colonial powers at once
from 1900-1920, made extensive use of this mechanism.
Dir Rooble beesha Damal Muuse sheegatay ee Gaboose Ka soo Jeedo
WAXAAN WARSAN LAHAA DIRKA KOONFURTA DAGAN ANIGOO AH NIN MAJEERTEENA INA DHALEEN DIR ROOBLE MAXAA AY KU DHACDAY IN AY ABTIYAASHEEY OO GABOOSAYAASHA AHAA IN AY ISAGA HAYAAMAN GALKACAYO AYAGOO WAQOOYI AADAY SHEEGTAYNA ISAAQ. MAXAA KEENAY DHIBKAAN? WAA RUN DAD BADAN OO LADHASHAY ABTIYAASHEY WAA JOOGAAN GALKACAYO LAAKIN HADA QUNYAR SOCOD AYAY NOQDEEN DAD KALENA WEY KU HOOS JIRAAN OO DIR AH DAGANA GALKACAYO OO AYAGU GACANTA HAYN JIREEN INTII AYSAN DIR ROOBLE FASHILMIN OO U KALA BIXIN QAAR ISAAQ OO MAGAC CUSUB SHEEGTA IYO KUWOO DIRNIMADOODI SHEEGTA LAAKINSE KA XISHOODA MAGACII HOREE AY LAHAYEEN KUN TIIRSAN DAD KALE??
ABTIYAASHEEY DAGEYSO GABEYGAAN LA TIRIYAY 1909 KII OO SAYIDKU MAJEERTEEN LAF DHAN OO DIR ROOBLE LA DHAHO KU ABTIRSATA . DIREEY MA WAXAAD DHEHEYSAAN MAJEERTEEN OO ILAA INTAAS KU ABTIRSADAY GABOOSE CIDIISA ILAA 800 SANO MANTA MAGACII MA JIRO OO WAA LAGA TANASULAY.???? AQRI GABEYGA CIID XIRSI, GALKACAYO 2005
http://www.aftahan.com/gabayo/sayid/bahdir%20rooble.htm
Bah dir Rooble
Hordhac: Majeerteen iyo Boqor Cismaan ayuu Sayidku gabaygan u tiriyey isagoo difaacayey Daraawiishta iyo halgankoodii oo Boqor Cismaan laf-dhuungashay ku noqday:
Bahdir inay majnuun wada tahaan marag u haystaaye
Waa niman masakhan oon ahayn midhaha Daaroode
Waa niman siddii Moolaadhabe miciya dheerdheere
Waa niman maddada oo cir weyn oo masiiba ahe
Waa niman lafaha mudhuxsadoon muruqna reebayne
Waa niman haddad min u furtoo malab durduursiiso
Ama aad maqaarreyda geel xero u meegaarto
Waa niman inay mahad naqaan laga malaynayne
Cir milshiyey dhulkoo malaf ka baxay maalka oo dararay
Waa niman martidu eeyan tegin madal ay joogaane
Waa niman madaal inay baxshaan loogu muhanayne
Waa niman haddaad gabadh markab ah maqaasiinka u geyso
Wuxuu fiidka horre mayracoo marakabeeyaaba
Waa niman masaladood jabtoo hooyadood mira e
Waa niman misciliisha ugu jira sina u meerkeede
waa niman candhada laga maraa milil ka dhiiqaaye
Waa niman maruubada la’oo minidu dhaaftaaye
Waa niman siddiii mowle bahal laga mareertaaye
Waa niman mareeg lagu dabraa sida maliid awre
Waa niman madhuushoodu tahay mooye qaab darane
Waa niman margigu siiban yahay iyo mataanuhuye
Waa niman macaankii jannada meel aan ku lahayne
Waa niman futadu maastahoo duud maloogna ahe
Waa niman miskaha lagala dhacay qaare madax weyne
Waa niman minjuhu ay yihiin miiqan taag darane
Gabaygaa ha laguu maadsadee mariya oo geeya
Markab nagaga sii qaada oo meel walba u dhoofsha
Nimankii makhaayadaha fadhiyey naga mihiibsiiya
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ciid saxiibow ilaaha cadil ah maxaa isku cebeyneysaa oo laan gaabyasha abtiyaashaa u soo bandhigeysaa. Saar, sheegad, laangaab magan sheegte iyo dad liitaa ka dhashatee
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Cayda ma haboona, Dir Rooble waa Dir wali oo meel dheer ma aadin, Habar Yonis waa niman oo dir ah maahe Dirna gala marka Dirtaan dagan mudug waa Dir waana maahe Dir marka Dir Rooble hadii ay Maahe Dirka Mudug dagan ka wareegsadeen oo tolkood oo Habar Yoonis ah sheegtaan saad adigu leedahay ha sheegtaan. Laakin adiga Majeerteenow yaa kuu sheegay in isirka Dir Rooble ka soo jeedin Habar Yonis oo aad ugu riixeydaa Dirka Mudugta.
Dirka Muduga waxa ay sheegaan saan:
Dir Rooble wax la yidhi odeyga Saleeban Cabdalle ayaa bari hore helay Gabar wiil yar wadata oo la yiraahdo Rooble oo saxaraha ku luntay ninkii qabeyna dhintay. Waxa ay sheegtay in uu adeer wiilka yar u yahay Saleeban Cabdalle waayo in uu dhalay nin Maxamed Xiniftire ah. Saleeban cabdaale mudo ka dib ayuu guursaday gabadhii wexeyn u dhashay Cismaan Saleeban Cabdalle. Marka Dir Rooble iyo Cismaan Habar isku hooyo ayeey noqdeen. Afarta Cabdaale wax ay shhegi Jireen in ay leeyihin labo adeer oo kala ah Dir Rooble iyo Habar Deel. Rag badan oo ay ka mid yihiin Ina iigare oo askari ingiriiska u ah iyo Cabdullahi Qarsho iyo Ilmo Gabooseba Dir Rooble ayay ku abtirsadaan. Suurrah ayeyna meel walb la daganayeen. Arintu iyadoo saa tahay ayaan waxan ka war helany Dir Rooble ay yihiin Damal Muuse (Habar Yoonis). Callaa kuli xaal Rooble ama Damal waa niman tolka ah oo Cismaan Saleeban Cabdaale la dhashay. Wixii kale Allahu Yaclam.
posted to The History of the Dir People.. at Sat Apr 02 02:22:40 EST 2005.Posted: Fri Aug 17, 2007 11:00 pm Post subject: DIR ROOBLE,DAMAL MUUSE (HABAR YOONIS)
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waraa adi nimankaan sheegadka ah ha difaacin wana sheegeysaaa in ay Saleeban Cabdalle heleen naag uur leh. okey, odeygaad ku abtirsaneysidna waa aroosay aad leedahay oo qeyb adinka idin ka midaa Dir Rooble ilmo Habreeda la ah. Iisheeg xayawanyow wecelkii aad sheegtay iyo wecelkii aad dhehysid anakaadhalnay na is raacino. ani galgaduudaan ka imaaday....1980kii waxaan ogahay ragaas kuwii magacoodi bedeshay la racadeeyay kuwii soo harayna ----ceeb badanaa dhacaday oo wiil iyo walalkiis iyo aabe iyo wiilkiis aa wax kala sheegtay qaarna waa bexeen oo guure
Gabey aaba jiray: oo Beesha Dir Rooble ugu weyn Galin Saciid aa la dhahaa lagu cayay oo ahaa: Galin Saciid waa garacyo gugana rooble sheegta jilaakana geed damal ku abtirsada wax saasa. waxna jirtay in 4 nin oo ayaka ah ay dileen mareexan dhanka xadka Galgaduud oo magtoodina qadan kariwaayeen ilaa laba nin oo kuwii la dilay ay sheegteen laf Dir ah oo magtii loo raadshay
Posted: Sat Aug 16, 2007 5:23 pm Post subject: Bah dir Rooble
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HAL WAX AYAA LAGU HAYSTAA RAGAAN
DHABATADA UGU WEYN EE HAYSATA RAGAN DIR ROOBLE LOO AQOON JIRAY WAXA AY TAHAY:
1000 SAN0 DIR ROOBLE AYAA LOO AQOON JIRAY BEESHAAN, XITAA GABAYADII SAYID MAXAMED CABDULE XASAN GABEY DHEER OO LA DHAHO BAH DIR ROOBLE OO UU KU DACAYADEYNAYO MAJERTEEN BAH DIR AYAA JIRAY,MAR KALIYAATAA, MALIN MALIMAH KA MID AH SANADKU MARKUU AHAA 1978 KII AYAY WAX AY BILAABEEN IN AY H.YOONIS SHIRAR IS DABAJOOGA LA GALAAN, WAXANA LAGU AMRAY IN AY ISTICMAALAN MAGAC CUSUB (DAMAL MUUSE) DIB DANBENA LOOGA MAQAL DIR ROOBLE!!!!!!
MACQUUL MIYAA IN NIN MAGAC LOO YAQAANAY 1000 SANO KU DHAWAD OO AY KU ABTIRSADAAN BEELO DHAN OO MAJEERTEENA (BAH DIR ROOBLE) IN MALIN KALIYA UU BADALO MAGICIISI.
MAANTA NIN DADKAASA OO WAQOOYIDAGAN MAGACAA MA SHEEGTO, MAXAA DHACAY?
MIDA KALE WAXAA JIRA ILAA HADA BEESHAN DIR ROOBLE IN LABO NIN OO WALAALO AH MIDNA DIIDO HABAR YOONIS MIDNA WAQOOYI UU JOOGO OO SHEEGTO MAGACAA CUSUB.
BUUGATII ISTACMAARKA INGIRISKA AY U MEERIYEEN ODAYASHA HABAR YOONIS WAX DAMAL MUUSE LA DHAHO KUMA JIRIN.
MARKA DIR ROOBLE WAXAAN KA CODSANAYAA HORTA IN AY ISICMAALAN MAGAC ABAHOOD--DIR ROOBLE-- KADIB WAXA AY DOONAN HA SHEEGTAN -- H.YONIS AMA WAX KALE.
WAXAA HADA KA HORE AAN KULA KULMAY ODAYAAL D.ROOBLE AH HARGEYSA WAXAANAN KU IRI AYAAN DARO AYAA IDIN HAYSATA REER SHEIKH ISXAAQ MANTA IYAAGII AYAA DIRNIMO SHEEGANAYA-- IDINKA MAXAA IDINKA MAMNUUCAY MAGACIINI LA IDIN YAQAANAY-- HABAR YOONISBA ISKA NOQDEE
Posted: Sat Aug 18, 2007 5:42 am Post subject: Bah dir Rooble
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Tariikhda Qaboose
Posted: Sun Aug 19, 2007 2:11 pm Post subject:
Mar Dr Gabboose oo kalaa Xabsi la Geshaa
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Mar Dr Gabboose oo kalaa Xabsi la Geshaa
By: Cabdulwaaxid Khaliif Cabdulwaxid@hotmail.com
Ilaah baa mahad leh. Nabadgelyo iyo naxariis nabi Muxamed korkiisa ha ahaato.
Dr. Gabboose! Waa kuma Dr. Gabboose? Waxaa la sheegaa inuu ku dhashay Walwaal oo ka mid ah ceelasha ugu caansan carro Dannood. Sida ku dhacday dad badan oo ku dhashay dhulka Soomaaliyeed ee Xabashidu heysato ayaa dhaqtarka loo qoray inuu ku dhashay deegaan kale. Warqaddiisa dhalasho waxaa ku qoray inuu ku dhashay Gaalkacyo. Gaalkacyo ayuu ka bilaabay dugsi Qur’aanka iyo waxbarashada hoose. Isagoo gaban ahna Muqdishaa la geeyey halkaas oo uu waxbarashadiisa ka sii watay ilaa uu ka dhammeeyey dugsigii sare ee Banaadir. Dabadeedna wuxuu ku biiray jaamacadda caafimaadka/daawada ee Soomaaliya isagoo ka galay kaalinta koowaad. Sida la sheegay, si loogu diyaariyo inuu macallin ka noqdo kulliyaddaas, waxaa loo diray inuu takhasus ku soo qaato Talyaaniga siina kordhiyo aqoontiisa caafimaad. Mar kale ayuu kaalinta koowaad ka galay jaamacaddaas.
Waxaa magaca dhaqtarku dhegohayga kusoo dhaceen dhowr sano ka hor intuusan caan ka noqon isbitaallada, kulliyada dhaqtarnimada iyo wasaaradda caafimaadka. Anoo labadii sano ee dugsiga sare iigu dambeysay ka dhiganaya Banaadir ayaan ka ogaaday dad aan daris ahayn oo qaraabo la ahaa Dr Gabboose inuu dhigan jiray iskuulkaas. Waxay ii sheegeen inuu ku fiicanyahay waxbarashada sidoo kalana ahaa nin aan lagu aqoon dhib, ceeb iyo waqti-is-dhaafin midna. Micnuhu waa wuxuu ku mushquulsanaa waxbarasho. Hal mar baa magaca Dr. Maxamed Cabdi Gabbose bud soo yiri! Waxaa la is yiri: war wiilkan, ma shanta nin ee horboodayey golihii sare ee kacaankaa dhalay mise qaraabo u ah? Ma wasiir kalaa dhalay? Mise….? Iyadooy joogaan dhaqaatiir isaga dhalikarta oo weliba u ahaa macallimiin buu siduu isagu cadceed yahay iyaguna xiddigo qariyey. Illeyn wiilka waxaa gubaya waa aqoon iyo dadaal uu Ilaahay ku manneystay. Iyadoo dadka Soomaaliyeed u shaqeynayeen qaab qabiil haddana wiilkaasi ma ahayn mid qabiilkiisu meel geeyey sababtoo ah meeshuu ku dhashay iyo meeluhuu ku soo korayba waa looga badnaa qabiilkiisa. Marka Ilaahay baa caqligiisa ku gargaaray.
Haddaad fiiriso taariikhdiisa shaqo, wey adagtahay inaad aragto qof sidaas oo kale sallaanka jagada u fuuli kara. Waxaa la sheegaa inuu 1986 loo doortay agaasimaha guud ee isbitaalkii Digfeer. Sanadkii ku xigay 1987-kii wuxuu noqday wasiir-ku-xigeenka caafimaadka. Waxaa u sii raacay wasiir-ku-xigeenka dalxiiska iyo warfaafinta. Wuxuu kaloo noqday dhaqtarka khaaska ah ee madaxweynaha. Dadka taageera xisbiyada kale ee mucaaradka ah waxay dhahaan abtigiis baa Maxamed Siyaad ahaa! Ma fahmin waxay ka wadaan. Ma madaxweynihii Soomaaliyeed baa iskuul u dhigay? Ma isagaa ka dhigay inuu koow ka galo kulliyadda caafimaadka? Waa qofkee, qofkaan rabi lahayn in Dr Gabboose dhaqtar u noqdo? Ileyn caqli badnaantu waxay keeneysaa in dhaqtarku fahmo waxyaalo aysan dhaqaatiirta kale arki karin. Sidaas darteed, xaq buu u lahaa in madaxweynuhu ka raadsado daaweyn dhaqtarkaas. Iska daa madaxweyne Soomaaliyeede xitaa haddii dadkii ajnabiga ahaa ee Soomaaliya ku noolaa u soo raacsadaan dhaqtarka inuu daaweeyo waxaa khasab ku ahayd inuu daaweeyo. Dhaqtarku xudduud ma leh. Waa inuu daaweeyaa gacal iyo cadow labadaba.
Hadalkii siyaadeed ee ugu horreeyey ee Dr. Gabboose
Dr. Gabboosihii aan ku soo korin dhulka qabiilkiisu dego sidoo kalana heystay waxaas oo jago, magac iyo nimco ah wuxuu ka doortay inuu iskaga tago Soomaaliya. Ma filayo in si shakhsi ah cidi igu dhibtay Xamar ee keliya wuxuu uga tagay mabda’. Waxaa la sheegaa in 1989 ama 1990 mar laanta Afsoomaaliga BBC-du weydiisay inuu wax uga taabto caafimaadka madaxweyihii Maxamed Siyaad ayaa wuxuu Dr. Gabboose bixiyey jawaab la yaab ku noqotay wixii dhegeysanayey isagoo dhaqtarku sheegay in aan la bixin akhbaarta u dhaxeysa dhaqtar iyo qofkuu dabiibayo! Waa jawaab qofkii caqli lihi ka fahmi karo caqliga iyo mas’uulnimada uu xambaarsanyahay dhaqtarkaasi. Waxay tuseysaa xammilaadda iyo dulqaadka dhaqtarkaas, isagoo iska ilaaliyey inuu sheego sirta uu ka hayo bukaankiisa, ugana faa’iideysan xurguftii siyaasadeed. Iska daa Soomaaliye, waa yartahay inaad adduunka ku aragto qof noocaas oo kale ah. Hadalkaas kaddib ayaan gartay in dhaqtarkaasi noqon karo hogaamiye caaqibo leh haddii Soomaalidu ka faa’iideysato.
Burburkii Soomaaliya kaddib, wax aad ah kalama socdo taariikhda dhaqtarka oon ka ahayn inuu Somaliland ka qabtay jagooyin sarsare. Marka taas waxaan naga shaafinaya dadka reer Waqooyiga ah.
Maxaa xabsi loo dhigay Gabboose?
Labada korneyl ee Soomaaliya midna qorigii buu weliba dadka la dhacayaa midna waxaan xabsi-gelin ahaynba ma yaqaan. Riyaale imisa qof buu xiray? Meeye dadkii Soomaali Galbeed ka yimid? Culumadii? Nabaddoonnadii? Iyo hadda oo dhaqtarkii iyo siyaasiyiintii kale uu xiray. Soow Soomaalidu ma tiraahdo: fartaad taqaan qor? Ama: qofna qowlkiisu hadlaa, qorina qiiqiisuu uraa. Waa uun dadka Soomaaliyeed dadka inta beerta geed aan miro dhalin haddana jawaanno u tosha iney ka gurtaan hoobaan bislaatay.
Dhaqanka Soomaalidu waa ka liitaa kii mushrikiinta! Inkastoo mushrikiintii Makaad ay dhibi jireen muslimiintoo dhan haddana marna isku si ulama dhaqmi jirin nabiga (SCW), Abuu Bakar (RC) iyo Cismaan Binu Cafaan iyo muslimiinta kale sida Bilaal (RC), C/hi Binu Mascuud (RC) iyo Yaasir (RC). Maxaa yeelay gaaladu iyagoo muslimiintoo dhan neceb haddana marna ma inkiri jirin kaalinta ay Abuu Bakar iyo Cismaan lahaayeen. Hadda dadka Soomaaliyeed waxay ceyda iyo dhibka ku bilaabayaan dadka noogu mudan sida dhaqtarka oo kale. Mar uu Abuu Bakar (RC) Maka iskaga guuray ayaa waxaa dariiqa uga horyimid nin mushrik ahaa oo ay Qureysh xulufo ahaayeen. Ninkii wuxuu Abuu Bakar (RC) ku yiri: war ma adoo kalaa tolkiis saaraa?! Waxaad u miciintaa masaakinta, waxaad caawisaa kuwo dhibaateysan. Waxaad soortaa martida. Waxaad magangelisaa ciddii kusoo magangasha. Wuxuu tiriyey sifooyin badan oo Abuu Bakar (RC) lahaa. Gaalkii wuxuu yiri na celi anaa Qureysh la hadlayee. Kaddibna sidii baa Abuu Bakar (RC) ugu noqday Maka. Qiyaas, Meles Zenawi oo xukuumadda Riyaale ku leh: war soow Dr Gabboosihii caqligii la arkey lahaa maaha? Soow ninkii isagoo dhallinyaro ah kasoo dhexbaxay dhaqaatiirtii kale maaha? Daaya oo ha xirina!
Hindidu waa maqleen Gaandhi halka reer Hargeysa ay ganafka ku dhufteen Dr. Gabboose! Waxaa ugu daran: Feysal Cali Waraabe waa hogaamiye mucaarad ah. Riyaalana waa madaxweyne halka Dr. Gabboose la leeyahay urur kama mid noqon karo! Waxaan xasuustaa Feysal Cali Waraabe oo soo dhoweynaya xisbiga Qaran isagoo leh: waa soo dhoweyneynaa. Dhowr maalmood ka horna wuxuu lahaa: lama ogola wax ka badan seddex xisbi? Ma waxay dadka u qabaan xoolo sidii la rabo laga yeelikaro?
Dhaqtarka iyo ragga la xirin, inkastooy awalba dahab ahaayeen haddana dabkan iyo imtixaankan (xariga) wuxuu usii kordhinayaa saafinimo iyo iney soo baxaan iyagoo ah kuwa ka sii caansan kana fiiro-dheer siday awalba ahaayeen. Run bey sheegeen odayaashii lahaa waxay noqon doonaan Madeelaha Soomaaliya. Marka halkii maalin oo ay xabsiga kusii jiraanba waxay sii helayaan taageero badan.
Waxaan dadka Soomaaliyeed guud ahaan iyo gaar ahaan kuwa reer Waqooyiga kula talinlahaa iney iska daayaan qabiilka baas ee halkaas dhigay. Kuwo waxaad arkeysaa Riyaale u taageeraya hebel iyo hebel oo ay isku qabiil yihiin baa faa’iido ku heysta xukuumaddaas isagoon fiirineyn Somaliland. Waa sida aan horay ugu arkey dadka Puntland. Intaas oo sano baan ku hayey: aan iska deyno dadka aan iska dabo ordeyno. Aan fiirinno sawirka guud iyo waxa dadkoo dhami dan ugu jirto. Reer Puntland taladii markey diideen waxay dhaxleen iney weli la sii dagaalayaan qabiillooyinkii Soomaaliyeed. Iney gaareen heer Boosaaso la soo dhigo mashiinno lacag lagu sameeyo markey galeen dagaal qaab daran oo dhaqaalihii Boosaaso ka soo bixi jiray ku filnaanwaayey. Marka maxay tahay dimuqraadiyadda ay Somaliland ka hadleyso haddii qofkii xisbi ka hadlaba xabsiga la dhigayo? Miyeydaan arag in Britain uu hal xubin oo baarlammaan uu xisbi sameystay? Waa George Galloway. Sidee Dr. Gabboose, saaxiibada kale oo qaarkood soo ahaa SNM iyo intaas oo aqoon yahan loo dhihi karaa xisbi ma furan karaan? Marka caqliga isticmaala oo soo dhoweeya dhaqtarka iyo wixii la halmaala. Mise waxaa dastuurka idiin ku qoran: qofkii caqli iyo karti leh ma furan karo xisbi umana tartami karo madaxweynanimo?
Marba haddii Feysal Cali iyo Riyaale xisbiyo ka furankaraan Hargeysa halka Dr. Gabboose iyo kuwii ka tirsanaa SNM aysan furan karin ayaan jeclaan lahayn inaad noo ogolaataan haddaan reer Koonfur nahay inuu noo soo wareego Dr Gabboose. Annagoo idiin ku beddeleyna kuwii soo laayey dadka reer Waqooyiga si ay xisbiyada UCID, UDUB ugu biiraan ama kuwo cusub u furtaan. Ileyn idinkaa kuwii idin soo dhibay ama aan wanaag laga arag hoosta ku wata halka kuwii la arkey kartidooda la liidayo. Marka waxaan ka baqayaa in la arko xisbi ay leeyihiin “walaalaha Tigree”. Maddaama wiilkaasi kusoo barbaaray waxna ku soo bartay dhulka la yiraahdo Koonfurta Soomaaliya, ayaa dadka reer Koonfureed waxay jeclaanlahaayeen iney isku qabiil yihiin Dr. Gabboose oo iyaga loo tiiriyo halka reer Waqooyiga qaarkood qarinayaan caqliga iyo kartida dhaqtarka si mid ay isku qolo u yihiin uu meesha u joogo. Ka reer Mudug ahaan waxaan ku faannaa warqaddiisa dhalasho ee ay ku qorantahay inuu ku dhashay Gaalkacyo marka uu jaamacadaha iyo meelaha la isagu tago ka daho waxaan ku dhashay Gaalkacyo. Idninkuna inta isagii oo socda idiin yimid baad ka faa’iideysan la’dihiin.
Waxaan leeyahay waa in la sii daayo dhaqtarka iyo ragga la xiran si shuruud la’aan ah. Sidoo kalana waa in loo daayo xisbigooda laguna taageero.
Posted: Sun Aug 19, 2007 2:25 pm Post subject: Labo Maqaal oo Gaboose ku saabsan
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Aduunka waxa ugu liita ninkii sheegta wax uusan aheyn isagoo la dihi karo waa kafir ilaahey rumeysnen! Ha waa run. Sababtoo ah Illahey ma aminsana ninkii is yiraahda magaca abkaa inkir oo ilaahey kiyaame. War ilaahey ma waxa uu kugu siin waayay magaca abahaa ayuu kugu siin karaa magaca nin kale.
Waa ceeb iyo waji xumo in aad magacaaga oo lagu yaqanay inaad badasho oo magic aan jirin sheegato.
Hadii ay ku toleynayaan dadkaa Mahe Direed ee Isaaq xitaa, ha badalin magacaga. Mise waa lagu diiday Dir Rooble?
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Cabdiwaaxid Khaliif Muxuu soo Kordhiyay: Reer Cabdi-Gaboose Rer Mudug Ma-ahan
Siciid xasan
sdhegacade@hotmail.com
Cabdi Yuusuf Dalab oo ku magac dheeraa Cabdi Gaboose, Ilaahy janadii haka waraabiyee, iskadaa isaga iyo aabihiise, awoowgiissii 15aad waxay kasoo jeedaan deegaankaas teedsan carro mudug korna u aad ilaa bariga Baargaal. Xaaji Cabdi-Gaboose waxuu ka mid ahaa amase hormuud ka ahaa raggii seeska u jeexay magaalada Galkacyo, waxuu ahaa caaqil bahdiisu jeceshahay maamuus iyo xormana ku lahaa tolkiis iyo dhammaan ummadda Soomaaliyeed. Aniga qoraya maqaalkaan Cabdi-gaboose waxuu iigu toosanyahay awoowe, oo aabbahay adeer buu u ahaa.
Ninkii yaqaan Galkacyo baa garanayee waxuu maqaamkiisa ganacsi garabka ku hayay Xaaji Aden Wabeeneeye oo ahaa Xaajigii dhisay masaajidka ugu wayn Gaalkacyo.una dhawow suuqa macaauunta ee bartamaha magaalada. Gaboose isaga iyo isirkiisaba waxay ku dhasheen deegaanka Mudug, waxuuna ahaa Caaqil ka diiwaan gashan maamuladii isticmaarka iyo kii soomalidaba. Waxuu ahaa halbowlaha ay ku soo hirtaan beesha Dir isagoo lagu yiqiin in gurigiisa sidii Kuleejo oo kale ay marwalba tuunsanaayeen dhammaan jilibyada Dir ee aan u kala soocnayn.
Haddi aan sii faaqido Cabdi gaboose Jilibkiisa waxaa la yiraahdaa Dir-Rooble, waxaana u malayn wiilka la yiraahdo CabdiWaxid inuu maqlay Bah-dir rooble oo ah jilibka ugu caansan Cismaan Maxamuudka Majeerteen, oo macnuhu yahay islaan Dir rooble baa dhashay qabiilkaas lagu abtirsanayo. Cabdi gaboose waligiis lagama maqal waxaan kasoo jeedaa Carro waqooyi oo waayadan dambe qabiilka iyo siyaasadda la isku qassay ayaa is xulafaysi dartiis loo sameeyay isku abtirsiinyo dano siyaasadeed ka dambayso.
Haddaan usoo noqdo arrinka SNM ee uu ka dhawaajiyay Cabdi waaxid. Waxaad ogaataa in rag badan oo u dhashay Dir Mudug ku biireen dagaalyahanadii SNM, ayagoo ka dhiidhiyay arrintii foosha xumayd ee taliskii Barre ku hayay walaalahooda Waqooyi. Waxaana ka mid ah oo hadda kula jooga London Siciid Indhool oo dagaalkaas ku waayay labadiisii indhood ee qaaliga ahayd waligiisna lagama maqal waxaan ahay rer waqyooyi. Ogowna isaga iyo rer Gaboose abtirsiinaya aad bay isugu dhow yihiin. Waxaa kaloo ka mid ahaa ninkii hogaamin jiray garabkii Khalid bin waliid ee allaha unaxariistee Cabdinaasir Sh.Cali Salaad oo ku dhintay dagaalkii u dambeeyay, iyo rag kaloo badan.
Cabdi Waaxid abti intaadan falin ka fiirso, Gaalkacyo markii kuugu horaysay waan xasuutaa oo waxaad timmid markii uu geeriyooday Awoowgay Cabdi-Gaboose sannadkii 1978dii. Marka maanta inaad tiraahdid Dr.Gaboose waxuu ka yimmid Caro walwaaleed isagoo ku barbaaray dhul aan tolkiis joogin. Qadafkaas waa inaad ka istaaqfuralaystaa! waayo dambi weeye haddii qof nasabdii ka leexiso oo aad u jahayso cid aan dhalin. Ka waran haddaan iraahdo Cabdi waaxid shaqo kuma leh ninkii rer Cigalle ee labo lafoodka ahaa ee shaarabada dheeraa oo aan kugu ladho qof kale subxaanallha ima qabato. marka iska jir arrimaha siyaasadda iyo xagga nasabiyadda. Waxaad kaloo kuu sheegin Cabdi Gaboose waxuu abti u yahay Islaanka Cisse Maxamuud ee Islaan Ciise bal waydii oo waxaad tiraahdaa Abtigaa xagge kasoo jeedaa. Teeda kale Galkacyo ilaa golol ilaa Ayl baa tolkiis xoolahoodu daaqayaa oo maanta ina Gaboose haddii galkacyo lagu qafaalan lahaa waxaan u malayn in wax badan la iska waydiin lahaa raggga qafaashay ee meel u carro gedisaday maalin walbana la leeyahay waannu musafurin haku musbaarin
Siciid xasan
sdhegacade@hotmail.com
Shaqadiisii
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Dr. Gaboose oo Loo Diiday Shaqadiisii
Sida lagu soo qoray meelo badan oo ka mid websiteska Somaali-diidka ah, waxaa dhowaan shir isugu yimid beesha H/Yoniis oo ka didsan nin ku soo tolloobay reerkaas oo diiday in guurtida Waqooyiga ay xilka kororsadaan.Shirkaasna, waxaa lagu cadeeyey in Dr. Gaboose uu reerkaas ku soo biiray mudda hadda laga joogo 20 sano uusan abidkiisa magacooda ku hadli karin.
Arrintaasna , waxay kaga yaabisay dad badan oo aan aniguba ka mid ahay, sababtoo ah:
1. Waligeeyba , waxaan maqli jiray in Iidoorku ay yihiin Dir sida uu qabay Dr. Gaboose.
2. Dr. Gaboose oo diiday in SSNM uu noqdo ayaa wuxuu ka mid ahaa SNM laga soo bilaabo markii uu wasiirnimadii Siyad uu ka soo cararayn ilaa maanta oo aanu joogno.
3. Halkii uu Koonfurta ka aadi lahaana , wuxuu degay Waqooyiga.
4. Markii Cigaal iyo guurtadiisiiba ay H/yoonistu ay qaadhaceen ayaa Gaboose oo taas ay u aheyd fursad ayaa wuxuu la shaqeeyey maamulkaas.
5. Gaboose wuxuu mar kale ka fa'iideystay magaca H/Yooni si uu ku furto xisbigii Sahan ee aan heysanin taageerada reerkaas oo wakhtigaas ku kacsanaa mamaulkii Cigaal.Taasoo laga garankaro baaqyadii ay wakhtigaas ku lahaayeen anagu maamulkaas kama tirsanin.
Maanta danta reerkaas waa doorasho iyagoo ku liibaanay doorasadii wakiilada ee ku noqdeen beesha ugu tirada badan,taasna waxaa u dheer iyagoo dadka hadda u matala ay yihiin dabadhilifyadii Cigaal oo walibana gudoomiye u yahay Saleebaan Gaalkii Burco burburinteedii ka masúulka ahaa.Intaasna , waxaaba sii dheer Ciidagale oo iyaguna la fikrad ah oo illoowi la' in xilligaas Hargeeysa laga qixiyey, lagalana wareegay baacaadlihii magaaladaas.
Ugu dambeyntiina, Gaaboose ayaa shir jawaab u aheed ceyrintii lagaga eryey beesha uu sheegan jirin qabtay , isagoo jawaabtaasna dhinac maray.Wxanse leeyahay Dottore Dirnimadii aad ku ixtiraamneed iskaga soo noqo ,iskana illoow wakhti iyo tacabkii kaa dhumay , ogoowna in cawska jiilaal uu yahay lama huraan.
A.Dirir
Sawir iyo Maqaal ku sabsan Gaboose
http://somalilandpatriots.com/news-3401.html
Geel jire MUUSE CARRE
Posted: Mon Sep 24, 2007 6:35 pm Post subject: TARIIKHDA DIR ROOBLE HABAR YONIS WAA LAGA DHIGAY
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Waryaa xayawaan adiga nin laangaaba oo jilicsan aad foorumka oo hadleydaa. Naga dhaaf qurunle isku kalsooneen oo magaciisa diidayaa.
[i]geel markii loo heeso goranyo aad u heestaan Direey[/i]
Dir Rooble waa niman laangaabyo ah oo Bari ka cararay----Waxaana lasheegay in ayagoo abaar dilitagtay oo GEEDKA LA YIRAAHDO DAMAL HOOS FADHIYA in ay soo magan galeen MUUSE CARRE-HABAR YOONIS.
WAXAA LA YIRI NIMANKAAN MAGAN GALYO HA LASIISYO, MAGACOODI HORENA HA BADALAAN. WAXAA LAYESKU RAACAY IN LOO BAXSHO AMA LOOGU MAGAC DARO GEEDKII AY HOOSE FADHIYEEN EE DAMALKA AHAA!!! SIDAAS AYAA LOOGU BAXSHAY DAMAL IYO MUUSE OO AH ODEYGII DHALAY MUSE CARRE.
HAATAN XITAA 75 % DADKA WEXEY SHEEGTAAN MAGACOODI HORE AYAY SHEEGTAN. MARKAA WAXA ILA HABOON IN DADKANI AY KA WANTOOBAN MAGAC BADALKA. HABARYOONISTUNA WEY KU KHALDANEED IN AY ILAA HEER KU KHASBAN NIMAN TOLKOODA IN AY DAFIRAAN DURIYADOODI DIREED.. QUDO SHEIKH ISXAAQBA NIN DIREED AYUU AHAA OO RAG KA XOOG BADAN AYAA JIRAY BARIGII UU DHASHAY OO DIREED OO NASIKH KARI LAHAA.
DIRI HA NOOLATO, NOOLI KULUNTEE
salaad
Guest
Posted: Sun Oct 07, 2007 6:45 am Post subject: dadka suuraha ah ha iskaa dhaafaan dadkaan
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dadka suuraha ah ha iskaa dhaafaan dadkaan
aan ka hadalno dadka suuraha ah ee aan anaku masuul ka nahay.
dir rooble suure ma aheyn waxa shaqo ah oon ku leenahay hadii ay isaaq noqdaan ama ciise noqdan ma jirto sababta oo ah abtirka qubeys ama cabdallena ma galaan.
wa Bilaahi Towfiiq
GUNAANAD IYO GABAGABO: HORTA NINKII SHEEGTA MAGAC NIN AAN DHALIN WAA GAAL-- QURAANKAA SHEEGAYA IN UUNSAN NINA BADALIN MAGACA ABKII-- AYADU WAXA AY KU SOO DAGTAY S.A.W OO WIIL UU KORSADAY GAALADU KU SHEEGTAY WAA WIILKIISI MANA GEEYO RASUULKA S.A.W GABADHUU FURAY WIILKII UU KORSADAY. MARKA WEY CADAHAY DIR ROOBLE MAGACOODI WEY BADALEEN OO WEY GAALOOBEEN SABABTA OO AH ILAAHEY MA WAXA UU KU SIINAYAA DAMAL MUUSENIMO WAXA UU UGU DIIDAY DIR ROOBLENIMO MISE ILLAAHEY SUBXAANA WA TACAALA AYAAD KHIYAAMEYN KARTAA... MIDA KALE HABAR YOONISTIIBAABA DIR BAAN NAHAY LEH.
SUAASHU WAA MEXEY DIR ROOBLE MAGACOODI U DIIDEEN OO U QARIYAAN 800 BOQOLOO SANO AY SHEEGAN JIREEN MAXAYSE U SHEEGTAAN UN MAGACAN CUSUB. HABAR YOONIS ABTIRSSINYADOODA WAXAA QORAY INGIRIISKA IYO INTA JUFO AY YIHIIN WALIGEED 1968 KA HOR LAMA SHEEGIN DAMAL MUUSE, OO WAXA LA SHEEGAA IN UU YAHAY GEED LAGU QAABILAY XOOGAHA DIR ROOBLE AH OO MUUSE CARRAH U QAXDAY LAGUNA MAGACAAB AY GEEDKII LAGU HOOS SHIRAY EE DAMALKA AHAA
saxiibayaalow ilaahey ka cabsada dir rooble waa niman Maxamed xiniftire ah oo suure eheyn hadii ay isaaq sheegtaan ama biyomaal ama bajimaal Maxammed xiniftire waaye anaga waxa naga quseeya maleh. suure dir rooble adeer uu u ahaa saasuuna ula joogay meelkasta niman aan xaqdhoorno ay ahyeen waa na dhaleen hadana suure ma quseyso hadii ay isaaq noqdaan ama ciise wali adeer ay noo yihiin 100% 65 wali waa nala dagan yihiin cuqaal iyo arcan iyo tol ay noo yihiin ha laga waantoobo caydaan iyo xifaalaha--- foorumkaan hadii uu suure leeyahayna ha laga baxsho waxaan
dir roble waa niman waalid suure u ah qaar badana dhalay. gaboose isagoo magac direed u jihaaduu ku dhintay wilkiis ma aqaan aniga waxana lagu duugay galkacayo
WAXAAN WARSAN LAHAA DIRKA KOONFURTA DAGAN ANIGOO AH NIN MAJEERTEENA INA DHALEEN DIR ROOBLE MAXAA AY KU DHACDAY IN AY ABTIYAASHEEY OO GABOOSAYAASHA AHAA IN AY ISAGA HAYAAMAN GALKACAYO AYAGOO WAQOOYI AADAY SHEEGTAYNA ISAAQ. MAXAA KEENAY DHIBKAAN? WAA RUN DAD BADAN OO LADHASHAY ABTIYAASHEY WAA JOOGAAN GALKACAYO LAAKIN HADA QUNYAR SOCOD AYAY NOQDEEN DAD KALENA WEY KU HOOS JIRAAN OO DIR AH DAGANA GALKACAYO OO AYAGU GACANTA HAYN JIREEN INTII AYSAN DIR ROOBLE FASHILMIN OO U KALA BIXIN QAAR ISAAQ OO MAGAC CUSUB SHEEGTA IYO KUWOO DIRNIMADOODI SHEEGTA LAAKINSE KA XISHOODA MAGACII HOREE AY LAHAYEEN KUN TIIRSAN DAD KALE??
ABTIYAASHEEY DAGEYSO GABEYGAAN LA TIRIYAY 1909 KII OO SAYIDKU MAJEERTEEN LAF DHAN OO DIR ROOBLE LA DHAHO KU ABTIRSATA . DIREEY MA WAXAAD DHEHEYSAAN MAJEERTEEN OO ILAA INTAAS KU ABTIRSADAY GABOOSE CIDIISA ILAA 800 SANO MANTA MAGACII MA JIRO OO WAA LAGA TANASULAY.???? AQRI GABEYGA CIID XIRSI, GALKACAYO 2005
http://www.aftahan.com/gabayo/sayid/bahdir%20rooble.htm
Bah dir Rooble
Hordhac: Majeerteen iyo Boqor Cismaan ayuu Sayidku gabaygan u tiriyey isagoo difaacayey Daraawiishta iyo halgankoodii oo Boqor Cismaan laf-dhuungashay ku noqday:
Bahdir inay majnuun wada tahaan marag u haystaaye
Waa niman masakhan oon ahayn midhaha Daaroode
Waa niman siddii Moolaadhabe miciya dheerdheere
Waa niman maddada oo cir weyn oo masiiba ahe
Waa niman lafaha mudhuxsadoon muruqna reebayne
Waa niman haddad min u furtoo malab durduursiiso
Ama aad maqaarreyda geel xero u meegaarto
Waa niman inay mahad naqaan laga malaynayne
Cir milshiyey dhulkoo malaf ka baxay maalka oo dararay
Waa niman martidu eeyan tegin madal ay joogaane
Waa niman madaal inay baxshaan loogu muhanayne
Waa niman haddaad gabadh markab ah maqaasiinka u geyso
Wuxuu fiidka horre mayracoo marakabeeyaaba
Waa niman masaladood jabtoo hooyadood mira e
Waa niman misciliisha ugu jira sina u meerkeede
waa niman candhada laga maraa milil ka dhiiqaaye
Waa niman maruubada la’oo minidu dhaaftaaye
Waa niman siddiii mowle bahal laga mareertaaye
Waa niman mareeg lagu dabraa sida maliid awre
Waa niman madhuushoodu tahay mooye qaab darane
Waa niman margigu siiban yahay iyo mataanuhuye
Waa niman macaankii jannada meel aan ku lahayne
Waa niman futadu maastahoo duud maloogna ahe
Waa niman miskaha lagala dhacay qaare madax weyne
Waa niman minjuhu ay yihiin miiqan taag darane
Gabaygaa ha laguu maadsadee mariya oo geeya
Markab nagaga sii qaada oo meel walba u dhoofsha
Nimankii makhaayadaha fadhiyey naga mihiibsiiya
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ciid saxiibow ilaaha cadil ah maxaa isku cebeyneysaa oo laan gaabyasha abtiyaashaa u soo bandhigeysaa. Saar, sheegad, laangaab magan sheegte iyo dad liitaa ka dhashatee
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Cayda ma haboona, Dir Rooble waa Dir wali oo meel dheer ma aadin, Habar Yonis waa niman oo dir ah maahe Dirna gala marka Dirtaan dagan mudug waa Dir waana maahe Dir marka Dir Rooble hadii ay Maahe Dirka Mudug dagan ka wareegsadeen oo tolkood oo Habar Yoonis ah sheegtaan saad adigu leedahay ha sheegtaan. Laakin adiga Majeerteenow yaa kuu sheegay in isirka Dir Rooble ka soo jeedin Habar Yonis oo aad ugu riixeydaa Dirka Mudugta.
Dirka Muduga waxa ay sheegaan saan:
Dir Rooble wax la yidhi odeyga Saleeban Cabdalle ayaa bari hore helay Gabar wiil yar wadata oo la yiraahdo Rooble oo saxaraha ku luntay ninkii qabeyna dhintay. Waxa ay sheegtay in uu adeer wiilka yar u yahay Saleeban Cabdalle waayo in uu dhalay nin Maxamed Xiniftire ah. Saleeban cabdaale mudo ka dib ayuu guursaday gabadhii wexeyn u dhashay Cismaan Saleeban Cabdalle. Marka Dir Rooble iyo Cismaan Habar isku hooyo ayeey noqdeen. Afarta Cabdaale wax ay shhegi Jireen in ay leeyihin labo adeer oo kala ah Dir Rooble iyo Habar Deel. Rag badan oo ay ka mid yihiin Ina iigare oo askari ingiriiska u ah iyo Cabdullahi Qarsho iyo Ilmo Gabooseba Dir Rooble ayay ku abtirsadaan. Suurrah ayeyna meel walb la daganayeen. Arintu iyadoo saa tahay ayaan waxan ka war helany Dir Rooble ay yihiin Damal Muuse (Habar Yoonis). Callaa kuli xaal Rooble ama Damal waa niman tolka ah oo Cismaan Saleeban Cabdaale la dhashay. Wixii kale Allahu Yaclam.
posted to The History of the Dir People.. at Sat Apr 02 02:22:40 EST 2005.Posted: Fri Aug 17, 2007 11:00 pm Post subject: DIR ROOBLE,DAMAL MUUSE (HABAR YOONIS)
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waraa adi nimankaan sheegadka ah ha difaacin wana sheegeysaaa in ay Saleeban Cabdalle heleen naag uur leh. okey, odeygaad ku abtirsaneysidna waa aroosay aad leedahay oo qeyb adinka idin ka midaa Dir Rooble ilmo Habreeda la ah. Iisheeg xayawanyow wecelkii aad sheegtay iyo wecelkii aad dhehysid anakaadhalnay na is raacino. ani galgaduudaan ka imaaday....1980kii waxaan ogahay ragaas kuwii magacoodi bedeshay la racadeeyay kuwii soo harayna ----ceeb badanaa dhacaday oo wiil iyo walalkiis iyo aabe iyo wiilkiis aa wax kala sheegtay qaarna waa bexeen oo guure
Gabey aaba jiray: oo Beesha Dir Rooble ugu weyn Galin Saciid aa la dhahaa lagu cayay oo ahaa: Galin Saciid waa garacyo gugana rooble sheegta jilaakana geed damal ku abtirsada wax saasa. waxna jirtay in 4 nin oo ayaka ah ay dileen mareexan dhanka xadka Galgaduud oo magtoodina qadan kariwaayeen ilaa laba nin oo kuwii la dilay ay sheegteen laf Dir ah oo magtii loo raadshay
Posted: Sat Aug 16, 2007 5:23 pm Post subject: Bah dir Rooble
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HAL WAX AYAA LAGU HAYSTAA RAGAAN
DHABATADA UGU WEYN EE HAYSATA RAGAN DIR ROOBLE LOO AQOON JIRAY WAXA AY TAHAY:
1000 SAN0 DIR ROOBLE AYAA LOO AQOON JIRAY BEESHAAN, XITAA GABAYADII SAYID MAXAMED CABDULE XASAN GABEY DHEER OO LA DHAHO BAH DIR ROOBLE OO UU KU DACAYADEYNAYO MAJERTEEN BAH DIR AYAA JIRAY,MAR KALIYAATAA, MALIN MALIMAH KA MID AH SANADKU MARKUU AHAA 1978 KII AYAY WAX AY BILAABEEN IN AY H.YOONIS SHIRAR IS DABAJOOGA LA GALAAN, WAXANA LAGU AMRAY IN AY ISTICMAALAN MAGAC CUSUB (DAMAL MUUSE) DIB DANBENA LOOGA MAQAL DIR ROOBLE!!!!!!
MACQUUL MIYAA IN NIN MAGAC LOO YAQAANAY 1000 SANO KU DHAWAD OO AY KU ABTIRSADAAN BEELO DHAN OO MAJEERTEENA (BAH DIR ROOBLE) IN MALIN KALIYA UU BADALO MAGICIISI.
MAANTA NIN DADKAASA OO WAQOOYIDAGAN MAGACAA MA SHEEGTO, MAXAA DHACAY?
MIDA KALE WAXAA JIRA ILAA HADA BEESHAN DIR ROOBLE IN LABO NIN OO WALAALO AH MIDNA DIIDO HABAR YOONIS MIDNA WAQOOYI UU JOOGO OO SHEEGTO MAGACAA CUSUB.
BUUGATII ISTACMAARKA INGIRISKA AY U MEERIYEEN ODAYASHA HABAR YOONIS WAX DAMAL MUUSE LA DHAHO KUMA JIRIN.
MARKA DIR ROOBLE WAXAAN KA CODSANAYAA HORTA IN AY ISICMAALAN MAGAC ABAHOOD--DIR ROOBLE-- KADIB WAXA AY DOONAN HA SHEEGTAN -- H.YONIS AMA WAX KALE.
WAXAA HADA KA HORE AAN KULA KULMAY ODAYAAL D.ROOBLE AH HARGEYSA WAXAANAN KU IRI AYAAN DARO AYAA IDIN HAYSATA REER SHEIKH ISXAAQ MANTA IYAAGII AYAA DIRNIMO SHEEGANAYA-- IDINKA MAXAA IDINKA MAMNUUCAY MAGACIINI LA IDIN YAQAANAY-- HABAR YOONISBA ISKA NOQDEE
Posted: Sat Aug 18, 2007 5:42 am Post subject: Bah dir Rooble
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Tariikhda Qaboose
Posted: Sun Aug 19, 2007 2:11 pm Post subject:
Mar Dr Gabboose oo kalaa Xabsi la Geshaa
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Mar Dr Gabboose oo kalaa Xabsi la Geshaa
By: Cabdulwaaxid Khaliif Cabdulwaxid@hotmail.com
Ilaah baa mahad leh. Nabadgelyo iyo naxariis nabi Muxamed korkiisa ha ahaato.
Dr. Gabboose! Waa kuma Dr. Gabboose? Waxaa la sheegaa inuu ku dhashay Walwaal oo ka mid ah ceelasha ugu caansan carro Dannood. Sida ku dhacday dad badan oo ku dhashay dhulka Soomaaliyeed ee Xabashidu heysato ayaa dhaqtarka loo qoray inuu ku dhashay deegaan kale. Warqaddiisa dhalasho waxaa ku qoray inuu ku dhashay Gaalkacyo. Gaalkacyo ayuu ka bilaabay dugsi Qur’aanka iyo waxbarashada hoose. Isagoo gaban ahna Muqdishaa la geeyey halkaas oo uu waxbarashadiisa ka sii watay ilaa uu ka dhammeeyey dugsigii sare ee Banaadir. Dabadeedna wuxuu ku biiray jaamacadda caafimaadka/daawada ee Soomaaliya isagoo ka galay kaalinta koowaad. Sida la sheegay, si loogu diyaariyo inuu macallin ka noqdo kulliyaddaas, waxaa loo diray inuu takhasus ku soo qaato Talyaaniga siina kordhiyo aqoontiisa caafimaad. Mar kale ayuu kaalinta koowaad ka galay jaamacaddaas.
Waxaa magaca dhaqtarku dhegohayga kusoo dhaceen dhowr sano ka hor intuusan caan ka noqon isbitaallada, kulliyada dhaqtarnimada iyo wasaaradda caafimaadka. Anoo labadii sano ee dugsiga sare iigu dambeysay ka dhiganaya Banaadir ayaan ka ogaaday dad aan daris ahayn oo qaraabo la ahaa Dr Gabboose inuu dhigan jiray iskuulkaas. Waxay ii sheegeen inuu ku fiicanyahay waxbarashada sidoo kalana ahaa nin aan lagu aqoon dhib, ceeb iyo waqti-is-dhaafin midna. Micnuhu waa wuxuu ku mushquulsanaa waxbarasho. Hal mar baa magaca Dr. Maxamed Cabdi Gabbose bud soo yiri! Waxaa la is yiri: war wiilkan, ma shanta nin ee horboodayey golihii sare ee kacaankaa dhalay mise qaraabo u ah? Ma wasiir kalaa dhalay? Mise….? Iyadooy joogaan dhaqaatiir isaga dhalikarta oo weliba u ahaa macallimiin buu siduu isagu cadceed yahay iyaguna xiddigo qariyey. Illeyn wiilka waxaa gubaya waa aqoon iyo dadaal uu Ilaahay ku manneystay. Iyadoo dadka Soomaaliyeed u shaqeynayeen qaab qabiil haddana wiilkaasi ma ahayn mid qabiilkiisu meel geeyey sababtoo ah meeshuu ku dhashay iyo meeluhuu ku soo korayba waa looga badnaa qabiilkiisa. Marka Ilaahay baa caqligiisa ku gargaaray.
Haddaad fiiriso taariikhdiisa shaqo, wey adagtahay inaad aragto qof sidaas oo kale sallaanka jagada u fuuli kara. Waxaa la sheegaa inuu 1986 loo doortay agaasimaha guud ee isbitaalkii Digfeer. Sanadkii ku xigay 1987-kii wuxuu noqday wasiir-ku-xigeenka caafimaadka. Waxaa u sii raacay wasiir-ku-xigeenka dalxiiska iyo warfaafinta. Wuxuu kaloo noqday dhaqtarka khaaska ah ee madaxweynaha. Dadka taageera xisbiyada kale ee mucaaradka ah waxay dhahaan abtigiis baa Maxamed Siyaad ahaa! Ma fahmin waxay ka wadaan. Ma madaxweynihii Soomaaliyeed baa iskuul u dhigay? Ma isagaa ka dhigay inuu koow ka galo kulliyadda caafimaadka? Waa qofkee, qofkaan rabi lahayn in Dr Gabboose dhaqtar u noqdo? Ileyn caqli badnaantu waxay keeneysaa in dhaqtarku fahmo waxyaalo aysan dhaqaatiirta kale arki karin. Sidaas darteed, xaq buu u lahaa in madaxweynuhu ka raadsado daaweyn dhaqtarkaas. Iska daa madaxweyne Soomaaliyeede xitaa haddii dadkii ajnabiga ahaa ee Soomaaliya ku noolaa u soo raacsadaan dhaqtarka inuu daaweeyo waxaa khasab ku ahayd inuu daaweeyo. Dhaqtarku xudduud ma leh. Waa inuu daaweeyaa gacal iyo cadow labadaba.
Hadalkii siyaadeed ee ugu horreeyey ee Dr. Gabboose
Dr. Gabboosihii aan ku soo korin dhulka qabiilkiisu dego sidoo kalana heystay waxaas oo jago, magac iyo nimco ah wuxuu ka doortay inuu iskaga tago Soomaaliya. Ma filayo in si shakhsi ah cidi igu dhibtay Xamar ee keliya wuxuu uga tagay mabda’. Waxaa la sheegaa in 1989 ama 1990 mar laanta Afsoomaaliga BBC-du weydiisay inuu wax uga taabto caafimaadka madaxweyihii Maxamed Siyaad ayaa wuxuu Dr. Gabboose bixiyey jawaab la yaab ku noqotay wixii dhegeysanayey isagoo dhaqtarku sheegay in aan la bixin akhbaarta u dhaxeysa dhaqtar iyo qofkuu dabiibayo! Waa jawaab qofkii caqli lihi ka fahmi karo caqliga iyo mas’uulnimada uu xambaarsanyahay dhaqtarkaasi. Waxay tuseysaa xammilaadda iyo dulqaadka dhaqtarkaas, isagoo iska ilaaliyey inuu sheego sirta uu ka hayo bukaankiisa, ugana faa’iideysan xurguftii siyaasadeed. Iska daa Soomaaliye, waa yartahay inaad adduunka ku aragto qof noocaas oo kale ah. Hadalkaas kaddib ayaan gartay in dhaqtarkaasi noqon karo hogaamiye caaqibo leh haddii Soomaalidu ka faa’iideysato.
Burburkii Soomaaliya kaddib, wax aad ah kalama socdo taariikhda dhaqtarka oon ka ahayn inuu Somaliland ka qabtay jagooyin sarsare. Marka taas waxaan naga shaafinaya dadka reer Waqooyiga ah.
Maxaa xabsi loo dhigay Gabboose?
Labada korneyl ee Soomaaliya midna qorigii buu weliba dadka la dhacayaa midna waxaan xabsi-gelin ahaynba ma yaqaan. Riyaale imisa qof buu xiray? Meeye dadkii Soomaali Galbeed ka yimid? Culumadii? Nabaddoonnadii? Iyo hadda oo dhaqtarkii iyo siyaasiyiintii kale uu xiray. Soow Soomaalidu ma tiraahdo: fartaad taqaan qor? Ama: qofna qowlkiisu hadlaa, qorina qiiqiisuu uraa. Waa uun dadka Soomaaliyeed dadka inta beerta geed aan miro dhalin haddana jawaanno u tosha iney ka gurtaan hoobaan bislaatay.
Dhaqanka Soomaalidu waa ka liitaa kii mushrikiinta! Inkastoo mushrikiintii Makaad ay dhibi jireen muslimiintoo dhan haddana marna isku si ulama dhaqmi jirin nabiga (SCW), Abuu Bakar (RC) iyo Cismaan Binu Cafaan iyo muslimiinta kale sida Bilaal (RC), C/hi Binu Mascuud (RC) iyo Yaasir (RC). Maxaa yeelay gaaladu iyagoo muslimiintoo dhan neceb haddana marna ma inkiri jirin kaalinta ay Abuu Bakar iyo Cismaan lahaayeen. Hadda dadka Soomaaliyeed waxay ceyda iyo dhibka ku bilaabayaan dadka noogu mudan sida dhaqtarka oo kale. Mar uu Abuu Bakar (RC) Maka iskaga guuray ayaa waxaa dariiqa uga horyimid nin mushrik ahaa oo ay Qureysh xulufo ahaayeen. Ninkii wuxuu Abuu Bakar (RC) ku yiri: war ma adoo kalaa tolkiis saaraa?! Waxaad u miciintaa masaakinta, waxaad caawisaa kuwo dhibaateysan. Waxaad soortaa martida. Waxaad magangelisaa ciddii kusoo magangasha. Wuxuu tiriyey sifooyin badan oo Abuu Bakar (RC) lahaa. Gaalkii wuxuu yiri na celi anaa Qureysh la hadlayee. Kaddibna sidii baa Abuu Bakar (RC) ugu noqday Maka. Qiyaas, Meles Zenawi oo xukuumadda Riyaale ku leh: war soow Dr Gabboosihii caqligii la arkey lahaa maaha? Soow ninkii isagoo dhallinyaro ah kasoo dhexbaxay dhaqaatiirtii kale maaha? Daaya oo ha xirina!
Hindidu waa maqleen Gaandhi halka reer Hargeysa ay ganafka ku dhufteen Dr. Gabboose! Waxaa ugu daran: Feysal Cali Waraabe waa hogaamiye mucaarad ah. Riyaalana waa madaxweyne halka Dr. Gabboose la leeyahay urur kama mid noqon karo! Waxaan xasuustaa Feysal Cali Waraabe oo soo dhoweynaya xisbiga Qaran isagoo leh: waa soo dhoweyneynaa. Dhowr maalmood ka horna wuxuu lahaa: lama ogola wax ka badan seddex xisbi? Ma waxay dadka u qabaan xoolo sidii la rabo laga yeelikaro?
Dhaqtarka iyo ragga la xirin, inkastooy awalba dahab ahaayeen haddana dabkan iyo imtixaankan (xariga) wuxuu usii kordhinayaa saafinimo iyo iney soo baxaan iyagoo ah kuwa ka sii caansan kana fiiro-dheer siday awalba ahaayeen. Run bey sheegeen odayaashii lahaa waxay noqon doonaan Madeelaha Soomaaliya. Marka halkii maalin oo ay xabsiga kusii jiraanba waxay sii helayaan taageero badan.
Waxaan dadka Soomaaliyeed guud ahaan iyo gaar ahaan kuwa reer Waqooyiga kula talinlahaa iney iska daayaan qabiilka baas ee halkaas dhigay. Kuwo waxaad arkeysaa Riyaale u taageeraya hebel iyo hebel oo ay isku qabiil yihiin baa faa’iido ku heysta xukuumaddaas isagoon fiirineyn Somaliland. Waa sida aan horay ugu arkey dadka Puntland. Intaas oo sano baan ku hayey: aan iska deyno dadka aan iska dabo ordeyno. Aan fiirinno sawirka guud iyo waxa dadkoo dhami dan ugu jirto. Reer Puntland taladii markey diideen waxay dhaxleen iney weli la sii dagaalayaan qabiillooyinkii Soomaaliyeed. Iney gaareen heer Boosaaso la soo dhigo mashiinno lacag lagu sameeyo markey galeen dagaal qaab daran oo dhaqaalihii Boosaaso ka soo bixi jiray ku filnaanwaayey. Marka maxay tahay dimuqraadiyadda ay Somaliland ka hadleyso haddii qofkii xisbi ka hadlaba xabsiga la dhigayo? Miyeydaan arag in Britain uu hal xubin oo baarlammaan uu xisbi sameystay? Waa George Galloway. Sidee Dr. Gabboose, saaxiibada kale oo qaarkood soo ahaa SNM iyo intaas oo aqoon yahan loo dhihi karaa xisbi ma furan karaan? Marka caqliga isticmaala oo soo dhoweeya dhaqtarka iyo wixii la halmaala. Mise waxaa dastuurka idiin ku qoran: qofkii caqli iyo karti leh ma furan karo xisbi umana tartami karo madaxweynanimo?
Marba haddii Feysal Cali iyo Riyaale xisbiyo ka furankaraan Hargeysa halka Dr. Gabboose iyo kuwii ka tirsanaa SNM aysan furan karin ayaan jeclaan lahayn inaad noo ogolaataan haddaan reer Koonfur nahay inuu noo soo wareego Dr Gabboose. Annagoo idiin ku beddeleyna kuwii soo laayey dadka reer Waqooyiga si ay xisbiyada UCID, UDUB ugu biiraan ama kuwo cusub u furtaan. Ileyn idinkaa kuwii idin soo dhibay ama aan wanaag laga arag hoosta ku wata halka kuwii la arkey kartidooda la liidayo. Marka waxaan ka baqayaa in la arko xisbi ay leeyihiin “walaalaha Tigree”. Maddaama wiilkaasi kusoo barbaaray waxna ku soo bartay dhulka la yiraahdo Koonfurta Soomaaliya, ayaa dadka reer Koonfureed waxay jeclaanlahaayeen iney isku qabiil yihiin Dr. Gabboose oo iyaga loo tiiriyo halka reer Waqooyiga qaarkood qarinayaan caqliga iyo kartida dhaqtarka si mid ay isku qolo u yihiin uu meesha u joogo. Ka reer Mudug ahaan waxaan ku faannaa warqaddiisa dhalasho ee ay ku qorantahay inuu ku dhashay Gaalkacyo marka uu jaamacadaha iyo meelaha la isagu tago ka daho waxaan ku dhashay Gaalkacyo. Idninkuna inta isagii oo socda idiin yimid baad ka faa’iideysan la’dihiin.
Waxaan leeyahay waa in la sii daayo dhaqtarka iyo ragga la xiran si shuruud la’aan ah. Sidoo kalana waa in loo daayo xisbigooda laguna taageero.
Posted: Sun Aug 19, 2007 2:25 pm Post subject: Labo Maqaal oo Gaboose ku saabsan
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Aduunka waxa ugu liita ninkii sheegta wax uusan aheyn isagoo la dihi karo waa kafir ilaahey rumeysnen! Ha waa run. Sababtoo ah Illahey ma aminsana ninkii is yiraahda magaca abkaa inkir oo ilaahey kiyaame. War ilaahey ma waxa uu kugu siin waayay magaca abahaa ayuu kugu siin karaa magaca nin kale.
Waa ceeb iyo waji xumo in aad magacaaga oo lagu yaqanay inaad badasho oo magic aan jirin sheegato.
Hadii ay ku toleynayaan dadkaa Mahe Direed ee Isaaq xitaa, ha badalin magacaga. Mise waa lagu diiday Dir Rooble?
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Cabdiwaaxid Khaliif Muxuu soo Kordhiyay: Reer Cabdi-Gaboose Rer Mudug Ma-ahan
Siciid xasan
sdhegacade@hotmail.com
Cabdi Yuusuf Dalab oo ku magac dheeraa Cabdi Gaboose, Ilaahy janadii haka waraabiyee, iskadaa isaga iyo aabihiise, awoowgiissii 15aad waxay kasoo jeedaan deegaankaas teedsan carro mudug korna u aad ilaa bariga Baargaal. Xaaji Cabdi-Gaboose waxuu ka mid ahaa amase hormuud ka ahaa raggii seeska u jeexay magaalada Galkacyo, waxuu ahaa caaqil bahdiisu jeceshahay maamuus iyo xormana ku lahaa tolkiis iyo dhammaan ummadda Soomaaliyeed. Aniga qoraya maqaalkaan Cabdi-gaboose waxuu iigu toosanyahay awoowe, oo aabbahay adeer buu u ahaa.
Ninkii yaqaan Galkacyo baa garanayee waxuu maqaamkiisa ganacsi garabka ku hayay Xaaji Aden Wabeeneeye oo ahaa Xaajigii dhisay masaajidka ugu wayn Gaalkacyo.una dhawow suuqa macaauunta ee bartamaha magaalada. Gaboose isaga iyo isirkiisaba waxay ku dhasheen deegaanka Mudug, waxuuna ahaa Caaqil ka diiwaan gashan maamuladii isticmaarka iyo kii soomalidaba. Waxuu ahaa halbowlaha ay ku soo hirtaan beesha Dir isagoo lagu yiqiin in gurigiisa sidii Kuleejo oo kale ay marwalba tuunsanaayeen dhammaan jilibyada Dir ee aan u kala soocnayn.
Haddi aan sii faaqido Cabdi gaboose Jilibkiisa waxaa la yiraahdaa Dir-Rooble, waxaana u malayn wiilka la yiraahdo CabdiWaxid inuu maqlay Bah-dir rooble oo ah jilibka ugu caansan Cismaan Maxamuudka Majeerteen, oo macnuhu yahay islaan Dir rooble baa dhashay qabiilkaas lagu abtirsanayo. Cabdi gaboose waligiis lagama maqal waxaan kasoo jeedaa Carro waqooyi oo waayadan dambe qabiilka iyo siyaasadda la isku qassay ayaa is xulafaysi dartiis loo sameeyay isku abtirsiinyo dano siyaasadeed ka dambayso.
Haddaan usoo noqdo arrinka SNM ee uu ka dhawaajiyay Cabdi waaxid. Waxaad ogaataa in rag badan oo u dhashay Dir Mudug ku biireen dagaalyahanadii SNM, ayagoo ka dhiidhiyay arrintii foosha xumayd ee taliskii Barre ku hayay walaalahooda Waqooyi. Waxaana ka mid ah oo hadda kula jooga London Siciid Indhool oo dagaalkaas ku waayay labadiisii indhood ee qaaliga ahayd waligiisna lagama maqal waxaan ahay rer waqyooyi. Ogowna isaga iyo rer Gaboose abtirsiinaya aad bay isugu dhow yihiin. Waxaa kaloo ka mid ahaa ninkii hogaamin jiray garabkii Khalid bin waliid ee allaha unaxariistee Cabdinaasir Sh.Cali Salaad oo ku dhintay dagaalkii u dambeeyay, iyo rag kaloo badan.
Cabdi Waaxid abti intaadan falin ka fiirso, Gaalkacyo markii kuugu horaysay waan xasuutaa oo waxaad timmid markii uu geeriyooday Awoowgay Cabdi-Gaboose sannadkii 1978dii. Marka maanta inaad tiraahdid Dr.Gaboose waxuu ka yimmid Caro walwaaleed isagoo ku barbaaray dhul aan tolkiis joogin. Qadafkaas waa inaad ka istaaqfuralaystaa! waayo dambi weeye haddii qof nasabdii ka leexiso oo aad u jahayso cid aan dhalin. Ka waran haddaan iraahdo Cabdi waaxid shaqo kuma leh ninkii rer Cigalle ee labo lafoodka ahaa ee shaarabada dheeraa oo aan kugu ladho qof kale subxaanallha ima qabato. marka iska jir arrimaha siyaasadda iyo xagga nasabiyadda. Waxaad kaloo kuu sheegin Cabdi Gaboose waxuu abti u yahay Islaanka Cisse Maxamuud ee Islaan Ciise bal waydii oo waxaad tiraahdaa Abtigaa xagge kasoo jeedaa. Teeda kale Galkacyo ilaa golol ilaa Ayl baa tolkiis xoolahoodu daaqayaa oo maanta ina Gaboose haddii galkacyo lagu qafaalan lahaa waxaan u malayn in wax badan la iska waydiin lahaa raggga qafaashay ee meel u carro gedisaday maalin walbana la leeyahay waannu musafurin haku musbaarin
Siciid xasan
sdhegacade@hotmail.com
Shaqadiisii
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Dr. Gaboose oo Loo Diiday Shaqadiisii
Sida lagu soo qoray meelo badan oo ka mid websiteska Somaali-diidka ah, waxaa dhowaan shir isugu yimid beesha H/Yoniis oo ka didsan nin ku soo tolloobay reerkaas oo diiday in guurtida Waqooyiga ay xilka kororsadaan.Shirkaasna, waxaa lagu cadeeyey in Dr. Gaboose uu reerkaas ku soo biiray mudda hadda laga joogo 20 sano uusan abidkiisa magacooda ku hadli karin.
Arrintaasna , waxay kaga yaabisay dad badan oo aan aniguba ka mid ahay, sababtoo ah:
1. Waligeeyba , waxaan maqli jiray in Iidoorku ay yihiin Dir sida uu qabay Dr. Gaboose.
2. Dr. Gaboose oo diiday in SSNM uu noqdo ayaa wuxuu ka mid ahaa SNM laga soo bilaabo markii uu wasiirnimadii Siyad uu ka soo cararayn ilaa maanta oo aanu joogno.
3. Halkii uu Koonfurta ka aadi lahaana , wuxuu degay Waqooyiga.
4. Markii Cigaal iyo guurtadiisiiba ay H/yoonistu ay qaadhaceen ayaa Gaboose oo taas ay u aheyd fursad ayaa wuxuu la shaqeeyey maamulkaas.
5. Gaboose wuxuu mar kale ka fa'iideystay magaca H/Yooni si uu ku furto xisbigii Sahan ee aan heysanin taageerada reerkaas oo wakhtigaas ku kacsanaa mamaulkii Cigaal.Taasoo laga garankaro baaqyadii ay wakhtigaas ku lahaayeen anagu maamulkaas kama tirsanin.
Maanta danta reerkaas waa doorasho iyagoo ku liibaanay doorasadii wakiilada ee ku noqdeen beesha ugu tirada badan,taasna waxaa u dheer iyagoo dadka hadda u matala ay yihiin dabadhilifyadii Cigaal oo walibana gudoomiye u yahay Saleebaan Gaalkii Burco burburinteedii ka masúulka ahaa.Intaasna , waxaaba sii dheer Ciidagale oo iyaguna la fikrad ah oo illoowi la' in xilligaas Hargeeysa laga qixiyey, lagalana wareegay baacaadlihii magaaladaas.
Ugu dambeyntiina, Gaaboose ayaa shir jawaab u aheed ceyrintii lagaga eryey beesha uu sheegan jirin qabtay , isagoo jawaabtaasna dhinac maray.Wxanse leeyahay Dottore Dirnimadii aad ku ixtiraamneed iskaga soo noqo ,iskana illoow wakhti iyo tacabkii kaa dhumay , ogoowna in cawska jiilaal uu yahay lama huraan.
A.Dirir
Sawir iyo Maqaal ku sabsan Gaboose
http://somalilandpatriots.com/news-3401.html
Geel jire MUUSE CARRE
Posted: Mon Sep 24, 2007 6:35 pm Post subject: TARIIKHDA DIR ROOBLE HABAR YONIS WAA LAGA DHIGAY
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Waryaa xayawaan adiga nin laangaaba oo jilicsan aad foorumka oo hadleydaa. Naga dhaaf qurunle isku kalsooneen oo magaciisa diidayaa.
[i]geel markii loo heeso goranyo aad u heestaan Direey[/i]
Dir Rooble waa niman laangaabyo ah oo Bari ka cararay----Waxaana lasheegay in ayagoo abaar dilitagtay oo GEEDKA LA YIRAAHDO DAMAL HOOS FADHIYA in ay soo magan galeen MUUSE CARRE-HABAR YOONIS.
WAXAA LA YIRI NIMANKAAN MAGAN GALYO HA LASIISYO, MAGACOODI HORENA HA BADALAAN. WAXAA LAYESKU RAACAY IN LOO BAXSHO AMA LOOGU MAGAC DARO GEEDKII AY HOOSE FADHIYEEN EE DAMALKA AHAA!!! SIDAAS AYAA LOOGU BAXSHAY DAMAL IYO MUUSE OO AH ODEYGII DHALAY MUSE CARRE.
HAATAN XITAA 75 % DADKA WEXEY SHEEGTAAN MAGACOODI HORE AYAY SHEEGTAN. MARKAA WAXA ILA HABOON IN DADKANI AY KA WANTOOBAN MAGAC BADALKA. HABARYOONISTUNA WEY KU KHALDANEED IN AY ILAA HEER KU KHASBAN NIMAN TOLKOODA IN AY DAFIRAAN DURIYADOODI DIREED.. QUDO SHEIKH ISXAAQBA NIN DIREED AYUU AHAA OO RAG KA XOOG BADAN AYAA JIRAY BARIGII UU DHASHAY OO DIREED OO NASIKH KARI LAHAA.
DIRI HA NOOLATO, NOOLI KULUNTEE
salaad
Guest
Posted: Sun Oct 07, 2007 6:45 am Post subject: dadka suuraha ah ha iskaa dhaafaan dadkaan
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dadka suuraha ah ha iskaa dhaafaan dadkaan
aan ka hadalno dadka suuraha ah ee aan anaku masuul ka nahay.
dir rooble suure ma aheyn waxa shaqo ah oon ku leenahay hadii ay isaaq noqdaan ama ciise noqdan ma jirto sababta oo ah abtirka qubeys ama cabdallena ma galaan.
wa Bilaahi Towfiiq
GUNAANAD IYO GABAGABO: HORTA NINKII SHEEGTA MAGAC NIN AAN DHALIN WAA GAAL-- QURAANKAA SHEEGAYA IN UUNSAN NINA BADALIN MAGACA ABKII-- AYADU WAXA AY KU SOO DAGTAY S.A.W OO WIIL UU KORSADAY GAALADU KU SHEEGTAY WAA WIILKIISI MANA GEEYO RASUULKA S.A.W GABADHUU FURAY WIILKII UU KORSADAY. MARKA WEY CADAHAY DIR ROOBLE MAGACOODI WEY BADALEEN OO WEY GAALOOBEEN SABABTA OO AH ILAAHEY MA WAXA UU KU SIINAYAA DAMAL MUUSENIMO WAXA UU UGU DIIDAY DIR ROOBLENIMO MISE ILLAAHEY SUBXAANA WA TACAALA AYAAD KHIYAAMEYN KARTAA... MIDA KALE HABAR YOONISTIIBAABA DIR BAAN NAHAY LEH.
SUAASHU WAA MEXEY DIR ROOBLE MAGACOODI U DIIDEEN OO U QARIYAAN 800 BOQOLOO SANO AY SHEEGAN JIREEN MAXAYSE U SHEEGTAAN UN MAGACAN CUSUB. HABAR YOONIS ABTIRSSINYADOODA WAXAA QORAY INGIRIISKA IYO INTA JUFO AY YIHIIN WALIGEED 1968 KA HOR LAMA SHEEGIN DAMAL MUUSE, OO WAXA LA SHEEGAA IN UU YAHAY GEED LAGU QAABILAY XOOGAHA DIR ROOBLE AH OO MUUSE CARRAH U QAXDAY LAGUNA MAGACAAB AY GEEDKII LAGU HOOS SHIRAY EE DAMALKA AHAA
saxiibayaalow ilaahey ka cabsada dir rooble waa niman Maxamed xiniftire ah oo suure eheyn hadii ay isaaq sheegtaan ama biyomaal ama bajimaal Maxammed xiniftire waaye anaga waxa naga quseeya maleh. suure dir rooble adeer uu u ahaa saasuuna ula joogay meelkasta niman aan xaqdhoorno ay ahyeen waa na dhaleen hadana suure ma quseyso hadii ay isaaq noqdaan ama ciise wali adeer ay noo yihiin 100% 65 wali waa nala dagan yihiin cuqaal iyo arcan iyo tol ay noo yihiin ha laga waantoobo caydaan iyo xifaalaha--- foorumkaan hadii uu suure leeyahayna ha laga baxsho waxaan
dir roble waa niman waalid suure u ah qaar badana dhalay. gaboose isagoo magac direed u jihaaduu ku dhintay wilkiis ma aqaan aniga waxana lagu duugay galkacayo
The Quran and Prophet both condem Sheegadism.
The Quran States that you are Ahul Naar if you claim other then your Father's family. So Dear brothers of Isaaq it is unislaamic to claim the Qureysh when you are not from them.
Quran says: “Call them (adopted sons) by (the names of) their fathers, that is more just with Allaah…” [al-Ahzaab 33:5]
There are some very stern warnings regarding this from Allah and his Prophet (pbuh). Read below:
The Prophet (pbuh) said: “Whoever calls himself by other than his father’s name (or attributes himself to someone other than his father), will be cursed by Allaah, the angels and all the people.” (Reported by Ibn Maajah, Book of punishments, 2707)
Harti
Angonyar
Warsangeli
Yacquub/obakar
Wabudhan
Da'oud
Rer Mattan
Mohamed Muse
Wa'esli
Abgaal Qaybaha
1- HARTI ABGAL Ciise Harti, Owbakar YAQUUB, Agoonyar, Warsangali, Habar Nugaal, Yaber Maxamad, Cabadlla Caroone.
2- Wacbuudhan Abgaal Daa’uud, Kabaale, Cabdulle Galmaax, Celi cumar, Maxamed Muuse, Mataan cabdule.
3- Warculus waceesle Abgaal Haarun wacaysle, Jibraa'iil Waceysle, Absuge, Macalin dhiblaawe, Cali Gaaf, Dhagawayne, Cabdi Raxmaan, Faqay.
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